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Fiaui v Samau [2025] WSSC 106 (21 November 2025)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
Fiaui v Samau [2025] WSSC 106 (21 November 2025)


Case name:
Fiaui v Samau


Citation:


Decision date:
21 November 2025


Parties:
MAGELE SEKATI FIAUI, Candidate for the Constituency of Faasalelega 2 (Petitioner) v VAAELUA SENETENARI SAMAU, Candidate for the Constituency of Faasaleleaga 2 (Respondent)


Hearing date(s):
27th October, 4th & 7th November 2025


File number(s):
2025-01235 SC/CV/UP


Jurisdiction:
Supreme Court – CIVIL


Place of delivery:
Supreme Court of Samoa, Mulinuu


Judge(s):
Justice Leutele Mata K. Tuatagaloa
Justice Loau Donald A. Kerslake


On appeal from:


Order:


Representation:
T. Toailoa for the Petitioner
L. Sua-Mailo, V. Faasii & M. Volentras for the Respondent


Catchwords:
Election petition


Words and phrases:


Legislation cited:


Cases cited:


Summary of decision:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
HELD AT MULINUU


IN THE MATTER:


of Part 14 (Election Petitions) of the Electoral Act 2019


BETWEEN:


MAGELE SEKATI FIAUI, Candidate for the Constituency of Faasalelega 2.


Petitioner


AND:


VAAELUA SENETENARI SAMAU, Candidate for the Constituency of Faasaleleaga 2.


Respondent


Coram: Justice Leutele Mata K. Tuatagaloa

Justice Loau Donald A. Kerslake

Counsels: T. Toailoa for the Petitioner
L. Sua-Mailo, V. Faasii & M. Volentras for the Respondent


Hearing: 27 October – 4 November & 7 November 2025
Judgment: 21 November 2025


JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Introduction

  1. A general election for the country was held on Friday, 29 August 2025. The Petitioner and Respondent were two of five candidates for the Electoral Constituency of Faasaleleaga 2.
  2. After the official count by the Electoral Commissioner of the votes cast at the election the results of the poll for the electoral constituency of Faasaleleaga 2 were publicly notified on 5 September 2025 as follows:
  3. The results showed that the Respondent polled the highest number of votes at 678 and the Petitioner with 610. The Respondent was officially declared the Member of Parliament for the electoral constituency of Fa’asaleleaga 2.
  4. The Petitioner pursuant to section 108(2) of the Electoral Act 2019 (‘the Act’), polled sufficient votes (reached 50% of the winning votes) to qualify to petition.
  5. By an election petition dated 18 September 2025 and filed on 19 September 2025, Magele Sekati Fiaui seeks a declaration that the election of Vaaelua Senetenari Samau, the Respondent in these proceedings, be declared void on the grounds of bribery and treating, pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Electoral Act 2019.
  6. In response, the Respondent filed a Response to Election Petition and Counter Petition, dated and filed on 29 September 2025. The Respondent denies all allegations of corrupt practices. The Counter Petition sets out allegations of corrupt practices said to have been committed by the Petitioner. We will refer to the response and counter-allegations as the counter petition.
  7. The petition alleges bribery and treating while the counter-petition alleges only bribery. We address this in our judgment as follows:

PART 1 – THE LAW

(a) Bribery

  1. The relevant parts of section 96 of the Electoral Act 2019 (“EA 2019”) for present purposes are as follows:
  2. As to what amounts to corrupt intention, we refer to Olaf v Chan Chui to mean:
  3. Also relevant is section 96 (5) insofar as the elector who receives the bribe is concerned:

(b) Treating

  1. The relevant parts of section 97 of EA 2019 for present purposes are as follows:
  2. Since the allegations allege bribery and treating through and by the campaign committee members, it is necessary therefore to refer to the law of agency in election matters.

(c) Agency

  1. What constitutes agency has been considered in several decisions of this court. In Netzler v Chan Chui, it was said:
  2. The Court in Sio v Patea referred to Hosking J in Re Bay of Islands Election Petition:
  3. This approach is consistent with the spirit of the legislation that elections should be conducted by honest and proper means and untainted by underhand influences.
  4. Of relevance also is section 116 which provides:
  5. The onus of proving the allegations made in the election petition lies with the Petitioner. The required standard of proof is the criminal standard which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

PART 2 – THE EVIDENCE

  1. The Court has jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate a matter relating to the petition in any manner it thinks fit.[1] Pursuant to section 118 of the EA 2019, the Court is guided by the substantial merits and justice of the case. It may admit evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible, where such evidence will effectively assist the court in the just determination of the proceedings.
  2. Evidence supporting both the petition and the counter petition has been by way of affidavits and oral testimony and are irreconcilably contradictory. The narratives are mutually exclusive and only one can be true, and the veracity of one necessarily invalidates the other.
  3. In evaluating the case, careful consideration has been given to the entirety of the evidence. The probative value of each item has been weighed, appropriate inferences drawn, and the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses assessed. The submissions of counsels are acknowledged with appreciation.
  4. Of relevance also is the following electoral timeline:
• Campaign period: 14 July – 24 August.[2]
  1. Bribery and treating are prohibited under the Electoral Act 2019 whenever they occur in relation to an election – before, during, or after the campaign period. The Act does not define an “election period”, so for the purpose of assessing allegations of bribery and treating, the Court adopts a purposive approach. The issuance of the writ of election marks the formal commencement of the electoral process but acts before the writ can still breach sections 96 and 97 if they are sufficiently connected to the election and intended to influence the election. The key question is whether the conduct occurred “in relation to an election.” If so, it is unlawful regardless of when it happened.
  2. The Court now turns to a detailed analysis and assessment of the oral and affidavit evidence in relation to each allegation and counter-allegation and sets out its findings accordingly.

PART 3 – THE PETITION & RESPONSE TO PETITION

  1. We address the allegations as follows:
  2. Both Laurence and Faatafa allege that the Respondent held committee meetings or rally on these days:
[25.1] Lawrence Tauese Tanumoa alleges that on 7 June 2025, sometime after 7:00 p.m, he was picked up by a matai, Logologo Lene, together with two other men, and transported to a meeting or rally purportedly organised by the Respondent at the Savaiian Hotel. He claims that the Respondent and three of his committee members, including Talalafai Toma, were present.
[25.1.2] According to his testimony, the venue was crowded, and the meeting concluded shortly after his arrival. He further states that Talalafai retrieved an envelope from the table and, with the assistance of another committee member, distributed $150 to all attendees. Lawrence asserts that he received $150 from Talalafai Toma and a plate of food.
[25.2] Faatafa Gauta Matautia alleges that on 4 August 2025, she received $100 tala from Talalafai Toma during a programme, rally or promotional event purportedly hosted by the Respondent at the Savaiian Hotel. In her testimony, Faatafa stated that she and her cousin Moana arrived at the hotel after the programme had concluded. She described the venue as crowded, with food being distributed, and claimed to have seen the Respondent seated inside. Despite asserting that many people were present, no additional witnesses were called to support her account, not even Moana she went with.
[25.2.1] Faatafa Gauta Matautia also alleges that on 14 August 2025, at approximately 5:30 p.m., she attended a gathering at the Savaiian Hotel with her cousin. She claims the event was hosted by the Respondent, and that money was being distributed by the Respondent’s children. Faatafa states she received $100 tala from the Respondent’s son, whom she identified as older than Doreen, the Respondent’s daughter, who had previously been her classmate. 
  1. In response, the Respondent called eleven witnesses who were all committee members who consistently testified as follows:
  2. Tu’ualesa Kavana, secretary of the Respondent’s committee, kept a diary recording the dates of committee meetings. Entries in the diary confirm that meetings were held on 3 April 2005, 12 May 2025, 12 June 2025, 10 July 2025, 7 August 2025, and 21 August 2025. Notably, there are no entries for 7 June 2025, 4 August and/or 14 August 2025. The reasonable inference is that no committee meetings or related events occurred on those dates.
  3. Talalafai Toma, a committee member alleged to have given money out on these dates not only confirmed that no meeting, promotion or rally occurred on those dates but also denied distributing money on behalf of the Respondent.
  4. Counsel for the Petitioner in her submissions said that none of the witnesses for the Respondent could place the Respondent somewhere other than the Savaiian Hotel on the dates alleged by Laurence and Faatafa of committee meetings. As such, this is uncontested evidence. We disagree.
  5. The issue was whether there were committee meetings on the dates alleged by Laurence and Faatafa whereby money and food were distributed by an agent or representative of the Respondent and not whether the Respondent was present. The Respondent does not have to be present for bribery to be proven if indeed money and food were distributed on his behalf.
  6. Counsel also raised with the Court that all eleven witnesses gave ‘alibi’ evidence. As we understand, an alibi is a defense where an accused person asserts that they were elsewhere at the time an alleged offence occurred and therefore could not have committed it. In R v McGregor a simple denial of being at the scene or evidence that does not establish the Respondent's presence at another specific location does not constitute alibi evidence. So, evidence which merely establishes the absence of a meeting without indicating the specific location of the Respondent is not alibi evidence. In any event, the Respondent is not facing a criminal charge but an election petition, and the issue is not whether the Respondent was physically present at the alleged events. The Court itself noted that the question was whether bribery or treating occurred through agents, not whether the Respondent was present.[3]
  7. The eleven witnesses testified to rebut the allegations by stating that:

This is rebuttal evidence, not alibi evidence, because it addresses the substance of the allegations rather than proving the Respondent’s physical absence. The Court even expressed confusion at the counsel’s suggestion that this was “alibi” evidence, noting that such characterization was misplaced.

  1. In any event, we find Lawrence’s account not sufficiently credible or reliable to sustain a finding of bribery for the following reasons:
  2. We are not impressed with the witness Faatafa and find her to be neither reliable nor a credible witness. Her evidence is uncorroborated and contradicted by the testimony of the Respondent’s eleven committee members, who consistently deny that any rally, promotional event or meeting or distribution of money or food occurred on 4 August or 14 August 2025. The absence of independent witnesses or contemporaneous documentation further diminishes the probative value of her testimony.
  3. We accept evidence from the Respondent’s eleven witnesses. Their evidence is consistent and supported by documentary records, including a diary maintained by the committee secretary, Tualesa Kavana, which confirms that no such meetings or gatherings took place on 7 June 2025, 4 August and 14 August 2025. Consequently, we conclude that no money or food was distributed by the Respondent or his committee members.
  4. Applying the criminal standard of proof and weighing the credibility of the evidence, the Court concludes that the allegations have not been established beyond reasonable doubt and must therefore be dismissed.

21 August 2025 - Allegations 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12

  1. Four separate complainants allege that acts of bribery and treating were committed by the Respondent on the same day. Each claimed to have received either $100 or $50 from a person acting on behalf of the Respondent during an event held at the Savaiian Hotel, purportedly to induce them to vote for the Respondent. In addition, all except Faatafa allege they were provided with a plate of food at the event, with the intent to influence their vote.

(i) Faleatuse Logoa (voter no.1327) - Allegations 6.5 (Bribery) and 6.11 (Treating)

[37.1] Faleatuse was not called by the Petitioner to give evidence and accordingly did not testify. In the absence of any supporting evidence, allegations 6.5 and 6.11 are dismissed.

(ii) Etuale Efalata (voter no.1713) - Allegations 6.3 (Bribery) and 6.10- (Treating)
(iii) Fetu Magele (voter no. 282)- Allegations 6.4 (Bribery) and 6.9(Treating)
(iv) Faatafa Gauta (voter no. 1327)- Allegation 6.6 (Bribery)

[37.2] The allegations by these three witnesses are substantially similar as follows:
  1. In rebuttal, eleven members of the Respondent’s committee testified that:
  2. In support of this account, the Respondent relies on the following contemporaneous evidence:
  3. Talalafai gave evidence that he did not do any demonstration to show where to vote on a ballot paper, nor did he distribute money at any meeting or at any time whether for or on behalf of the Respondent.
  4. There are material inconsistencies and weaknesses in the Petitioner’s evidence:
  5. Although the evidence of Etuale, Fetu, and Faatafa, are facially consistent in structure, they are undermined by internal contradictions, identification errors, and a lack of corroboration. These deficiencies are compounded by the absence of contemporaneous documentation or neutral witnesses to support their claims. Taken together, these deficiencies render their testimony unreliable.
  6. The Petitioner’s case is further weakened by independent video footage tendered by the Respondent. This footage corroborates both the affidavits and oral testimony of the Respondent’s witnesses, confirming that only committee members and scrutineers were present at the Savaiian Hotel at 4.43pm and 5.07pm on 21 August 2025. The video directly contradicts the Petitioner’s version of events, particularly the claims by Fetu and Faatafa regarding the presence of a large crowd and the alleged distribution of money and food. As contemporaneous visual evidence, the footage carries inherent reliability and probative weight that surpasses uncorroborated oral testimony.
  7. Furthermore, the claim that Talalafai demonstrated how to vote on a ballot paper is implausible. The law clearly provides that ballot papers are issued at polling booths on the official day of voting.[4] It follows that such materials would not have been accessible to the public on 21 August 2025, further undermining the credibility of this aspect of the Petitioner’s case.
  8. In contrast, the Respondent’s rebuttal evidence is detailed and internally consistent:
  9. Having weighed the credibility of the evidence and applied the criminal standard of proof, the Court finds that the allegations relating to 21 August 2025 have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
  10. Greater weight is given to the account provided by the Respondent’s witnesses. It is accepted that no meeting was convened by the Respondent for the constituency of Faasaleleaga 2 at which money or food was distributed with the intent to induce votes in his favour.
  11. Accordingly, we dismiss allegations 6.3, 6.4, 6.6, 6.9, 6.10, and 6.12.

25 August to 27 August 2025 - Allegation 6.7

  1. The allegation is that a representative or agent of the Respondent gave $50 to Gauta Sa, in the presence of Faatafa Gauta Matautia, with the intent of inducing him to vote for the Respondent.
  2. The sole evidence in support of this allegation is the affidavit of Faatafa Gauta. In it, she states that three men came to their house claiming to be from the Respondent’s Committee and gave her father, Gauta, $50 tala while urging him to vote for the Respondent.
  3. Under cross-examination, however, Faatafa admitted that she was not present in the same house when her father spoke with the men. She did not hear the conversation nor witness any money being handed over. She further conceded that her knowledge of the alleged exchange came solely from her father. Notably, her father was not called a witness by the Petitioner. As a result, Faatafa’s oral testimony contradicts her affidavit and constitutes hearsay.
  4. In rebuttal, Sua Tofilau Pati, a witness for the Respondent, submitted an audio recording of a conversation between himself and Gauta, Faatafa’s father. In the recording, Gauta states that the only committee members who visited him and gave him $50 tala were affiliated with Magele Simaika, a different candidate. There is no mention of the Respondent or any of his committee members. This account clearly contradicts the evidence provided by Faatafa in her affidavit.[5]
  5. We again find Faatafa not a credible witness. We found her evidence to be inadmissible and unreliable. The contradictions, lack of firsthand knowledge, absence of corroboration, and rebuttal evidence collectively justify the dismissal of the allegation for failure to meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Result of the Petition

  1. We find that none of the allegations by the Petitioner against the Respondent have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. We therefore dismiss the Petition in its entirety.

PART 3 - THE COUNTER PETITION & RESPONSE TO COUNTER PETITION

  1. We first deal with the allegations which involve allegations of cash payment by the Petitioner or his representative before addressing the allegations involving the issuing of cheques from the Fono Faavae Office.

12 July 2025: Iva Hall

  1. Three separate complainants who allege bribery by the Petitioner on this day.
  2. It is alleged that at Iva Hall, each complainant received $50 from the Petitioner, through his agent or committee member Tumua Olive, with the intent of inducing them to vote in his favor. Such conduct, if proven, constitutes the corrupt practice of bribery.
  3. The following facts are not in dispute:
  4. The following evidence remains contested:
  5. The central issue is whether the Petitioner acted with corrupt intent when directing Tumua to distribute $50 to each attendee.
  6. Upon careful assessment of the evidence, the Court finds that the gathering at Iva Hall was not a committee meeting, but an open invitation extended by the Petitioner. This finding is supported by:
  7. The explanations advanced by the Petitioner’s witnesses - that the gathering was a committee meeting, and the money given were allowances, are undermined by material inconsistencies and contradictions. Conversely, the testimony of Motu, Usufono, and Paulo is internally coherent and corroborated by independent circumstances. The Petitioner’s witnesses differ on key facts, including the number of attendees, the purpose of the gathering, and whether the payments were allowances or contributions for food.
  8. The testimony of Motu, Usufono, and Paulo aligns with observable facts: no cleaning materials were brought; no cleaning took place; and the Petitioner acknowledged the prohibition against inducements immediately before distributing money. The claim that payments were allowances for billboard work is contradicted by Leaana’s testimony and by the timing of the campaign period, which had not yet commenced. Taken together, these facts and contradictions reinforce the inference that the payments were not innocent for allowances, but inducements intended to influence votes.
  9. The comparative weight of the evidence favours the Respondent’s witnesses. The inconsistencies in the Petitioner’s case suggest a post factum rationalisation designed to legitimise the payments. By contrast, the Respondent’s witnesses provided straightforward, credible accounts that withstand scrutiny. Their attendance was at the Petitioner’s request, and Paulo joined at Motu’s invitation.
  10. Even if the Petitioner’s account is accepted—that the gathering was a committee meeting and the payments were allowances for services rendered—this explanation fails to account for the presence of Motu and Usufono, who were not committee members. Tumua’s claim that they were FAST supporters who assisted him with committee work, is expressly denied by both individuals. There is no evidence before the Court that either performed any duties on behalf of the committee, As Motu aptly observed, the funds in question were not Tumua’s to distribute at will; they were given to him to distribute. The inclusion of non-committee members in the distribution of money—absent any demonstrated contribution to committee activities—was improper and unjustified.
  11. In any event, the law is unequivocal. Section 96(1) defines a “voter” as a person who has or claims to have the right to vote. This includes all individuals who registered to vote, irrespective of their role in a committee. Accordingly, Tumua Olive (voter no. 1410), Polisi Lavatai (voter no. 1301), and Leaana Taifau (voter no. 1304)[6] are all voters within the meaning of the Act. The legislation does not provide any exemption for payments to committee members.
  12. The prohibition against bribery and treating applies whenever such acts occur in connection with an election. If the provision of money or food is intended to influence the outcome of an election, it is unlawful—regardless of timing or the status of the recipient.
  13. In this case, the distribution of money immediately following the Petitioner’s reminder about the prohibition against inducements, coupled with the timing of the meeting, the absence of any legitimate committee business and the presence of non-committee members, gives rise to a strong inference of corrupt intent.
  14. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Petitioner, through his agent Tumua Olive, committed the corrupt practice of bribery on 12 July 2025 at Iva Hall. The distribution of $50 to Motu Papalii, Usufono Tino, and Paulo Su’a Tino was made with the intent to induce their votes in favour of the Petitioner.
  15. The Court is therefore satisfied that the Respondent has proven, beyond reasonable doubt, the allegations of corrupt practice against the Petitioner outlined in allegations (ii), (iii) and (iv) of the Counter Petition.

22 August 2025: Usufono Tino (voter no. 1578): Allegation (v) – Bribery

  1. The allegation is that, on the date in question, the Petitioner, with the intent to corruptly induce Usufono Tino, a registered voter, to vote in his favour, provided him with $30 tala.
  2. It is not disputed that a committee meeting of the Petitioner was held at his residence in the evening; Tumua, his brother, and Usufono were present and remained behind to discuss matters with the Petitioner and the Petitioner gave Usufono $30 tala.
  3. The issue is whether the Petitioner by giving $30 to Usufono, intended to influence his vote in the general elections. In determining the propriety of the payment, the Court must assess its timing, context and circumstances.
  4. Tumua states that Usufono solicited money from the Petitioner for the purpose of providing food for his family. Usufono, in contrast, contends that the Petitioner voluntarily gave him the money, provided him transport home, and instructed him in the car not to disclose the payment. Tumua further disputed this aspect of Usufono’s evidence, maintaining that the Petitioner never made the statements attributed to him.
  5. If Usufono’s evidence is accepted, then the Petitioner’s actions and words clearly amount to an inducement to vote in his favour, thereby constituting bribery.
  6. Even if we accept Tumua’s account, the Petitioner remains in difficulty. His own witnesses confirmed that, on this day, 22 August as at the earlier gathering of 12 of July 2025, he expressly cautioned those present against giving money to voters, acknowledging that such conduct could amount to bribery. Notwithstanding this clear awareness of the statutory prohibition, the Petitioner nevertheless gave Usufono $30, a mere seven days before polling day.
  7. Any monetary gift by a candidate, particularly in the days immediately preceding an election, must be subject to strict scrutiny and this payment cannot reasonably be characterised as an allowance or remuneration for services rendered as none had been performed. Acts of purported charity in such circumstances are especially problematic and, in principle, should be avoided altogether.
  8. In Kasimani v Seuala [2011] WSSC 87 (8 August 2011) the Court said:
  9. The principle articulated in Kasimani applies squarely to the present matter. Just as the Court in Kasimani rejected the explanation of “habitual generosity” where money was given immediately prior to polling, so too here the Petitioner’s act of giving $30 to Usufono whether solicited or not, only seven days before the election, cannot reasonably be regarded as ordinary charity. The timing of the payment, the context in which it was made, and the Petitioner’s own prior acknowledgment of the legal risks associated with giving money to voters all point to the same conclusion: that the payment was intended to influence electoral choice.
  10. Under section 96(1) of the EA 2019, a “voter” includes any person who has, or claims to have, the right to vote. Usufono, having registered to vote, falls squarely within this definition. Section 96(2) prohibits any person from giving or agreeing to give money to a voter with the intent to influence that person’s vote. Timing is therefore critical. The Petitioner was fully aware of this prohibition and of the heightened scrutiny attached to monetary gifts made close to polling day. We find that the payment of $30, presented as an act of generosity, was in substance a device intended to secure Usufono’s electoral support, and therefore constitutes bribery.
  11. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the allegation of bribery has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Remaining Counter -Allegations

  1. The remaining six allegations concern the issuing and presentation of cheques from the Fono District Development Councils or Fono Faavae. These allegations are unique as this is the first time the Court has been required to address allegations of bribery involving funds disbursed through cheques earmarked for projects under the Fono Faavae. Before addressing the specific allegations, it is necessary to outline the structure, purpose, and processes of the District Development Councils, as they are central to the issues raised in the counter-petition.

The District Development Councils (Fono Faavae)

  1. The District Development Councils (DDCs) were officially established in July 2022 under the Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development as part of the government’s broader decentralization strategy to empower local communities and strengthen district-level governance. Its mandate includes approving eligible initiatives, overseeing financial management, and ensuring compliance with procurement and accountability standards. The processes governing project approval and cheque issuance are set out in the District Development Program Operating Manual, prescribe strict requirements for authorisation, documentation, and disbursement. These procedures are central to the allegations before the Court, as they inform whether the Petitioner’s actions in signing and presenting cheques were consistent with administrative duties or amounted to corrupt practices intended to influence electoral outcomes.
  2. The DDC for Faasaleleaga 2 is staffed by an Executive Officer, Project Officer and Office Assistant. They also have a District Development Council or ‘Komiti’ consisting of fourteen people representing the six villages from within the Constituency of Faasaleleaga 2. This Komiti is chaired by the Member of Parliament for that Constituency.[8]
  3. The grant as of the last financial year was $1m a year for each DDC which has been maintained for the 2025-2026 financial calendar - $700k was released on 9 May and $300k released on 1 July.

District Development Program - Program Operating Manual

  1. The Program Operating Manual was tendered into evidence as Exhibit R.25 (“the Manual”). It sets out the roles and responsibility of the District Development Councils (“DDC”) as well as the District Development Council Office (“DDCO”). The relevant role and responsibility of the DDC for the purposes of these proceedings at section 3.3.1 of the Manual include:

As for the DDCO, section 3.1.4 of the Manual outlines:

“...
(c) Prepare the project proposal(s) including the Annual Work plan, Budget and M&E Results Framework for the DDC in accordance with the Manual and based on the updated District Development Plans (“DDPn”) and agreed EDI endorsed by the DDC.
(d) Process payments for the eligible expenditures of DDP initiatives and office operations in accordance with the manual.
  1. In accordance with the Manual Flow charts at section 4.5, it is the role of the DDCO to review proposals, ensure its completeness and compliance with DDP policy and then submit to the Komiti for screening and approval. The Komiti reviews, screen and approves the proposals.
  2. As to financial management, section 6.3.2 of the Manual requires three authorised signatures for the DDC cheque account with at least two required to sign cheques. The signatories must be the chairperson, deputy chairperson and secretary/treasurer with the signature of the chairperson being mandatory in all cases. The chairperson’s signature must be the final and last signature affixed to the cheque and a DDC signatory must not commit to signing a cheque unless first sighting an invoice or voucher.
  3. All procurement must comply with the procedures set out in the Manual. These include:
  4. Under these requirements, cheques are to be issued directly to the approved service provider, supplier or contractor.[9] In some instances, however, representatives of the approved projects have been permitted to collect the cheques and deliver them to the suppliers.[10]
  5. This process aligns with the testimony of Suafoa Sasagi (Deputy Chairman) and Tevaga Leo (Komiti Member), who confirmed that these steps reflect the proper procedure for approving projects and issuing cheques with Faasaleleaga 2 constituency.
  6. The Executive Officer, Lavilavi Soloi, acknowledged the same process but added that he exercised authority to reallocate savings from one project to complete another. However, he conceded that such reallocations cannot be used to finance a project which has not been approved by the DDC.

Discrepancies and Unauthorized payments

  1. Significant evidence was presented regarding whether the projects funded by these cheques were duly authorized by the DDC and whether their issuance complied with the relevant Manual. Concerns were raised regarding non-compliance with established financial management procedures.
  2. The testimony of Lavilavi Soloi addressed both projects formally approved by the DDC and those he claimed authority to approve. Specifically:
  3. We turn now to consider the counter allegations relating to the cheques and Fono Faavae.

20 July 2025: Allegation (i) of the counter claim - Pentecostal church at Safua – Bribery

  1. The allegation before the Court is that the Petitioner presented a cheque in the sum of $10,000 tala to Reverend Iosefo Metusela and the Safua Pentecostal Church, whose congregation includes registered voters of Faasaleleaga 2, with the intent of inducing them to vote in his favour.
  2. According to Lavilavi, there was only one other instance involving a religious organisation EFKS Safotulafai where the DDC was requested to formally present the cheque to the congregation. On that occasion, the chairperson, members of the DDC as well as officers of the DDCO travelled to the church to make the presentation.
  3. The facts not in dispute are:
  4. The evidence in support of the allegation was provided by Malu Vaalepu Toalima Faagutu. Malu’s evidence as to the Petitioner’s attendance on a Sunday during their church service to personally present the cheque and what was said was not challenged. In his affidavit (Exhibit R.21), Malu stated that the Petitioner attended their church on the third Sunday of July, was introduced as a guest, and given the opportunity to address the congregation. He expressed gratitude and presented the cheque to Reverend Metusela, declaring that it was intended for improvements to the church. Reverend Metusela accepted the cheque, which was subsequently cashed at Samoa Commercial Bank Ltd on 28 July 2025.
  5. Malu further testified that the Petitioner’s attendance was highly unusual, his only prior appearance being at a funeral three years earlier. Malu emphasized that the timing of the cheque presentation, so close to the polling date, was inappropriate. In oral testimony, he added that the Petitioner exhorted the congregation with the words “tautuana le palota” (“remember your vote”), which he interpreted as a direct attempt to induce the votes of approximately sixty members of the congregation, the majority of whom were of voting age.
  6. Counsel for the Petitioner sought to discredit Malu’s testimony by reference to Mua v Malolo [2021] WSSC 35 (16 July 2021), arguing that the additional evidence amounted to recent fabrication and thereby casting doubt upon the veracity of his entire account. Although we accept that this is an additional statement, Malu’s version of what was said was not challenged by any other evidence. In the absence of contradiction, his testimony stands unshaken and must be accorded full evidentiary weight.
  7. The allegation concerns the timing and presentation of a cheque valued at $10,000 by the Petitioner to Reverend Iosefo Metusela and the Safua Pentecostal Church congregation. The undisputed facts establish that the cheque originated from a request for financial assistance submitted in March and duly approved by the DDC in April; however, it was not released until 26 July. The circumstances of its delivery—personally by the Petitioner, during a Sunday service, and without the presence of any DDC or DDCO officials—raise significant concerns as to motive and propriety.
  8. The disputed date, whether the cheque was presented on 20 July or 27 July 2025, does not materially alter the substance of the allegation. However, we find it more likely that the Sunday church service which was attended by the Petitioner was on 27 July 2025. This is consistent with the evidence before the Court that the cheque was released to the Petitioner on Saturday, 26 July. The presentation however occurred in close proximity to the polling date, thereby heightening the inference of electoral inducement.
  9. The testimony of Suafoa (Deputy Chairman) further underscores the irregularity of the Petitioner’s conduct. When questioned regarding the appropriateness of the Petitioner appearing alone to present the cheque, he expressed surprise. He emphasized that the established procedure required the DDCO to notify the congregation of the successful application and then request a representative to collect the cheque from the DDC office.
  10. This deviation from protocol is significant. By bypassing the official channel and personally delivering the cheque during a church service, the Petitioner assumed a role that was neither authorized nor customary. Suafou distinguished this incident with the formal presentation made to EFKS Safotulafai, where proper procedure was observed and representatives of the DDC and DDCO accompanied the delivery. The absence of such oversight in the present matter highlights the exceptional and irregular nature of the Petitioner’s actions.
  11. The Court further observes that Malu emphasized the unusual nature of the Petitioner’s attendance, his only prior appearance being at a funeral three years earlier. This lends weight to the inference that the Petitioner’s presence was not motivated by spiritual fellowship but by political calculation.
  12. The timing, context, and language employed by the Petitioner transform what might otherwise appear as a legitimate act of community support into conduct tainted by electoral purpose. The exhortation to “remember your vote,” delivered during the presentation of substantial financial assistance, constitutes a direct appeal to the congregation to reciprocate with electoral support. Such conduct falls squarely within the statutory definition of bribery as a corrupt practice.
  13. Having considered the totality of the evidence, the Court finds that the Petitioner’s actions were neither innocent nor incidental. The presentation of the cheque, coupled with the exhortation to vote, was calculated to influence the electoral choices of the Safua Pentecostal Church congregation. The Court therefore concludes that the allegation of bribery has been substantiated beyond a reasonable doubt.
  14. Accordingly, the Petitioner is found to have committed the corrupt practice of bribery.

27 August 2025: Cheques signed by the Petitioner

  1. The allegations are, that on this date, five cheques issued by the District Development Council (DDC) were signed by the Petitioner and subsequently disbursed through his agent with the intent to corruptly influenced these people. These five cheques form the foundation of the allegations of bribery raised in the counter-petition:
  2. Significant evidence was presented regarding whether the projects funded by these cheques were duly authorized by the DDC and whether their issuance complied with the relevant Manual. Concerns were raised regarding non-compliance with established financial management procedures.
  3. The testimony of Lavilavi Soloi addressed both projects formally approved by the DDC and those he claimed authority to approve. Specifically:
  4. The issues to be considered by the Court in relation to these cheques are:
(ii) Whether, irrespective of agency, the timing of the cheques—issued immediately prior to polling—amounts to bribery by the Petitioner?

Are members of the DDCO and DDC committee members for the Petitioner?

  1. Counsel for the Respondent submits that Lavilavi Soloi and Savali Mariner as employees of the DDCO and Latu Tofia, as a member of the DDC, were acting as agents or committee members of the Petitioner. Each of them denied the allegation.
  2. The argument rests on the Respondent’s belief that the Petitioner, in his capacity as chairman of the DDC, instructed and authorized Lavilavi to approve certain programs and issue cheques which were subsequently delivered by Savali and Latu.
  3. The difficulty with this argument is the absence of evidence that Lavilavi, Savali, or Latu promoted the Petitioner’s election, whether expressly or implicitly. Tevaga testified that Lavilavi claimed the Petitioner instructed him to sign the cheques, but Lavilavi denied this. His evidence was clear: the preparation of cheques was undertaken in the ordinary course of employment as DDCO officers, and 27 August 2025 was simply the date on which the Petitioner, as chairman, was available to sign them.
  4. The actions of Lavilavi and Savali in implementing projects and preparing cheques were consistent with their official duties. There is no evidence that they acted on behalf of the Petitioner in his personal capacity as a candidate, nor that their conduct was directed toward securing his electoral advantage. The mere fact that the Petitioner chaired the DDC does not transform DDCO employees into his personal agents for electoral purposes.
  5. The same reasoning applies to Latu. His membership in the DDC and involvement in the Iva School Hall project, do not render him an agent of the Petitioner.
  6. Accordingly, we do not accept the submissions by Counsel for the Respondent that Lavilavi, Savali and Latu were agents of the Petitioner.

Whether timing of cheques amounts to bribery?

  1. Despite our earlier conclusions regarding DDCO employees, it remains necessary to examine the Petitioner’s conduct in his dual capacity: as a candidate in the general elections and as chairperson of the DDC, entrusted with the disbursement of government funds. The central question is whether his endorsement and signing of cheques on the eve of polling — specifically, on the day of pre-polling and two days before the election, amounts to the corrupt practice of bribery.
  2. Two distinct scenarios arise:
  3. It is undisputed that the projects funded by these cheques fell within the remit of the DDC. The decisive issue, however, is whether the timing of these disbursements — so close to polling day — transformed otherwise legitimate administrative acts into electoral inducements. This concern is heightened in relation to projects not approved by the DDC. Endorsing the Executive Officer’s decisions to release funds for such projects raises questions about the Petitioner’s motives, particularly when the beneficiaries were members of his constituency. As chairperson, he was expected to be well-versed in the procedures and approval levels set out in the Manual. Circumventing these requirements appears to have been a deliberate choice. It is also notable that the cheques were issued to organizations closely affiliated with personnel in the DDCO or DDC, including Savali (Mafutaga Tina and Tamaitai Aso Fitu) and Latu (Iva Primary School).
  4. The Court emphasizes that timing is critical in assessing corrupt practice. Approvals made in the ordinary course of governance, well removed from elections, may be routine. By contrast, approvals effected immediately before polling are apt to be perceived as inducements or rewards for electoral support. We question why the Petitioner did not sign the cheques earlier for the approved projects and/or wait until after the elections to consider those not yet approved. No urgency justified the release of funds at that particular moment.
  5. The source of funds — whether public, private, or business — is immaterial. What matters is the electoral context. When benefits are conferred upon electors in the days immediately preceding an election, the inference of intent to influence voting is strong. Moreover, the use of public funds in this manner distorts electoral equality. Candidates who control such funds gain an unfair advantage, leveraging community resources to secure votes. This undermines the integrity of the electoral process and contravenes the prohibition against bribery.
  6. Accordingly, the Court finds that the approval and signing by the Petitioner of cheques on the day of pre polling and two days prior to polling cannot be regarded as mere administrative procedure. Viewed in its electoral context, such conduct constitutes an inducement of voters and falls within the definition of bribery. The timing of the approvals is decisive: it converts otherwise lawful disbursements into corrupt practices, contrary to both the spirit and letter of electoral law.
  7. We therefore make the following findings in respect of four of the five cheques:
(ii) The approval and signing of the $2,500 cheque to Latu Tofia was to induce his vote and the votes of the workers which include Leauanae.
(iii) The approval and signing of the $5,802 cheque to the Primary School of Iva was to induce the vote of Latu, Leauanae and villagers of Iva.
(iv) The approval and signing of the $50,000 cheque for the Vaisaulu project was to induce the vote of Mauga Mafoe and other villagers of Vaisaulu.
  1. In respect of allegation (ix) of the $500 cheque to Savali Mariner - We accept Lavilavi’s evidence that the DDCO’s established practice for petty cash was to issue a cash cheque withdrawn by a DDCO employee. Savali, as an employee, was tasked with withdrawing the funds. Lavilavi confirmed that Savali presented the cash to him, and the money was used for minor disbursements and office expenditures.
  2. Although discrepancies exist regarding the precise use of the $500, these are more appropriately matters of internal control to be addressed by audit procedures. We do not accept that the cheque was issued to induce Savali to vote for the Petitioner. It was clearly used for office expenditure. Accordingly, we are not satisfied that bribery has been proven to the necessary standard.

Overall Findings of the Court

  1. We make the following Orders:
  2. We hereby certify these findings and will issue our Report to the Honorable Speaker of the Legislative Assembly pursuant to section 122 of the Electoral Act 2019 in due course.

Recommendation

  1. We intend to raise with the Honorable Speaker in our Report a number of issues identified in this case concerning the disbursement and issuance of Fono Faavae funds by a candidate under the guise of official duties, we recommend the following measures:
(ii) Section 12 of the Electoral Act be amended to expressly reflect the recommendation.

JUSTICE LEUTELE M TUATAGALOA
JUSTICE LOAU D KERSLAKE


[1] Electoral Act 2019, s115(4).

[2] Pursuant to section 43(1) of the Electoral Act 2019 campaign period commences within 3 days after the close of nomination. The ‘prohibited period’ pursuant to section 43(3) commenced on 12.00 noon on 24 August 2025 and ended after the official declarations of results.


[3] R v McGregor BC200762, para 23.

[4] Electoral Act 2019, s68

[5] EXH R8/R8.1

[6] EXH R1 – Electoral Roll for Faasaleleaga 2

[7] para 88.

[8] Lavailavi Soloi’s evidence
[9] Program Operating Manual, p37 – 43.
[10] Also confirmed by Suafoa Sasagi and Tevaga Leo in their testimonies.

[11] The District Development Councils or Fono Faavae, were only established in 2022 and are not encompassed within sections 11 & 12 of the Electoral Act 2019. Those provisions require the resignation of public servants appointed under the Public Service Act 2004 or the Public Bodies (Performance and Accountability) Act 2001 as well as Government officers who are nominated as candidates for the election. The prescribed period of resignation is aligned with the nomination period. However, because the nomination period occurs in close proximity to the elections, it does not adequately address the concerns identified. Accordingly, the recommendation is that resignation should take effect from the date of the writ of election.

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