You are here:
PacLII >>
Databases >>
Supreme Court of Samoa >>
2022 >>
[2022] WSSC 12
Database Search
| Name Search
| Recent Decisions
| Noteup
| LawCite
| Download
| Help
Police v TB [2022] WSSC 12 (27 June 2022)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
Police v TB [2022] WSSC 12 (27 June 2022)
Case name: | Police v TB |
|
|
Citation: | |
|
|
Decision date: | 27 June 2022 |
|
|
Parties: | POLICE (Informant) v TB (Defendant) |
|
|
Hearing date(s): |
|
|
|
File number(s): |
|
|
|
Jurisdiction: | CRIMINAL |
|
|
Place of delivery: | Supreme Court of Samoa, Mulinuu |
|
|
Judge(s): | Justice Leiataualesa Daryl Clarke |
|
|
On appeal from: |
|
|
|
Order: | Accordingly, I am satisfied that it was open to the assessors on the evidence to accept the prosecution evidence and reject the alternative
narrative on behalf of the defendant. Accordingly, I have determined not to veto the verdict of the assessors pursuant to section
136(4)(a) of the CPA 2016. |
|
|
Representation: | V. Fa’asi’i for Prosecution S. Ponifasio for Defendant |
|
|
Catchwords: | Rape – unlawful sexual connection – indecent act – conviction appeal - |
|
|
Words and phrases: | “victim under 16 years of age” – “guilty verdict by panel of assessors” – “whether assessor’s
verdict unreasonable” – “power to acquit a defendant” – “veto power” |
|
|
Legislation cited: | |
|
|
Cases cited: | |
|
|
Summary of decision: |
|
NOTE: THERE IS A SUPPRESSION ORDER PERMANENTLY SUPPRESSING OR PROHIBITING THE PUBLICATION OF THE NAME OF THE VICTIM AND ANY DETAILS
THAT MAY IDENTIFY HER
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
HELD AT MULINUU
BETWEEN:
P O L I C E
Informant
A N D:
T.B a.k.a T.P
Defendant
Counsel: V. Fa’asi’i for Prosecution
S. Ponifasio for Defendant
Verdict: 06 May 2022
Submissions Concurrence: 13 May 2022
Ruling: 27 June 2022
RULING ON ASSESSOR’S VERDICT OF GUILTY
INTRODUCTION
- The defendant is charged with three charges:
- (i) one charge of rape that on or between the 23rd March 2019 and the 24th March 2019, he raped the complainant (“VC");
- (ii) one alternative charge to rape being a charge of unlawful sexual connection that on or between the 23rd March 2019 and the 24th March 2019, he engaged in sexual connection with the complainant, a female under the age of 16; and
- (iii) one charge of committing an indecent act on the complainant, a female under the age of 16.
- The defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges. Following a three (3) day trial, the assessors returned guilty verdicts on the charges
of rape and indecent act. The rape verdict was by majority of four (4) and the verdict on the charge of indecent act was unanimous.
- Following delivery of the verdict of assessors, I adjourned the matter to hear from counsel as to whether the assessor’s verdict
is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence pursuant to section 136(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2016 (“CPA 2016”).
THE LAW
- Section 136 of the CPA 2016 relevantly provides:
- “136. Concurrence of assessors - (1) On a trial before a Judge and assessors, a defendant is not to be convicted of any offence unless the conviction is concurred
by at least 4 assessors
- ....
- (4) If the presiding Judge is of the opinion that the assessors verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, the presiding Judge may:
- (a) acquit the defendant if the verdict is guilty; or
- (b) order a new trial if the verdict is not guilty.” (emphasis added)
- The test imposed on a trial Judge when determining whether to acquit a defendant pursuant to section 136(4) of the CPA 2016 is, though
differently worded, similar to that the Court of Appeal applies when determining a conviction appeal under section 180(1)(a) of the
CPA 2016. Section 180(1)(a) provides:
- “180. Determination of appeals in ordinary cases - (1) On any appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal may allow the appeal if that Court is of the opinion:
- (a) that the verdict of the assessors should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence; or...” (emphasis added)
- The power of a presiding Judge to acquit a defendant pursuant to section 136(4) is a new provision introduced by the CPA 2016. The
power to acquit pursuant to section 136(4) of the CPA 2016 is materially different to the power a Judge could previously exercise
under section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1972 (repealed) (“CPA 1972”) to acquit a defendant. The now repealed
provision stated:
- “100.Concurrence of presiding Judge – If the presiding Judge is of the opinion that the defendant should not be convicted, or if less than 3 out of 4 or 4 out of 5, as
the case may be, of the assessors concur in the defendant’s conviction, the defendant shall be acquitted.”
- The power of a Judge under section 136(4) of the CPA 2016 to acquit a defendant on a guilty verdict of assessors is a narrower power
to that earlier contained in section 100 of the CPA 1972.
- In Attorney General v Crichton [2014] WSCA 8 (2 May 2014), the Court of Appeal set out the approach that a Judge was to adopt in determining whether to concur or not with a guilty
verdict by assessors under section 100 of the CPA 1972. The Court of Appeal stated that:
- “[13]...What the section requires of the judge if the assessors return a guilty verdict is quite plain. The judge is under
a duty in that circumstance to form an opinion as to whether the defendant should not be convicted and, if so, the judge must acquit
the defendant. It is not merely a requirement that the judge should consider whether a reasonable panel of assessors could have reached a guilty verdict, but of whether the judge himself holds the opinion that guilt has not been proven to the requisite
standard. If the judge’s opinion is that it has not been proven the judge must intervene. He is not permitted to stand to one
side and leave the overturning of the assessors’ decision to the appeal court...”
- In Police v Fonoti [2020] WSSC 46 (12 August 2020), Tuala-Warren J examined the legal authorities for the exercise by a Judge of the power to acquit a defendant under
section 100 of the CPA 1972. Tuala-Warren J then relevantly discussed section 136(4) of the CPA 2016 in light of appeal grounds advanced
on the basis that a verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence by examining the Court of Appeal’s
approach in Samuelu v Attorney General [August 2020] WSCA 1 (5 August 2020). The Court of Appeal in Samuelu v Attorney General stated:
- “10. ...The effect of the Criminal Procedure Act 2016 is that the only legally possible grounds for an appeal against the verdict of assessors are those contained in s 180(1):
- (a) that the verdict of the assessors should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard
to the evidence; or
- ...
- 12 As to s 180(1)(a), a verdict is unreasonable only if, having regard to all the evidence, reasonable assessors could not have been
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty. And a verdict cannot be challenged on the ground that it was insupportable
on the evidence if there was creditable evidence capable of supporting a finding of guilty. This Court will therefore intervene under
s 180(1)(a) if, but only if, reasonable assessors ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant.
It would not be enough for this Court to simply disagree with their verdict.
- ...
- 21. It was open to the assessors to accept that evidence, and to reject the version given by the appellant at trial, if they chose
to do so. It was also open to the assessors to infer from that evidence that the appellant intended to kill or to injure knowing
that it was likely to cause death and being reckless whether death ensued or not.
- 22. In those circumstances it could not be said that the verdict of the assessors was unreasonable or unsupported by available evidence.
The same applies to the decision of the Judge not to interfere in the assessor verdict in the exercise of her power to do so under
s 136(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2016.” (emphasis added)
- In Samuelu v Attorney General (supra), the Court of Appeal at paragraph 8 referred to the Judge’s power under section 136(4) of the CPA 2016 as a “veto
power”.
- In terms of an appeal court’s power to over-turn a guilty verdict on the basis that “the verdict of the assessors ...
is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence”, the Court of Appeal further stated in Samuelu v Attorney (supra) that “[w]e are not free to substitute our own view for that of the assessors unless - and in practice this is relatively
uncommon - the requirements of s.180(1)(a) are met.” In Chea v R [2016] NZCA 207 (19 May 2016), the New Zealand Court of Appeal in this context stated:
- “[14]...Under s 232(2)(a) of the CPA the Court must allow an appeal if satisfied that, having regard to the evidence, the jury’s
verdict was unreasonable. The applicable principles are summarised in the judgment of this Court in Wiley v R. The Supreme Court
in Owen v R emphasised that there is no practical distinction between an unreasonable verdict and one that cannot be supported having
regard to the evidence. A guilty verdict based on no or insufficient evidence must necessarily be an unreasonable verdict. The Court
must perform a review function, and cannot just substitute its own view of the evidence. The Court will not lightly interfere with
the verdict and will only allow an appeal where satisfied that no jury applying the criminal standard of proof could reasonably have
reached a guilty verdict on the evidence.”
- The New Zealand Supreme Court in R v Owen [2007] NZSC 102; [2008] 2 NZLR 37 stated:
- “[1] Section 385(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1961 states that the Court of Appeal or this Court must allow an appeal against conviction if the Court is of the opinion that the verdict
of the jury should be set aside on the ground “that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence”.
- ...
- [5] Section 385(1)(a) contains two distinct, albeit overlapping, concepts. The first concerns a verdict which is unreasonable. A
verdict will be unreasonable if, having regard to all the evidence, the jury could not reasonably have been satisfied to the required
standard that the defendant was guilty. The second concept concerns a verdict which cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
That will be so when there is no evidence capable of supporting it. This can arise particularly when a specific factual ingredient
of the offence lacks evidentiary support. It is unlikely that a case will have reached the point of a verdict of guilty if that is
so, but this ground is contained in para (a) both for historical reasons to be mentioned below, and because it must have been thought
necessary to cater for that kind of case. Although they are distinct, the two limbs of s 385(1)(a) overlap because a verdict of guilty
based on no evidence must necessarily be an unreasonable verdict. On the other hand a verdict of guilty based on some evidence is
not necessarily a reasonable verdict.
- [12] It is now appropriate to recognise that the “cannot be supported” limb of s 385(1)(a) has no practical significance.
An “unsupported” verdict must necessarily be an unreasonable verdict. An unreasonable verdict has insufficient evidence
to support it. Aict with no evidence to support it is simply at the outer eter end of a continuum. Henceforth it will suffice simply
to apply the unreasonableness limb.”
- The New Zealand Supreme Court went on to elaborate:
- “[17] ... There is, in the end, no need to depart from the language of Parliament. The question is whether the verdict is unreasonable.
That is the question the Court of Appeal must answer. The only necessary elaboration is that expressed earlier, namely that a verdict
will be unreasonable if, having regard to all the evidence, the jury could not reasonably have been satisfied to the required standard
that the defendant was guilty.”
- One final point on the law must be made. In Fetuao v National Prosecution Office [2016] WSCA 10 (2 September 2016), the Court of Appeal addressed the role of the Court of Appeal where the appeal challenges the verdict of assessors
on the basis that it is unreasonable. The Court of Appeal stated:
- “[11] The test to be applied was explained by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Owen v R [2008] 1NZLR 37 as:
- “A verdict will be unreasonable if, having considered all of the evidence, the jury could not reasonably have been satisfied
to the required standard that the defendant was guilty.”
- This Court approved and adopted this test in Muaiava Ufi v Attorney General [2009] WSCA 13. It is to be applied with certain considerations in mind. Under the Samoan judicial system the body ordinarily charged with finding
the facts of a case is the assessors. This Court performs a review function. It should not lightly intervene, and must give due weight
to the advantages enjoyed by the assessors, including that they see and hear the witnesses in person and have a lifetime appreciation
of Samoan people and their ways. We must also bear in mind that reasonable minds may differ on matters of fact.”
- Under Samoa’s judicial system, unless a defendant elects trial by Judge alone, it is the assessors that are charged with findings
of facts in cases such as this. This Court’s role pursuant to section 136(4) of the CPA 2016 is also a review function. A key
difference however between the review function of the Supreme Court under section 136(4) of the CPA 2016 and the Court of Appeal
is that the presiding Judge in the Supreme Court shares the advantage enjoyed by assessors of seeing and hearing the witnesses in
person. Despite this however, the presiding Judge must not lightly intervene nor supplant the role of assessors as the body charged
with findings of fact, unless the presiding Judge can be satisfied that the verdict reached by the assessors is unreasonable.
BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE: PROSECUTION CASE
- The prosecution case is that on or between the 23rd and 24th March 2019, the defendant raped the complainant at X-village. In the course of that rape, he also committed an indecent act on her
by sucking her breasts.
- The complainant’s evidence was that the defendant asked her brother X1 if she could sleep with his daughter X2 that Saturday
night.[1] This was because X2 was leaving on the Sunday to go to New Zealand.[2] She and X2 are friends.[3] That night, she then slept at X3’s house with X2.[4] She marked with the letter “C” in photo 8 of exhibit P2 where she said she was sleeping with X2 as well as X3’s
children.[5] She does not usually sleep with X2.[6] X3’s house is shown in photograph 7 and 8 exhibit P2.[7] X3 is the defendant’s sister.[8] X3 was sleeping in the same room at the back, however, partitioned by a sheet.[9]
- The complainant’s evidence and prosecution case was that the defendant came that night and woke her and X2 to go and shower.[10] She said in cross-examination that the defendant came into the room while they were asleep and said “VC, tu i luga e o ma X2
e taele.”[11] She later said that it was X2 who told her for them to go and shower and that it was not the defendant that woke her.[12] She said in examination-in-chief the time was 12am,[13] however, under cross-examination, she then later agreed that she didn’t know the time that the defendant entered the room.[14] Later again, she said that when X2 told her for them to shower, X2 had said it is almost 3.30am.[15]
- The complainant and X2 went to the house shown in photographs 1 and 2 of exhibit P2 with the defendant.[16] This house neighbours X3’s house, as can be seen in photo 1. The defendant chased X2 to go and shower, the pipe where the complainant
says she showered being outside of the house.[17] The defendant then took the complainant into the room marked ‘E’ in photograph 3.[18] The complainant gave evidence in terms of X2 showering and entering the house to get a towel but this evidence was changing and she
then agreed that she was guessing.[19] The complainant in her evidence described what happened to her as follows:[20]
- “Pros: ave oe totonu o le potu, o le a le isi mea na tupu?
- Wit: tago loa ia tape moli
- Pros: uma na tape moli e iai se isi mea na tupu?
- Wit: tago loa ia tatala o’u ofu
- Pros: Ia?
- Wit: tago loa ia tatala o’u ofu tago ai lo’u susu taumatau
- HH: VC can you speak up I can’t even hear you
- Wit: Tago loa ia ‘ai lo’u susu taumatau
- Pros: E iai se isi mea na tupu ese mai le mea lena?
- Wit: Tago loa ia tuu lana pi ia a’u ae oso ia a’u
- Pros: E iai se isi mea na tupu?
- Wit: uma loa laia tago loa ga ia fai lavalava a a’u
- Pros: VC, e manatua e oe o le a le taimi lena, ete manatua le a le taimi?
- Wit: O le po o le Aso Sa
- Pros: O le a lau tali?”
- Wit: O le po o le Aso Sa
- ...
- Pros: VC, e e manatua e oe ua ta lena ose fia?
- Wit: Taimi lena o le a ta le 12.”
- The complainant said that she was lying on the bed[21] she marked ‘b’ in photograph 5 where the defendant did those things.[22] She confirmed in her evidence that the bed marked “b” was where the bed was that night.[23] Later in her evidence however, she marks a different place in the room where she said that the defendant did the things to her which
she marked “g” in photo 6 exhibit P2.[24] She explained in her evidence that the defendant had pushed her onto the bed.[25] When the defendant inserted his penis into her, she screamed for her brother and was told that if she screamed again, he will cut
her with a knife.[26] She said when the defendant inserted his penis, her vagina hurt.[27] When the defendant got off the top of her, he told her to put her clothes on and he chased her outside to go and sleep at X3’s.[28] The complainant described in detail the clothes she wore and the order they were removed.[29]
- In her evidence under cross-examination, the complainant said that when she was in the room with the defendant, she did not hear
X2 look for her.[30] However, she then said that X2 said: “faimai mum fea VC su’e loa a’u iina.”[31] The complainant said that X2 and her mother were looking for her before she had screamed for her brother.[32] After being told to go back to X3’s house to sleep, the complainant said she arrived there and X3 was awake breast feeding
her baby.[33] X3 told her that X2 was looking for her.[34]
- On the Monday following the alleged incident, the complainant’s sister X4 said that the complainant told her about what had
occurred. The complainant had said that he took her to the room, switched off the light, pushed her on the bed and aiai (ate) her
breast, neck and vagina and that he ‘pugapuga’ on top of the complainant.[35] When X4 asked her why she didn’t scream, she said it was because the defendant had ripped a white cloth and tied her mouth
with it.[36] She was then told by the complainant that the defendant said to her that if she told anyone about what is happening, he would cut
her with the little knife.[37] X4 confirmed that she was never told by the complainant that she had screamed.[38]
BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE: THE DEFENCE CASE
- The defence case was that the events recounted by the complainant did not occur and that when the defendant went to X3’s house,
only X2 was woken to go with the defendant, her father. In his evidence, the defendant said that he went to X3’s house at approximately
12.00am.[39] When he arrived there, the door to the house was open and X3 was awake.[40] He woke only his daughter up to get her ready saying to her “X2, X2 nofo mai luga ta ō e faasauni oe”.[41] His sister X3 asked why he is waking her and they spoke.[42] The defendant explained in his evidence:[43]
- “Na ou fafagua lea o lo’u afafine, ae fai mai lo’u tuafafine ia te au, po’o le a le mea ua fafagu ai le teine
lea taimi e le’i taitai, ae ou tali i lo’u afafine oute alu e faataele ma faasauni aua toe o le lasi po lea ile ma’ua
feiloaiga, ona ma o loa lea ma lo’u afafine a’o lo’o moe pea VC ile taimi lea. Na uma loa laia lea ua ou alu faataele
lo’u afafine lea taimi, ile taimi lea e le’i leva lava ae taunuu mai lo’u toalua ua uma le bingo, sau loa le fafine
ou fai iai, sau loa oe e faamaea atu na faataele atulo’u afafine ae sei fai sa’u malologa.”
- The defendant said that there was a time he had an argument with his wife looking for the key of the car but he then went to sleep
because he was tired and had been drinking for a long time.[44]
- The defendant’s evidence was in large part confirmed by X3 who said that after church that evening, they stayed home and watched
TV and didn’t go anywhere else.[45] The children slept in the area marked “C” in photo 8 exhibit P2, who X3 identified as “o la’u fanau o X5,
X6, X7, X2, VC ma X8.”[46] Between 12am and 1.00am, she was awake when the defendant came to her house.[47] The door was open and he came and woke his daughter.[48] She explained in her evidence:[49]
- “ia na alu atu TB la oute ala i le taimi lena. O a’u foi na ou faimai iai poo le a le mea e fafagu ai fua le teine ae
le tuu pea lae le’i taitai le taimi e o ai ae faimai se’i ave pea lona afafine e faataele ona la o a lea ma X2.”
- He then left with his daughter and the complainant remained asleep.[50] When the defendant and his daughter left, X3 said she was watching TV.[51] This evidence is consistent with the defendant’s evidence that when he arrived at X3’s house, she was watching TV.[52] It was around 3.00am that X9, the defendant’ wife then woke the complainant.[53]
- In his evidence, the defendant said that X2’s flight to New Zealand was at 9.00am and they got ready to leave for the airport
at around 3.00am that morning.[54]
- X3 states that in the corner of photo 5 of exhibit P2 is a mattress on a table.[55] She says you cannot lie on the mattress because the table is weak.[56] The defendant also said that marked “d”, referred to in error by the defendant instead of ‘b’ in photo 5
exhibit P2, is a mattress on a table and not a bed.[57] He also said you cannot lie on that type of table. [58]
DISCUSSION
- There is evidence to support each element of the two offences that the panel of assessors have returned a guilty verdict on. The
issue therefore is not dealing with, as the New Zealand Supreme Court in R v Owen (supra) observed, the:[59]
- “second concept [which] concerns a verdict which cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. That will be so when there
is no evidence capable of supporting it. This can arise particularly when a specific factual ingredient of the offence lacks evidentiary
support. It is unlikely that a case will have reached the point of a verdict of guilty if that is so...”
- The question for this court is whether the verdict is unreasonable in that “having regard to all the evidence, reasonable assessors
could not have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant [defendant] was guilty.”[60] In Chea v R (supra) at paragraph 14, the New Zealand Court of Appeal framed the terminology slightly differently, namely, that “no jury
applying the criminal standard of proof could reasonably have reached a guilty verdict on the evidence.”
- In determining whether to veto the verdict of assessors, I remind myself that the verdict of the assessors cannot be challenged if
there was creditable evidence capable of supporting a finding of guilty. It is not enough for me to simply disagree with their verdict.
I must also bear in mind as the Court of Appeal has reiterated that reasonable minds may differ on matters of fact. With this in
mind and the assessors in this proceeding charged with being the finders of fact, in my respectful view, having regard to all the
evidence, the verdicts reached by the assessors were open to them and the verdicts therefore reasonable.
- The prosecution case relied almost solely on the evidence of the complainant together with that of X4. The prosecution evidence against
the defendant contained numerous inconsistencies, acknowledged by prosecution in closing submissions. These included the complainant’s
evidence about the time the alleged incident occurred. Originally saying it occurred at 12.00am, this became 3.30am and later, the
complainant didn’t know. When the complainant identified the ‘bed’ in which she alleges the defendant raped her,
she marked this with the letter ‘b’ on exhibit P2 photograph 5. Where the complainant marked ‘b’, both the
defendant and X3 said that you cannot lie there. The room in photograph 5 shows a number of beds and mattresses.
- After marking photograph 5 of exhibit P2 with the letter “b” where the complainant alleges the rape occurred, she then
later marked with the letter “g” an altogether different place in the same room in photograph 6 exhibit P2. The area
marked “g” in photograph 6 is not a bed and could not have been a place where the defendant could carry out the sexual
acts described by the complainant in her evidence.
- Similarly, although the account the complainant gave to X4 about the sexual acts itself were broadly consistent with her evidence,
there were some key inconsistencies between the complainant’s evidence and that of her sister X4. According to X4, the complainant
was expressly asked whether she screamed and she said no and that she couldn’t scream because she had an ‘ie’ in
her mouth. In her evidence before the court however, the complainant said that she screamed for her brother when the defendant inserted
his penis. She made no mention in her evidence in court that she had an ie placed in her mouth, effectively gagging her.
- In contrast to the prosecution evidence, the evidence for the defendant given by the defendant and his sister X3 was largely consistent.
When the defendant came to X3’s house, X3 was awake. She was watching TV. Only X2 was woken and only X2 accompanied the defendant
and the complainant remained asleep. The rape and sexual acts recounted by the complainant could never have happened.
- Although the prosecution case contained numerous inconsistencies, the assessors heard and saw the complainant’s evidence. She
marked with the letter ‘g’ in photo 6 of exhibit P2 an area where there is no bed and the sexual acts she alleged occurred
could not possibly have occurred. When asked to identify X2’s house in photo 1 of exhibit P2, she marked the road as X2’s
house with an “h” when asked to mark it with an “E”.[61] When asked whether what she had marked was a house, she responded yes even though it is a road. In her evidence, the complainant’s
mother X10 described the complainant stating:[62]
- “DC O lea lona manaoga faapitoa?
- Wit: Na o a’u lava le Tina o VC sa fanau ai ia te au oute iloa le manaoga faapitoa o VC. O VC na fanau mai e le atoatoa lona
malosi
- DC` Ia, a’o le a lona manaoga faapitoa?
- Wit: O lona manaoga faapitoa, e leiloa faamatala, e leiloa se mea, e leiloa tusitusi, e leiloa faitau, e leiloa foi tautala, a mana’o
la VC ise mea e manao ai, ona sau lea faagugu, e avatu lo’u lima e fai le mea lea e manao ai, ona ou faia lea, o manaoga na
- DC Ia e leai la se mea o iai aua o lea sa molimau VC ananafi i luma o le Faamasinoga o lae iloa tautala a?
- Wit: ia e.”
- There was evidence before the assessors from which they could draw inferences and make findings of fact, including in relation to
findings of fact in terms of the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.
- Although the defence evidence was largely consistent, there are a few key pieces of the evidence that can lead assessors to reject
the defence version of events that the complainant never accompanied the defendant and X2 to the house marked “V” in
photo 1 of exhibit P2. The first, emphasised by prosecution counsel is that both the prosecution and defence evidence is that when
X2 went next door after being woken, she went to shower. If, as the defence case was prosecuted, the complainant was asleep, how
did defendant know that X2 went to shower? Second, the defendant went and woke X2 up at X3’s house to go and shower at between
12am and 1am. If the flight was not until 9am and they didn’t leave for the airport until sometime between 3am and 5am, why
would the defendant wake X2 go to shower at this time? Third, if he woke X2 up because it was their last night together and for her
to get ready for New Zealand, why then did he just go to sleep? From the evidence, an inference open to the assessors was that the
complainant knew that X2 went and showered because she accompanied the defendant and X2 as she had said. Similarly, the other evidence
could lead assessors to reject the credibility of the defence evidence given at trial.
- Accordingly, I am satisfied that it was open to the assessors on the evidence to accept the prosecution evidence and reject the alternative
narrative on behalf of the defendant. Accordingly, I have determined not to veto the verdict of the assessors pursuant to section
136(4)(a) of the CPA 2016.
JUSTICE CLARKE
[1] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 4.
[2] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 18.
[3] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 18.
[4] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 5.
[5] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 12, 22 – 23.
[6] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 18.
[7] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 12.
[8] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 4 – 5.
[9] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p 25.
[10] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 5.
[11] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 24.
[12] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 25 - 26.
[13] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 6.
[14] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 24.
[15] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 26 - 27.
[16] Transcript 03 May at p. 27.
[17] Transcript 03 May at p. 28.
[18] Transcript 03 May at pp. 15 - 16.
[19] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp 28 – 30.
[20] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 5 – 6.
[21] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 6.
[22] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p.11.
[23] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p.12.
[24] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 16 – 17.
[25] Transcript 4 May 2022 at pp. 5 – 6.
[26] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 9 - 10.
[27] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p.7.
[28] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp.8 - 9.
[29] Transcript 03 May 2022 at pp. 8 – 9.
[30] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 31.
[31] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 31.
[32] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 34.
[33] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 36.
[34] Transcript 03 May 2022 at p. 36.
[35]Transcript 04 May 2022 at pp. 6, 16.
[36] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 6.
[37] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 6.
[38] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 6.
[39] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p 38.
[40] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p 38.
[41] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p 38.
[42] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p 38.
[43] Transcript 04 May at p.39.
[44] Transcript 04 May at p.39.
[45] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 56.
[46] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 57.
[47] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 60.
[48] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 60.
[49] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 60.
[50] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 60.
[51] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 61.
[52] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 52.
[53] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 61.
[54] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 39.
[55] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 64.
[56] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 64.
[57] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 42.
[58] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 42.
[59] [2008] 2 NZLR 37 at para. [5].
[60] Samuelu v Attorney General [August 2020] WSCA 1 (5 August 2020).
[61] Transcript 3 May 2022 at p. 12.
[62] Transcript 04 May 2022 at p. 29.
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/ws/cases/WSSC/2022/12.html