Haikiu v Akuila [1983] SBHC 10; [1983] SILR 109 (29 April 1983)

[1983] SILR 109

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Customary Land Appeal Case No.15 of 1982

HAIKIU

V

AKUILA

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Daly CJ)
Customary Land Appeal Case No.15 of 1982

29th April 1983

Procedure - Customary Land Appeal Court - reasons - adequacy of.

Facts:

Appellant having succeeded in the Local Court in a Customary land case, lost in the Customary Land Appeal Court ("the C.L.A.C."). The judgment of the latter was brief and merely stated that the decision of the Local Court was against the weight of the evidence and gave reasons why it considered the six points found as important by the Local Court were of no weight.

Held:

Appellate courts should give reasons out of courtesy to the court below. Accepting, as was said in Taloibiu v Ramousia C.L.A.C. No.8 of 1979, that there was a duty to give reasons albeit brief then the question reasons given here so adequate as to amount to an error of 1aw? In the circumstances they were not so short as to amount to error of law. Appeal dismissed.

Case also considered:

R-v-Gaming Board for G.B. exp. Benaim (1970) 2 All E.R. 534

For Appellant: A. Nori
For Respondent: K. Brown

Daly CJ: This is an appeal from a decision of the Customary Land Appeal Court for the Central Islands Province ("the CLAC") given on 15th March, 1982 in which it reversed the decision of the Bellona Local Court in relation to BAIGAU land. The CLAC decided that the Respondent Lydia AKUILA owned the land whereas the Local Court had decided that the Appellant, Heman HAIKIU should take the land.

The Appellant originally placed before the court 15 appeal points. Some have been struck out and others abandoned so that at the hearing of the appeal I was asked to consider points 3, 4, 5, and 6 in one group and 8 and 12 in another group.

The first group alleged certain circumstances surrounding the court case which it was suggested, in the grounds as drafted, led to a suspicion of bias or unsatisfactory control of court proceedings. Leave was granted to call evidenced these matters but in the event only one witness gave evidence, who by no means established sufficient basis for this Court to act. These appeal points then are rejected.

The remaining two points (8 and 12) complains that the CLAC in its judgment failed sufficiently to state the basis upon which it found that the Respondent won the case. The judgment of the CLAC is very brief. The substance of it is contained in the following paragraph:

"Having read the record of the Bellona Local Court, having heard evidence and arguments on appeal we are of the opinion that the Bellona Local Court Decision all the circumstances against the weight of evidence."

The CLAC then goes on to consider the six points found as important by the Local Court and gives its reasons why considers these points of no weight.

There is no reason, of course, why the paragraph I have set out above should not be an entirely accurate reflection of the way the decision was reached. However a summary of findings of fact and the custom applicable in a case such as this where the CLAC is reversing the decision of the Local Court are desirable. As I have said before, appellate courts as a matter of courtesy to the court below, should give reasons for reaching a different conclusion. It is right to say that there are direct reasons given for differing on individual points but, without a general background of the facts and custom relied upon, one is left with an unfortunate impression of a decision based upon a series of contradictions the points found by the Local Court.

However my function is to decide whether the form of the judgment in this case is such as to amount to an error of law. That a judgement without reasons can amount to such an error was decided by Davis C.J. in Taloibiu v. Ramousia (C.L.A.C. 8/1979 judgment given 14th May, 1979). In that case the learned Chief Justice said:-

"In any court - and in my view this applies as much to the Local Courts and Customary Land Appeal Courts as to any other courts in Solomon Islands - a finding of fact, such as this that Ramousia’s ancestors were the first to discover Kwathadiumalefo, must be based on evidence before the court and the court should indicate briefly on what evidence it came to its finding.

The Tobaita Local Court in its judgment in the original case between Ramousia and Taloibiu gave its based on the evidence it had heard for finding that Ramousia had no property or burying place in the whole of the Kwana’ai land. The Customary Land Appeal Court gives no reason whatever for its finding, reversing the decision of the Local Court, that Ramousia does have rights to that portion of land within the Kwana’ai land known as Kwathadiumalefo and that Ramousia's rights to Kwathadiumalefo are primary rights and those of Defari (i.e. Taloibiu) are secondary rights. In the absence of any indication as to how on the evidence before it this finding has come to, I consider that this finding was bad in law, and that the Appellant succeeds in his appeal on Ground (7)."

The basis for so holding as a matter of law is not given in that judgment. There is no express requirement in our statute law that reasons must be given by the CLAC and the general rule of the common law is that reasons need not be given (See R. v. Gaming for Great Britain ex p Benaim (1970) 2 All E.R. at p. 534 per Lord Denning MR). Presumably therefore the learned Chief Justice was holding that here is an implied duty to state reasons in order that a party may have adequate notification of the case he has to meet in order to exercise his right of appeal. Although the point has not been argued in full before me, I accept that there is, for this reason, an implied duty that reasons be given by the CLAC where it is making a different finding from the Local Court.

The question remains, are the reasons given in this case adequate for these purposes? This is clearly a case on the borderline. There are reasons but they are short. As I say, I consider they could be more full. But nevertheless I am not prepared to find that as a matter of law they are inadequate. In those circumstances I do not find there was an error of law sufficient for this court to interfere with the decision appealed against.

Appeal dismissed with costs.