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Yama v Pariwa [2026] PGSC 30; SC2873 (26 March 2026)

SC2873


PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]


SC REVIEW (EP) NO 68 of 2023


APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 155(2)(b) OF THE CONSTITUTION


AND IN THE MATTER OF PART XVIII OF THE ORGANIC LAW ON NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL GOVERNMENTS


BETWEEN
PETER CHARLES YAMA
Applicant


AND
HON. RAMSEY PARIWA
First Respondent


AND
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Second Respondent


WAIGANI: TOLIKEN J, FRANK J, CHRISTENSEN J
27 NOVEMBER 2025, 26 MARCH 2026


ELECTION PETITION – REVIEW – Right to review – s 220 of the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections – whether error in fact and law as to corroboration – no legal requirement for corroboration – corroboration as a matter of proof – whether error in fact and law as to credibility finding – advantage of trial judge to assess credibility – whether error in fact and law in assessment of inconsistencies – focus of election petition is on substantive and important issues


The applicant sought to review an election petition decision of the National Court arising from the Madang Regional Electorate in the 2022 National Election. The applicant challenged the election result on a basis of contended undue influence, alleging that the elected member uttered fraudulent statements about the applicant during election campaigning. The primary judge found that the petitioner failed to prove that the alleged statements were made.


The applicant contends that the reasoning and findings of the primary judge were erroneous as (i) they required corroboration, when none was required, but was nonetheless available on the evidence; (ii) irrelevant matters as to the assessment of credibility were considered; and (iii) the assessment of inconsistencies was done by reference to the contents of the election petition.


Held


(1) Whether s 220 of the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections excludes from the inherent power of the Supreme Court a right of review of an election petition decision is a matter that stands to be considered and determined in an appropriate case.

(2) There is no statutory or legal requirement for corroboration in an election petition matter. Nonetheless, the particular facts that arise in an allegation may, as a matter of proof rather than of law, warrant corroboration.

(3) It is trite law that a primary judge of the facts is better placed to assess the credibility of a witness.

(4) An election petition and the Organic Law that guides such a proceeding is concerned to ensure prompt and efficient resolution of election disputes.

(5) It is not of consequence whether an inconsistency in evidence arises from the contents of the election petition. The focus for a primary judge in an election petition is whether any contended inconsistency has material connection or significance to the substance issues in the case.

(6) No important point of law that is not without merit is demonstrated, no gross error of fact occurred, and there were no findings of fact resulting in injustice. The primary judge did not fail to afford the applicant an opportunity to do real justice on the substantive merits of the case.

Cases cited


Aihi v Isoaimo [2013] PGSC 56, SC1276
Biri v Re Bill Ninkama & Ors [1982] PNGLR 342
Dekena v Kuman [2013] PGSC 23, SC1272
Devlyn David v. The State [2006] PGSC 22, SC881
Ganzik v Iguan [2024] PGSC 134, SC2668
Pokaya v Marape [2018] PGNC 145, N7234
Review Pursuant to Constitution Section 155(2)(b); Sauk v Polye and Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea [2004] PGSC 13, SC769
Sia v Numu [2020] PGSC 68, SC1978
Singirok v Fairweather [2014] PGNC 53, N5577
Tulapi v Lagea [2013] PGNC 134, N5323
Waranaka v Dusava [2009] PGSC 11, SC980
Warisan v Arore [2015] 1 PNGLR 315, SC1418
Yama v Pariwa & Electoral Commission [2023] PGNC 264, N10458
Yama v Pariwa & Electoral Commission [2023] PGNC 364, N10536


Counsel


K Makeu for the applicant
M Kombri for the first respondent
K Barrion for the second respondent


  1. BY THE COURT: By way of application to review filed 4 March 2024, the applicant Peter Yama seeks to review the whole of the written judgment of an election petition decision of the National Court of 23 October 2023.
  2. The National Court decision relates to the dismissal an election petition arising from the Madang Regional Electorate in the 2022 National Election (the election). At the time of the election, the applicant was the sitting Governor for Madang Province. The applicant challenged in the petition (EP No 95 of 2022) the return of the first respondent as the elected member.
  3. The applicant was a candidate for the election. Polling throughout Madang Province was conducted between 6 July 2022 and 19 July 2022 using the Limited Preferential Voting System. The first respondent was declared as the duly elected member for the Madang Provincial Electorate seat on 18 August 2022, with the applicant placed fourth.

BACKGROUND


  1. The National Court petition, filed 27 September 2022, contained six grounds of challenge. Three grounds were abandoned by the petitioner and two were struck out for being incompetent: Yama v Pariwa & Electoral Commission [2023] PGNC 264, N10458.
  2. This left one ground that proceeded to trial, being ground three of the petition, namely “undue influence by the first respondent on 29 June 2022 at Tugutugu Village, Karkar LLG, Sumkar District”.
  3. The trial was heard in Madang and Waigani on 8, 9 and 21 September 2023. A no case submission by the second respondent was refused. At the conclusion of the trial, the primary judge found that the petitioner failed to prove that the first respondent made the alleged statements and ordered that the petition be wholly dismissed: Yama v Pariwa & Electoral Commission [2023] PGNC 364, N10536.
  4. On 6 November 2023, the applicant filed his application for leave to review. On 20 February 2024, leave to review was granted by a single judge of this court.

THE REVIEW


  1. The applicant submits that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice and relies on the following grounds in support of his application:

Ground 1: The primary judge erred in fact and in law in holding that the petitioner had relied on only one witness to prove his allegation of undue influence as he was required to provide corroboration from other witnesses when there is absolutely no law, be it statute or case, that warrants such a position in law as a case can still be made on the uncorroborated direct of one eye witness.


Ground 2: The primary judge erred in fact and law in taking into consideration irrelevant factors to make a finding that the main witness for the petitioner, Gideon Jerome, was not a credible witness.


Ground 3: It was the duty of the primary judge to identify all inconsistencies in a witness’ evidence, assess their significance and give reasons for regarding them as significant or not but in this instance, the primary judge erred in fact and in law when he failed to discharge this duty when making findings that were inconsistencies in the evidence of the petitioner’s main witness but did not assess the significance or otherwise of such inconsistencies and provide reasons accordingly.


  1. It is submitted that establishment of one or more grounds would satisfy the court as to the merits of the review.
  2. The applicant seeks that:
  3. The first respondent submits that the review should be dismissed with costs as there is no important point of law that is not without merit, and there are no issues of facts that are grossly erroneous or have resulted in an injustice. It was emphasised that the remarks of the primary judge were to be considered in the context of the case, and that the applicant is seeking both to enforce s 217 of the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections and to ignore it in the contended grounds. Section 217 of the Organic Law provides:

The National Court shall be guided by the substantial merits and good conscience of each case without regard to legal forms or technicalities, or whether the evidence before it is in accordance with the law of evidence or not.


  1. The second respondent joins the first respondent in seeking that the review be dismissed. The primacy of the primary judge’s role in assessing witnesses was emphasised.

PRELIMINARY JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE


  1. At the outset of the review hearing, the court raised with the parties the application of the majority view in Ganzik v Iguan [2024] PGSC 134, SC 2668. In short, in Ganzik v Iguan, their Honours Hartshorn J and Numapo J concluded that s 220 of the Organic Law, which provides that “a decision of National Court is final and conclusive and without appeal, and shall not be questioned in any way”, meant that there is no right to review a decision in a election petition pursuant to s 155(2)(b) of the Constitution. His Honour Anis J declined to determine the jurisdictional issue in circumstances where the parties had not come prepared to address the issue raised by the court.
  2. In the current matter, in the brief time available for the parties to consider the issue, the applicant submitted that given leave has already been granted, any application of the majority view in Ganzik v Iguan was nullified. The parties otherwise submitted that there have been numerous decisions of the Supreme Court that have found that election petitions fall within the category of the inherent power of the Supreme Court to review all judicial acts of the National Court pursuant to s 155(2)(b) of the Constitution.
  3. We are of the view that it is not appropriate to dismiss the current review on an application of the majority in Ganzik v Iguan. The parties did not have the opportunity to fully consider and ventilate the issue raised, and leave for the review was granted prior to that decision. Dispensation of justice in this matter requires consideration and determination of the merits of the review.
  4. The application of the majority view in Ganzik v Iguan stands to be considered and determined in an appropriate case.

PRINCIPLES ON ELECTION PETITION REVIEW


  1. It warrants observing from the outset fundamental principles that govern election related review proceedings.
  2. An important starting point is to recall that “it is basic and fundamental that elections are decided by voters who have a free and fair opportunity of electing the candidate that the majority prefer”, with this being a “sacred right”: Biri v Re Bill Ninkama & Ors [1982] PNGLR 342, SC235 per Kidu CJ, Kapi DCJ and Andrew J.
  3. This does not though absolve an applicant in an election petition from exercising a review proceeding without proper basis. As David J, Sawong J and Kassman J observed in Dekena v Kuman [2013] PGSC 23, SC1272 at [13] – [15]:

The inherent power of review of an election petition matter is however available only where the applicant is able to demonstrate an important point of law that is not without merit to be determined.


Where issues of facts are raised, the Supreme Court has held that there must be gross error clearly apparent or manifested on the face of the evidence before the court would review; or where on the face of the findings of fact, it is considered so outrageous or absurd so as to result in, injustice; and such that a review of the finding of fact is warranted.


Thus a review is concerned with a decision making process and its integrity but not the decision itself.

[citations omitted]


FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL


  1. The applicant alleged at trial that during the election period following the issue of writs, the first respondent engaged in certain activities and interacted with certain people in a manner that amounted to undue influence.
  2. It was not in issue at trial, or on the review, that ‘undue influence’ in this context is per s 215(1) of the Organic Law, s 102 of the Criminal Code, and as considered by the Supreme Court in Sia v Numu [2020] PGSC 68, SC1978.
  3. Section 102(b) of the Criminal Code was relied upon by the applicant, which provides:

A person who –

[ ... ]

(b) by force or fraud prevents or obstructs the free exercise of the franchise by an elector, or by any such means compels or induces an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, is guilty of a misdemeanour.


  1. The primary judge, applying Warisan v Arore [2015] 1 PNGLR 315, SC1418, Singirok v Fairweather [2014] PGNC 53, N5577, and Pokaya v Marape [2018] PGNC 145, N7234, determined that the petitioner had the burden of proving “to the entire satisfaction of the Court” that the offence of undue influence was, or was attempted to be, committed.
  2. The critical question at trial was one of fact, being whether the petitioner had proven to the entire satisfaction of the court that the first respondent made the alleged statements about the petitioner in the campaign event at Tugutugu village.
  3. As to this, the applicant contended that on 29 June 2022 a registered voter from Sangana Village, Mr Gedion Jerome, observed a campaign speech by the first respondent at the Yakon Field in Tugutugu village. It was contended that during that speech, the first respondent made false statements and/ or unqualified accusations against the applicant.
  4. The applicant contended that the words uttered caused Mr Jerome to have second thoughts on supporting the applicant, for whom he had previously been an avid supporter. As a result of what he had heard during the campaign speech, Mr Jerome is said, per the petition, to have not given any vote to the applicant.
  5. Mr Jerome gave evidence by way of affidavit and in person at the trial. He was cross examined. Additionally, affidavit and viva voce evidence was adduced by the petitioner from four persons.
  6. The evidence of the first respondent at trial was by way of affidavit and he was also cross examined. He denied uttering false statements at the election rally and gave evidence that the allegations were not his style of campaign. He denied ever telling anyone not to vote for the applicant. The primary judge found the first respondent to be a reasonably convincing witness, but that it was also a case that rested essentially on one witness. The primary judge found that:

... while there is a lingering doubt therefore about whether the first respondent was telling the truth when he denied saying that the petitioner was corrupt, there is not enough doubt to tilt the case in the petitioner’s favour.


  1. At trial, it was submitted on behalf of the first respondent that the allegedly impugned words were not uttered, but that if something of such nature was said, it was not false and/ or did not obstruct the free exercise of voting preference. It was further submitted that the applicant adduced no evidence to dispute the first respondent’s evidence of an asserted fact that the petitioner had previously been arrested and charged for an alleged criminal offence.
  2. The primary judge found, inter alia, that:

...if the prosecution (here, the petitioner) presents only one witness to prove his case and that witness is not really convincing, and the accused person (here, the first respondent) is the only witness for the defence, it is very difficult for the prosecution [the applicant] to discharge the onus of proof. That has turned out to be the story of this case. The petitioner’s case is simply not strong enough to warrant a finding that the first respondent committed the offence of undue influence under
s 102(b) of the Criminal Code.


GROUND ONE: Error in fact and law as to corroboration


  1. The applicant submits that there is no legal requirement for corroborative evidence to be adduced. It is submitted that s 102(b) of the Criminal Code is explicitly clear in its singular use of the term ‘elector’ such that it is only incumbent on one elector to come forward and claim undue influence.
  2. It is submitted that the very nature of voting, one done in a secret form, is irreconcilable with corroboration. Further, it is submitted that to the extent the primary judge required corroboration as to the first respondent’s alleged conduct, there was no legal requirement for this, but that in any event, corroborative evidence was adduced. In oral argument, these two particulars of this ground were developed. Each of these will be considered in turn.

The primary judge erred in requiring corroboration


  1. The Court accepts, as this ground contends, that undue influence is conceivably able to be established on the uncorroborated direct evidence of one eyewitness. Similarly, the Court accepts that there is no statutory or other legal requirement for corroboration in an election petition in the legal sense that this term is commonly understood. Nonetheless, this does not absolve a petitioner from proving their case to the requisite standard.
  2. In any event, the primary judge did not, as contended by the applicant, find that corroboration was a necessary perquisite or a requirement to prove the allegation. While the primary judge did say that Mr Jerome’s evidence “was evidence that required corroboration”, this reasoning must be understood in its context. The primary judge explained that:

The petitioner presented only one eyewitness, Gideon Jerome, who testified that he was present at the campaign event at Tugutugu village, Karkar Island. His evidence was entirely uncorroborated. It is difficult to see a good reason for no other witness being able to be identified by the petitioner and organised to give evidence, given that it was a campaign event at which apparently many people were present and it was clear that the first respondent was not going to admit making the statements about the petitioner being corrupt. This was evidence that required corroboration but there was none.


  1. When understood in context, of what his Honour said and the allegation made, the primary judge was not importing a principle of corroboration as a legal requirement to the trial. Rather, his Honour was explaining the value of supportive evidence if the applicant was to establish the allegation in the factual circumstances that arose. There was importance for corroboration as a matter of proof, not of law.
  2. Further, it was not that corroboration was of significance as to the subjective state of mind of the voter – this can be established by direct evidence of the voter or by inference from the evidence – but it was of significance as to the element of whether force or fraud occurred as alleged.
  3. Despite Mr Jerome claiming in his affidavit that the crowd at the campaign speech “were really touched and were heavily discussing and digesting what the speakers had all said”, no other persons from the crowd gave evidence as to what was said. As the primary judge considered, it was for the applicant to discharge the onus of proof.
  4. Whilst corroboration is neither a statutory nor legal requirement to establish that a successful candidate’s election be declared void, in an allegation such as this where it can be inferred multiple people were present, the absence of corroborative evidence is significant. In the factual circumstances, it was readily open to the primary judge to find that the evidence of a sole witness as to the contended words said was not capable of entirely satisfying the court as to the allegation of undue influence.
  5. This aspect of ground one must be dismissed.

The primary judge erred in not taking into account the evidence of the other witnesses


  1. The applicant submits that the primary judge did not take into account the evidence of the other witnesses, which was submitted to be capable of being corroborative evidence.
  2. The evidence adduced at the trial included two contended incidents in March and April 2022 in Bogia. This evidence was admitted over the objection of the respondents. The first of these alleged occasions originally formed the basis for ground two of the petition but was abandoned given that the first respondent was not at that time an official candidate for the election.
  3. The evidence adduced from four witnesses at trial was that these two occasions involved the first respondent making degrading statements about the applicant during campaign events. The applicant submitted that evidence of two other incidents where the first respondent was observed making similar statements to those alleged was corroborative evidence that supported the assertions of Mr Jerome. It was submitted that what was alleged to have occurred at Tugutugu Village was not an isolated incident, with the first respondent proved to have already engaged in such conduct before the election period.
  4. The primary judge found that the evidence of these witnesses was not so strong as to give rise to an inference that the first respondent must have said similar things at the subject campaign event. It is plain that, contrary to the submission of the applicant, the primary judge did take into account the evidence of the other witnesses. It was not though compelling in the factual circumstances.
  5. There was no error in this finding. The evidence of the four witnesses was undermined and lacked credibility. For example, in affidavits, it was asserted that video recordings of one of the alleged events was available, but this was not admitted into evidence.
  6. The alleged earlier occasions of disparaging comments were remote in time to the alleged undue influence, and remote in circumstance, with the occasions distinct from the conduct of the first respondent during an election campaign. The extent to which this evidence was ever capable of being corroborative of Mr Jerome’s evidence, or the substantive allegation, was negligible. There was no error in the primary judge’s finding that this evidence did not enable the inference the applicant sought to be drawn.
  7. Both aspects of ground one are not established, and accordingly the ground fails.

GROUND TWO: Error in fact and law as to credibility finding


  1. The applicant’s submissions as to the contended error with respect to credibility can be understood as raising two issues as to the assessment of credibility.
  2. Firstly, it was submitted that the absence of evidence to corroborate the witness’s qualifications and his irregular employment history were not capable of relevance to the assessment of the witness’ credibility. Secondly, it was submitted that the primary judge’s consideration of the witness having given evidence in Tok Pisin was erroneous in an assessment of credibility.
  3. It is submitted by the applicant that the primary witness gave detailed and credible evidence, and that the matters considered by the primary judge, being the witness’ qualification, his employment history and his giving of evidence in Tok Pisin, were not of significance in undermining credibility.
  4. It is trite that a trial judge is better placed to assess the credibility of a witness. In Waranaka v Dusava [2009] PGSC 11, SC980 per Kandakasi J (as then was), Lay J and Gabi J, this was expressed at [24] as:

When it comes to determining the credibility of witnesses, it is settled law that a primary judge of the facts is usually said to be in a better position to determine that issue because he sees the demeanour and the performance of the witnesses in the witness box. As such, a reviewing authorities such as this Court, is usually slow to interfere with the findings of a primary judge of the facts, except in the clearest of cases in which the primary judge has fallen into an obvious and or serious errors that vitiates his decision.


  1. In the reasons, the primary judge observed that the witness described an irregular employment history, despite his stated qualification. The primary judge did not conclude that the witness lied under oath but found that there were some parts of the witness’ evidence that did not ring true. The witness was found to not be sufficiently convincing for the applicant to meet his burden of proof.
  2. The primary judge did not find the witness’ evidence was unconvincing because he gave his evidence in Tok Pisin. This would of course be likely an erroneous approach to assessment of a witness’ evidence. As much was observed by the primary judge himself during submissions by counsel in which his Honour expressed that the giving of evidence in Tok Pisin is understandable, even with an educated witness, given the intimidating and unfamiliar environment of a courtroom.
  3. Rather, what the primary judge found was that Mr Jerome’s election to give evidence in Tok Pisin did not undermine his credibility. His Honour said that “[o]f course he was entitled to do that, but it did not add credibility to his evidence” (emphasis added). This was in a context where the witness had explained that he was a qualified civil engineer. There was no error in such an assessment of credibility.
  4. There is nothing to suggest that the primary judge fell into obvious and or serious error in the credibility assessment. The primary judge was in a position to assess the honesty and reliability of the witness and made no identifiable error in reaching the conclusion made. There was no error in fact and law as to the credibility findings and this ground is refused.

GROUND THREE: Error in fact and law in assessment of inconsistencies


  1. The applicant submits that a gross error of fact occurred by the primary judge in assessing a deviation in the primary witness’ evidence to what was contained in the petition. It is submitted that the primary judge failed to consider and acknowledge that the petition was not drafted by the witness and may contain matters not known to the witness. The applicant emphasised the consistency between the primary witness’ affidavit and his viva voce evidence.
  2. We acknowledge, as the applicant submits, that the Supreme Court has stated that a primary judge has a duty to identify inconsistencies, assess their significance and give reasons regarding them. In Waranaka v Dusava, an election petition review, the Court said at [38]:

This Court in its recent decision in Devlyn David v. The State [2006] PGSC 22, SC881 correctly stated the principles in these terms at paragraph 154:


In any criminal trial, if there are any inconsistencies in the evidence adduced by the State, it is the duty of the primary judge to identify them, assess their significance and give reasons for regarding them as significant or not, as the case might be.

We add that, unless any inconsistencies are properly and reasonably explained and are insignificant, inconsistencies can form the foundation to find contradictory witnesses and their testimonies not credible and therefore unreliable.


  1. It must be recalled though that the principle from David v The State, considered in Waranaka v Dusava, was concerned with a criminal trial. An election petition proceeding is guided by s 217 of the Organic Law. The effect of this provision, and its relevance to the decision phase of an election petition trial was considered by Injia CJ in Tulapi v Lagea [2013] PGNC 134, N5323, an authority which has since been considered and applied in numerous Supreme Court authorities. His Honour relevantly observed at [13], [14] that:

Once the evidence is completed, the Court should move to the second phase. The Court must consider the evidence, make reasonable findings of fact and reasonable inferences from those proven facts. Those facts should then be measured against the requirements of the law and conclusions drawn from them. From those conclusions, the Court should then reach and pronounce a decision on the case.

Section 217 requires the Court to focus on the substantive and important issues in the case and determine the merits of those issues without pre-occupying itself with procedural issues such as whether the evidence conforms strictly to the pleadings. It requires the Court to avoid dwelling on evidence, inconsistencies and contradictions in evidence included over points that have no material connection or significance to the substantive issues in the case and have no impact on the outcome of the case.

[citation omitted]

  1. The primary judge here did give comprehensive and considered reasons as to the issue of purported inconsistencies in the primary witness’ evidence.
  2. At trial, the applicant submitted that the only inconsistencies in Mr Jerome’s evidence were as to the date of polling and as to the order of preference for the applicant when he voted. The applicant submitted that these did not amount to substantial inconsistencies and submitted that Mr Jerome never deviated from his evidence in cross examination.
  3. However, the primary judge regarded the significance of the evidence as to the order of preference in voting differently. His Honour found that in the petition it was alleged that after he heard the first respondent’s speech, Mr Jerome was persuaded not to give any of this voting preference to the applicant. In his oral testimony, and in his affidavit, Mr Jerome said that after hearing the speech, he gave his vote to another candidate (not the first respondent) and gave the applicant his second vote. Because of this, the primary judge found, there was a departure from the allegation of fact in the petition in a material way.
  4. That the primary judge identified the inconsistency as between the allegation as set out in the petition, rather than in, for example the affidavit or viva voce evidence, is not of consequence. The materiality of the inconsistency was its departure from the allegations of fact, and consequentially, on the extent to which the evidence was capable of informing the court as to whether it could be satisfied of the allegation. It was, and is, beside the point that the inconsistency arose because of what was contained in the petition, and that the witness himself was not responsible for the drafting of the petition.
  5. The considered approach by the primary judge as to the assessment of contended inconsistences is also apparent by his Honour’s rejection during the course of submissions at trial as to the purported inconsistency in the witness’ evidence as to the date of polling. During the course of submissions with counsel for the first respondent, his Honour ventilated with counsel that a confusion about dates appeared to be of little consequence. This purported inconsistency formed no part of his Honour’s reasoning on the decision.
  6. The primary judge was plainly concerned to properly identify and assess the significance of any apparent inconsistencies in Mr Jerome’s evidence. His Honour then, as outlined above at [60] provided reasons as to why the inconsistency as to the voting preference order was regarded as significant. It amounted to a material departure from the factual allegation.
  7. The material inconsistency between the allegation and the primary witness’ evidence undermined the veracity of his credibility. This informed the primary judge’s finding that the witness was not particularly convincing, and that the burden of proof as to the particular allegation was not met. In so finding, the primary judge identified the inconsistency, assessed its significance, and gave a reason as to its consequence on the finding.
  8. The primary judge neither erred in fact and law in the assessment of inconsistencies and this ground fails.

CONCLUSION


  1. There has been no contention that the primary judge failed to afford the applicant an opportunity to do real justice on the substantive merits of the case as is required in the hearing of an election petition: Aihi v Isoaimo [2013] PGSC 56, SC1276. The applicant plainly was afforded this opportunity. No important point of law that is not without merit has been demonstrated, there is no gross error of fact, nor findings of fact resulting in injustice.
  2. None of the grounds having been established, the review is to be dismissed.

ORDERS


  1. For these reasons, the following orders are made:

_______________________________________________________________
Lawyers for the applicant: Lomai & Lomai Attorneys
Lawyers for the first respondent: Kombri & Associates
Lawyers for the second respondent: Kuman Lawyers

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