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Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]
SCREV NO. 27 OF 2015
BETWEEN:
KEVIN JOHN
Appellant
AND:
THE STATE
Respondent
Waigani: Gavara-Nanu J & Manuhu J.
2020: 21st July
2021: 18th October
APPEAL – Particular Offence – Murder –Law on identification evidence – Law on circumstantial evidence.
Cases Cited:
Paulus Pawa v The State (1981) PNGLR 498
The State v Tom Morris (1981) PNGLR 493
Mathias Peter Joseph Evertz v The State (1979) SC 154
John Beng v The State [1977] PNGLR 115
Counsel:
Appellant, In person
C. Sambua, for the Respondent
19th October, 2021
“In proceedings where evidence of identification is relevant, the Court should be mindful of all the inherent dangers, the need for caution before convicting in reliance on the correctness of identification, the possibility that a mistaken witness could be a convincing one and that any number of such witnesses could all be mistaken; the Court should examine closely all the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made bearing in mind that recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger, but that even where the witness is purporting to recognize someone he knows mistakes can be made.
When the quality of the identification evidence is good the matter should proceed to a verdict, when the quality of identification evidence is poor, unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification, an acquittal should be entered.”
13. There was no direct evidence against the appellant. The trial judge had to make findings of fact on the basis of circumstantial evidence. In that regard, the law on circumstantial evidence is well settled in this jurisdiction in the cases of Paulus Pawa v The State (1981) PNGLR 498 and The State v Tom Morris (1981) PNGLR 493, which, for the benefit of the appellant, are simplified below:
(a) When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the judge cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.
(b) To enable a judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused it is necessary not only that his guilt should be a rational inference but that it should be the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable them to draw.
(c) However, an inference to be reasonable must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a judge from finding the prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all the facts in evidence.
20. Husband Anton Wembi also gave evidence for the prosecution. He said he was woken up by his wife, Margaret Anton, in the early hours. He stood at the door asking his wife as to what was going on. Then he and his wife went to the back of their house where they met the boys. Those boys were Augustine, Felix, John Big Boy and Simon Kundu. The witness pointed to the appellant as John Big Boy.
21. He ushered them to where the light was in front of the snooker table and enquired what they were doing. Augustine got a bush knife and swung at him. Then they walked away and then Anton went to see Manus Ope. They used a mobile phone light and proceeded to the banana patch where they discovered the body of the deceased. They called out and people gathered. At around 8.00am or 9.00am, the CID arrived at the scene.
22. On the evidence, there was no dispute that the appellant was also known as Big Boy. Witness Rodney Ria pointed to the appellant in court as Big Boy. There was no dispute that Felix Ousi was the leader of the group and the aggressor. Rodney Ria said he saw the appellant in the company of Felix Ousi at all material times. Manea Seni also met Felix Ousi, Augustine and (Big Boy) the appellant in the early hours of the day in question.
23. Witness Lucas Mara was woken up by his wife because of a commotion outside. When he went to investigate, he saw Big Boy (the appellant) with Felix Ousi, who was demanding compensation for a cut on his hand. Witness Margaret Anton gave evidence that the appellant was one of those who chased the deceased. Witness Anton Wembi also saw the appellant with Felix Ousi at the relevant time. The fourth and fifth State witnesses were the only witnesses who did not name the appellant in their evidence.
24. Notwithstanding the grounds of appeal, which also raised issues of law, it is apparent that the appellant mostly disputes the trial judge’s findings of fact. He seemed aggrieved that Felix Ousi, the aggressor and leader of the group, was not charged and was still at large. However, it has to be understood that where an appeal ground relates to a trial judge’s findings of fact, in the absence of a clear error or a clear misapprehension of the evidence, this Court would be reluctant to disturb the trial judge’s findings. This was explained by Kearney J in the case of Mathias Peter Joseph Evertz v The State (1979) SC154, thus:
“It is inherent in the nature of the trial process that this Court must place great weight upon the views of the trial judge on issues which turn upon the credibility of the witnesses who testified before him, unless the appellant shows that the rejection of his own testimony on those issues flows from some fundamental misconception of the evidence as a whole, or from a failure to take it all properly into account.”
25. In this case, Felix Ousi stood out as the leader of the group of boys who were drinking, making a lot of noise and confronting other residents. The witnesses saw the appellant with Felix Ousi and others at all material times. The appellant was seen with Felix Ousi chasing the deceased to the banana garden where he was found dead. Accordingly, it was open to the trial judge to make a finding against him pursuant to section 7 of the Criminal Code. There was sufficient lighting under which all these happenings took place, as described by the witnesses. The witnesses and the appellant were not strangers. The appellant was thus positively identified at all material times and immediately before the killing took place when he was seen amongst the boys chasing the deceased to the banana patch.
26. We are satisfied therefore that the trial judge did not commit any error in his analysis of the evidence and in his application of the principles on identification evidence. We are similarly satisfied that the trial judge did not commit any error in his analysis of the evidence and in his application of the principles on circumstantial evidence. For these reasons, we find that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. The appellant’s conviction and sentence are confirmed.
Orders accordingly.
_________________________________________
Lawyers for the Appellant : In Person.
Public Prosecutor: Lawyers for the Respondent
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGSC/2021/92.html