Manase v Polye [2019] PGSC 131; SC1907 (9 August 2019)

SC1907

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

SCREV(EP) NO. 11 OF 2019

APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 155(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION

IN THE MATTER OF PART XVIII OF HE ORGANIC LAW ON NATIONAL AND LOCAL-LEVEL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

BETWEEN:
LUKE ALFRED MANASE
Appellant

AND:
DON POMB POLYE
First Respondent

AND:
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Second Respondent

Waigani: Batari J
2019:8^th & 9^th August

SUPREME COURT REVIEW – election petition – time - essence of - leave to dispense with - interlocutory decision – “decision” - application to dispense with meaning of – delay – no reasonable explanation for inordinate delay – application refused.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - election petition – rules technical requirements of – non-compliance may render application incompetent.

Held:

1. Failure to set out the concise statement of the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the matter at hand may warrant dismissal of the cause for want of form under O. 13 r. 15 of the Supreme Court Rules [para.6]
   
2. In an application for leave to review an interlocutory decision made outside the time limit to make the application, the applicant must show reasonable account: (i) why the time was missed; a Rule was missed or why dispensation was required (ii) any explanation for the delay between the expiry time and the making of the application for waiver/extension of time (iii) the application will not prejudice the other party; (iv) the grant of dispensation or extension of time will enable all issues in contest to be promptly dealt with without further delay: Wari Vele v Powes Parkop [2008] PNGLR, 470[para 23].
   
3. The principle of “change of circumstances” as in the case of a Bail application coming before the same court which had previously refused bail, does not apply to an election petition review where a party dissatisfied with a direction or order of a single Judge of the Supreme Court has recourse under O. 11 r. 27 of the Supreme Court Rules to make the same application before the full court afresh provided that a written request is served on the registrar within 14 days of the orders refusing relief.[para.27, 28]
   
4. Where a trial has been concluded, any issues of law, fact or procedure arising therefrom are part and parcel of one decision against which one appeal or judicial review should properly lie and hence, knit-picking different aspects of the trial process for standalone appeals or reviews at the conclusion of trial is an abuse of the court process, with such gravity as to proliferate the mischief in procrastinating and prolonging speedy disposition of the case.[paras 40,41,44]
   
5. Procedural approaches tending to frustrate and procrastinate early finality of an election petition offends against constitutional laws and legislations on time limitations and the intended notion for simplicity of election petitions. [paras 45 to 60]
   

Cases Cited:

Alphonse Moroi v Kila Haoda (2014) SC1379
Anton Yagama v Peter Charles Yama (2013) SC1244
Behroug Boochani v State (2017) SC1566
Delba Biri v Bill Ninkama [1982] PNGLR 342
Dick Mune v Paul Poto (No.2) [1997] PNGLR 356
Dr Thilgawathy Subendranathan v Maxwell Paiya (2017) N7644
Joseph Nandali v Curtain Brothers Ltd (2012) SC1483
Kikala v The Electoral Commission [2013] PGSC 48; SC1295
Matiabe Oberia v Chief Inspector Michael Charlie (2005) SC801
Michael Wilson v Clement Kuburam (2016) SC1489
Moi Avei v Charles Main o& Or (1998) SC584
Pacific Equities & Investments Ltd v Teup Goledu (2009) SC962
Philemon Embel v Jeffery Komal (2016) SC1579
Wari Vele v Powes Parkop [2008] PNGLR 470
William Powi v Pastor Bernard Kaku & Anor (2019) SC1856

Counsel:

Ms. C Copland, for the Applicants
Mr. M Kipa, for the First Respondent
Mr. S Ranewa, for the Second Respondent

9^th August, 2019

1. BATARI J: In this ruling, the applicant seeks extension of time for leave to apply for judicial review of an election petition decisions. He also seeks orders for dispensation from the Rules.
   
2. The application is supported by the following affidavits;
   1. Affidavit of Luke Alfred Manase sworn on 17/7/2019
   2. Affidavit of Luke Alfred Manase sworn on 17/7/2019
   100. Affidavit of Christine Copland sworn 17/7/2019.
        

Preliminary Rulings

3. Several of the orders sought can be dealt with quickly. Paragraphs 1 (1) and (3) seek dispensation with the requirements for service and for substituted service. Events have overtaken those requests. Both parties are present in Court and the application is heard inter parties.
   
4. Paragraph 1(4) seeks extension of time for hearing of the Application for Leave to Review. The hearing has been fixed for Friday, 16/8/2019 at 9.30am. If the application is not heard on the scheduled date, consequential extension should naturally follow or upon application.
   
5. Paragraph 1(5) seeks ad hoc directions as to form. I am satisfied, the form adopted is sufficiently compliant, consistent with the guidelines in, William Powi v Pastor Bernard Kaku & Anor (2019) SC1856.
   
6. However, the point is made, that O. 13 r.15 of the Supreme Court Rules requires all applications for interlocutory orders to contain a concise statement of the Court’s jurisdiction to grant the orders being sought. The general form in Form 4 is to be adopted, subject to inclusion of the jurisdictional basis for the application. Applying the strict approach, technical flaws in non-compliance with O.13 r.15 are enough in themselves to warrant dismissal for want of competence: Pacific Equities & Investments Ltd v Teup Goledu (2009) SC962; Joseph Nandali v Curtain Brothers Ltd (2012) SC1483; Behroug Boochani v State (2017) SC 1566.
   
7. In this case, the jurisdictional basis for the application is not immediately apparent until one reads the terms of the orders sought.
   
8. Arguably, an application that is filed in substantial compliance with Form 4, may not be enough to cure the omission in setting out at the outset in a separate assertive paragraph, the concise statement of the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the matter at hand. This issue was not raised in the course of hearing. So, I make no ruling on it, here.
   

The application before this Court

9. The balance of the orders sought, concerns dispensation of:
   1. time requirement to file, serve and hear the application for leave to review the decisions of;5/7/2018, and9/11/2018; and
   2. compliance with the requirement or meaning of, “decision” as defined in O. 5 r. 7 of the Supreme Court Rules.
      
10. Relevantly, the applicant applies after the final decision in, EP No.73 of 2017 Don Pomb Polye v Luke Alfred Manase & Electoral Commission, for leave to review certain interlocutory rulings of the primary Court.
    
11. In brief, the primary Court partially upheld an objection to competency of the election petition on 5/7/2018. The applicant (First Respondent then), sought leave to review the ruling and applied to dispense with the definition of, “decision” in O. 5 r. 7 of the Supreme Court Rules. On 30/7/2018 a single Judge of the Supreme Court refused the application so, the trial proceeded on the surviving grounds. On 9/11/2018 the primary Court rejected the respondents’ No Case submissions. The final decision on 4/7/2019 upheld the petition and ordered inter alia, a recount of the votes.
    
12. Then on 17/7/2019 the applicant filed two separate causes, namely;
    
    • (i) Application for Leave to Review the final decision;
    • (ii) Application for leave to dispense with the requirements of the rules on time limitations and the definition of “decision”.
      
13. Order 5 r. 14 of the Supreme Court Rules requires the application for leave to be filed, served and heard within 14 days of the decision sought to be reviewed or within such time as extended within that 14 days period.
    
14. The two applications were filed on the 11^th hour. The 14 days in relation to the final decision lapsed the next day following filing. Extension of time has been granted. As regards the interlocutory decisions, the time to seek leave to review has long lapsed.
    

Time Limitations & Issue of delay

15. The applicant contends, there has been no delay. If there was any delay, it is explained in the “change of circumstances” occasioned by a subsequent full court decision.
    
16. Ms. Copland for the applicant, conceded her client initially accepted the decision refusing leave for judicial review. But then the full Court in, William Powi v Pastor Bernard Kaku & Anor (2019) SC1856 held, the definition of “decision” in O.5 r.7 of the Supreme Court Rules contravenes the inherent power of the Supreme Court under Constitution s.155(2)(b). Counsel argued, the decision led to change of circumstances which in effect, vitiated the refusal of leave by a Judge. Hence, this application will settle a misnomer in the application of the Supreme Court Rules. Too, the application raises important points of law to be determined by the full Court. Counsel also submitted, the applicant has been prejudiced by the full Court decision such, that the justice of the case favours grant of leave.
    
17. Counsel for the respondents, Messrs Kipa and Ranewa did not seriously contest the issue of delay and the merits of the application.
    

Considerations & Ruling

18. The applicant applies under O. 5 r. 39of the Supreme Court Rules to dispense with the 14 days within which to file, serve and prosecute the application for leave to review. In regard to the interlocutory decisions of 2018, the delay would have occurred in two possible ways:
    
    1. If time runs from 4/7/2019, the expiry date is 18/7/2019;
    2. If time runs from the actual dates of the interlocutory decisions in July and November of 2018, the expiry dates have long lapsed.
       
19. In the first scenario, the question of delay does not arise. An application for leave to apply for judicial review is pending hearing. If the pending application does not include issues from the 2018 interlocutory decisions, that omission would be the applicant’s own making.
    
20. Granted that, this is a separate application from that which is pending the leave hearing, the delay in making the application is significant.
    
21. It is trite, that where an application to waive or extend the time limit is made after the prescribe time limit, the applicant has the onus to show a reasonable cause for the delay. This is settled in, Wari Vele v Powes Parkop [2008] PNGLR, 470 where the Supreme Court stated at p 476:
    

“23. As with all applications made after the first opportunity to establish the appellant or applicant’s rights has been missed, the first issue to be established is why that time limit was missed, a Rule has not been complied with or otherwise why dispensation is required. There has to be some reasonable explanation. The second matter to be explained is the delay, if any, which has occurred between the expiry of the time limit and the making of the application to waive/extend the time limit. Next, it should be established that the relief sought by the applicant will not unduly prejudice the respondent's conduct of his case. Lastly it should be established that the grant of dispensation will enable all of the issues in contention to be promptly put before the Court without further delay.”

22. I will first deal with the issue of delayed application for leave in respect of each separate decision. In the latter part of this ruling, I make some observations on issues of delays affecting election petitions generally.

Interlocutory Decision of 5/7/2018

23. The applicant’s reasons for the delay is essentially, that the full Court decision created, “change of circumstances” which has prejudiced his case.
    
24. I do not accept the applicant’s contentions for several reasons. First, the applicant no doubt became aware of the implications of the full Court decision early but failed to act promptly. He filed this application at the conclusion of the trial and final decision being, some three months of the full Court decision and12 months of the National Court and single Judge of the Supreme Court decisions. It is clear, “change of circumstances” is not the cause for delay. He had reacted upon mere hindsight.
25. Second, when the Supreme Court Judge refused his application for leave for judicial review, he was not left without recourse. He had the option to move the same application before the full Court under s. 10(2) of the Supreme Court Act and O. 11 r. 27 of the Supreme Court Rules. He chose not to do that and allowed the time to run.
    
26. Section 10(1) of the Supreme Court Act provides in mandatory terms, that where an order sought upon application pursuant to s. 10(1) is refused, that application must not be dismissed but must remain on foot to be moved before the full Court under s. 10(2) subject to administrative request to the Registrar in writing, of the intention to make that application. Under O. 11 r. 27, the applicant has 14 days to serve a written request on the Registrar to make the same application before the full Court.
    
27. So, it is not permissible under s 10 (1), (2) of the Act and O. 11 r. 27 of the Rules to move the same application before the same Court. The prohibitive effect in those provisions are clear.
    
28. Whilst change of circumstance may be a factor supporting a fresh application, that application can only be made to the full Court. “Change of circumstances” as in bail applications where the same application may be heard by the same Court that had previously refused bail, is not applicable to orders refused by the Court under s.10 (1) of the Act. The factor of “change of circumstances” also do not amount to reasonable explanation for coming before this court or for the inordinate delay.
    
29. Third, the applicant made a deliberate choice to accept the ruling. He allowed the trial to draw to conclusion. In my view, backtracking to file a standalone application after final decision is highly inappropriate and mischievous. Such approach will cause prejudice against the party in whose favour the decision has been made.
    
30. Fourth, the approach the applicant has taken is an abuse of the court process. This Court has previously dealt with the same application. I agree with Mr Kipa, such tactic amounts to a second bite of the apple. What his Honour Kariko, J stated in, Dr Thilgawathy Subendranathan v Maxwell Paiya (2017) N7644, on the types of abuse of the court process is applicable to this case:
    

“An abuse of process will exist if a claimant who is unsuccessful in one proceeding makes the same claim in another proceeding – when he returns to Court for “a second bite at the cherry”; Pokia v Yallon (2014) SC1336”.

31. In, Michael Wilson v Clement Kuburam (2016) SC1489 Gavara-Nanu, J noted at [para 25]:
    

“The types of abuses of process may vary from case to case but to establish an abuse of process there must be evidence showing that the processes of the court have been improperly used; or have been used for an improper purpose; or have been used in an improper way; or that such abuse of process have resulted in the right of the other party being denied, defeated or prejudiced.”

32. In all the circumstances, the delay in seeking to waive the time limit is inordinate and inexcusable.
    

Interlocutory Decision of 9/11/2018

33. This concerns dismissal of a No Case Submission. The application to review that decision is time-barred. The applicant had 14 days to seek leave to review or dispense with the requirement of the rules. This application is made some eight months after the decision.
    
34. Things have since moved on. The conclusion of the trial proceedings has overtaken any irregularity, error, act or omission in the decisions or rulings in the course of the proceedings. Those decisions may be causes for grievance on the basis of which the applicant may seek a judicial review at the conclusion of the case. I will return to this aspect on the latter part of this ruling on causes affecting finality of proceedings.
    
35. As for this head, there is no reasonable explanation for allowing the time limit for compliance to lapse. There is similarly no explanation for the delay which has occurred between the expiry of the time limit and the making of the application to waive the time requirement. The applicant has also failed to show, the relief he is seeking will not prejudice the respondents’ conduct of their cases. Nor has he demonstrated how the grant of dispensation will enable all of the issues in contention to be promptly put before the Court without further delay.
    
36. The inescapable conclusion is, that the delay is without explanation.
    

Relevant issues of delays in this case and election petitions generally

37. Under this head, I make some pertinent observations on causes for delays in this case and election petition cases generally.
    
38. I start with judicial review applications generally and specifically to that which is associated with election petition proceedings. Notwithstanding the right that may exist to apply for judicial review at any stage of the proceedings, the undesirable effect has invariably been the delay caused in reaching the substantial issues for determination and finality of the case.
    
39. In this case, the applicant has applied at the conclusion of the case to review interlocutory decisions, one of which has previously been refused by a single judge of the Supreme Court. In other instances, parties are seeking reviews of multiple decisions made at different stages of the trial proceedings before final decision. Such piece-meal approach has been the cause for delays in the smooth progress and expeditious disposition of election petition cases.
    
40. In my view, it is only proper and convenient, that issues arising from any of those decisions should be left to one appeal or judicial review at the conclusion of the whole trial process.
    
41. The rationale is simple. Rulings on such matters as objections to competency of proceedings, a voir-dire, a no case submission or findings and rulings on legal, factual and procedural issues are intrinsic, inseverable components of one trial process and one final decision. The whole trial process ought to take its course to final verdict or decision, uninterrupted by piecemeal, hair splitting, time-wasting appeals and judicial reviews of interlocutory decisions. There is a lot of common sense in this proposition. This proposition also reflects the whole intention in the promulgation of the 2012 Supreme Court Rules.
    
42. There may be cases that will warrant early intervention by the appellate Court. If for instance, before conclusion of the trial, the overwhelming desire to review an interlocutory decision is manifest on a fundamental issue of the power of the court to deal with the matter at hand, the appellate Court should intervene. However, the exercise of discretion to grant the application for leave should be strictly guided by the higher standard of scrutiny with the onus on the applicant. I iterate what I stated in, Anton Yagama v Peter Charles Yama (2013) SC1244, that:

“The standard of scrutiny in assessing the leave application in election petition reviews is higher than the usual considerations in ordinary cases of administrative reviews or where the applicant has no right of appeal or has lost that right. This is evident from the precondition to show an apparent error of law or fact on the face of the record. If the error is a question of law, it must be a serious and important point of law that is not without merit. If factual error is alleged, it must be shown to be ‘a gross error clearly apparent or manifested on the face of the evidence.’ Or the exercise of discretion was excessive, or the decision is ‘so outrageous or absurd so as to result in injustice.’ This high onus was recently restated in obiter dicta by the Supreme Court in, Anton Yagama v Peter Charles Yama, Steven Biko, Andrew Trawen and the Electoral Commission (2013) SCR 55of 2012 (unnumbered), that such a review should only be allowed where, “there is a clear error which has a very high chance of success.” (Emphasis mine).

43. Properly and consistently applied, this high standard of scrutiny should be able to avert the mischief of delays that often results from a misguided notional right to be heard under Constitution s. 155(2)(b).It is of course settled, and I accept that a party is at liberty to pursue an interlocutory relief or cause, or action or wishes to abandon or withdraw any of those substantive processes wholly or partially. The court will not interfere unless the course taken will result in an abuse of the court process, it will lead to inconvenience or result in prejudice, hardship or injustice to the other party: Alphonse Moroi v Kila Haoda (2014) SC 1379. As to the test in the exercise of judicial discretion, see Matiabe Oberia v Chief Inspector Michael Charlie & two ors (2005) SC801.
    
44. Returning to the case scenario before this Court where, a party files a separate application for leave to review an interlocutory decision after final decision, the court time is best saved because such approach is bound to cause; inconvenience and hardship to parties; increased time and costs; procedural unfairness; prejudice against the party having the benefit of the decision in its favour; convoluted and complicated review processes.
    
45. Importantly, knit-picking different aspects of the trial process for standalone appeals or reviews at the conclusion of trial is an abuse of the court process, with such gravity as to proliferate the mischief in procrastinating and prolonging speedy disposition of the case. The courts ought to rein-in such practices for other reasons, following.
46. Apposite to iterate, an election petition in its uniqueness, falls outside the normal run-of-the-mill common causes. Central to this, is the essence of time circumscribed by the term of Parliament under Constitution s. 105 (General Elections) and the strict legal and procedural requirements under ss. 208, 209 and 2010 of the Organic Law on National & Local Level Government Elections (the Organic Law).This enabling constitutional laws are implemented by the election petition Rules, designed to guide the smooth and speedy disposition of cases.
    
47. In Wari Vele v Powes Parkop (supra) the Supreme Court made it plain, the purpose of the Election Petition Review is not to treat an election petition review as an ordinary matter but, as a special matter requiring constant and close attention to reduce to minimum, the time between the various steps in the review. See also, Philemon Embel v Jeffery Komal (2016) SC 1579. The policy on case management has also shifted to reflect the special nature of election petitions cases. These cases are now given priority attention, through fast-track-lane case listings.
    
48. The smooth and expeditious disposition of elections petition cases are the responsibility of all the parties including the courts. In my view, it behoves upon lawyers involved in election petitions to exercise greater professional independence and moral insight apposite to serving the greater public interest in the finality of litigation. The ordinary people have the right to fair and full representation in Parliament. The voice of the majority having spoken through the election process should not be exasperated by fragmentary claims where, every conceivable fault - real or perceived, is tested all the way to final decision.
    
49. Parties predisposed with fighting election petitions every step of the way ought to bear in mind, the serious adverse consequences and the mischief occasioned by unnecessary procrastinations. The courts also have the duty to guard against abuse and procedural approaches tending to stall and prolong or delay the expeditious completion of proceedings.
    
50. The Supreme Court Rules, 2012 also contribute to the delay. The Rules permit interventions by the Supreme Court at any stage of the trial proceedings through the so-called, “Constitution Section 155(2)(b) Applications”. That process opened the flood-gate for all manner of interlocutory applications for or against compliance with the Rules or dispensation of compliance with the requirement of the Rules, sometimes under the guise of doing justice on the substantive merits of the case.
51. I think, the permissive approach under Constitution s. 155(2)(b) is an inhibiting factor in the development of the original notion, that election petitions be kept simple, less technical, unwieldy and promptly concluded.
    

Election Petitions are intended to be simple and less cumbersome

52. Section 217 of the Organic Law stipulates, that an election petition proceeding must be guided by the substantial merits and good conscience of each case and without regard to legal forms or technicalities. This provision stipulates its own rules of evidence and implores the Court to adopt a more liberal and purposive interpretation so, that trial proceedings are not bogged down with legal forms or technicalities or technical laws and technical rules of the evidence. I consider that this liberal approach also extends to the way the evidence is assessed and weighed. The speedy disposition of election petition cases can be clearly inferred from this arrangement.
    
53. As to the extent of the application of s. 217, judicial opinion is divided. One view is that s. 217 only comes into operation once an election petition has progressed to trial: Delba Biri v Bill Ninkama [1982] PNGLR 342 (Kidu CJ, Kapi DCJ Andrew J). See also, Dick Mune v Paul Poto (No.2) [1997] PNGLR 356; Moi Avei v Charles Manio & Or (1998) SC 584.The other and more recent proposition as represented by the opinion in, Kikala v The Electoral Commission [2013] PGSC 48; SC 1295 (Salika DCJ, Cannings, Kariko JJ)is, that given the distinct nature of election petitions, s. 217 requires the National Court to take a special approach to the hearing of the election petition from the instant any aspect of the petition is before the Court for its determination. See also, Powi v Kaku &Anor (2019) SC1856(Kandakasi, DCJ, Mogish Dingake JJ).
    
54. Those Supreme Court decisions are by three member Benches. With respect, the most recent authority may be preferred as being reflective of progress and changing circumstances. However, it is not binding authority on another Supreme Court of the same composition. (Constitution, Schedule 2.9(2) and Underlying Law Act 2000, s.19(2)). Until settled by a five-member bench, both propositions of law remain persuasive authorities.
    
55. Reading s. 217 together with ss. 220 and 222 of the Organic Law, it is explicit, Parliament intended the liberal and purposive approach in dealing with election petitions. Section 220 forbids an appeal against the National Court decision. The prohibition is in mandatory terms. It affirms the need to protect the integrity of the electoral process based on a rebuttable presumption, that the election results are correctly arrived at. Too, the majority of the electors having spoken through the often difficult and costly election processes ,are entitled to fair and full representation in Parliament. Their rights should not be thwarted by busy bodies and others with predisposed political motives bent on challenging the election results.
    
56. On the other hand, the rule of law must also prevail. It is common occurrence, that the aftermath of elections is inundated with allegations of irregularity, illegality or improper practice or conduct which unduly influenced an election result or compromised the integrity of the election process. Constitution s. 155 (2) (b) gives the Supreme Court the inherent power to review all judicial acts of the National Court where, the applicant has no right of appeal or has lost the right of appeal.
    
57. I consider, that the exercise of a right to seek a judicial review under s. 155(2)(b) must be strictly guided by the prerequisites under the Organic Law, the Rules and principles of law as averted to in, Jurvie Oveyara (2008) SC 935 and the high standard of scrutiny highlighted in Anton Yagama v Peter Charles Yama (supra).
    
58. Section 222 limits representation by a lawyer to the consent of all the parties or by leave of the court. I consider that this provision beseechs the National Court to be satisfied, the lawyer representing one party has the mandate from the other parties or, that leave to appear should be granted. Hence, a lawyer appearing in an election petition must come under strict scrutiny of the Court as to his or her right to appear. Procedurally, lawyers appearing ought to file proof of consent by all the parties or make a formal application and show cause why he or should have leave to appear.
    
59. It is clear, the restriction of legal representation in s. 222 is intended to enhance the liberal/simplicity approach. An ordinary elector who is aggrieved by the election result but cannot afford exorbitant legal fees of a private lawyer should be able to appear in person to prosecute or defend his or her own case in person. The restriction in my view, also intends, that grounds of the petition be drafted in simple form with brief statements of supporting facts under s. 208 (a) of the Organic Law.
    
60. However, the unfortunate reality is, that election petition proceedings have turned out to be a nightmare. Petitions are often drafted in long unwieldy and convoluted fashion they do not make easy reading. In other instances, the petition needlessly knit-picked every conceivable fault, the court is best saved the time on. And the trial proceedings are riddled with applications upon applications ,exacerbated by challenges to interlocutory decisions and final decisions in judicial reviews and slip rule applications.
61. There may be clear cases warranting early disposal or leave to review. Instances of those should be confined to exceptions where breaches of ss. 208 and 209 are clearly incontestable and the election petition cannot proceed because of s.10 of the Organic Law.
    
62. In conclusion, this application is misconceived. It also an abuse of the Court process for several reasons, that:
    
    • The interlocutory decision refusing to dispense with the meaning of “decision” in O.5 r.7 of the Supreme Court Rules has determined that issue. That decision is now absolved into the entire final decision such that, there can only be one judicial review.
    • The same application for dispensation of the meaning of “decision” cannot be heard by the same Court.
    • The applicant deliberately waived his right to make the same application to the full Supreme Court under O.11 r.27 of the Supreme Court Rules.
    • Back-tracking to knit pick an interlocutory decision to review in a piecemeal fashion is an abuse of the court process, it ascribes to delaying tactics and militates against the public interest in speedy disposition of election petition cases.
    • Good administration of election petition cases from filing through to trial proceedings and conclusion of case is essential to allay delays and ensure the smooth and expeditious disposition of cases.
      
63. The application for dispensation of the Rules is refused. I order that:
    
    1. The orders sought in paragraph 1(2) and 1(6) are refused.
    2. The time limit within which to prosecute the application for leave to seek a judicial review of the National Court decision is extended to 16/8/2019.
    3. The applicant shall serve the application and supporting documents on the respondents personally or on their lawyers.
    4. The application shall bear the costs of an incident to this application to be taxed if not agreed.
       

___________________________________________________________
Simpson Lawyers: Lawyers for the Applicant
Fairfax Legal: Lawyers for the First Respondent
Kawat Lawyers: Lawyers for the Second Respondent