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Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]
SCA NO. 114 OF 2017
BETWEEN:
YII ANN HII
Appellant
AND:
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Waigani: Kassman, J
2017: 7th & 14th September
SUPREME COURT – application for stay – principles of application for stay – consideration of – application for stay refused
Cases cited:
Edward Manu Trading as Manu & Associates Lawyers v Vele [2006] PGNC 87 N3097.
Gary McHardy v Prosec Security & Communications Limited trading as Protect Security (2000) PNGLR 279
Kalinoe v Paraka [2010] PGSC 12; SC1024
Mesach Autahe v Paul Korerua (2008) SC956
Mirupasi v Tulapi [2007] PGNC 108 N3249
Rural Development Bank v James Kond (2010) N5876
Wartoto v State [2013] PGSC 59; SC1298
Legislation cited:
Constitution section 155(4)
Supreme Court Act Sections 4, 5(1)(b) and 19
Insolvency Act c.253 Sections 2(1), 27, 28, 97(1), 150 and 154
Counsel:
E P. Asigau, for the Applicant/Appellant
E. Parua and S. Teno, for the Respondent
DECISION
14th September, 2017
1. KASSMAN J: This is the court's ruling on an application for stay filed 31 August 2017 by Yii Ann Hii ("the Applicant") which was moved on 7 September 2017. The Respondent in the substantive appeal and this application for stay is the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia ("the Respondent"). The Applicant relied on the Affidavit of Emmanuel Asigau filed 31 August 2017. The Respondent relied on the Affidavit of Eunice Parua filed 5 September 2017. Written submissions were handed up and exchanged.
2. After hearing submissions, I reserved my decision on the application for stay and adjourned proceedings to 14 September 2017. I also issued interim orders, with the consent of the Respondent, by ordering the Trustee shall not take any further steps other than ascertaining assets and liabilities of the Applicant and verification of creditors claims pending delivery of this decision.
BACKGROUND
3. It is necessary to set out the background facts and circumstances to this appeal as it has its origins from legal proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction Australia and a judgement of that court issued two years ago. Further, the substantive appeal arises from insolvency proceedings commenced in the jurisdiction which are governed by statutory processes prescribed by the Insolvency Act c. 253.
Judgement in Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia
4. In proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia, Registry: Brisbane/Number 5941 of 2013, on 11 May 2015, judgment was entered by consent for the Respondent against the Applicant where the Applicant was ordered to pay the Respondent the sum of AU$59,848,407.32 ("the Queensland SC Judgement").
Registration in PNG of the Queensland SC Judgement
5. On application by the Respondent in National Court proceeding OS No. 48 of 2016 (Comm), the Queensland SC Judgement was registered in this jurisdiction and entered against the Applicant on 30 March 2016 pursuant to an Order made 24 March 2016 for the amount of K57,024,877.57 ("the judgment sum").
Insolvency proceedings
6. Despite demands by the Respondent for payment from the Applicant, the judgment sum remained unpaid. On 15 August 2017, the Applicant was adjudged insolvent by the National Court in proceedings MP (COM) No. 37 of 2016 ("the Insolvency proceedings"). When the National Court adjudged the applicant insolvent, the court also ordered the Applicant disclose to the Trustee by 8 September 2017 a full, true and accurate statement of his debts and liabilities of every kind and of the name and residences as far as they are known to him of his creditors and the causes of his inabilities to meet his engagements. Further, the court also ordered that all creditors shall meet for the election of a Trustee at 10am on 11 September 2017.
Grounds of Appeal from insolvency order
7. On 21 August 2017, the Applicant filed this appeal from the judgment of the National Court in the Insolvency proceedings of 15 August 2017. The Notice of Appeal states seven grounds of appeal which I understand to be raising essentially three main grounds. Firstly, the Applicant argues the National Court erred in finding the Applicant was a resident of the jurisdiction and was "resident" in Papua New Guinea within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Insolvency Act. Secondly, the Applicant argues the National Court erred in finding the Applicant had property in the jurisdiction and was therefore "resident" in Papua New Guinea within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Insolvency Act. Thirdly, the Applicant argues the National Court erred in finding the creditor's petition was duly signed by the Respondent as petitioning creditor when it was signed by someone other than the Respondent who was not so authorised within the meaning of Sections 27 or 28 of the Insolvency Act.
8. In the course of submissions, Counsel for the Applicant informed the court the Applicant had not challenged the Queensland SC Judgement of 11 May 2015 in that Court or such other court of competent jurisdiction in Australia. Counsel for the Applicant also informed the court the Applicant had not challenged, in the National Court or the Supreme Court in this jurisdiction, registration in PNG on 24 March 2016 of the Queensland SC Judgement. I will return to this when discussing factors relevant to the exercise of discretion on the application for stay.
APPLICATION FOR STAY
9. Pending the hearing and determination of the substantive appeal, the Applicant applies for a stay of the Insolvency proceedings and in particular the judgment of the National Court of 15 August 2017 which declared the Applicant insolvent. The Applicant argues his appeal raises serious questions and a prima facie case which is not without merit and, if a stay is not granted, the appeal is liable to be rendered nugatory. Further, the Applicant argues if a stay is not granted, the damage and inconvenience likely to be suffered will outweigh the prejudice to the Respondent if a stay is granted.
Jurisdiction
10. The application for stay is made pursuant to section 5(1)(b) and/or section 19 of the Supreme Court Act, and/or section 155(4) of the Constitution. These provide:
Section 5(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act
"5. Incidental directions and interim orders.
(1) Where an appeal is pending before the Supreme Court—
(b) an interim order to prevent prejudice to the claims of the parties;"
Section 19 of the Supreme Court Act
"19. Stay of proceedings on appeal.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court or a Judge, an appeal, or an application for leave to appeal, to the Supreme Court does not operate as a stay of proceedings."
Section 155(4) of the Constitution.
“155. The National Judicial System.
Both the Supreme Court and the National Court have an inherent power to make, in such circumstances as seem to them proper, orders in the nature of prerogative writs and such other orders as are necessary to do justice in the circumstances of a particular case.”
11. By Section 19, the Supreme Court, whether sitting as the full court or as a single judge, has the power to order a stay of proceedings. An interim stay is by its name and nature an interim order and by Section 5(1)(b), a judge of the Supreme Court sitting as a single judge of the Supreme Court has the power to issue an interim stay of proceedings where it is an interim order to prevent prejudice to the claims of the parties. The applicant and respondent were in agreement on this. By my reading of Section 5(1)(b), a judge of the Supreme Court sitting as a single judge of the Supreme Court has no power to issue a permanent stay of proceedings.
12. I do not think it is necessary to consider Section 155(4) of the Constitution other than to repeat what was said in Avia Aihi v The State [1988] PNGLR 81 that Section 155(4) does not confer a primary right and neither does it recreate a primary right. As stated above, the reliance on Sections 5(1)(b) and 19 of the Supreme Court Act are sufficient authority to hear and determine an application for stay in this matter.
Application for Stay - principles applicable
13. The Applicant and the Respondent agree the principles applicable on an application for stay pending appeal have been discussed in numerous judgments of the National Court and the Supreme Court in this jurisdiction and that the leading case is the Supreme Court's decision in Gary McHardy v Prosec Security & Communications Limited trading as Protect Security (2000) PNGLR 279 where the court heard and determined an application for stay filed pursuant to Section 19 of the Supreme Court Act.
"..... [The principal premises [is] that the judgment creditor is entitled to the benefits of the judgment. The other factors include the following:
(a) Whether leave to appeal is required and whether it has been obtained;
(b) Whether there has been any delay in making the application;
(c) Possible hardship, inconvenience or prejudice to either party;
(d) the nature of the judgment sought to be stayed;
(e) The financial ability of the applicant;
(f) Preliminary assessment about whether the applicant has an arguable case on the proposed appeal;
(g) Whether on the face of the record of the judgment there may be indicated apparent error of law or procedure;
(h) The overall interest of justice;
(i) Balance of convenience;
(j) Whether damages would be sufficient remedy".
14. The principal premise is that the party in whose favour judgment has been obtained in the trial court is entitled to the benefit of that judgment. The onus therefore rests with the applicant to demonstrate why the appeal court should intervene and stall enforcement, implementation or the operation of the judgment of the trial court.
15. The Supreme Court has said "the discretion available to the Judge or the Court when deciding whether to grant the interim orders or a stay of proceedings, is very broad ..." Kalinoe v Paraka [2010] PGSC 12; SC1024. In that case, the Supreme Court also said an applicant, in the Supreme Court, for stay is not required to provide an undertaking as to damages.
16. Firstly, I must examine the nature of the order sought to be stayed. I should refuse the application for stay where the order sought to be stayed is an interim order and there is recourse available, to the applicant in the court below, to set-aside the order sought to be stayed. I should also refuse the application for stay if leave to appeal is required and has not been obtained. Likewise, if the order is final and the main ground of appeal raises a question of fact for which leave is required, and has not been obtained, I should refuse the application for stay.
17. Secondly, I must assess whether there has been any delay in the filing and moving of the application for stay. If there is unreasonable delay, I should refuse the application for stay. I must draw my attention to the period from the date of the order sought to be stayed to the dates the applicant filed the appeal, filed the application for stay, served the application for stay; and moved the application for stay. Any unexplained or unreasonable delay will be taken to demonstrate that the application for stay is designed to simply deny the respondent the benefit of the order sought to be stayed.
18. Thirdly, I must examine any serious jurisdictional issues in the appeal proceeding which are apparent the court or raised by the respondent by notice of objection to competency or in submissions by the respondent which need to be addressed as an immediate priority. If any serious jurisdictional issues are raised, I should give priority to determination of the jurisdictional issue over the application for stay.
19. Fourthly, I should ascertain whether there are strong prospects on the merits of the appeal. I should grant the application for stay (a) if there is apparent error of law or procedure; and (b) if there are arguable (and not weak) grounds of appeal raised; and (c) where there is commitment by the applicant to prosecute its appeal with due diligence.
20. Fifthly, I must then assess the overall interests of justice by weighing up the competing arguments about hardship or prejudice to be suffered if I grant or refuse the application for stay. If the hardship or prejudice is greater to the Applicant, I should grant the application for stay. If hardship or prejudice is greater to the beneficiary of the order sought to be stayed, then I should refuse the application for stay. I should also examine any other interests affected by the order sought to be stayed and also any other interest that have the potential to be affected by the grant of the stay order.
21. Even where there are strong prospects on the merits of the appeal, I should not hesitate to exercise my discretion to refuse the application for stay where an award of damages will be sufficient remedy to the applicant and where the respondent to the application for stay being the beneficiary of the order sought to be stayed has financial capacity to pay damages for any loss sustained by the applicant as a result of a refusal of the application for stay. The same should apply where the competing interests of justice are equal or balanced as between the applicant and respondent.
22. Further, the application for stay should be refused where the applicant does not have the financial capacity to pay damages to the respondent, the beneficiary of the order sought to be stayed, for any consequences of the grant of a stay in the event the applicant's appeal is dismissed.
23. In determining whether there will be possible hardship, inconvenience and prejudice to the parties, the Supreme Court has said it is relevant to emphasise that the right to appeal is a statutory right and that is fundamental to ensure an appellant has the full protection of the law. The execution of the judgment and the relevant orders before the appeal is heard and determined would render the Appellant's right to appeal futile and nugatory. Where it has been the case that not granting a stay rendered the right to appeal "futile, nugatory and hypothetical", the Courts consider it the proper exercise of the discretion to grant a stay in order to upload an appellant's fundamental right to appeal, and have their case properly heard Wartoto v State [2013] PGSC 59; SC1298
24. I also make the following observations. The hearing of the application for stay in most appeals will be the first opportunity for the Supreme Court, and another opportunity for the parties in the appeal, to ascertain (a) the issues for determination in the substantive appeal; (b) the strengths of the appellant's case; (c) the strength of the respondent's case; and (c) whether the respondent is serious with the order or judgment obtained in its favour in the court below. It is also another opportunity for the parties to reassess their respective positions following the orders or judgment of the trial court and explore avenues to resolve their ongoing dispute.
McHardy principles - Arguments raised by the parties
25. The nature of the judgment sought to be stayed; Whether leave to appeal is required and whether it has been obtained? The Applicant says the judgment sought to be stayed is a final judgment and leave to appeal is not required. The Respondent says, although the judgment sought to be stayed is final in the ordinary sense, the Appellant has recourse in the court below to apply to the National Court to review, rescind and vary the order which the Appellant seeks to stay and that is a process available to the Appellant, and not taken by the Appellant, under section 150 of the Insolvency Act. The Respondent also says the Appellant has recourse in the court below to apply to the National Court for a stay of the same order the Appellant seeks to stay in this court and that is a process available to the Appellant, and not taken by the Appellant, under section 154 of the Insolvency Act. The Appellant has failed to exhaust processes available under the very statute invoked by the Respondent in obtaining the orders now sought to be stayed. Sections 150 and 154 provide:
150. Power of review.
The Court may review, rescind or vary any order made by it under this Act.
154. Staying of proceedings.
On proof to its satisfaction that any proceedings in insolvency ought to be stayed—
(a) because negotiations are pending for the liquidation of the affairs of the insolvent by arrangement, or for the acceptance of
a composition by the creditors, under Part XIV.; or
(b) for any other sufficient reason,
the Court may at any time make an order staying the proceedings, altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and subject to such conditions as the Court thinks just.
26. By Section 150, the National Court has the power to review, rescind and vary its own orders issued in the same insolvency proceeding. The wording of Section 150 is self explanatory. Before filing this appeal, the Applicant could have filed and moved an made application in the National Court pursuant to Section 150 to review, rescind and vary its own orders issued on 15 August 2017.
27. The Respondent referred to matters where applications to review, rescind or vary an order made under the Insolvency Act were made pursuant to Section 150 in National Court proceeding Rural Development Bank v James Kond (2010) N5876; Mirupasi v Tulapi [2007] PGNC 108 N3249; Edward Manu Trading as Manu & Associates Lawyers v Vele [2006] PGNC 87 N3097. I have perused those judgments and note applications were made in the National Court pursuant to Section 150. That demonstrates that there is recourse available to the Applicant in the National Court pursuant to Section 150.
28. By Section 154, the National Court has the power to stay its own orders issued in the same insolvency proceeding. The wording of Section 150 is self explanatory. Section 154 is clear in providing avenue to stay the insolvency proceeding for the reasons stated in sub-paragraph (a) or "for any other sufficient reason" as provided in sub-paragraph (b). Such application for stay can be made to the National Court at any time and that court can stay the insolvency proceedings "altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and subject to such terms as the Court thinks just". Before filing the application for stay in this court, the Applicant could have filed and moved an made application in the National Court pursuant to Section 154 to stay its own orders issued on 15 August 2017.
29. The Respondent did not refer to any judgments of the National Court where application for stay was made pursuant to Section 154 and neither was I able to find any in my limited research of PNG cases but as discussed above, the Applicant had, and still has, the opportunity to file and move an application in the National Court pursuant to Section 154 to stay its own orders issued on 15 August 2017.
30. The Appellant says any application whether pursuant to section 150 or section 154 of the Insolvency Act will be a futile exercise as he would be raising the same arguments raised prior to the grant of the insolvency orders and such an approach would be met with the res judicata argument and the Appellant's only recourse was to file this appeal. That submission is a concession to the position that the applicant has recourse in the National Court pursuant to section 150 or section 154 as discussed above.
31. That line of argument also tells me the Applicant is only concerned with the process by which the Respondent obtained the insolvency orders in the National Court on 15 August 2017. That also tells me the Applicant has no issue with the judgment or award obtained by the Respondent, which I add, was obtained by consent against the Respondent in the Queensland SC Judgement. Further, neither is the Applicant concerned with registration in this jurisdiction of the Queensland SC Judgement.
32. I am satisfied that there is recourse available to the Applicant in the trial court to set-aside the order sought to be stayed. This will be one reason why I should refuse the application for stay. I will address the other criteria in the exercise of my discretion.
33. Any delay? The Applicant says there has been no delay in making this application. The decision of the National Court was handed down on 15 August 2017. The Appellant filed his appeal on 21 August 2017 which was served along with this application for stay on 31 August 2017. The application for stay was moved on 7 September 2017. The Respondent concedes there has been no delay. I am satisfied there has been no delay on the part of the Applicant in filing, serving and moving his application for stay.
34. Are there any serious jurisdictional issues that may affect the competency of the appeal? The Respondent argues the Applicant is insolvent and has no standing to commence this appeal proceeding or take any other step, including this application for stay, unless and until he is discharged from the adjudication of insolvency. On 1 September 2017, the Respondent filed Notice of Objection to Competency of the appeal. The competency of the appeal is a matter that goes to the full court for determination. For the purposes of assessment of the strength of the appeal as it stands, I am obliged to examine and comment on the competency issue raised. The Respondent argues the Applicant has no legal standing in three respects.
35. Firstly, the Respondent argues the Applicant has no legal standing to invoke the inherent powers of the court as an insolvent. The Respondent relies on the Supreme Court decision in Mesach Autahe v Paul Korerua (2008) SC956 where the Supreme Court held that unless and until an applicant's insolvency is discharged by operation of law, he has no legal standing to seek a review as a normal person with legal standing. From my perusal of that decision, there is no distinction to be drawn between a review and an appeal as in this substantive proceeding. This objection has strong prospects of success.
36. Secondly, the Respondent argues the Applicant has no legal standing as an insolvent pursuant to section 4 of the Supreme Court Act. The Respondent has not expanded on this aspect in submissions. The discussion raised above will apply here.
37. Thirdly, the Respondent argues the Applicant has no legal standing as an insolvent in that this is not an appeal pursuant to section 97(1) of the Insolvency Act. Section 97 provides;
(1) The insolvent or a creditor, debtor or other person aggrieved by any act or decision of a trustee may appeal to the Court.
38. The Respondent is correct in saying this is not an appeal made pursuant to Section 97(1). However, the Applicant does not say this appeal is made pursuant to Section 97(1). I understand the Applicant filed the substantive appeal as of right pursuant to section 14 of the Supreme Court Act on the basis the decision of the National Court of 15 August 2017 is a final decision and raises questions of law or mixed fact and law.
39. Section 97(1) would not be applicable in the circumstances of this appeal as Section 97(1) applies to appeals filed in the National Court, and not the Supreme Court, from decisions of a trustee acting in accordance with provisions of the Insolvency Act following the adjudication of insolvency. This is an appeal from an adjudication of insolvency by the National Court. This ground of objection raised by the Respondent does not make sense and is liable to be dismissed.
40. Preliminary assessment about whether the applicant has an arguable case on the proposed appeal; Whether on the face of the record of the judgment there may be indicated apparent error of law or procedure; The Applicant says he has an arguable appeal. As discussed above, the Applicant in his Notice of Appeal states seven grounds of appeal which I understand to be raising essentially three main grounds.
41. Section 2(1) of the Insolvency Act which provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act relating to the adjudication of insolvency apply to all debtors who are resident in, or have property in, the country.
42. Firstly, the Applicant argues the National Court erred in finding the Applicant was a resident of the jurisdiction and was therefore "resident" in Papua New Guinea within the meaning of section 2(1). From my perusal of the transcript of the judgment by the primary judge, there was no such finding made by the learned primary judge as alleged by the Applicant. I also agree with the Respondent that there is no provision in the Insolvency Act that prevents the making of an adjudication of insolvency to a person without "territorial connection". So it was certainly open to the learned trial judge to find that the National Court had jurisdiction on finding the Applicant as the debtor had "property" within the country.
43. Secondly, the Applicant argues the National Court erred in finding the Applicant had property in the jurisdiction and was therefore "resident" in Papua New Guinea within the meaning of section 2(1).
44. The primary judge said "I am satisfied that the Respondent has property in Papua New Guinea by virtue of having an obligation within Papua New Guinea to pay money that constitutes a judgment sum as ordered by a judgement registered in Papua New Guinea. Consequently, I am satisfied that the respondent does come within section 2(1) of the Insolvency Act and this court does have jurisdiction to hear the petition." The Applicant argues the primary judge should have found that there was no evidence establishing the Applicant had a requisite territorial connection with Papua New Guinea specifically as resident in or having property in the country. From my consideration of this issue, the Applicant has not identified any error in the reasoning of the learned primary judge.
45. Thirdly, the Applicant argues the National Court erred in finding the creditor's petition was duly signed by the Respondent as petitioning creditor when it was signed by someone other than the Respondent who was not so authorised within the meaning of Sections 27 or 28 of the Insolvency Act which provide:
A creditor's petition shall be signed by the petitioner or a person authorized by Section 28 to verify the petition.
(1) Subject to this Act, a creditor's petition shall be verified by the oath of the petitioner.
(2) Where the petitioning creditor is a corporation, joint-stock company or company authorized to sue in the name of a public officer, the petition may be verified by the manager, secretary or other authorized officer of the corporation or company.
(3) Where the petitioning creditors are two or more persons in partnership, the petition may be verified by one only of the partners.
(4) Where the petitioning creditor is out of the country, the petition may be verified by his duly authorized attorney or agent in the country
(5) The verification shall be—
(a) by affidavit in Form 3; and
(b) annexed or subscribed to the petition.
(6) Where a petition is verified by a person other than a petitioner, he shall also show in the affidavit verifying the petition that he is authorized under this Act to verify the petition.
46. In James Kond v National Development Bank (2015) SC1432, the appellant argued, as the applicant argues here, that the creditor’s petition was incompetent for being signed by someone other than the petitioning creditor. In the Kond matter, the creditor’s petition was in fact signed by the lawyer for the Petitioner Company which act was affirmed by an officer of the Petitioner in an affidavit verifying the petition. The Supreme Court endorsed the view of the primary judge, who is coincidentally the same as the primary judge in this appeal, that "the signing of a creditor's petition of a company petitioner by a lawyer so authorised to sign but who is not an officer of the company, does not render the creditor’s petition a nullity. Further, when such a petition is properly verified as in this instance, the omission of the person signing the creditor's petition not being an officer of the company petitioner is not such that the creditor's petition should be rescinded or set aside or that the proceedings in which it was issued should be dismissed." The reasoning of that decision is sound and I have no basis to differ.
47. For the reasons discussed above, I am of the respectful view the appeal has poor prospects of success and the Respondent has strong prospects of success on the objection to competency.
48. The overall interest of justice; As stated above, I should also examine any other interests affected by the order sought to be stayed and also any other interest that have the potential to be affected by the grant of the stay order. Other creditors who have made known their interest in the insolvency proceeding will certainly be affected by a stay of the insolvency adjudication of 15 August 2017. Any prolonging of the insolvency proceedings will have a detrimental effect on those creditors, both secured and unsecured, who will want to know quickly the fate of their claims. The required notices of insolvency have been published in the two daily newspapers on 29 August 2017 and 1 September 2017 and creditors will be keenly awaiting the creditors meeting and other consequential processes. Business processes operate and function most efficiently where there is certainty in business and where there is certainty in the application and interpretation of applicable laws.
49. Whether damages would be sufficient remedy; I agree with the Respondent that the Applicant has not produced any evidence to show that there would be any loss or irreparable injury other that what can be expressed in monetary terms. I am also satisfied, in the circumstances of this case, damages will be a sufficient remedy in the event the appeal is successful. The Applicant has not argued the Respondent will be unable to meet an award of damages. Any orders flowing from the insolvency adjudication can be reversed with appropriate orders as to the accounts, property and other interests of the Applicant and with necessary modifications to the Respondent's assessments on the Applicants tax liability.
50. Possible hardship, inconvenience or prejudice to either party. The financial ability of the applicant; Balance of convenience; Having expressed fairly strong views that the appeal has poor prospects of success, that there are strong prospects on the objection to competency and assessing in favour of the Respondent the other considerations, I do not feel it necessary to necessary to consider closely the remaining considerations other than to say I consider it is in the overall interests of justice to refuse the application for stay and order that the parties diligently prosecute the appeal and objection to competency.
51. With that in mind, I will also proceed to issue directions as to the immediate prosecution of the appeal and objection to competency with a view to have those matters heard in the October 2017 sittings of the Supreme Court.
52. The formal orders of the court are:
Judgment accordingly,
___________________________________________________________
Pacific Legal Group Lawyers: Lawyers for the Appellant
Leahy Lewin Lowing Sullivan Lawyers: Lawyers for the Respondent
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