Sonk v Marape [2025] PGNC 426; N11533 (20 October 2025)

N11533

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS (JR) NO 110 OF 2025

BETWEEN
WAPU RODNEY SONK
Plaintiff

HON. JAMES MARAPE, PRIME MINISTER, AND KUMUL PETROLEUM TRUSTEE
First Defendant

AND
GEREA AOPI, as the purported Chairman of the Board of Kumul Petroleum Holdings Ltd and GEORGE GWARE, SANARAM SRINIVASAN and JACOB ANGA as the purported Directors of Kumul Petroleum Holdings Ltd appointed in June 2025
Second Defendant

AND
DR BENEDICT YARU in his capacity as the Chairman of the Incumbent Board of Kumul Petroleum Holdings Ltd
Third Defendant

AND
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Fourth Defendant


WAIGANI: PURDON-SULLY J
7, 8, 20 OCTOBER 2025

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Application for leave to review – Application by State to summarily dismiss leave application as abuse of process – Multiplicity of proceedings considered – Abuse of process considered – Authorities considered – Application dismissed as abuse of process - Standing to bring leave application also considered – Applicant has failed to established standing – Leave application should be dismissed on this basis alone - Order 16 r 13(13)(a) & (b), Order 16 r 3 National Court Rules – Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited Authorisation Act 2015

Cases cited
Anderson Agiru v Electoral Commission [2002] SC687
Batistatos v. Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256
Chow v Samson [2020] N8667
Ekip v Gamato [2017] SC1594
Hon Mao Zeming v Justice Timothy Hinchcliffe [2005] SC791
Jacob Popuna v. Ken Owa (2017) SC1564
Kalapi Transport Ltd v Eastern Highlands PEC [2024] N10972
Karl Paul v Aruai Kispe and Ors [2001] N2085
Keka v Yafaet [2018] SC1673
Koaba v Peter [2024] PGNC 223; N10896
Kupo v Independent State of Papua New Guinea [2025] PGSC 24; SC2713
Makeng v Timbers PNG) Ltd [2008] N3317
Mari v Marape [2022] SC2311
Matava v Sungi [2024] SC2567
Mathew Sisimolu & 1 Or v Phillip Kende and Ors [2022] SC2267
Mondiai v Wawoi Guavi Timber Co Ltd [2007] SC886
National Airports Corporaiton Limited v Simatap [2019] SC1883
O’Neill v Eliakim [2016] SC1539
Papua New Guinea Air Pilots Association v. Director of Civil Aviation and National Airline Commission [1983] PNGLR 1
Pruaitch v Manek [2019] SC1884
R v Inland Revenue Commissioners Ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1981] UKHL 2; [1982] AC 617
Rogers v The Queen [1994] HCA 42
Smith v Ruma Constructions Limited [2002] SC695
Somare v Manek [2011] SC118
Telikom (PNG) Ltd v Independent Consumer and Competition Commission [2008] PGSC 5; SC906 [2008] SC906
Wiko Development Corporation Ltd v Samson [2025] PGSC 40; SC2732
Wilson v Kuburam [2016] SC1489

Counsel
Mr J Holingu, for the plaintiff
Mr D Mel, for the State

JUDGMENT

1. PURDON-SULLY J: This is an application by the Plaintiff, Mr Sonk, pursuant to an Originating Summons filed on 25 September 2025 seeking leave to judicially review decisions by the First Defendant effected by way of instrument dated 10 June 2025 and three (3) different instruments dated 26 June 2025 appointing a Chairman and directors to Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited.
2. The application for leave is made under Order 16 r 3 of the National Court Rules (NCR).
3. If the Plaintiff is successful in securing a grant of leave he seeks further relief in accordance with a Notice of Motion filed on 25 September 2025 in the nature of stay and interim injunction orders pursuant to Order 16 r 3(8) of the NCR.
4. The Fourth Defendant, The Independent State of Papua New Guinea, who by virtue of s 8 of the Claims by and Against the State Act and Order 16 r 3(3) of the NRC is required to be heard on a leave application, seeks orders pursuant to a Notice of Motion filed on 30 September 2025 seeking summary dismissal of the Plaintiff’s application for leave on the basis that the proceedings are an abuse of court process being frivolous and vexatious and failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. The State does not press its alternative position, namely dismissal by reason of the proceedings being res judicata and/or issue estoppel.
5. The State’s motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Order 16 r 13(13)(2((a) and (2)(b)(a) of the NCR. It provides the jurisdictional basis for the Court to summarily dismiss a matter, inter alia on the basis of competency.
6. For convenience in these reasons I shall refer to:
   1. Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited as “KPHL”
   2. the Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited Authorisation Act 2015 as “the Act”
   100. the Plaintiff as “Mr Sonk”
   4. the First Defendant as “the Prime Minister”
   5. the Second Defendants as “the current board”
   6. the KPHL board at the time of the decisions as “the former board”
   7. The Third Defendant as “Dr Yaru” or “the former Chairman”
   8. The Fourth Defendant as “the State”
   9. The decisions the subject of leave for judicial review as “the decisions”.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

7. Before outlining the relevant background, there is a preliminary issue and that is whether I should hear and determine the State’s motion to dismiss first or proceed to hear the leave application on its merits.
8. It is submitted on behalf of the State that its revised approach is to seek summary dismissal of the proceedings based solely on the issue of abuse of court process, namely multiplicity of proceedings. It is contended that the nature of the abuse of process arguments to be made in its dismissal application cannot be adequately addressed in a consideration of either one of the requirements for a grant of leave for judicial review, namely, locus standi, arguable case, alternative remedies, delay and decision of a public body.
9. It is submitted that there are two ways the Court can approach the matter, firstly, the Court can deal with the State’s dismissal application as a stand-alone application and then make a ruling on that one and the outcome of that will then determine how the matter proceeds. If it is upheld, then the proceedings are dismissed. If it is refused, then the matter proceeds to the leave stage. The other way is to hear both the application for dismissal first and then proceed with the leave application and then if the Court grants the dismissal application, then that is the end of the matter and if the Court refuses the dismissal application, then the Court can rule on the application for leave.
10. It is submitted on behalf of Mr Sonk that his first position is that the Court should consider the leave application first with the application to dismiss heard after that if leave is granted. It is contended that the State wants to end the proceeding before it has begun and that that, in itself, is an abuse of process. It is submitted that the nature of the leave application itself is that there is a checklist that an applicant is required to satisfy the Court before the door opens for substantive hearing hence the application to dismiss the proceeding should come after leave is heard and Court makes a determination, because if the Court refuses leave, that is the end of the matter. The State’s application thus wants to end that process before it even begins and that is an abuse of process itself. Alternatively, the issues raised by the State can be made in response to the leave application and the leave application can be heard and the State can make its response.
11. I accept the submissions on behalf of the State. Having heard submissions on both applications I propose to consider the State’s application first.
12. The State’s application is about abuse of procedure. There is no issue that the Court has power to summarily determine a proceeding, here the leave application, either on application by a party or on the Court’s own volition if the Court concludes that there has been an abuse of the Court’s processes. I am satisfied that the State’s motion for summary determination is properly before the Court and that I should hear it first as a stand-alone application, make a ruling on that and depending on the outcome then proceed to determine the application for leave.
13. While Mr Sonk is yet to be granted leave to proceed with his application for judicial review, the National and Supreme Court has an inherent power to intervene at any stage of a proceeding to prevent an abuse of process (Somare v Manek [2011] SC118; Pruaitch v Manek [2019] SC1884).
14. The Court’s discretion to screen out claims including claims for leave for judicial review as an abuse of process of the Court is a wide one (Keka v Yafaet [2018] SC1673 citing with approval Karl Paul v Aruai Kispe and Ors [2001] N2085 at [26]).
15. Whether a matter is an abuse of process is an issue of competency. Proceedings that are an abuse of process cannot be said to be properly before the Court.
16. While many of the arguments raised in the leave application may find their way into the application for leave for judicial review, in my discretion, and in light of the arguments raised on multiplicity of proceeding, as a basis for abuse of process, I have concluded that the better approach is to proceed as outlined. I see no significant prejudice to Mr Sonk in that approach.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

17. The background to the matter is detailed at [5] of the Statement in Support filed 25 September 2025, Mr Sonk’s affidavits and the written submissions.
18. Mr Sonk seeks leave to judicially review the decisions as particularized in his Originating Summons and at [3] of his Statement in Support which concern the appointments of current board of KPHL consisting of Mr Gerea Aopi as Chairman and Messrs George Gware, Jacob Anga and Sundaram Srinivasan as directors of the board and by instrument dated 10 June 2025 and three instruments dated 26 June 2025 the inference that Mr Yaru the Third Defendant had already retired or had been removed as a director of KPHL and Chairman of the board by operation of the law or by law he assumed was self-executing.
19. It is Mr Sonk’s case that the appointments were unlawful, inter alia by reason of a failure to follow the mandatory process for appointment as prescribed under s 10 of the Act as particularized in his Statement. It is his case that a failure to comply with the requirements of the Act risks serious reputational and commercial damage to the country.
20. Since the making of the decisions both the former board and the current board have held themselves out as the lawfully appointed board of KPHL.
21. KPHL is a State-owned Enterprise involved in the conduct of oil and gas exploration and development in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Its principal objective is to hold and develop petroleum interests and projects in the country.
22. It is the exclusive nominee of the State in oil and gas projects under the Oil and Gas Act 1998. It holds equity, manages licenses and plays a critical role in the PNG LNG Gas Project by managing and maximising the value of the country’s petroleum assets.
23. While not a State instrumentality and its assets not public assets, by virtue of its governing legislation and following the coming into operation of the Act, the Kumul Petroleum Trustee, the State and KPHL entered into the Kumul Petroleum Trust Deed whereby the Kumul Petroleum Trustee, as trustee, holds the Kumul Petroleum Shares for and on behalf of the State (s 4(1) of the Act).
24. The Kumul Petroleum Trustee is whoever holds the Office of Prime Minister of PNG from time to time, in this case the First Defendant, the Hon James Marape MP (s 4(2) of the Act).
25. The composition of the board and appointment procedures are set out in s 10 of the Act.
26. The Board of KPHL comprises of seven (7) directors (s 10(1)).
27. One of the directors is the Managing Director of KPHL (s 10(3)).
28. Each of the directors is appointed for a term of up to three (3) years, other than the Managing Director (s 10(4)).
29. The members of the board are appointed by the Prime Minister in his capacity as Kumul Petroleum Trustee (s 10(8)).
30. By letter dated 7 May 2025 the former Chairman, Dr Yaru, wrote to the Prime Minister notifying him of Board vacancies, that the board had engaged an external recruiter in July 2024 to initiate the recruiting process and on reviewing its report, recommended three (3) candidates for appointment to the board.
31. By appointment instrument on 10 June 2025 the Prime Minister appointed Mr Aopi as Chairman of Kumul and on 26 June 2025 he appointed three new directors all of whom comprise the Second Defendant in these proceedings. The appointments were made purportedly on the basis that there was no quorum on the board.
32. Until 12 September 2025 Mr Sonk was Managing Director of KPHL and by virtue of that position a director on the Board.
33. On 12 September 2025 Mr Sonk received by email a Notice of Suspension from duties signed by Mr Aopi, the Chairman of the current board. The Plaintiff was suspended on full pay. He was served with the notice on 18 September 2025.
34. The current board appointed Mr Luke Liria as Acting Managing Director for a period of three months. At the time of his appointment he was employed by KPHL in the substantive position as Executive General Manager Corporate Services. As Acting Managing Director he will also act as director on the Board.
35. On 25 September 2025 Mr Sonk filed these proceedings seeking leave to challenge the decisions. He raises the following grounds of review:
    1. Jurisdictional error/ultra vires/illegality
    2. Error of law on the face of the record
    100. Breach of statutory procedure
    4. Decision was a legal nullity
    5. Failure to comply with a condition precedent
    6. Bad faith
    7. Irrelevant considerations
    8. Breach of natural justice
36. Mr Sonk seeks the relief at [4] of his Statement, inter alia in the form of certiorari quashing the decisions, declarations that the instruments of appointment and the appointments of the current board are unlawful and invalid, that the former board is lawfully constituted, a permanent injunction restraining the current board from holding themselves out as and exercising the powers of Chairman and directors of KPHL and an interim injunction restraining the Prime Minister and current board from taking any action or making any decisions on the retirement, removal or appointment of directors of the board to suspend, remove or terminate Mr Sonk.
37. Subject to the grant of leave he seeks interim orders in his Notice of Motion staying the decisions which would reinstate the former board and restraints on taking any steps on his suspension or to otherwise remove or terminate him.

ABUSE OF PROCESS

38. It is submitted on behalf of Mr Sonk that there has been no abuse of process. It is submitted that while a central tenet of the judicial system is that controversies once resolved are not be reopened, and that multiplicity of proceeding is an abuse of process, the present proceedings do not rise to multiplicity of proceedings or an abuse of process within the meaning of Kupo v Independent State of Papua New Guinea [2025] PGSC 24; SC2713 and Telikom (PNG) Ltd v Independent Consumer and Competition Commission [2008] PGSC 5; SC906 [2008] SC906 and related authorities.
39. It is submitted that the authorities make clear that multiplicity arises only where two or more proceedings concerning the same subject matter are current or pending at the same time or whether a party after final determination seek to relitigate the same cause of action or remedy in a piecemeal manner. It is the existence of overlapping proceedings which is “noxious” and presumptively abusive, not the mere fact that several distinct proceedings have been filed at different times, especially where each was discontinued or dismissed without adjudication on the merits.
40. It is contended that in the present case there are no parallel or concurrent proceedings. Each had been withdrawn, discontinued or dismissed before any substantive determination was made on the validity of the Prime Minister’s appointments or removals under the Act. The present proceeding is the first and only live action properly involving the Court’s judicial review jurisdiction to test those decisions on their merits. Moreover, the parties and causes of action in the earlier proceedings were not identical. Some were commenced by Dr Yaru in his capacity as Chairman, others by Mr Sonk and Mr Pipi as directors. Several proceedings were procedural in nature (for example, concerning joinder or suspension issues) and were discontinued once it became apparent that judicial review was the proper forum.
41. I turn firstly to general principles.
42. The Court has an inherent power to intervene and prevent an abuse of its processes. The purpose of Order 16 r 13(13)(2)(a) of NCR is to give the Court power to terminate actions or claims which are untenable. A claim that is an abuse of process in an untenable claim. It can also be characterised as one that is frivolous or vexatious because it can not possibly succeed.
43. A Court, however, should be cautious and slow in exercising its discretionary power to remove a plaintiff from the judgment seat in a summary manner. (Takori v Yagari [2007] SC905).
44. There has been substantial judicial pronouncement on what constitutes an abuse of process.
45. In Anderson Agiru v Electoral Commission [2002] SC687 (Agiru) the Court (Hinchliffe J, Jalina J, Batari J) said:

The basic principles that are to be applied when the court is considering whether or not there has been an abuse of its processes have been succinctly put before us by Mr. Cannings in his submissions. Those principles in essence are that, the court’s inherent power is its authority to do all things that are necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such inherent power consists of all powers reasonably required to enable the court to perform efficiently its judicial functions and to protect its dignity and integrity. Essential to these inherent powers is the court’s duty to protect itself by ensuring that vexatious litigants do not abuse the court’s process by instituting frivolous or vexatious suits. It behoves litigants therefore to carefully choose their causes of action before they commence proceedings in this Court purporting to enforce their rights. The court should summarily dismiss proceedings it considers frivolous, vexatious or is an abuse of process. (see, generally, Ronney Wabia v BP Exploration Operating Co. Ltd & Ors, Unreported National Court Judgment N1697dated 28 March 1998).

....

The court must ensure that a multiplicity of proceedings is not commenced by unsuccessful litigants. That is that a litigant having selected one mode of proceeding and having failed to obtain a remedy, cannot generally be entitled to then institute an alternative proceeding seeking the same remedy that was denied in the earlier proceeding. This has been clearly set out by the Supreme Court in National Excutive Council v Public Employees Association [1993] PNGLR 264 where it was held:

"An abuse of the process of the court may arise where, in an application for a remedy under O 16 r 1 (1), a party can also obtain a declaration or injunction but does not do so and, subsequently, applies to obtain such an order by way of writ or originating summons in a separate proceeding. That would be an attempt to avoid the requirements under O 16 and would, as well, constitute multiplicity of proceedings. It is not wise to indicate the circumstances that may amount to abuse of the process of the court. This can be developed on a case by case basis."

[Underlining added]

46. In Wilson v Kuburam [2016] SC1489, the Court (Gavara-Nanu J) said at [34] -[35]:

34. In NAE Limited (1-21320) v. Curtain Bros &Ors (OS 225 of 2014) (12th March, 2015) Hartshorn J, in discussing the Court's inherent power to deal with abuse of process, said:

"Notwithstanding that the first defendant makes application pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40 National Court Rules (sic.), to dismiss the proceeding on the ground among others, that it is an abuse of process, the following classic statement of Lord Diplock in the House of Lord's decision of Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police and Others [1981] UKHL 13; [1982] AC 529, as to the inherent jurisdiction of a court to deal with an abuse of its process is worthy of reproduction:"

"This is a case about abuse of process of the High Court. It concerns the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people. The circumstances in which an abuse of process can arise are very varied;......It would, in my view, be most unwise if this House were to use this occasion to say anything that might be taken as limiting to fixed categories the kind of circumstances in which the court has a duty (I disavow the word discretion) to exercise this salutary power." (my underlining).

35. The above principles in my respectful opinion affirm that the Court can in the exercise of its inherent power consider and determine abuse of process, an issue which both counsel have fully addressed in their respective submissions. In my view, such an approach by the Court is in harmony with the view held in Application by Anderson Agiru (supra), where the Supreme Court stated among other things, that the Court can in the exercise of its inherent power summarily dismiss a proceeding which is an abuse of process. In my respectful opinion, Lord Diplock stated this same principle in Hunters v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police and Others (supra), which Hartshorn J referred to in NAE Limited (supra). See also; Breckwoldt & Co. (N.G.) Pty v. Gnoyke [1974] PNGLR 106 at 121 per. Prentice J (as he then was) and PNG Forest Products and Inchcape Berhad v. The State & Jack Genia, Minister for Forests [1972] PNGLR 85. The types of abuses of process may vary from case to case but to establish an abuse of process there must be evidence showing that the processes of the court have been improperly used; or have been used for an improper purpose; or have been used in an improper way; or that such abuse of process have resulted in the right of the other party being denied, defeated or prejudiced: National Executive Council v. Public Employees Association [1993] PNGLR 264 and The State v. Peter Painke [1976] PNGLR 210.

[Underlining added]

47. In Pruaitch v Manek [2019] SC1884 the Court (Kandakasi DCJ, Shepherd and Berrigan JJ) said at [22]

We agree with those observations and add that when determining whether to exercise its power to prevent an abuse of process, the Court should have regard to the full facts and circumstances of the case, the prejudice to each of the parties and the need for public confidence in the administration of justice. As the authorities above make it clear, this power exists to enable the court to protect itself from abuse and thus safeguard the administration of justice. In the words of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Batistatos “that purpose may transcend the interest of any particular party to the litigation”.

[Underlining added]

48. With those principles in mind, I now turn to a consideration of the matter.
49. While this application is in and of itself a lawful process, the issue is whether its purpose is improper and/or whether its filing is a continuation of conduct by Mr Sonk and others in filing multiple applications to use the Court process in a way not intended thus amounting to an abuse of process.
50. To answer that question, the starting point is the letter that was sent by Mr Sonk to the Prime Minister in July 2025 and the history of this litigation.
51. At the date of the decisions, namely 10 and 26 June 2025 the board of KPHL comprised Dr Yaru as Chairman, Dr Ila Temu, Mr Peterson Pipi, Mr Paul Nerau and Mr Hari Karyuliarto, together with Mr Sonk by virtue of his position as Managing Director.
52. It appears uncontroversial that when the Prime Minister appointed the current board:
    1. He was the appointing authority under the Act (s 10(8).
    2. No person could be appointed or remain on the board if that person had turned 72 years of age (s10(6)(d)).
    100. No person (other than the Managing Director) could be appointed or remain on the board if that person had been a director of KPHL for a maximum of nine (9) years in aggregate (s10(6)(a)(iii)).
    4. Dr Yaru and Dr Temu had each served nine years as a director, Dr Yaru and Dr Temu unable to remain as a director after 2 September 2023 by operation of s 10(6)(a)(iii).
    5. Mr Pipi’s three year term of appointment expired on 3 March 2023.
    6. Mr Karyuliarto’s three year term of appointment expired on 12 July 2024.
    7. Mr Nerau had reached compulsory retirement age of 72 years on 25 December 2024 and could not continue as director after that date by operation of s 10(6)(a)(iv).
53. Thus, at the time of the decisions that effected the appointments to the current board, five (5) out of the six directors could not continue as directors either by operation of the law or by reason of their terms of appointment having expired. The State’s table detailing the terms of office of each director at [14] of written submissions, was unchallenged, albeit I hasten to add that what is challenged is how those directors were to be removed, the view being that the members of the former board remained valid directors under the Companies Act and for the purposes of the Act and that appointments and removals were required to be undertaken in accordance with s 10 of the Act. .
54. It is also uncontroversial that:
    1. It was the responsibility of the board to notify the Prime Minister of vacancies to be filled on the board and the names of suitable persons for appointment as directors (s 10(8); and
    2. The only evidence before the Court that the board had met its obligation to inform and recommend candidates to fulfil the vacancies that existed on the board is a letter to the Prime Minister on 7 May 2025, a board resolution in that regard having been made 2 July 2024, some fourteen (14) months earlier.
55. On the evidence of the Prime Minister, the board failed to notify him of the vacancies in 2023 and 2024, a failure he viewed as “deeply concerning amounting to a breach of the law and a gross dereliction of their duties and responsibilities, especially for a company of national importance” (affidavit of the Prime Minister filed 2 October 2025 at [8]).
56. The chat messages in evidence between the Mr Sonk and the Prime Minister dated 21 July 2022, 27 March 2023 and 2 July 2024 would prima facie appear to fall short of the board’s statutory obligations as outlined. For example,
    1. on 21 July 2022 Mr Sonk informed the Prime Minister in a WhatsApp message of the need to renew the terms of Dr Yaru and Dr Temu;
    2. on 27 March 2023 he sought a brief meeting with the Prime Minister, without stating the purpose of the meeting;
    100. on 2 July 2024 he notified the Prime Minister of the board’s resolution to initiate an appointment process and a list of potential candidates.
57. It is in dispute as to whether the former board was non-functioning by reason of unfulfilled vacancies.
58. By letter dated 3 July 2025 the Hon William Duma MP as the Minister for State Enterprises and Trustee delegate informed Mr Sonk of the Prime Minister’s appointments and requested management to facilitate the commencement of duties and responsibilities of the current board.
59. By detailed letter dated 11 July 2025 to Mr Duma, the former board, through Mr Sonk, replied raising legal and reputational concerns with respect to the appointment process. The board sought the opportunity to correct the defects in the instruments of appointment.
60. On the same day a letter in similar terms was sent to the Prime Minister by the board, again through Mr Sonk.
61. On 9 July 2025 the former board convened a special meeting which among a number of resolutions authorised the institution of legal proceedings in the National Court with the stated purpose to “preserve the status quo and allow for dialogue” with the Prime Minister and Mr Duma and “direct the company secretary and Management to refrain from implementing and giving effect to the Instruments of Appointments of the persons named in the instrument” (affidavit of Dr Yaru filed 21 July 2025 being annexure to the Affidavit of Caleb Yaga filed 30 September 2025).
62. Between 21 July 2025 and 8 October 2025 litigation was conducted in the National and Supreme Courts at fever pace.
63. Excluding the current proceedings, applications were filed by the current board (excluding Mr Sonk), Mr Sonk and Mr Pipi and Mr Sonk, all conducted in circumstances of purported urgency, with hearings before five different Judges. All were either dismissed, discontinued or withdrawn.
64. Documents relating to those proceedings, numbering hundreds of pages, are contained in four (4) volumes of annexures to the affidavit of Caleb Yaga filed 30 September 2025.
65. To properly consider the arguments raised by Learned Counsel for both parties it is important to consider that material in some little detail.
66. On 21 July 2025 Dr Yaro, in a representative capacity as Chairman for himself and Dr Yaru, Dr Temu, Mr Pipi, Mr Nerau and Mr Karyuliarto, filed proceedings OS No 144 of 2025 in the National Court seeking to challenge the decisions as defective and unlawful.
67. Holingu Lawyers acted for Dr Yaru.
68. Orders were sought in the form of declarations inter alia that the Prime Minister’s decisions were null and void and of no legal effect being in breach of s 10 of the Act.
69. By Notice of Motion filed the same date interim relief was sought in the form of a stay of the decisions and that the Prime Minister be restrained from giving effect to the instruments issued on the 10 and 26 June 2025.
70. On 22 July 2025 the Chief Justice granted ex parte interim orders to stay the decisions and interim restraints.
71. On 13 August 2025, on application by the Prime Minister filed on 28 July 2025, the proceedings were dismissed by Bre J on competency grounds. It was the Prime Minister’s case firstly, that Dr Yaru had no standing as he was not a director or Chairman, having ceased to hold both positions as at 2 September 2023; that the representative action was defective in form; there was no lawfully functioning board since at least 3 September 2023, those holding themselves out as directors and conducting the affairs of the board since then had done so in breach of the law; and finally, that Dr Yaru had used the incorrect mode of proceeding given the nature of reliefs sought included prerogative writs.
72. On 28 July 2025 Dr Yaru’s lawyers were informed of further defects rendering the proceeding incompetent.
73. On 13 August 2025, Bre J summarily dismissed the proceeding for being incompetent for lack of standing and Dr Yaru’s lack of representational capacity. With respect to the former, the Court found that by virtue of s 10(6)(a)(iii) of the Act Dr Yaru’s term as director expired on 3 September 2023 and he had no legal standing to challenge the Prime Minister’s decision as appointing authority of directors of the board of KPHL.
74. On 15 August 2025, in SCA No 107 of 2025, Dr Yaru appealed the decision of Bre J to the Supreme Court seeking by way of urgent ex parte application a stay of Her Honour’s order to dismiss and restraints on the current board from sitting.
75. Holingu Lawyers acted for Dr Yaru.
76. A ground of appeal as amended was error in finding inter alia that Dr Yaru lacked standing, lacked representative capacity and had failed to produce a board resolution authorising him to bring the proceedings.
77. Mr Sonk filed affidavits on 15 and 19 August 2015 in support of the former board.
78. On 15 August 2025, on application by Dr Yaru, the matter came before the Supreme Court (Cannings J) on the basis of urgency seeking a stay of Bre J’s decision. The Prime Minister sought and was granted an adjournment to the 25 August 2025.
79. On 19 August 2025, the current board met and determined to defer all meetings pending the hearing and determination of the Yaru application for stay and interim restraining orders.
80. On 25 August 2025, Dr Yaru’s application for stay was refused. The appeal was referred to the duty judge.
81. The findings made by Cannings J in his ex tempore ruling are found at [20] to 25 of Mr Yaga’s affidavit.
82. Of relevance to His Honour’s consideration were the overall interests of justice and balance of convenience which favoured the preservation of the status quo. In assessing the relevant factors in that regard His Honour reasoned inter alia of critical importance was the possible prejudice to KPHL as a company and to its reputation; that the relevant status quo was that the National Court had refused an application by Dr Yaru on 13 August 2025 for declarations that would have had the effect of nullifying the appointments; that it was reasonable to infer that the new Chairman and new board would be staking steps to take office as there was nothing stopping them from implementing their appointments and to be in charge of the company. The orders sought by Dr Yaru would be “swinging the pendulum back again” putting the former board back in place which His Honour viewed would create uncertainty internally in the company, uncertainty externally in the company’s international relations and uncertainty in the market which was not a good thing for the company.
83. On 28 August 2025, and notwithstanding the ruling of Cannings J only three days before, the former board under Dr Yaru held a special board meeting and issued written directions to the KPHL management to refrain from dealing with any other persons holding themselves out as directors of the board.
84. On 8 September 2025 the Prime Minister applied for urgent restraining orders against the former board holding themselves out as the board of directors of KPHL and against Mr Sonk as Managing Director from dealing with former board and refusing to recognise and deal with the current board.
85. On 9 September 2025 the matter was back before Cannings J. Mr Sonk, represented by Dentons, appeared as an interested party and was granted an adjournment to enable service to be effected.
86. On the 10 September 2025, Dr Yaru filed a Notice of Discontinuance. The appeal was abandoned and appellants ordered to pay costs.
87. The following day, 11 September 2025, Mr Pipi and Mr Sonk, in OS (JR) No 105 of 2025, filed proceedings for leave to judicially review the decisions.
88. Holingu Lawyers acted for the plaintiffs.
89. The Prime Minister was named as defendant in his capacity as Trustee. The State was not named.
90. The grounds and relief sought are in near identical terms to those in the current proceedings.
91. If leave was granted, Mr Pipi and Mr Sonk sought to move an application for interim stay of the decisions and further injunctive orders.
92. The matter was listed by way of urgent hearing before me on 12 September 2025. The Prime Minister was represented however the State had not been served. Following a hearing leave was granted to the plaintiffs to withdraw the proceedings. Costs were awarded in favour of the Prime Minister.
93. On 12 September 2025 the current board resolved to suspend Mr Sonk as Managing Director and appoint Mr Luke Liria as Acting Managing Director.
94. By Originating Summons filed on 19 September, as amended on 20 September 2025, Mr Sonk in his purported capacity as “Managing Director & Director of Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited and on behalf of Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited” commenced proceedings OS No 175 of 2025 in the National Court, the first defendant, the Registrar of Companies Mr David Kil and the other defendants the members of the current board.
95. Baniyamai Lawyers acted for Mr Sonk.
96. The cause of action was a derivative action under s 143(1)(a) of the Companies Act. Mr Sonk sought orders inter alia by way of leave to pursue the action on behalf of KPHL, declarations that the members of the current board were not directors of KPHL, restraints on them holding themselves out as such, including Mr Apio as Chairman, that all resolutions passed by the current board be stayed and that they have no power of management and control over the affairs, employees and assets of KPHL.
97. Mr Sonk also sought restraints against Mr Kil effecting changes to the official records of KPHL.
98. Mr Sonk sought a further order that his suspension on 12 September 2025 be declared null and void.
99. Mr Pipi, as interim Chairman of the former board, filed an affidavit in support of Mr Sonk’s application. He deposed to informing Mr Sonk on 19 September 2025 that he remained the Managing Director notwithstanding his suspension which, on his evidence, had been made by a board that was not lawfully appointed. On his evidence, and given that there were two boards operating and the management of KPHL “in a dilemma”, it was necessary that Mr Sonk bring an action to protect the interests of the company. While his affidavit was silent on why he and the other members of the former board were not taking steps to protect the company, it is not unreasonable to infer that the issue of their standing may have formed part of that consideration.
100. By Amended Notice of Motion filed the same date, Mr Sonk sought interim injunctions against the current board. He also sought orders staying his suspension and the appointment of Mr Liria as Acting Managing Director.
101. The matter was bought on by way of urgent hearing before Makail J on 22 September 2025.
102. The Prime Minister was represented and foreshadowed the filing of a joinder application. The matter was adjourned to 25 September 2025 to enable that to occur. That application was filed on 23 September 2025.
103. On 23 September 2025 however, Mr Sonk filed an application for leave to discontinue the proceedings with the parties to bear their own costs. The lawyers for the defendants were notified of his intention to that effect that morning by email.
104. On 24 September 2025 the matter came back before Makail J and leave was granted to discontinue. Mr Sonk was ordered to pay costs.
105. On 22 September 2025, two days earlier, Mr Sonk commenced further proceedings in the National Court in OS No 176 of 2025 challenging his suspension as unlawful, in breach of contract and of no effect. He sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, who were members of the current board, from taking steps to implement his suspension together with an order that he continue as the lawful Managing Director. He sought damages for breach of contract.
106. Holingu Lawyers acted for Mr Sonk.
107. On the same day Mr Sonk filed a Notice of Motion seeking interim orders in the form of a stay of his suspension, restraints on the defendants from interfering with his performance of duties and giving effect to the suspension and that he be at liberty to resume his duties forthwith.
108. That application was also brought on urgently, the reasons detailed at [15] of Mr Sonk’s affidavit in support. It included that his suspension was unlawful, made by Mr Aopi whose appointment was unlawful, and that if the Court allowed Mr Aopi to continue to convene board meetings it would be tantamount to supporting and legitimising questionable or illegal and unlawful conduct. On his evidence the question of two boards needed to be settled because “right now, the Board of Dr Benedict Yaru and Peterson Pipi are at work and have been running Board meetings and effectively supervising the management of KPHL”.
109. That piece of evidence must be viewed in the context of the findings of Bre J that remained, having not been overturned on appeal, together with the findings of Cannings J that led to his refusal to grant the stay orders sought by the Dr Yaru, the former Chairman by urgent application. That refusal had the effect of “green lighting” the current board’s right to assume the responsibility to make decisions on behalf of KPHL.
110. In light of that ruling, it is difficult, with respect, to see why it would have been necessary for the current board to take any further legal steps by way of the seeking of declarations as to its power to act as deposed to by Mr Sonk (affidavit (No 3) filed 30 September 2025 at [26]).
111. The matter came before Makail J on the same day, 23 September 2025. His Honour made similar orders to those made in OS No 175 given that the Prime Minister who was not named, intended to seek to join the proceedings.
112. The following day, 24 September 2025 Mr Sonk sought leave to discontinue the proceedings. It was his evidence at [3] – [5] of his affidavit filed that day, that he had reconsidered his position after hearing on 22 September that the Prime Minister expressed an interest in joining the proceedings and that he had received advice that the better mode of proceeding and forum, one where the Prime Minister could be heard, would be judicial review challenging his decision on the appointment of the defendants named in this proceedings.
113. On 24 September 2025 Mr Sonk was granted leave to discontinue. He was ordered to pay costs.
114. That is the background to the current application, brought in circumstances of urgency, Holingu Lawyers acting, this being the sixth proceedings in the litigation continuum as outlined following the making of the decisions by the Prime Minister.

CONSIDERATION

115. In considering that history and the fulsome submissions made with regard to it, what is necessary is to now stand back. As when viewing an impressionist painting, it is important to not only look at the individual brush strokes but to stand back to gain a proper appreciation of the artist’s intent and the picture that emerges.
116. Applying the legal principles earlier outlined to the facts of this case I reject the submissions on behalf of Mr Sonk that:
     1. The presumption of abuse based on multiplicity of proceedings does not arise in the current case or, if it did, is rebutted by demonstrating that the earlier proceedings were abandoned or withdrawn for procedural reasons only; and
     2. The authorities relied upon by the State are distinguishable from the current proceeding.
117. I accept the submissions on behalf of the State and make the following findings:
     1. A consideration of the litigation history shows that the current proceeding represents a culmination of a series of calculated actions using different modes of proceeding being an attempt at abusing and circumventing court processes and rulings of the National and Supreme Court. Dr Yaru and members of the former board commenced the process. Mr Sonk picked up the baton and ran with it.
     2. The abuse was evidenced by the nature of the Court proceedings filed, the naming of the parties, the interim and substantive reliefs sought, the evidence filed in support of the various proceedings and the manner in which the proceedings were conducted.
     100. The applicants, which included Mr Sonk in four of the proceedings, had a common agenda by way of multiple filings involving similar parties filed in circumstances of urgency seeking similar reliefs, which were then either dismissed, withdrawn or discontinued.
     4. The common thread was and continues to be a challenge to the decisions by the Prime Minister leading to a reinstatement of the former board. There is no better evidence of this than a reading, as a whole, of the proceedings as contained in the four volumes of documents in evidence annexed to Mr Yaga’s affidavit, that evidence, filed in support of the earlier proceedings, presenting as a legal Ground Hog Day where the same thing happens over and over, with the same grievance and complaint, the same evidence repetitively played out, involving the same parties, with an occasional variation or twist to meet an emergent circumstance, the genesis being the Prime Minister’s decisions and the consequential tussle for ascendancy between the two boards.
     5. It was an abuse heightened by filing matters as urgent only to then discontinue or withdraw shortly thereafter.
     6. It was an abuse perpetuated in ignorance of the orders of Bre J with respect to Dr Yaru’s status, a named Third Defendant in these proceedings where the Plaintiff makes no claim and seeks no remedies against him.
     7. It was an abuse underscored by Mr Sonk’s lack of standing for a grant of leave in these proceedings to which I shall return.
118. The fact that there was no hearing on the merits of the earlier proceedings, as submitted by learned Counsel for Mr Sonk, the fact that some of the proceedings were withdrawn or discontinued by reason of procedural defect or some other reason does not suggest that the current proceeding is not an abuse of process (National Airports Corporaiton Limited v Simatap [2019] SC1883 at [10]-[11]; Jacob Popuna v. Ken Owa (2017) SC1564 at [16]).
119. As learned Counsel for the State, Mr Mel submitted, it is a proposition if carried to its logical conclusion, would suggest that the filing of 20 or 30 applications within a short period of time, withdrawn or discontinued, after testing the judicial waters and/or determining that a different tack should be taken, could not be viewed as abuse of process by reason of no determination having been made on the merits, a circumstance that arises solely by the applicant’s own actions.
120. If Dr Yaru chose not to continue his appeal through to a conclusion, then that was a choice he made. If Mr Sonk chose to discontinue OS proceedings he initiated, then that was a choice he made. It is not a circumstance of mitigation (Agiru at pp 11 and 12).
121. Similarly, the submission on behalf of Mr Sonk that the present proceedings provide the first opportunity for judicial determination of the decisions on their merits in accordance with Order 16 is not persuasive. If judicial review was the appropriate mode of proceedings, it is unexplained why Mr Sonk chose to litigate in the piecemeal manner he did. Time was of the essence on his case. If his case is to be accepted, he had a duty to do so by reason of a deposed focus on good governance, risk to the company and his fiduciary responsibilities as a director.
122. I accept the submission on behalf of the State that the current proceedings are but a part of a continuum that commenced with Mr Sonk’s letter to the Prime Minister on behalf of the former board. In these proceedings Mr Sonk is seeking to reagitate the same grievance, namely the Prime Minister’s decisions, to achieve the same outcome, which is removal of the current board and reinstitution of the former board and at the same time restore his position as Managing Director following his suspension.
123. In the current proceedings Ms Sonk seeks to review the same decisions which were the subject of legal challenge in OS No 144 of 2025 (dismissed), SCA No 107 of 2025 (discontinued) and OS (JR) No 105 of 2025 (withdrawn).
124. The current action is in near identical terms to OS (JR) No 105 of 2025. It seeks the same grounds and same relief with a further remedy with respect to Mr Sonk’s suspension. However, with respect to Mr Sonk’s suspension, no grounds are advanced in support of the relief sought by him at (11)(b) of his Statement.
125. I accept the State’s submission that by seeking the relief he does in that regard, namely orders that effect his return as Managing Director, he is attempting to avoid the requirements of Order 16.
126. He is seeking to use these proceedings to address his suspension without challenging the suspension itself, a circumstance that would have proven problematic in judicial review given his contract of employment and given that judicial review deals with matters of public law. It is relief sought against the background of his discontinuance of OS 176 where he sought to address his suspension.
127. During the course of oral submissions, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr Holingu referred to the suspension as “a change of event”. Notice to that effect was given to Mr Sonk on 12 September 2025 and formal notice served on 18 September 2025. It was submitted by Mr Holingu that it was that event “that triggered him”, Mr Sonk, to commence the proceedings OS 175 and OS 176 to challenge his suspension.
128. As noted earlier in my outline, both proceedings were brought on urgently and both then discontinued within days of filing. It was then, on the further submissions of Mr Holingu, that his client initiated the current proceedings for judicial review. He put it thus:

“...because he was affected by the suspension on the 12th of September and the decision was made by the Second Defendant Board which is the basis of this judicial review proceedings on the validity of their appointment”.

129. That is an abuse of process. The basis of the judicial review proceedings as pleaded is a challenge to the decisions, not the decision to suspend Mr Sonk.
130. In trying to explain why these judicial review proceedings were different from the earlier proceedings and in trying to distance the current proceeding from the earlier proceedings filed, the real purpose and intent was revealed.
131. It was a damaging admission.
132. By challenging the lawfulness of the board appointments, that is, the decisions made by the Prime Minister, Mr Sonk’s real intent is to review the board decision that suspended him, a decision that was made by the current board, not the Prime Minister. At the same time the former board would be returned.
133. I accept the submission on behalf of the State that having run out of legal options Mr Sonk commenced these proceedings which enable him, in a single action, in one fell swoop, to challenge and quash the decisions of the Prime Minister, reinstate the former board and address his suspension.
134. Whether the authorities relied upon by the State are distinguishable or not from the current proceeding (see for example the submissions at [4] to [11] of written submissions on behalf of Mr Sonk), matters not in the circumstance so this case, as it is the general principles that emerge on those authorities that is relevant as applied to the particular facts and circumstances before the Court. As the authorities make clear the categories of abuse of process centring on multiple proceedings are not closed. This is because of the endless variations of circumstance that arise as a result of human behaviour and may give rise to an abuse. It is precisely why the authorities have held that the question of abuse is one that should be considered on a case-by-case basis, the jurisprudence thus free to develop. Within the doctrine of legal precedent, it is a course that permits a nuanced application of the law.
135. The further submission by Mr Holingu, that there were different circumstances at the relevant time triggering the different earlier filings, does not, with respect, advance Mr Sonk’s case. It ignores the panorama, the wide-angle view, the common link, the common goal from the beginning which was a challenge to the Prime Minister’s decisions and reinstatement of the former board, a position with which Mr Sonk was aligned at the earliest, while at the same time addressing the “trigger” for a change in mode of challenge, namely Mr Sonk’s suspension.
136. The fact that there may have been different causes of actions or that in some of the earlier actions the Prime Minister was not named in proceedings, does not impact the Court’s ultimate conclusion.
137. Finally, the propositions advanced on behalf of Mr Sonk ignore a crucial consideration, highlighted on the facts of this case, and that is the Court’s need to jealously guard its dignity.
138. The observations I made in Koaba v Peter [2024] PGNC 223; N10896 at [67] – [69] are apposite:
     67. The Court’s responsibility to ensure that its processes are not abused, is a serious one. There is good reason for this. It is because it provides the safest path to a fair outcome.
         
     68. The form that an abuse of Court process may take is not capable of finite measurement (Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police and Others [1981] UKHL 13 per Lord Diplock at [1]). It may, for example, involve using the Court processes to engage in deliberate delay, or the filing of applications involving the same parties and issues in different proceedings whether in the same or a different litigation stream, either as a form of ‘judge shopping’ or until a preferred outcome is achieved or for some perceived strategic advantage. At its core, however, is the use of a court process in way not intended. It is using the rules and procedures meant to ensure a fair system to manipulate that system for a desired outcome. To use a colloquial expression, it is an attempt to ‘game the system’. At its core also, as Justice Carey, accurately described, respectfully to His Honour, is bad lawyering. This Court respectfully endorses the concerns expressed in the plainest terms by His Honour in his ex tempore reasons in OS No 146 of 2023 with respect to the misuse of Court’s processes by litigants and/or their lawyers and the impacts of that on the Court’s work.
         
     69. In the end unless the Court zealously protects its processes, it is the administration of justice which suffers.

[Underlining added]

139. And can I add to that, the effect is to offend the dignity of the Court and, in the words best put by Glesson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Batistatos v. Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256, cited with approval in Pruaitch v Manek (supra) at [22], it is to bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right thinking people and public confidence in it, an interest that transcends the interest of any particular party to litigation.
140. In Rogers v The Queen [1994] HCA 42, also cited in Pruaitch v Manek (supra) McHugh J observed:

Although the categories of abuse of procedure remain open, abuses of procedure usually fall into one of three categories: (1)the court's procedures are invoked for an illegitimate purpose; (2)the use of the court's procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; or (3)the use of the court's procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[Underlining added]

141. All three categories emerge on the facts of this case because:
     1. Mr Sonk has commenced judicial review to achieve an outcome not otherwise open to him under Order 16.
     2. The history of ongoing litigation, of which Mr Sonk has been a part, conducted piecemeal and at pace, under the mantle of urgency, has been manifestly unfair and unjustifiably oppressive to the other parties, the processes of the Court used in a way not intended, incurring unnecessary costs, the full extent of which are not necessarily remedied by way of costs orders.
     100. The use of the Court’s procedures has the potential to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
142. Litigation is not uncontrolled open competition. Multiplicity of proceedings and/or litigation conducted in a piecemeal manner should be avoided and proactively discouraged by the Court, absent demonstrated good reason (Telikom (PNG) Ltd v Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (supra)).
143. No good reason appears on the evidence here.
144. Litigants must choose their mode of proceeding wisely. This is not only because litigation carries risks, financial and reputational, but because it draws other parties into its orbit, at cost and potential prejudice to them. It is also a waste of judicial time, drawing upon Court resources, which in the case of the current proceeding has involved just short of nine (9) hours of hearing time accommodated at short notice ahead of other listed matters. That overview excludes the judicial time required in considering the extensive material relied upon which related to the earlier proceedings.
145. I pause here to address another matter and that is the Court time taken up in dealing with requests for urgent hearings.
146. It must be said at the outset that applications based on urgency will always be accommodated by the Court with listings given that are responsive to the degree and nature of the urgency. In my experience such requests, usually in a written letter to the Registry, are rarely supported by sworn evidence as to urgency and, as is the case here, rarely meet the level of urgency asserted.
147. At the time of filing of this application for leave Mr Sonk’s lawyers, by accompanying letter, requested an urgent listing by way of hearing on Wednesday 1 October 2025 to enable their compliance with the two-day service requirement on the State. On Monday 29 September 2025 a chamber order was issued listing the matter on the Friday of that week, namely 3 October 2025, a listing given during a Supreme Court week. A direction was made for service on all parties given that Mr Sonk was seeking to move his application for a stay and restraints in the event leave was granted which would necessitate the defendants, other than the State, an opportunity to file material and be heard.
148. In my experience, and again dependent on the degree of urgency, in matters such as this and to avoid applications for adjournment by reason of short service, it is preferable, where possible, to ensure sufficient notice is afforded to the State who have a statutory right to be heard on leave applications, to enable its action officer to meet internal allocation procedures and, where a stay is also sought, to afford sufficient notice to the other parties.
149. Not content, however, with the Court’s listing date on 3 October 2025, Mr Sonk’s lawyers sent a second letter to the Registrar, dated 29 September 2025, copied to my chambers, the Judge Administrator’s Chambers and to a member of registry staff. The State was not copied in.
150. In that communication Mr Sonk’s lawyers sought a listing date on or before Thursday 2 October 2025, based upon purported “circumstances of extreme gravity and urgency which pose an immediate and substantial threat not only to the Plaintiff but to KPHL and the significant national interest it represents” and by reason of the “profound and potentially irreversible damage being inflicted upon a critical national asset”, the need for judicial intervention sought to “preserve the status quo and prevent catastrophic financial and reputational loss to KPHL and by extension the Independent State of PNG” and “restore order and lawful process”.
151. The Court listed the matter for hearing on Wednesday 1 October 2025. The lawyer with the carriage of the matter for the State, Mr Mel, was not available, as he was appearing in an appeal before the Supreme Court. Mr Pilumb appeared on his behalf. He sought an adjournment to enable Mr Mel to appear as he was unable to assist the Court with the matter. The matter was adjourned to 3 October 2025, the original date given.
152. On 3 October 2025 Mr Mel appeared and sought a further short adjournment as his Supreme Court commitments had run over to the following day, leaving, on his submission, insufficient time to prepare. The application was opposed. The application for adjournment was granted with reasons given by the Court. The matter proceeded to a hearing on the 7 and 8 October 2025.
153. Three observations should be made.
154. Firstly, in my respectful view, the matter did not present with the level of urgency asserted, certainly not one that required a review by the Court of the date first fixed by way of chamber order for its hearing, namely 3 October 2025. There was no immediate threat to KPHL. There was no vacuum of leadership or decision-making at KPHL in light of the decision of Cannings J. The need for the Court to review the matter and the hearing on 1 October 2025 was a waste of Court time.
155. Secondly, a consequence of an urgent listing is that it usually involves someone else being asked to forgo the Court time allocated to them or time otherwise set aside for judicial consideration of their matters. Everyone who seeks the assistance of the Court, from humble subsistence farmer to those at the top end of town is entitled to fair Court time and a timely determination of the issues that brought them to Court.
156. Thirdly, the State’s application for a short adjournment should have been consented to without the need for a contest and Court ruling on the matter. There was no prejudice to Mr Sonk’s case in delaying a hearing from a Friday to the following Tuesday and nothing unreasonable about the State’s request where the lead Counsel had had limited time by reason of other Court duties to respond to a matter brought on at short notice. Court decisions are best made when all parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare and assist the Court.
157. While hindsight is usually clarity of vision, in my respectful view, the proceedings should have stopped following the discontinuance of the Yaru appeal on 10 September 2025, which followed the refusal by a senior Judge of the Supreme Court to grant a stay of the order of Bre J. The reasoning of His Honour was clear. There was no appeal against the order.
158. The findings of Bre J, on Dr Yaru’s standing, remain in place to this day. Yet in the current proceedings, Dr Yaru is a named Third Defendant described as Chairman of the “incumbent board” and a relief sought is a declaration that the former board is the lawful board and for it to resume its functions.
159. Relevantly, Mr Sonk is seeking to quash the decisions and reinstate the former board notwithstanding that Dr Yaru and members of the former board have effectively abandoned all rights attaching to their appeal against Bre J’s decision, including all matters raised in the appeal grounds, which included Dr Yaru’s standing to act as Chairman of the board (Smith v Ruma Constructions Limited [2002] SC695).
160. Notwithstanding the gravamen of Bre J’s decision and Cannings J’s reasoning in refusing a stay of that decision, a mere three days later the former board was holding a Special Board Meeting and giving a written directive to staff not to deal with the current board.
161. Unsurprisingly, that was met with an urgent application by the Prime Minister seeking restraining orders, only to then be met with Dr Yaro and the board discontinuing their appeal. It was a capitulation by the former board and should have been the end of the matter. Mr Sonk was still Managing Director and a director on the board. He could have continued in his position under the current board or he could have resigned if he felt that his duties as director and/or ethical obligations prohibited him from continuing to serve on a board he viewed as unlawful.
162. And here we are today.
163. It was the submission of Mr Holingu that Mr Sonk was taking a neutral position and that it was a matter for the Court to decide.
164. The difficulty with that submission is two-fold. Firstly, the Court had made a ruling, two in fact. Further, the former board, who he seeks reinstated, has taken no steps, since the discontinuance of their appeal, to otherwise address the lawful status of the current board.
165. Secondly, Mr Sonk’s purported neutrality is at odds with the evidence. He took a side.
166. For example, he continued to attend board meetings conducted by Dr Yaru up until September 2025 (affidavit of Mr Sonk filed 25 September 2025 at [31]).
167. While not part of Dr Yaru’s representative action, on the evidence of Dr Yaru, not challenged in these proceedings, the former board, of which Mr Sonk was a director, resolved on about 9 July 2025 in a Special Board Meeting to authorise Dr Yaru for and on behalf of himself and the directors of KPHL to institute the legal proceedings (at [13(f)] of his affidavit filed 21 July 2025). There is no evidence in the form of board minutes that Mr Sonk was not present at that meeting and either objected, abstained or withdrew.
168. Mr Sonk filed affidavits in support of the Yaru appeal, deposing to the appointments of the current board as unlawful and ultra vires the Prime Minister’s power to appoint (affidavit of Mr Sonk filed 15 August 2025 being annexure CY-17 to the affidavit of Caleb Yaga filed 30 September 2025).
169. Mr Sonk reiterated his position to that end in his email to the new Chairman, Mr Aopi, on 3 September 2025.
170. Mr Sonk informed Mr Aoip, that he would continue to work with the former board until the Court decided (affidavit of Mr Sonk filed 25 September 2025 at [53]).
171. The Yaru appeal having been abandoned, Mr Sonk elected not to attend a board meeting called by Mr Aopi on 10 September 2025, the attendance of the directors noted to be “essential” (affidavit of Mr Sonk filed 25 September 2025 at [57]; see also affidavit of Mr Sonk filed 15 August 2025 being annexure CY-20 to the affidavit of Caleb Yaga filed 30 September 2025).
172. On 11 September 2025, the following day, Mr Sonk commenced legal proceedings with Mr Pipi seeking leave to judicially review the decisions.
173. After being granted leave to withdraw those proceedings, on 19 September 2025 Mr Sonk commenced derivative proceedings in the National Court, essentially seeking to "step into the shoes" of KPHL to seek remedies that at its heart challenged the Prime Minister’s decisions to prevent purported harm to the company. The contents of his affidavit filed 19 September 2025 make that clear. The orders sought against Mr Kil were consequential to the desired outcome which was the reinstatement of the former board and the lifting of his suspension.
174. On 29 September 2025, and notwithstanding his suspension, Mr Sonk swore an affidavit in support of these proceedings in his capacity as Managing Director deposing to his authority to do so.
175. In conclusion, I have concluded that these proceedings amount to an abuse of process and necessitate dismissal. While a serious step, it is a course plain on the facts of the case, the Court required to be vigilant in ensuring that its processes are used as intended.
176. This is not the case where the history of multiple filings can be explained away by reason of lack of representation or litigant or commercial naivety.
177. I accept the submission on behalf of the State at [128] of their written submissions that this is a classic case of unsuccessful litigants filing case after case as a form of judge shopping and/or using the processes of the Court in a way not intended until a preferred outcome is reached, in this case restitution of the former board. While the issue of suspension was a new event, a “trigger” for further action, the common thread throughout was to challenge the Prime Minister’s decisions and oust the current board.
178. Finally, there is a further reason why Mr Sonk’s application must fail, and that is because he lacks locus standi, a requirement for the grant of leave for judicial review. It is an issue that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear his application.
179. If an applicant lacks the standing to bring an application, if he does not have the right to bring the action or challenge the subject decision, then he has can have no reasonable cause of action, he cannot succeed, a circumstance alone that is an abuse as he is seeking to use the court process in a way not intended.
180. For a grant of leave, the applicant, who carries the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities, must show:
     1. He has sufficient interest in the decision.
        
     2. There has not been any undue delay in making the application.
        
     100. He has exhausted all other statutory or administrative avenues for redress before making the application
          
     4. There is an arguable case justifying the grant of leave for judicial review.
181. Whether viewed as a fifth requirement or not, it is settled law that judicial review is only available against a body exercising public functions in a public law matter. The claim must therefore be based on public law principles, not the enforcement of private law rights. It is an issue that goes to the Court’s jurisdiction.
182. The State, who contests all of the above requirements, submits with respect to standing, that Mr Sonk is seeking leave to review the decisions to appoint new directors to the KPHL board when he is not directly affected by those decisions. The decisions do not concern him, his position on the board or as Managing Director, now suspended.
183. It is submitted on behalf of Mr Sonk, however, that while the State has restricted the test of sufficient interest to decisions that directly affect the rights and interests of Mr Sonk, the requirement of sufficient interest is broad in its application and not restrictive. It is contended that so long as Mr Sonk is able to show that he has some relationship or connection with the subject matter and that his relationship or interest in the subject matter is so affected by a decision of a public body that, in itself is sufficient ground to seek a review, the Court in this regard, referred to the decision of Chow v Samson [2020] N8667 at [15] (Numapo J) which applied the broad view of sufficient interest.
184. Order 16 r 3(5) of the NRC provides:

The Court shall not grant leave unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.

185. As is clear from a plain reading of the rule, what is required is not mere interest – it must be accepted that Mr Sonk, as Managing Director and as a director of the board at the time the appointments were made, would have an interest in the decisions.
186. However, the question is whether Mr Sonk evidences a “sufficient interest” to bring these proceedings.
187. Sufficient is a word that comes from the Latin sufficiens meaning "to meet the need." The Cambridge online dictionary defines the word as meaning “enough for a particular purpose”. In this case the question is whether on the evidence Mr Sonk has enough of an interest in the decisions for the purpose of judicial review, a special and restrictive procedure.
188. The question of sufficiency of interest is one of both law and fact having regard to all the circumstances of the case (R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1981] UKHL 2; [1982] AC 617).
189. In this regard learned Counsel, Mr Holingu, referred the Court to the decision of Mondiai v Wawoi Guavi Timber Co Ltd and my decision in Kalapi Transport Ltd v Eastern Highlands PEC [2024] N10972, wherein I made reference to the principles in Mondiai.
190. In Mondiai, the Supreme Court (Kapi CJ, Davani & Lay JJ), following a fulsome consideration of the English, Australian and New Zealand authorities, formulated the following questions to test whether the applicants had "sufficient interest" to be a party to proceedings in the National Court.

▪Is the party complained of a public body?

▪Does it have duties to perform at law, i.e. statutory duties?

▪What is the nature of the alleged breach of duty, are they duties in law or do they fall within managerial or administrative guidelines for decisions to be taken within a lawful discretion?

▪What is the complainant’s relationship to the subject matter of the duty alleged to have been breached?

▪Is the party bringing the complaint genuinely concerned or a mere busybody?

▪Does the complainant point to some duty in law which objectively has (on a leave application, arguably) not been observed?

191. It is submitted on behalf of Mr Sonk that:
     1. the Prime Minister is a public authority exercising statutory powers under the Act, the decision thus reviewable under judicial review principles.
     2. As Managing Director and a board director Mr Sonk is directly involved in the functioning of the board and the recommendation process under s 10 of the Act and as such has a duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company.
     100. The decisions directly affect Mr Sonk’s ability to perform his duties, undermined the corporate governance structure of KPHL and created uncertainty in the management and operation of the company.
     4. Mr Sonk is not a busy body: he is genuinely concerned and legally obligated to ensure compliance with the Act and as such directly affected by the decisions. In this regard his interest is direct, substantial and legally recognized.
192. In the decision of Ekip v Gamato [2017] SC1594, decided 10 years after Mondiai, a differently constituted Court (Hartshorn, Polume-Kiele and Shepherd JJ) further considered the question by reference to the provisions within Order 16 and later Supreme Court authority. The Court said at [12]-[16]:

12. As to what constitutes “sufficient interest”, this has been the subject of considerable judicial consideration. In our view, an indication as to the intended interpretation of “sufficient interest” is evident from other judicial review Rules that concern the interest of a party to a judicial review proceeding. One of these Rules is Order 16 Rule 13(5) National Court Rules which concerns the nature of that interest. It refers to service on, “... persons directly affected by the decision the subject of the review,”: O’Neill v. Eliakim (2016) SC1539 at [44].

13. That, “sufficient interest” is to be interpreted as a direct interest is reflected in the decision of Alois Kingsley Golu v. National Executive Council (2011) N4425. At [6], Gavara Nanu J said:

“First the plaintiff must show that he has sufficient interest in the decision vis., he must show that he is grieved (sic) by the decision and that the decision affects his rights and interests.”

14. This decision has been followed in Abaijah v. Mana (2015) N6071, among others.

15. The primary judge is criticised by the appellants for his treatment of the Supreme Court decisions of Petition of Michael Somare [1981] PNGLR 265 and Mondiai v. Wawoi Guavi Timber Co Ltd (2007) SC886. His observation that Somare (supra) was distinguishable as it is a constitutional reference is in our view however, correct. As to Mondiai (supra), that case concerned an application for joinder and an objection to competency. Order 16 Rule 13(5) National Court Rules was not argued before the Supreme Court, perhaps as that Rule did not come into force until 27^th September 2005. To the extent that the effect of this Rule was not considered by the Supreme Court in Mondiai (supra), in our view the comments therein concerning, “sufficient interest” are distinguishable.

16. On the basis that, “sufficient interest” is to be interpreted as a direct interest as referred to, the appellants are not, in our view, persons who have, “sufficient interest” as they have not been directly affected by the appointment decision and the appointment decision has not affected their rights and interests. It is the case that if during the course of the National General Elections, the appellants believe that they have been affected by actions of the third and fourth respondents, they have recourse pursuant to the relevant election petition provisions.

[Underlining added]

193. In Mari vMarape [2022] SC2311, a more recent Supreme Court decision, the majority (Makail & Lioso JJ) in adopting the approach in Papua New Guinea Air Pilots Association v. Director of Civil Aviation and National Airline Commission [1983] PNGLR 1 held that an applicant will generally have locus standi to bring judicial review proceedings if he can establish actual or apprehended injury or damage to his property or proprietary rights, to his business or economic interests including his social or political interests.
194. At [5]-[6] their Honours said:

5. One of the requirements for leave for judicial review under Order 16, rule 3(5) of the NCR is “ ...the applicant has sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates”. Sufficient interest or locus standi is a phrase that is not defined by Order 16 but has been subject of judicial consideration in this jurisdiction. One of the earliest cases which considered it is Papua New Guinea Air Pilots Association v. Director of Civil Aviation and National Airline Commission [1983] PNGLR 1 at 3. Andrew J adopted the definition given in Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v. Commonwealth of Australia (1980) CLR 493; 54 A.L..JR. 176:

“But depending on the nature of the relief which he seeks a plaintiff will in general have a locus standi when he can show actual or apprehended injury or damage to his property or proprietary rights, to his business or economic interests and perhaps to his social or political interests”.

6. We adopt the above statement as being the proper test to determine locus standi of an applicant seeking leave to apply for judicial review under Order 16.

195. The State urges on the Court the direct interest approach taken by the Courts to what amounts to sufficient interest. Mr Sonk urges a broader approach to the question.
196. Each case must turn on its own facts and circumstances. Whatever the approach to be taken, in my respectful view Mr Sonk has failed to establish standing.
197. The starting point for that conclusion are the decisions.
198. The decisions appointed four persons to the board by the recognised appointing authority, to fill vacancies on the board where appointments had either expired or directors had reached service and age limits. The persons who could be said to be directly affected by the decisions, if Mr Sonk’s case on the manner of their removal is accepted, namely members of the former board, no longer challenge the decisions.
199. Mr Sonk, on the other hand, has not made out how his own interests are genuinely affected by the decisions. He is not named in the decisions. He is not the subject of the decisions. He is not directly affected by the decisions because he continued in his role as Managing Director and a member of the board, notwithstanding the decisions, until his suspension.
200. He does not plead in his Statement in Support that his rights or interests are directly affected by the decisions. Nor does he give evidence to that effect in his affidavits in support.
201. Further, Mr Sonk is seeking to challenge the decisions as “Managing Director of KPHL” on behalf of the company when he has been suspended, that suspension no longer the subject of any litigation in circumstances where there is now an incumbent Acting Managing Director. As of the date of the hearing, Mr Sonk remained under suspension on full pay.
202. Even on the Mondiai approach, Mr Sonk must evidence a sufficient relationship to the subject matter of the duty alleged to have been breached, a genuine grievance, that entitles the Court within the restrictive ambit of an Order 16 procedure to determine it should intervene in the administrative functioning of a statutory appointing authority (Makeng v Timbers PNG) Ltd [2008] N3317 at [16]).
203. While he asserts his fiduciary responsibilities as director as grounding sufficiency of interest, the subject decisions did not affect his ability to perform his functions as Managing Director on the board. The decisions filled vacancies in circumstances where it is unchallenged there were vacancies to fulfil and who was not eligible to be considered.
204. If Mr Sonk was of the view that his fiduciary obligations were affected by the decisions it is unexplained why he did not commence these proceedings sooner, when on his own case time was of the essence.
205. The grievance, however, is his suspension by the current board, the trigger for these proceedings on the submissions of Mr Holingu. Mr Sonk may have viewed his suspension as a consequence of the decisions, the illegality of which he articulated, and which put him and the current board on a collision course, however the decisions had nothing to do with his suspension. The Prime Minister did not suspend him. He does not challenge the decision to suspend him yet seeks a consequential declaration to nullify that decision.
206. I accept the submission on behalf of the State that filing an application in the belief that it is in the best interests of KPHL does not demonstrate a sufficient interest in the decisions.
207. Nor do Mr Sonk’s fiduciary responsibilities, as submitted, give rise to either actual or apprehended injury or damage to his property or proprietary rights, to his business or economic interests or to his social or political interests (Mari v Marape (supra); see also O’Neill v Eliakim [2016] SC1539 at [44]).
208. There is also merit in the ‘floodgate’ submission advanced by Mr Mel on behalf of the State. While each case must turn on its facts, to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of Mr Sonk, based on fiduciary responsibility giving rise to sufficient interest, would potentially mean that any member of a board of directors could seek to challenge by way of judicial review a decision of a board with which they disagree.
209. The reason for the requirement of leave is because it involves a screening process and to that end the importance of presenting with a genuine grievance is heightened as illustrated in the decision of Makeng (supra).
210. I accept the submission on behalf of the State that what Mr Sonk is trying to achieve in one proceeding is a challenge the Prime Minister’s decisions and to address his suspension which I have determined to be an abuse of process. I repeat and rely upon my earlier findings in this regard.
211. The grant of leave is in the discretion of the Court, one that must be exercised judicially (Hon Mao Zeming v Justice Timothy Hinchcliffe [2005] SC791; Mathew Sisimolu & 1 Or v Phillip Kende and Ors [2022] SC2267 at [10]).
212. Mr Sonk may be upset by the decisions. He may view the decisions as plainly wrong. However, he is not directly aggrieved or affected by the decisions. Nor do the decisions affect his rights and interests of a sufficient nature to suggest standing to challenge them by way of judicial review.
213. The application for leave should be dismissed for this reason alone.
214. While the State challenges the other requirements for leave it is not necessary to consider those other requirements. The authorities make clear that if one of the considerations for the grant of leave is not satisfied it is unnecessary for the Court to go on and determine the remaining considerations (Matava v Sungi [2024] SC2567 at [15] cited with approval in Wiko Development Corporation Ltd v Samson [2025] PGSC 40; SC2732 at [23]).

ORDERS

215. I make the following orders:
     1. Pursuant to Order 16 r 13(13)(2)(a) and 2(b)(a) of the National Court Rules and the inherent powers of the Court the Plaintiff’s application for leave for judicial review is dismissed as an abuse of court process.
     2. The Plaintiff pay the State’s costs on a party/ party basis to be agreed or taxed.
     3. Time to abridge.

________________________________________________________________
Lawyers for the plaintiff: Holingu Lawyers
Lawyers for the State: Mel & Hennry