State v Daniel [2025] PGNC 328; N11469 (25 July 2025)

N11469

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR NO 602 OF 2023

THE STATE

V

MACK DANIEL

LAE: KANGWIA J
24, 25 JULY 2025

CRIMINAL LAW - Sentence - Murder – stabbing death – expression of remorse - compensation paid treated as special circumstance – sanctity of life – deterrent sentence imposed.

Cases cited
Mangi v the State [2006] SC880
See Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653
Kesino Apo v the State [1988] PNGLR 1880
Public Prosecutor -v- Panikuiaka Nopi [1979] SC165
Anna Max Marangi v The State (2002) SC702
Antap Yala v The State (unreported SC judgement in SCRA No 690 of 1996; Simon Kama v State (2004) SC740
State v Polin Pochalou Lopai [1988-89] PNGLR 48
Alois Peter Irobo Kovei v The State (2001) SC676
Max Java v State (2002) SC701
Joseph Enn v the State (2004) SC738
State v Alois Lagu (2011) N4354
State v Sagu Sogave (2000) N2086

Counsel
N. Pare, for the State
J. John, for the defence

1. KANGWIA J: Mack Daniel appears for sentence. He was convicted on one count of murder for stabbing to death Abel James.
   
2. He is believed to be 32 years old, single and unemployed. He has no prior conviction.
   
3. On his allocutus he states, “I say thank you to the Court the lawyers and everyone involved in taking time to hear my case. I have waited 3 years for it and now it has come to an end. I say sorry to the deceased family. I do not know anything about the problem, but witnesses named me in Court and court accepted it and found me guilty. I accept the decision of the court and ask for leniency as first-time offender. When the problem came as the first born, my family reconciled with the family of the deceased.

They have paid K14,000 and 1 pig valued atK3000 as Bel Kol already. I am now before the Court. Only the God of Abraham, Issac and Jacob knows I did not touch the deceased. I accept any decision of the court”.

4. On his behalf Mr John after highlighting sentencing principles submits that given the peculiar circumstances of the present case a head sentence of 10 years is appropriate. The offender is a first-time offender who surrendered to police. He has expressed remorse for it. His relatives have paid K14,000 with one pig valued at K3,000 as Bel Kol and the real compensation is pending. Payment of compensation is not an acceptance of blame but to maintain peaceful co-existence.
   
5. On behalf of the State Mr. Pare while acknowledging that Bel Kol has been paid submits that the present case falls into the second and third categories of the Manu Kovi v the State (2005) SC789 guidelines for murder and a sentence of 16 to 25 years is appropriate bearing in mind the sanctity of life. While citing sentences in earlier cases as possible guides, Mr. Pare submits that an appropriate sentence range for this type of offence is demonstrated in the case of Mangi v the State [2006]SC880. In that case on appeal against a sentence of 35 years for murder the Supreme Court reduced it to 16 years on the basis that there was no pre-planning where two drunks were fighting each other. In the present case it is submitted that even though there was no pre planning there was an intention to cause grievous bodily harm with an element of viciousness present where a life was lost with the use of a dangerous weapon.
   
6. Murder is a crime pursuant to s 298 of the Criminal Code. For the crime of murder s300 of the Criminal Code prescribes life imprisonment as the maximum punishment. However, the prescribed penalty is subject to s 19 of the Criminal Code and the principle of Law that the maximum prescribed penalty is reserved for the worst category of each case. (See Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653).
   
7. Parliament prescribed life imprisonment to preserve the sanctity of life which is irreplaceable after it is removed.
   
8. The Supreme Court endorsed that proposition in the case of Kesino Apo v the State [1988] PNGLR 1880 when it stated that imprisonment should be the starting point owing to the sanctity of life, a consideration which parliament intended.
   
9. In the case of Public Prosecutor -v- Panikuiaka Nopi [1979] SC165 the Supreme Court said:
   

“The sentence the Court imposes must also be geared towards preserving human life in obedience to the Constitutional mandate under s. 35. Courts have time and again placed great importance on the sanctity of human life and the need to impose adequate sentences on offenders who cause a death or are involved in any way in the loss of a human life”.

10. In Anna Max Marangi v The State (2002) SC702 the Supreme Court expressed the importance of life, thus:
    

“Life is the most precious gift from God who alone gives life and takes life. Any person who takes away someone else’s life, for whatever form or manner, and irrespective of what the extravagating or mitigating factors might be, they must adequately pay for it through the sentence that is imposed.”

11. I have stated in various homicide cases that sanctity of life demands nothing less than a custodial sentence for any type of killing. Custodial sentence must be the common denominator in sentencing for all homicides. To do otherwise renders the sanctity of life as a valueless commodity.
    
12. In sentencing for homicides there are basic principles.

One is as stated by the Supreme Court on an appeal against sentence for manslaughter in the case of Antap Yala v The State (unreported SC judgement in SCRA No 690 of 1996 dated 31 May 199). The Supreme Court said:

"The maximum punishment for the offence of manslaughter is life imprisonment. Whilst sentences for manslaughter will normally be lower than sentences for murder and wilful murder, there are those cases which will justify the imposition of heavy punishment and even the maximum punishment... The sentence in any given case will of course depend on its own peculiar facts.

13. In the case of Simon Kama v State (2004) SC740 the Supreme Court said this for sentence.
    

... we suggest that following the establishment of the guilt of an accused, either on a plea or after a trial, the Court approach sentence with a serious consideration of the maximum prescribed penalty first. Then allow the offender to make out a case for a lesser sentence. An offender could easily do that by pointing out to the factors in his mitigation with the appropriate evidence where evidence is required. Once the offender is able to do that only then should the Court carefully consider the factors both for and against an imposition of the maximum penalty.

14. In the case of State v Polin Pochalou Lopai [1988-89] PNGLR 48 again in a manslaughter case his Honour Bredmeyer J while discussing sentencing principles said, “Every form of punishment takes into account ... both seriousness of the intention behind the act or omission and the seriousness of the consequence...with consequence the more serious the consequence the greater the punishment”.
    
15. Applying the various principles the sentences imposed by the Courts for murder from time immemorial are varied in this jurisdiction reflecting the varying circumstances of each case. However, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained high sentences for murder as appropriate punishments.
    
16. In Alois Peter Irobo Kovei v The State (2001) SC676 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in which the prisoner abducted and raped before murdering the victim.
    
17. In the case of Max Java v State (2002) SC701 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against sentence and affirmed the sentence of 20 years imposed in a murder case where the appellant chased and stabbed the deceased.

In Joseph Enn v the State (2004) SC738 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against sentence and affirmed a sentence of 20 years imposed for chopping the neck of the deceased.

18. In the case of State v Alois Lagu (2011) N4354 the offender who stabbed a fellow villager at a gathering was sentenced to 20 years for murder. It was held in that case that there was no motive for the killing.
    
19. In the circumstances of the present case a deliberate desire to do arm is present. The offender armed himself and acted in a group with the strong desire to harm the deceased by reacting to problems instigated by his younger brother. The consequence of his desire to do harm is very serious. A life has been prematurely lost.
    
20. Wanton killings for all manner of reasons are rampant in this country, and it demands high sentences for those who remove another person’s life to preserve the sanctity of life. Life is precious and sacred since every person has it only once. Life cannot be replaced once it is removed. The Constitution under s35 proclaims the right to life of everyone which undoubtedly includes both the offender and the late deceased. In the present case the latter has been unceremoniously denied the right to life by the other.
    
21. The sanctity of life demands that an ideal punishment should be a custodial sentence commensurate with the sentences imposed by the Courts for murder in the cited cases.
    
22. However, there are factors operating in the offender’s favour. He is a first-time offender. There is no pre-planning associated to the killing. He has expressed genuine remorse on allocatus. In the State v Sagu Sogave (2000) N2086 the Court held that expression of remorse without anything such as compensation means nothing. In the present case the offender’s family has reconciled with the families of the deceased by paying K14,000 and 1 pig valued at K3,000 as Bel Kol compensation with the actual compensation yet to be paid. The relatives of the deceased have accepted the compensation paid.
    
23. The actions taken by the offender’s relative in my view are an expression of genuine remorse for the offender even though the offender did not personally take part in the reconciliation. On the same token the acceptance by the relatives of the deceased is deemed to have been accepted by the deceased.
    
24. It cannot be ignored that the people of this country are generally family centred, and anything done by relatives for and on behalf of an offender who is incarcerated, or a deceased is deemed to have been done by the person concerned. Practically the offender and the deceased cannot reconcile themselves individually, when one is incarcerated and the other is no longer alive.
    
25. Under the circumstances the reconciliation between the relatives of the offender and the deceased should not be overlooked just to satisfy the standing proposition that payment of compensation does not pay for crime or bring back the lost life. The most appropriate thing to do under the circumstances is to treat the reconciliation as a special mitigating factor for the sole reason that voluntary reconciliation paves the way for peace and harmony for co-existence to prevail that a high jail term cannot provide.
    
26. Therefore, in the exercise of sentencing discretion the head sentence which should be 20 years in line with the cited cases shall be lowered to 18 years imprisonment. Any discount that may be available to an offender who pleads guilty early is not available to the offender for being convicted after a trial.

From the 18 years the time in pre-sentence custody shall be deducted and the balance shall be served at CIS Buimo.

Lawyer for the State: Public Prosecutor
Lawyer for the defence: Public Solicitor