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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
OS NO. 203 OF 2020
BETWEEN:
MOUNTAIN PROEPRTY HOLDINGS LIMITED
Plaintiff
AND
JACK SAGALING
First Defendant
AND
KELLY SAGALING
Second Defendant
AND:
BOB SAGALING
Third Defendant
AND:
WARIL INCORPORATED LAND GROUP
Fourth Defendant
AND:
FUSION MATERIALS & MACHINARIES LIMITED
Fifth Defendant
Lae: Dowa J
2022: 4th August
2023: 11th October
LAND LAW – state lease -– plaintiff seeking declaratory relief of ownership of state lease –Indefeasibility of title under section 33 of Land Registration Act- Seeking orders for possession- and permanent injunctions from adverse dealings on land and from harassment or intimidation - defendants dispute claim on the basis encroachment to customary ownership, disputing that the injuncted land was outside the Plaintiff’s land- court has no jurisdiction to deal with disputes over alienated customary land– the appropriate body to hear disputes over alienated customary land is the Land Titles Commission - Orders granted in favour of the Plaintiff.
Cases Cited:
Mudge -v- Secretary for Lands [1985] PNGLR 387
Godowan Investment Ltd v Wambea (2018) N7263
Kimas v Oala (2015) SC1475
Robinson v Airlines Corp [1983] PNGLR 476
Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd (2011) SC1144
Counsel:
S. Kesno, for the Plaintiffs
T Cook, for the Frst Defendant
K Keindi, for Second, Third and the Fourth Defendants
RULING
11th October 2023
Background facts
Evidence
The fifth Defendant did not participate in the proceedings.
The Plaintiffs Claim
The Defendants Claim
Issues
ii. Whether the Plaintiff is the proprietor of Portion 410.
Consideration of the Issues
(i) Whether the proceedings are an abuse of the process based on res judicata
11. The second issue to determine is whether the Plaintiff is the owner of Portion 410.The Plaintiff has produced, a certificate of title, issued under State Lease, Volume 11 Folio 126 over the subject land, Portion 410. The Title shows the Plaintiff as the current registered owner. Section 32 of the Land Registration Act provides that where an instrument of title describes a person as the proprietor of an estate or interest, that person is the registered proprietor of the estate or interest. Section 33 of the Land Registration Act provides that a registered proprietor of an estate or interest holds it absolutely free from all encumbrances except for fraud and other exceptions set out in (1)(a) to (f). (Mudge -v- Secretary for Lands (1985) PNG LR 387)
12. The defendants have not disputed that the Plaintiff is registered as proprietor of Portion 410. They are, however, disputing the boundary of Portion 410 in relation to the injuncted land which they claim is customary land.
13. I find as a matter of fact from the undisputed evidence that the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of land described as Portion 410, Milinch of Erap, Fourmil Markham, Lae under State Lease, Volume 11 Folio 126.
(iii) Whether the injuncted (cleared) land is within the boundary of Portion 410.
14. The Defendants contend that the injuncted land is customary land, outside the boundary of Portion 410. They dispute the survey plans produced by Stanis Anea as lacking credibility.
15. The Plaintiff maintains that the cleared land is within the boundary of Portion 410. It is within the registered state lease and has indefeasible title under section 33 of the Land Registration Act.
16. Portion 410 is a huge portion of land containing 138 hectares. The cleared or injuncted land contains an area of 1.03 hectares. The survey plans produced by the Department of Lands and Physical Planning show, the injuncted land is within Portion 410. The Court notes the contention by the Defendants that the survey plans provided by Stanis Anea is unreliable because Mr. Anea is not a qualified and registered Surveyor. This contention is refuted by Mr. Anea. He says he is registered and is a qualified Surveyor although at the time of the survey he was not yet registered by the PNG Surveyors Board. From evidence presented, I accept the explanation presented by Mr. Anea and am satisfied that Mr. Anea is a qualified surveyor and the survey reports provided are credible. The evidence shows the survey was conducted by involving: i) the physical boundary walking and identification of landmarks and cement pegs, and ii) aerial survey using a GPS coordinated drone which took aerial photographs of the injuncted land. The survey was conducted as per direction of the Court given on 14th May 2021 by the Department of Lands and Physical Planning which clearly show the cleared land is within the boundary of the alienated land, Portion 410. On the flipside, the Defendants have not provided alternative survey to show that the cleared land is outside the boundary of Portion 410. I am therefore satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the cleared injuncted land is within the boundary of Portion 410.
17. As stated earlier in the judgment that, the law on Section 33(1) of the Land Registration Act is settled. A registered proprietor has indefeasible title under section 33 of the Land Registration Act except for fraud and other exceptions listed in subsection one (1).
18. The issue before the Court is not over proprietorship of Portion 410. Rather the dispute is centered around the boundary of Portion 410 in relation to the adjacent customary land belonging to the Defendants.
19. It is however worth noting that the Defendants are raising serious allegations disputing the Plaintiffs title on Portion 410 insofar as it encroaches onto customary land. They submit Portion 410 does not exist and the survey plans are a recent creation and that the cleared injuncted land is customary land. The defendants seem to be arguing that the circumstances of the acquiring the State Lease over Portion 410 from what used to be customary land is unsatisfactory, irregular, or unlawful. They are questioning the processes involving various legislation and State Departments in the initial acquisition and subsequent creation of various titles over land including Portion 410, the subject of these proceedings. The defendants are indirectly seeking a review of the various administrative decisions.
20. Whilst the allegations are serious, the Defendants have not taken any proper and appropriate action or steps to challenge the title in some tangible ways to raise the issue of bona fide dispute as to title. The First Defendant and the other customary landowners have not commenced any proceedings challenging the title obtained by the Plaintiff. The title was issued many years back. The Defendants and the other customary landowners have been aware since. The validity of the title was not challenged so far, in a Court of competent jurisdiction or the Land Titles Commission.
21. The onus of challenging the validity of title rests on the defendants. In Godowan Investment Ltd v Wambea (2018) N7263, Cannings J said this at paragraph 9 of his judgment:
“The fact that the leases were granted to and registered in the name of the plaintiff gives rise to the presumption that it has good and indefeasible title subject only to the exceptions prescribed by Section 33(1) of the Land Registration Act (Mudge v Secretary for Lands [1985] PNGLR 387). The onus of proving a case of fraud or that any of the other exceptions in Section 33(1) applies rests with the person who challenges the title of the registered proprietor (Niugini Properties Ltd v Londari (2014) N5727).”
22. I am also guided by a National Court decision in Yandu v Waiyu (2005) N2894, where the Court (Cannings J) in dealing with an eviction matter held that:
“2. If the registered proprietor of a State Lease commences proceedings in the District Court to enforce their interest in the land there is no bona fide dispute about title to the Land unless some other person demonstrates that they have taken some distinct, formal, legal steps to disturb that title.”
23. In the present case, the Defendants have not demonstrated to the Court that they have taken appropriate legal steps to disturb the Plaintiff’s title. Therefore, in my view there is no bona fide dispute about title.
24. Secondly, where customary land is alienated, the process of determining customary ownership and land rights is now vested with the Land Titles Commission. The National Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the issues raised by the Defendants. In Kimas v Oala (2015) SC1475, the Supreme Court settled the law. At paragraphs 6 and 7 of its judgment the Court said, and I quote:
“6. It is settled law that the National Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning ownership by custom of any land, including a dispute as to whether any land is or is not customary land. Such disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Titles Commission under section 15 (determination of Disputes) of the Land Titles Commission Act, which states:
The Commission has, subject to this Act, exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes concerning and claims to the ownership by custom of, or the right by custom to use, any land, water or reef, including a dispute as to whether any land is or is not customary land and may make all such preliminary inquiries and investigations as it deems necessary for the purpose of hearing and determining the disputes and claims.
25. Applying the reasonings in Kimas v Oala, I have expressed a similar view in Katumani & Ors v Elijah Yawing & Ors (2020) N8481. At paragraph 28 of my judgment, I said:
“28. Since the Defendants have raised substantial dispute over ownership, I will address them as well, so the parties have proper and informed understanding of the process involved in furthering their interests. It is trite law that both the district and National Courts have no jurisdiction to deal with disputes over customary land. Such disputes can be dealt with in the first instance by following the procedures and processes in the Land Dispute Settlement Act. Where a title is issued over customary land as in the present case, a disputing party can mount a case with the Land Titles Commission pursuant to section 15 of the Land Titles Commission Act”.
26. In my view, the Defendants are raising genuine questions on how the land is surveyed and mapped out. How is it that two main highways are cutting through a State Lease, especially when the Titles were issued only recently. That said, however, I find the defendants have not appropriately challenged the Plaintiff’s title to the property, Portion 410, up to now and are therefore not entitled to any reliefs not appropriately sought.
27. The Plaintiff seeks several reliefs in the Originating Summons. I will deal with them together. Firstly, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that it is the registered proprietor of Portion 410. From the evidence provided, it is clear the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of Portion 410, Milinch of Erap, Fourmill Markham, Lae, State Lease, Volume 11 Folio 126, containing an area of 138 hectares. The cleared injuncted land the subject of these proceedings is within the boundary of Portion 410, and thus the dealing by the Defendants amounts to an illegal encroachment to the quiet enjoyment of possession. I find the dealings between the first and the fifth Defendants over the injuncted portion of land illegal, a nullity and of no effect.
28. Next, the Plaintiff seeks injunctions and restraining orders against the Defendants. Generally, a grant of an interlocutory injunction is discretionary. Its purpose is to maintain status quo until final determination. See Robinson v Airlines Corp (1983) PNGLR 476. A permanent injunction on the other hand is more serious and is sparingly granted. The Supreme Court in Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd (2011) SC144 discussed the law on permanent injunction. At paragraphs 58-63of the judgment, the court said, and I quote:
“58. The law in relation to the grant of permanent injunctions is summarised in the text Spry, Equitable Remedies, Injunctions and Specific Performance, Seventh Edition (1980). At pg.392, Spry (supra) states:
"In all cases, it is a matter of discretion whether an injunction will or will not be granted; but the manner of exercise of that discretion depends on the precise nature of the particular rights that it is sought to protect and on all other material circumstances."
"An injunction may nonetheless, be refused, as a matter of discretion, should it appear to be unjust or 'highly unreasonable' to grant it, by reference to established equitable considerations such as laches, hardship, acquiescence, the absence of clean hands or such other matters. Further, statutory rights must be taken into account by the Court."
29. The Plaintiff, as the registered owner, is entitled to peaceful of the use of the property. It is not highly unreasonable or unjust to grant the orders sought. I will therefore grant an order for permanent injunction against the defendants.
30. In addition, the Plaintiff is also entitled to the grant of restraining orders against the Defendants which shall be granted as a further consequential order.
Costs
31. Finally, as to cost, it is discretionary matter. Generally, an order for cost is awarded to a successful party in a contested hearing. The proceedings have been vigorously defended and substantial cost is incurred. In the circumstances, cost shall be awarded to the Plaintiff to be taxed, if not agreed.
ORDERS
____________________________________________________________________
Kesno Lawyers: Lawyers for the Plaintiff
Cook & Co. Lawyers: Lawyers for the First Defendant
Gamoga Lawyers: Lawyers for the Second, Third and Fourth Defendants
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