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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
OS NO.166 OF 2016
BETWEEN:
PNG POWER LIMITED
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
AND:
BOB KERENGA as Chairman of the Kapma Gaten Landowners Association of Kau Basis and Dumun villages, Simbu Province
Defendant/Cross-Claimant
Waigani: David, J
2020: 23rd March
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – claim for compensation under transmission line access agreement – claim founded on simple contract –time for payment of compensation not stipulated - whether action time-barred – Frauds and Limitations Act, Section 16(1)(a).
Cases Cited:
Papua New Guinea Cases
Brian Josiah v Steven Raphael (2018) SC1665
Joe Kerowa v MVIL (2010) SC1100
John Hiwi v Rendle Rimua (2015) SC1460
Michael Nunulrea v PNG Harbours Ltd (2005) N2790
Otto Benal Magiten v Kopina Raka (2002) N2179
Oil Search Ltd v Mineral Resources Development Corporation Ltd (2010) SC1022
Paul Kumba v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust (2001) N2132
Overseas Cases
Midland Bank v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1978] 3 All ER 571
Wylie v Wake [2000] EWCA Civ 349
Treatise Cited:
Chitty on Contracts, Volume 1, General Principles, 1994, Sweet & Maxwell
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 28, 4th Edition
Counsel:
Derrick Dusava, for the Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
Edward Keka Komia, for the Defendant/Cross-Claimant
JUDGMENT
23rd March, 2020
PLAINTIFF/CROSS-DEFENDANT’S CLAIM
2. In PNG Power’s originating summons filed on 30 March 2016 which was later amended by amended originating summons filed on 13 April 2016 (amended originating summons), the main relief sought are:
DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT’S CROSS-CLAIM
3. Kerenga is an adult citizen of Papua New Guinea and is from Kapma Gaten tribe of Sinasina District in the Simbu Province. He represents himself and 3,600 others from his tribe in pursuing their claim against the plaintiff.
4. PNG Power is an entity established under the Independent Public Business Act 2002. It can sue and be sued and can be vicariously liable for the actions and omissions of its employees.
PLAINTIFF’S DEFENCE TO CROSS-CLAIM
15. PNG Power denies liability. It avers that; PNG Power is a company established under the Companies Act whose shares are held by the Independent Public Business Corporation; over 28 years have lapsed since the TAA was signed and the claim is statute barred by virtue of Section 16 of the Frauds and Limitations Act; the original persons who signed the TAAs were paid compensation for clearing the corridor at the material time; the project was abandoned due to the difficult terrain; over the course of time, the forest along the corridor has naturally regrown to its original state and this fact has been reported in environmental reports; the reports that Kerenga relies on were done some 20 years after the fact and therefore are not the true description of the value of plants within the corridor that was cleared.
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S DEFENCE TO CROSS-CLAIM
16. Kerenga joined issue with PNG Power on its defence.
EVIDENCE
17. PNG Power relies on the affidavit of Titus Tsigese sworn and filed on 7 August 2017 (Exhibit A). No cross-examination was conducted.
18. Kerenga relies on the following affidavits:
19. No cross-examination was conducted.
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF/CROSS-DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE
Titus Tsigese
20. He is employed by PNG Power as an Environmental Officer attached to its Operations Business Unit. He did an environmental report on behalf of PNG Power.
21. On 28 June 2007, he did a field trip to the area the subject of Kerenga’s claim which is situated in the Nilkama Valley, Sinasina Yongomugl District, Simbu Province. The field trip exercise involved tracking across the ridge where the planned 132 KV Transmission Line would have run starting from the Nilkama Valley and onto the Highlands Highway. The field exercise basically involved physical and visual observations of a section of the area of forest cut as easement for the aborted 132 KV Transmission Line and the surrounding original forest. This was to observe first hand any effect that the area cleared by PNG Power might have had and to compare the original forest with the regrowth from the area cut to see if there were any changes in flora species make up. It also involved observation of other activities that could have had an impact on the flora and fauna of the area.
22. There was nothing that suggested that PNG Power’s activities had negatively impacted the environment within the locality as the type of activity undertaken by PNG Power was not significant in terms of the area cleared and potential magnitude of its impact. On the other hand, the activities of the landowners themselves in terms of the size of the area they cleared and magnitude of its impact on the environment was quite significant. The area of forest cleared by PNG Power was very small compared to the vast area of forest removed by the landowners. Comparing the area of forest cut for the 132 KV Transmission Line easement and that removed by the landowners it was justifiable to claim that the clearance by landowners was more likely to cause environment impact than the clearance by PNG Power.
23. His assessment was that the damage claimed by Kerenga was excessive and not a true reflection of what he saw. The area concerned had significantly re-grown and had naturally rehabilitated. A true copy of his report compiled in July 2007 is annexure A to Exhibit A.
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT’S EVIDENCE
Ben Okoro
24. He is from Dumun village, Sinasina District, Simbu Province. He is the Chief of Kimba Ku Kane clan of the Kapma Gaten tribe.
25. Kapma Gaten tribe consists of eight clans that has a population of 3,600 people. The clans are Kimba Ku Kane, Bopakaiworo, KalGawo, Diga Kane, Damaku Kane, Kamara Gawo, Yusi Yal Komuo and Gerel Saki.
26. PNG Power constructed power pylons along 12 kms of their customary land in Sinasina District in 1988 but has not compensated the eight clans who own the customary land on which they stand. A data company in collaboration with PNG Power is using the power pylons to conduct their business. In fact, both PNG Power and the data company are using their customary land to conduct business and making profit without any form of just compensation paid to the customary landowners.
27. PNG Power agreed to pay compensation when it executed an access agreement with the Kapma Gaten Landowners Association and constructed power pylons in 1988 but has not paid compensation to customary landowners for damage done to their customary land.
Bob Kerenga
28. He is the Chairman of Kapma Gaten Landowners Association (the Association) of Sinasina Yongumugl District, Simbu Province. He has been the Chairman of the Association since May 2008.
29. A copy of the TAA that allowed PNG Power to enter and clear forest for purposes of transmission line construction and maintenance is annexed as annexure A to exhibit 4.
30. An environmental impact study of the corridor or stretch of land concerned was conducted by one Bafike Krongui, an environmental scientist of Chem Clean Environmental Services Ltd following his engagement in May 2010 between 12 and 14 June 2010 and a copy of the report he compiled in September 2010 relating to the study is annexed to Exhibit 3 as annexure A. In that report, the value of damage to flora (K65,642.57), fauna, ceremonial areas and land pollution (K346,200.00), timber (K4,532,612.76) and biomass (K121,170.00) was quantified at K5,065,625.33. Copies of the report were submitted to PNG Power through the Board of Directors of PNG Power and its Chief Executive Officer in September 2010.
31. The Association’s claim for compensation commenced in 1988 and has remain unsettled. Subsequent to that date, the Association has submitted numerous claims for compensation to PNG Power copies of which were sent to relevant State agencies.
32. The claim has been followed up with PNG Power directly and with the involvement of others. Annexure B to Exhibit 2 is a copy of a letter from the Association to the then Minister of Public Enterprises and State Investments, Hon. Ben Micah MP dated 24 January 2013 requesting his assistance and intervention in facilitating payment of compensation. Annexure C to Exhibit 2 is a copy of a letter from the then Minister of Public Enterprises and State Investments, Hon. Ben Micah MP to Mr Joshua Bakiri, Chairman of PNG Power dated 12 February 2013 requesting consideration and immediate settlement of the Association’s claim. Annexure D to Exhibit 2 is a copy of a letter from Dr. Clement Waine, Acting Secretary of Department of Public Enterprises & State Investments to Mr John Tangit, Chief Executive Officer of PNG Power dated 23 January 2014 requesting PNG Power to address the Association’s claim. Annexure E to Exhibit 2 is a copy of an undated letter from the Association to the Board of Directors of PNG Power proposing settlement of its claim for K10 million. Annexure F to Exhibit 2 is a copy of a letter from the Association to the Acting Chief Executive Officer of PNG Power dated 17 August 2015 following up on the Association’s claim. Annexure G to Exhibit 2 is a copy of a letter from the Association to the Manager, Legal of PNG Power dated 10 September 2015 following up on the Association’s claim and also giving notice of the possibility of disrupting power supply to all Highlands Provinces failing settlement of its claim. Annexure H to Exhibit 2 is a copy of a letter from Joe Kunda Naur, Provincial Administrator, Simbu Provincial Administration to the Chief Executive Officer of PNG Power dated 3 February 2016 requesting PNG Power to promptly address and expedite payment of the Association’s claim.
33. On 5 February 2016, the Association submitted a claim for compensation to PNG Power for environmental damage caused to 12 km of their customary land in Sinasina Yongomugl District, Simbu Province by PNG Power when clearing land to construct power pylons through the Manager of PNG Power, Kundiawa. A copy of the submission is annexure A to Exhibit 2.
34. Annexure I to Exhibit 2 is a copy of a letter from Superintendent, Albert Beli, Provincial Police Commander of Simbu Province to the Chief Executive Officer of PNG Power dated 16 February 2016 informing him of complaints received from landowners about non-settlement of their claim and threats issued by them to sabotage power pylons erected on their land failing settlement which the police and Provincial authorities had discouraged and requested PNG Power to give priority to addressing the Association’s claim.
AGREED FACTS
35. In the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts and Issues for Trial dated 8 November 2017 (the Statement of Facts and Issues), the parties stated that the following facts are not disputed:
DISPUTED FACTS
36. From the evidence and the Statement of Facts and Issues, the following facts are disputed:
LEGAL ISSUES FOR TRIAL
35. In the Statement of Facts and Issues, the parties agreed that the main legal issues for trial in relation to both claims of the parties are:
37. Given that, it would appear that other relief sought by PNG Power for declarations and grant of permanent restraining orders from paragraphs 3 to 8 of the amended originating summons have been abandoned and therefore dismissed.
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT’S CROSS-CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED?
38. PNG Power argues that Kerenga’s cross-claim is founded on a simple contract therefore it is time-barred by virtue of Section 16(1)(a) of the Frauds and Limitations Act which stipulates that no action can be brought after the expiration of six years after the cause of action accrued.
39. Kerenga contends that PNG Power is estopped from pleading Section 16(1)(a) of the Frauds and Limitations Act as a bar by the application of the principles of estoppel by conduct also known as estoppel by representation.
40. In addition, it was argued that the cause of action accrued not from the date when PNG Power stopped clearing the forest, but when PNG Power should have paid compensation to Kerenga. It was submitted that there was no date contemplating the completion of the parties’ obligations under the TAA, i.e.:
41. The starting point in the present case is Section 16(1)(a) of the Frauds and Limitations Act. It is instructive that I set out the relevant provision below.
Limitation of actions in contract, tort, etc.
(1) Subject to Sections 17 and 18, an action—
(a) that is founded on simple contract or on tort; or
(b) ....
(c) ....
(d) ....
shall not be brought after the expiration of six years commencing on the date on which the cause of action accrued.
42. In order to determine whether a cause of action founded on a contract was time-barred, the Supreme Court in Oil Search Ltd v Mineral Resources Development Corporation Ltd (2010) SC1022 suggested three matters that should be considered. The Supreme Court at paragraph 11 of the judgment observed:
A determination of whether an action involving an alleged breach of contractual obligations is time-barred under Sections 16(1) or 16(3) of the Frauds and Limitations Act necessarily entails a finding on three matters:
(a) What is the “cause of action” (that being the term used in both sub-sections)?
(b) What is “the date on which the cause of action accrued” (that term also being used in both sub-sections)?
(c) Is the action “founded on a special contract” (in which case the six-year limitation period in Section 16(1) will apply) or is it “an action upon a speciality” (in which case Section 16(3) applies and the limitation period is 12 years)?
43. I adopt and apply those matters below.
44. What is the cause of action in the cross-claim? I am of the opinion that the cause of action in the cross-claim is founded on a breach of a simple contract in which case the six-year limitation period will apply, i.e., an action for breach of contract must be brought within six years from the date of accrual of the cause of action.
45. What is “the date on which the cause of action accrued”?The general rule in contract is that a cause of action in a breach of contract accrues, not on the date of the contract, but on the date of the breach,: Midland Bank v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1978] 3 All ER 571, Otto Benal Magiten v Kopina Raka (2002) N2179, Michael Nunulrea v PNG Harbours Ltd (2005) N2790, John Hiwi v Rendle Rimua (2015) SC1460. So when was the TAA breached by the plaintiff?
46. The argument on estoppel aside, my understanding of Kerenga’s argument is that due to the uncertainty under the TAA as to when payment of compensation was to have been made, the breach of contract is a continuing one and the cause of action accrues die in diem, i.e., the right of action is a continuing one from day to day until the obligation to pay compensation under the TAA is performed by PNG Power.
47. The learned authors of Chitty on Contracts, Volume 1, General Principles, 1994, Sweet & Maxwell at paragraph 28-022 address the subject of successive and continuing breaches of a contract as follows:
Where the innocent party elects to treat himself as discharged from further performance consequent upon a breach of the contract, time begins to run immediately. For instance, if there is an anticipatory breach accepted by him as a repudiation of the contract, his cause of action accrues at once, and not from the failure of the party in default subsequently to perform at the time fixed for performance. But if there are one or more breaches which do not give rise to a discharge either because they are not sufficiently fundamental or because the innocent party declines to accept them as having that effect, each will give rise to a separate cause of action. There may also be a series of breaches of a single covenant. Examples are failure to pay instalments of interest or rent. Or the breach may be a continuing one, e.g. of a covenant to keep in repair. In such a case the plaintiff will succeed in respect of so much of the series of breaches or the continuing breach as occurred within the six (or 12) years before action brought. If the breach consists in a failure to act, it may be held to continue die in diem until the obligation is performed or becomes impossible of performance or until the innocent party elects to treat the continued non-performance as a repudiation of the contract.
48. I will be guided by this passage.
49. In Otto Benal Magiten v Kopina Raka (2002) N2179 when dealing with an application to dismiss the entire action as it was time-barred pursuant to Section 16(1) of the Frauds and Limitations Act, Sawong, J in upholding the application was guided by a passage in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 28, 4th Edition at paragraph 662 which states:
If the contract is to do something at a particular time or upon the happening of a contingency, and the thing contracted for is not done, the cause of action arises at the time specified or upon the contingency happening.
50. In that case, the parties entered into a contract for the repair of the plaintiff’s motor vehicle by the defendants. An essential element of the contract was that the defendants were to repair the plaintiff’s vehicle within three weeks. The defendants did not repair the vehicle within the three weeks period agreed to. Instead, it took about four months for the defendants to repair the vehicle. His Honour observed that the breach of contract occurred when the vehicle was not repaired by the defendants within the agreed three weeks period and the cause of action accrued immediately after the three weeks expired. The plaintiff commenced his action more than six years after the cause of action accrued and was clearly statute-barred so it was dismissed in its entirety.
51. A copy of the TAA annexed to Exhibit 4, as part of a bundle of documents marked as annexure A shows that the agreement which was to regulate entry and access to easement for transmission line construction and maintenance between Chuave and Kundiawa (Tower angle Position 28A-28) was entered into between ELCOM and one Mui Nuramil, a leader of the Gapma Gaten clan and of the Dumun community who signed as Owner/Occupier of land the subject of the easement. The easement or corridor was to be approximately 1000 metres long and 20 metres wide. It is instructive that I set the relevant terms of the TAA in full and I do so below.
The above named Owner/Occupier of the said land hereby permit and authorise Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission (hereinafter called “the Commission’’ which expression shall include the employees, agents, contractors, sub-contractors and duly authorised representatives of the Commission) to have access to and enter upon the said easement shown on the attached sketch plan for the purposes of construction of Transmission Lines UPON THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS:-
ACCESS (a) Access to be effected only along transmission line easement at access point on boundary line, as indicated on Sketch Plan; and/or
(b) On tracks at access points as indicated on Sketch Plan.
GATES (a) The Commission may erect and maintain suitable and safe gates at the access points indicated on the Sketch Plan; such gates to be securely locked when not in immediate use;
(b) Owner’s gates, where permitted to be used by Commission under this Agreement, are to be kept closed and barred by the Commission when not in immediate use, to prevent straying of animals or entry.
FENCES (a) The Commission to reinstate owner’s fences and gates where temporarily removed for the purpose of the works.
WORKS (a) Earthmoving and levelling to be carried out without interference with land outside easement area;
(b) Surface of land within easement to be restored so far as is practicable, to enable owner’s continuing use.
TIMBER (Provisions of timber or other growth or objects removed from easement area or access track)
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
DAMAGE In consideration of these present, the Commission hereby undertakes:-
(a) To reinstate the land and the property of the owner on the completion of the construction work as near as possible and practicable to its original condition; and
(b) To pay the owner, make good and compensate for all damage, detriment and deterioration of the land and the owner’s property thereon, which may be due to the construction of the works; over and above the compensation which the owner may be entitled for the grant of the easement only.
LIABILITY The Commission shall be liable for all injury and damage to third parties and property arising out of the construction or maintenance of the works, and shall indemnify the Owner against any claims that may be made against the Owner in respect of such injury or damage.
52. Clearly, there is no specific or clear stipulation as to the time when PNG Power was to pay compensation under the TAA. Other TAAs signed on different dates in April 1988 are in similar terms.
53. It is clear to me and I find as a fact from the available evidence before me that PNG Power abandoned the project and the easement or corridor has reverted back to the use of the original landowners. It is however not clear from the available evidence as to when the project was actually aborted and for what reason(s). It seems from the evidence of Mr. Tsigese that the corridor or easement cut has significantly regrown and naturally rehabilitated. An internal brief on important legal matters by PNG Power’s Manager Legal Services forming part of the bundle of documents constituting annexure A to Exhibit 2 shows that PNG Power never returned to the easement or corridor cut to erect power pylons. In the same brief, it is asserted that the landowners were paid K160.00 for each pylon that was proposed to be erected.
54. Kerenga’s evidence is that their claim for compensation commenced in 1988 and has been unsuccessfully pursued from that time to the present time. There is no strong and convincing evidence before the Court to suggest that all landowners who were alive and present at the time the TAA was signed personally received payment for the value of trees that had been cut down. It is not clear from the evidence as to the reason(s) why the claim for compensation was made not long after the TAA was signed. If that implies that the project was aborted before compensation was claimed and Kerenga elected to treat the non-performance of PNG Power’s obligation to pay compensation or damages under the TAA as a repudiation of the TAA, then Kerenga’s cause of action would have commenced accruing around that time. That means that Kerenga should have commenced his Associations’ action within six years from the time the project was aborted, i.e., sometime towards the end of 1994. If PNG Power aborted the project later than 1988, then it is difficult from the evidence available to pinpoint or guess the nearest date. Even if the project had been aborted anytime after 1988 say within six years of the signing of the TAA and Kerenga elected to treat the non-performance of PNG Power’s obligation to pay compensation or damages under the TAA as a repudiation of the TAA, then Kerenga should have commenced their action by year 2000.
55. In the circumstances, I find that Kerenga’s conduct in claiming compensation or damages under the TAA as I have alluded to above amounted to an election to accept repudiation of the TAA. Kerenga’s cross-claim is time-barred and I declare it to be so.
56. Given that conclusion, Kerenga’s cross-claim also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. I also note that it is an undisputed fact that Kerenga has previously filed proceedings in both the National Court and the Supreme Court seeking damages, but those claims were all dismissed.
57. Kerenga’s contention that PNG Power is estopped from pleading the statute of limitation as a bar by the application of the principles of estoppel by conduct also known as estoppel by representation is misconceived and rejected. The maxim equity follows the law and also expressed as aequitas sequitur legem which means that equity will not allow a remedy that is contrary to law is accepted and applied in our jurisdiction: Paul Kumba v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust (2001) N2132, Joe Kerowa v MVIL (2010) SC1100, Brian Josiah v Steven Raphael (2018) SC1665, Wylie v Wake [2000] EWCA Civ 349.
58. Is the action “founded on a special contract” or is it “an action upon a speciality”? The action in the cross-claim is neither founded on a special contract nor upon a specialty. Any contract in the form of a deed is a specialty: John Hiwi v Rendle Rimua (2015) SC1460. The action is founded on a breach of a simple contract in which case the six-year limitation period will apply.
59. I conclude that Kerenga’s claim pursued by the cross-claim is time-bared and amounts to an abuse of the process of Court and therefore will be dismissed in its entirety. This means that Kerenga will not be entitled to compensation under the TAA as PNG Power has no legal obligation to do so.
COSTS
60. Costs will follow the event, i.e., PNG Power is awarded costs of the entire proceedings inclusive of both claims. This means that Kerenga shall pay PNG Power’s costs on a party-party basis, which shall, if not agreed, be taxed.
ORDER
61. The formal orders of the Court are:
62. Judgment and orders accordingly.
____________________________________________________________
PNG Power In-house Lawyers: Lawyers for the Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
Chesterfield: Lawyers for the Defendant/Cross-Claimant
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