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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
OS (JR) NO. 330 OF 2015
BETWEEN
THE HONOURABLE BOKA KONDRA, MP
Plaintiff
AND
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SALATIEL LENALIA, HIS WORSHIP MR IGNATIUS KUREI & HER WORSHIP MS ROSIE JOHNSON AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS
OF A LEADERSHIP TRIBUNAL
First Defendants
AND
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Second Defendant
Waigani: Makail J
2016: 17th February & 1st March
JUDICIAL REVIEW – Review of decisions of Leadership Tribunal – Misconduct in Office – Finding of guilt – Penalty – Grounds of – Irrelevant considerations – Unreasonableness – Error of law – Duplicity of charges – Failure to take into account relevant considerations – Constitution – Sections 27 & 28.
LEADERSHIP CODE – Misconduct in Office – Misapplication of public funds – District Service Improvement Programme Funds – District Support Grants – Constitution – Sections 27 & 28 – Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership – Sections 13 & 27.
Cases cited:
Papua New Guinea cases
Peipul v Justice Sheehan (2002) SC706
Re Yambui (2007) N4052 (LT)
Re Joseph Lelang MP, Member for Kandrian Gloucester Open Electorate (2013) N5212
Re Puka Temo (2006) N3099
Re Sir Michael Somare (2011) N4224
Overseas cases
Boral Gas (NSW) Pty Ltd v. Magill (1995) 37 NSWLR 150
Bryne v. Baker [1964] VicRp 57; (1964) VR 443
Johnson v. Miller [1937] HCA 77; (1937) 59 CLR 467
Counsel:
Mr. I. R. Molloy with Ms. L. David, for Plaintiff
Mr. W. Hagahuno, for Defendants
JUDGMENT
1st March, 2016
1. MAKAIL J: This is an application for judicial review pursuant to Order 16 of the National Court Rules. Leave was granted on 16th July 2015. On 18th July 2015 the Court ordered the State to be joined as a defendant (second defendant). The plaintiff is the Member representing the North-Fly Open Electorate in the National Parliament. He was referred for prosecution by the Ombudsman Commission on six allegations of misconduct in office. They arose from misapplication of District Service Improvement Program Funds ("DSIP Funds") and District Support Grants ("DSG").
Decisions of Leadership Tribunal
2. The application relates to decisions of the first defendants, constituting a Leadership Tribunal ("Tribunal") appointed pursuant to sections 27(6) & 27(7)(e) of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership ("Leadership Code").
3. The Tribunal's decisions were:
a) On 27th April 2015 finding the plaintiff by majority guilty of six allegations of misconduct in office; and
b) On 29th May 2015 recommending by way of penalty that the plaintiff be dismissed from office as Member of Parliament for North Fly Open Electorate.
Grounds of Review
4. The grounds of review raised in the statement under Order 16 rule 3(2) of the National Court Rules are, that the Tribunal:
• Took into account irrelevant considerations.
• Failed to take into account relevant considerations.
• Error of law on the face of the record, and
• The Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness
Allegations of Misconduct in Office
5. There were six allegations against the plaintiff; Allegations 1, 3 and 5 all alleged he intentionally misapplied money. Allegations 2, 4 and 6 were supplemental to Allegations 1, 3 and 5.
6. Allegation 1 was:
That between December 2008 and December 2009 the Leader intentionally applied money forming part of a fund under the control of Papua New Guinea, namely District Services Improvement Programme (DSIP) funds and District Support Grants to the purpose for which it was not lawful;
In that the Leader used a total of K85, 276.00 from the DSIP funds and DSG held in the North Fly District Treasury Operation Account to pay for the office rentals for office space for the North-Fly Open Electorate in the North Fly District when he was already specifically allocated K36, 623.00 per annum payable over 26 pay period (fortnightly salary) to pay for:-
a. Employment of electoral staff;
b. Electoral travel;
c. Electoral duty;
d. Electoral rental
The sum of K36, 623.00 is not subject to an acquittal. Thereby being guilty of misconduct in office under section 13(a) of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership.
7. Allegation 3 was in substance:
That between 2008 and 2009 the Leader intentionally applied a sum of K134, 966.92 forming part of a fund under the control of Papua New Guinea to purposes for which it was not lawful in that whilst receiving a housing allowance of K1, 800.00 in his fortnightly salary, the Leader allowed the use of K134, 966.62 from the DSIP and the DSG held in the North-Fly District Operating Account for rental payments for accommodation for himself and his family in Port Moresby as outlined below:
For the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 the Leader was being paid housing allowances equivalent to that of a Governor when he received in:
Thereby being guilty of misconduct in office under section 13(1) of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership.
8. Allegation 5 was:
That between 2008 and 2010 the Leader intentionally applied money from part of a fund under the control of Papua New Guinea to purposes for which it was not lawful; In that the Leader misapplied a total of K18, 200.00 from the DSIP funds and the DSG to service outstanding debt incurred during the 2007 National Elections by hiring a motor vehicle from a company called Towi Smash Repairs and outlined as follows:-
• The leader incurred debts during his election campaign in 2007 and did not pay this (sic) almost two (2) years.
• He then allowed public funds from the DSIP and DSG to be used to pay off his personal debt.
• The Leader used public funds from DSIP and DSG totalling K18, 200.00 to settle his outstanding debt.
• The leader breached the DSG and DSIP guidelines by authorising funds to be used outside these guidelines.
Thereby being guilty of misconduct in office under section 13(a) of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership.
9. Allegations 2, 4, and 6 are all dependent on findings of guilt on Allegations 1, 3 and 5 respectively. They alleged that by reasons of the conduct alleged in Allegations 1, 3 and 5.
That between (the respective dated) the Leader failed to carry out the obligations imposed by section 27(1) of the Constitution; By conducting himself in his public life and in his association with other persons in such a way that he:
a. Demeaned his office as a Leader;
b. Allowed his official integrity and his personal integrity to be called into question.
c. And furthermore the Leader failed to carry out his obligations imposed by section 27(2) of the Constitution;
By using his name for personal gain in that the leader [was guilty of conduct alleged in Allegations 1, 3 and 5 respectively]. Thereby being guilty of misconduct in office under section 27(5) (b) of the Constitution.
Consideration of Allegations 1, 3 and 5
10. Mr. Molloy of counsel for the plaintiff presented detailed written submissions and spoke to it at the hearing. The same argument was advanced in relation to Allegations 1, 3 and 5, likewise, same argument for Allegations 2, 4 and 6. Counsel submitted that Allegations 1, 3 and 5 alleged that the plaintiff intentionally misapplied money. However, the evidence presented against the plaintiff at the Tribunal fell short of establishing the element of intention. Further, at the material times, the plaintiff was a first time Member and did not know much about the purposes of the funds and how they are distributed. He relied on the advice of the District Administrator. Accordingly, the guilt of the plaintiff could not reasonably be open to the Tribunal to find.
11. At the centre of the allegations of misapplication of funds and misconduct in office are DSIP and DSG funds. They are funds earmarked for projects in the District such as funding of Health, Education and Social Services. They are intended to improve lives of people living in the rural areas of the District. There is a prescribed procedure by which these funds are accessed. It is a long procedure which has checks and balances in place to prevent or minimise risk of abuse and misuse of funds as highlighted in the evidence of the witnesses the District Administrator, Mr. Ronald Dmonai and the District Treasurer, Mr. Karl Kanong.
12. Briefly, it starts with the service provider rendering an invoice for a claim to the District Administration for payment and ends with the District Treasurer approving for payment, and a cheque is raised, counter signed by the District Treasurer and delivered to the service provider. In between, the claim is examined and certified and Requisition Expenditure and General Expense forms ("FF3 & FF4") are filled and submitted with the invoice to the District Treasurer for processing payment. As to Allegations 1, 3, and 5, Mr. Molloy submitted that the evidence at the Tribunal established that:
12.1. the plaintiff did not receive the invoices for the office rental, accommodation and hire car (bus) from the service providers,
12.2. he was not shown the invoices for these claims,
12.3. the invoices did not come to his office, and
12.4. he did not sign any requisition or vouchers for payment.
13. On the other hand, the evidence established that:
13.1. the District Administrator requisitioned the payments,
13.2. the District Administrator chose where the funds were paid from, and
13.3. the District Administrator signed and remitted the cheques.
14. The Tribunal failed to take these matters into account. Based on this evidence, it is the plaintiff's submission that the prosecution had failed to connect him to the payment of office rentals, accommodation and hire car. Thus, the gist of the plaintiff's defence against Allegations 1, 3 and 5 is that he was not aware nor did he authorise payments of the claims for office rentals, accommodation and hire car. Accordingly, the Tribunal could not be satisfied that he intentionally misapplied sums from the DSIP and DSG funds to payment of office rent, accommodation and hire car.
15. Mr. Hagahuno of counsel for the defendants submitted that the judicial review should be dismissed because there was evidence before the Tribunal firmly establishing that the plaintiff intentionally misapplied money. First, counsel referred to the evidence of Leaders entitlements under the Salaries and Remuneration Determination ("SRC Determination") which provided for various allowances paid to a Member of the National Parliament. Amongst other things, a Member receives an allowance for housing, transport and office rental in the electorate.
16. Secondly, the plaintiff as Chairman of the Joint District Planning & Budget Committee ("JDPB Committee") and members of the said Committee in a meeting on 23rd October 2007 approved a sum of K400, 000.00 for the plaintiff's use. This sum came out of DSIP and DSG funds held in the bank account of North-Fly District Operating Account. Funds were drawn from this sum to pay for electoral office for the plaintiff in Kiunga, the plaintiff's accommodation in Boroko, Port Moresby and hire of bus during campaign in 2007 General Election.
17. Thirdly, the procurement process is not administrated by the plaintiff as Member for the electorate but the District Administration. That is why service providers render invoices to the District Administration for payment. As services were rendered to the plaintiff, the District Administration is contractually bound to settle the debts. The requisitioning of payments, choice of source of funds, signing and remittance of cheque are the responsibility of the District Administrator and his officers. The plaintiff as an elected Leader plays no part in the settlement of the debts. That is why there is no evidence of the involvement of the plaintiff in the settlement of the debts.
18. However, when the evidence is considered in totality, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the plaintiff received double payments for the same benefits (or expenses incurred by the Leader) and that he was guilty of intentionally misapplying the monies from the DSIP and DSG funds and further, misconduct in office. In other words, the gist of the prosecution case at the Tribunal was that this was a case of "double dipping", that is, the plaintiff received double payments for office rentals, accommodation and hire car.
19. The submission by Mr. Molloy on behalf of the plaintiff that evidence did not establish that the plaintiff was the person who procured and paid for the services of the service providers for office, accommodation and hire car is a fairly restrictive one and one that, with respect, ignores two significant aspects of the prosecution case. First is as pointed out by Mr. Hagahuno, the plaintiff received allowances for housing, transport and an office in the electorate under the SRC Determination for elected Leaders.
20. Secondly, as Chairman of the JDBP Committee, he and members of the Committee on 23rd October 2007 approved a sum of K400, 000.00 from the DSIP and DSG funds for his use. Notably, the meeting minutes showed that the plaintiff and Mr. Dmonai were among others who were present and passed the resolution for the allocation of K400, 000.00 for his use, described as "MP's Administration costs".
21. There is no dispute that this sum was used to settle the claims for office rental, accommodation and hire car. The test for establishing intention is an objective one. In my view, the Tribunal was not restricted in its consideration of this issue. It was open to it to consider the entire factual circumstances giving rise to each allegation in order for it to arrive at the decision that the plaintiff intentionally misapplied public funds.
22. Thus, while it is arguable that the Tribunal was supposed to find that the plaintiff did not intentionally misapply public funds because he did not receive invoices from service providers, that he was not shown invoices for these claims, the invoices did not come from his office and that he did not sign any requisitions or vouchers for payment, it was equally open to the Tribunal to also consider that the plaintiff received allowances for accommodation, transport and office rental pursuant to the SRC Determination and at the same time benefited from payments made by the District Administration for the same benefits to the service providers, particularly accommodation and office rental and in respect of the latter payments, raised no queries with the District Administrator as to where the funds came from to settle the claims and if he did, as he claimed, he did not even find out from the Salaries and Remuneration Commission whether it was proper and lawful for him to receive these further benefits.
23. It was also open to the Tribunal not to accept the plaintiff's defence because as correctly pointed out by Mr. Hagahuno in his final point of his submissions, the procurement and settlement process is not administrated by the plaintiff as Member for the electorate but the District Administration. That explains why there is no evidence of the involvement of the plaintiff in the settlement of the debts.
24. Finally, he cannot rely on his ignorance or him being a first time Member to support his defence because there is undisputed evidence from the Ombudsman Commission at the Tribunal that he was a participant and beneficiary of an Orientation Programme organised by the National Parliament for elected Leaders soon after the 2007 General Election and was informed of the entitlements and benefits of elected Leaders under the SRC Determination.
25. I should add that the plaintiff's denial of being involved in these payments or application of funds also cast doubt in the minds of the members of the Tribunal as they found it difficult to accept his explanation that he knew nothing about these payments when he benefited from the services rendered by the service providers. In my view, it was open to the Tribunal to assess the credibility of the plaintiff's explanation and come to the conclusion as it did.
26. Thus, in my view, it was open to the Tribunal to consider these matters and in so doing, it was open to it to find that notwithstanding the lack of evidence establishing the plaintiff's direct involvement in the procurement and settlement of these claims, the fact that he received allowances for accommodations, transport and office rental under the SRC Determination and the fact that he further benefited from payments made directly to the service providers by the District Administration for the same benefits using DSIP and DSG funds, established that he knew what he was doing was wrong, that is, he intentionally misapplied the funds.
27. The grounds on the failure by the Tribunal to take into account relevant matters and conversely, taking into account irrelevant matters are accordingly, dismissed.
28. As to the ground on unreasonableness of the decision based on the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness, when the entire circumstances of the case are considered, I am not satisfied that the decision reached was unreasonable. Contrary to Mr. Molloy's submission that the decision is unreasonable, the evidence shows that the misapplication of funds by the plaintiff was a well planned and well executed job. The people who were at the forefront were the District Administrator and the District Treasurer as they were the persons who facilitated the requests for payment to the service providers, noting too that the service providers had in one way or the other, connected to the District Administrator and the District Treasurer. The plaintiff remained in the background and quietly benefited. Put it this way, there was a conspiracy amongst these persons to defraud the North-Fly District of much needed funds.
29. For instance, the proprietor of the lessor of the office space Ambiwib Holdings Limited, one Mr. Kasper Martin (Martinus) is the Executive Manager of the plaintiff and worked at the electoral office in Kiunga. He is also a relative of the District Administrator and also the District Treasurer and leased the office space to the plaintiff and received rental monies from the North-Fly District Administration. At the same time, the plaintiff benefited from the deal by using the office space as his electoral office.
30. What concerns me as was the concern of the Tribunal (see para. 44 of the Tribunal's decision of Her Worship Rosie Johnson dated 27th April 2014), is that funds allocated under the North-Fly District for projects were diverted to pay for the plaintiff's expenses under the guise of "MP's Administration Costs", the same expenses having being paid fortnightly to the plaintiff as allowances under the SRC Determination. In the end, the ordinary people living in the rural North-Fly District missed out on much needed funds for Education, Health and Social Services.
31. Thus, how is it then that the plaintiff contends that the decision of the Tribunal was unreasonable? I find no justification for this ground and dismiss it.
Consideration of Allegations 2, 4 and 6
32. As to Allegations 2, 4 and 6, reliance is placed on the case of Re Puka Temu (2006) N3099 which decision was followed in the case of Re Sir Michael Somare (2011) N4224 and counsel submitted that it was decided that the manner in which allegations were drafted as in Allegations 2, 4 and 6 are in essence a duplication of Allegations 1, 3 and 5 respectively. As well as being uncertain, and duplicitous, they are also oppressive. They add nothing to the case against the plaintiff. On the authority of the cited cases, they should be dismissed.
33. Mr. Molloy further submitted that first, section 27(1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution contain two offences. It is fundamental and a matter of natural justice that a person called on to answer a charge should know precisely what the charge is, and that each charge should be of a single breach and cited the cases of Johnson v. Miller [1937] HCA 77; (1937) 59 CLR 467 and Bryne v. Baker [1964] VicRp 57; (1964) VR 443 to support this submission.
34. He submitted that a charge should unambiguously set out all elements of the breach, including the precise act or omission alleged to constitute to the charge and cited the case of Boral Gas (NSW) Pty Ltd v. Magill (1995) 37 NSWLR 150 to support this further submission. In this case, Allegations 2, 4 and 6 are not each limited to a single breach, but assert multiple breaches, and at the same time are ambiguous.
35. In response, Mr. Hagahuno submitted that the allegations constituted separate charges arising from the same facts and were found to be proper. Allegations 1, 3 and 5 are founded on section 13 of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership and the rest are founded on section 27 of the Constitution. He referred to the decision of the Tribunal where her Worship Ms. Rosie Johnson adequately canvassed the issue of duplicity and found the allegations to be proper.
36. Allegations 2, 4, and 6 allege that by reasons of the conduct alleged in Allegations 1, 3 and 5.
That between (the respective dated) the Leader failed to carry out the obligations imposed by section 27(1) of the Constitution; By conducting himself in his public life and in his association with other persons in such a way that he:
a. Demeaned his office as a Leader;
b. Allowed his official integrity and his personal integrity to be called into question.
c. And furthermore the Leader failed to carry out his obligations imposed by section 27(2) of the Constitution;
By using his name for personal gain in that the leader [was guilty of conduct alleged in Allegations 1, 3 and 5 respectively]. Thereby being guilty of misconduct in office under section 27(5) (b) of the Constitution.
37. Section 27(2) of the Constitution, referred to in these Allegations provides:
"A person to whom this Division [the Leadership Code] applies shall not use his office for personal gain or enter into any transaction or engage in any enterprise or activity that might be expected to give rise to doubt in the public mind as to whether he is carrying out or has the duty imposed by subsection 27(1) if:
1. A person to whom this division applies has a duty to conduct himself in such a way, both in his public or official life and his private life, and his associations with other persons, as not –
2. To place himself in a position in which he has or could have a conflict of interest or might be compromised when discharging his public or official duties; or
3. To demean his office or position; or
4. To allow his public or official integrity, or his personal integrity, to be called into questions; or
5. To endanger or diminish respect for and confidence in the integrity of government in Papua New Guinea."
38. As to the contention that Allegations 2, 4 and 6 are duplicitous of Allegations 1, 3 and 5, I note each member of the Tribunal did address it in their respective decisions. A more detailed discussion of this issue was by Her Worship Ms. Rosie Johnson at paras. 45 to 51 of her decision. It is noted that various Leadership Tribunals have expressed differing views on this issue. This was pointed out by Ms. Johnson in her decision. For instance, Re Puka Temo (supra) and Re Sir Michael Somare (supra) have expressed the view that an allegation drafted in the form of the present Allegations 2, 4 and 6 will be found to be duplicitous while there are other decisions of the Tribunal such as Re Joseph Lelang MP, Member for Kandrian Gloucester Open Electorate (2013) N5212 which expressed a contrary view.
39. Ms. Johnson concluded by saying that both parties' arguments were valid given the differing views and Tribunals will continue the trend until such time the issue of duplicity in drafting is determined by the Supreme Court. I agree with the view expressed by Ms. Johnson. In any case, the plaintiff clearly understood the allegations and accordingly provided his response. Thus, any claim that he was denied natural justice is without merit. For these reasons, I am not satisfied that it was not open to the Tribunal to find that Allegations 2, 4 and 6 are not duplicitous. I find no error in the decision of the Tribunal to refuse to dismiss Allegations 2, 4 and 6 for want of duplicity. This ground is dismissed.
Penalty – Dismissal from Office
40. I now turn to review the penalty. Mr. Molloy submitted that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations, namely, there was no serious culpability on the part of the Plaintiff, and public policy and public good did not require the plaintiff be dismissed from office. Counsel further submitted that the plaintiff was found guilty by majority on six allegations. The findings in respect of the second, fourth and sixth were a consequence of the findings in respect of the first, third and fifth charges. It is those later charges which must be assessed and the Tribunal failed to make that distinction. As a result, it came to a view that the misconduct of the plaintiff constituted serious culpability warranting dismissal from office.
41. Mr. Hagahuno submitted that penalty of dismissal from office was reasonable and justified because the misapplication of funds and misconduct in office were aggravated by a number of factors. First, the plaintiff benefited from the payments as services were rendered to him and secondly, as a Member of Parliament, he held a position of trust and breached that trust when he engaged in these activities.
42. Thirdly, the plaintiff influenced the JDBP Committee to set aside funds which it did for his own use and finally, this case concerns misapplication of public funds where a sterner punishment is necessary to discourage future breaches by elected Leaders where as in the case of The Leadership Tribunal Matter of Honourable Delilah Gore (2015), verbal harassment of a flight attendant and the Tribunal suspended the Leader for three months.
43. Section 28 (1A) of the Constitution provides –
"(1A) An Organic Law may provide that where the independent tribunal referred to in subsection (1) (g) finds that –
(a) There was no serious culpability on the part of a person found guilty of misconduct in office; and
(b) Public policy and the public good do not require dismissal, it may recommend to the appropriate authority that some other penalty provided for by law be imposed."
44. Section 27 (5) of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership provides –
"(5) If the Tribunal finds that a person to whom this law applied is guilty of misconduct in office, it shall recommend to the appropriate authority that –
45. The Leadership Code (Alternative Penalties) Act Ch. No. 1A as stated in its preamble implements section 28 (1A) of the Constitution and section 27(5) (b) of the Organic Law by providing for penalties, other than dismissal, for misconduct in office. The alternative penalties contained in section 2 of the Act are in an amount not exceeding K1,000.00 an order to enter recognizance in an amount not exceeding K500.00, suspension without pay for a period not exceeding three months, and reprimand.
46. The Tribunal looked at the totality of the findings of misconduct in determining what recommendation should be made: Peipul v Justice Sheehan (2002) SC706 per Amet CJ; Re Yambui 2 March 2007 and Re Sir Michael Somare (supra).
47. The plaintiff was found guilty by majority on six charges. The Tribunal found that this was a case of serious culpability. This was because the findings in respect of the second, fourth and sixth charges were separate from the findings in respect of the first, third and fifth charges. Thus, whilst the misconduct constituted by the findings in respect of the first, third and fifth charges all arose out of the misapplication of monies, in my view, it was open to the Tribunal to consider the findings in totality.
48. Given this, I accept Mr. Hagahuno's submission that the plaintiff's misconduct is aggravated by those factors he has identified in his submissions. Contrary to Mr. Molloy's submission that despite the findings, the evidence was that the payments were all made by the District Administrator, who was an experienced senior public servant and so forth, the plaintiff cannot distance himself from the payments because he was part of the Committee that approved and allocated K400, 000.00 for his use in that meeting of 23rd October 2007. He benefited from the payments by using the services provided by the service providers over a period of time. Now that the use of the funds has become an issue, he shifts the blame to the District Administrator.
49. This was a case of misapplication and stealing of money from public funds and I add, much needed funds for the little people back in the villages. It amounted to serious culpability and its nothing near to the recent case of The Honourable Ms. Delilah Gore who was found guilty of verbally harassing a flight attendant and was suspended for three months by a Leadership Tribunal. It is not a simple matter as contended by Mr. Molloy and shifting the blame to the District Administrator. In my view, the circumstances of the misconduct supported a finding of serious culpability.
50. The Tribunal did consider the plaintiff's previously unblemished record. In Peipul v. Justice Sheehan (2002) SC706, Injia J (as he then was) said:
"Finally, the tribunal or the Court must give due regard and weight to the personal antecedent circumstances of the leader which mitigate or aggravate the penalty. In the present case, the appellant had an outstanding education and career in government service which spread from some 26 years and had an unblemished character. Although the tribunal made mentioned of these, these factors were not given sufficient consideration and weight."
51. The plaintiff had a previously unblemished record. His record of public service was extensive. References were provided from a number of prominent persons attesting to his achievement and good character. Balancing this with the factors operating against him, the Tribunal found that the factors operating against his plea for a lenient punishment outweighed his previously unblemished record. The Tribunal further observed that not only was he a Member for North-Fly Open Electorate but also Minister for Culture and Tourism, a very high position of responsibility and this placed a greater responsibility on him to exercise duty care in his public and private life so as not to demean the offices he held.
52. For these reasons, I am not satisfied that it was not open to the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that it was in the interests of public policy and public good that the plaintiff be dismissed from office. The review of penalty of dismissal in each case is, therefore, dismissed.
Conclusion
53. I am not satisfied the plaintiff has established the grounds for judicial review in relation to the finding of guilty and further, on penalty.
Order
54. The orders are:
_______________________________________________________________
Pacific Legal Group: Lawyers for Plaintiff
Williams Attorneys: Lawyers for Defendants
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