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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
CR No. 868 OF 2013
THE STATE
V
AMBROSE ISOROMBO
CR No. 869 OF 2013
THE STATE
V
LAZARUS ISOROMBO
CR No. 870 OF 2013
THE STATE
V
GILBERT BEAGA
CR No. 1227 OF 2013
THE STATE
V
FRANK BONEMA
Popondetta: Toliken, J.
2016: 21st, 24th March
CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Manslaughter – Trial – Group attack – Four accused took part in kicking deceased – Deceased sustained laceration to temporal region of head, broken ribs on both sides of chest, rib pierces liver causing heavy internal bleeding leading to death – Degree of participation considered – Same degree of culpability and participation – Some intention to cause bodily harm – Mitigating, extenuating and aggravating factors considered – Appropriate sentences – 10 years for adult offenders – 5 years for youthful offender – Time in pre-trial custody deducted – No suspension – Criminal Code Ch. 262; s 300(1)(a).
Cases Cited:
Acting Public Prosecutor v Clement Maki and Tom Kasen (1981) SC 205
Avia Aihi v The State (No. 3 [1982] PNGLR 91
Gimble v The State [1988-89] PNGLR 271
Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 615
Jack Tanga v The State [1999] PNGLR 216
Joe Giamur v The State (2007) SC 884
John Tapil Kapi v The State [2000] SC 635
Mandatititip & Anor v The State [1978] PNGLR 128
Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC 789
Public Prosecutor v Don Hale (1998) SC 564
Rex Lialu v The State [1990] PNGLR 487
Thress Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC 1017
The State v Ambrose Isorombo; CR NO. 868 of 2013;
The State v Dickson Mondo (2002) N2339
The State v Frank Benoma; CR NO. 1227 of 2013 (unnumbered and unpublished judgment dated 19th March 2016)
The State v Gilbert Beaga; CR NO. 870 of 2013;
The State v Jacob Jack Poate; CR No. 322 of 2012 (Unreported and unnumbered judgment dated 26th September 2013)
The State v Lawrence Giobun (2009) N3728
The State v Lazarus Isorombo ; CR NO. 869 of 2013;
The State v Noelyn Anton (2012) N4828
The State-v- Tom Keroi Gurua, David Laiam Bawai, and Joseph Dimagi [2000] N2312
Counsel:
J. Done, for the State
L.B. Mamu, for the Accused Persons
SENTENCE
24th March, 2016:
THE FACTS
Skull x-ray was normal
Chest x-ray (#256,13/01/12) showed broken 7th , 8th and 9th ribs of both left and right ribs.
Approximately 3 litres of whole blood with clots were evacuated from the abdominal cavity, and a 2cm deep and 2cm penetrating wound was noted on the liver with corresponding wall laceration imprinted by the traversing broken rib piercing the liver. There were also 3 abrasions noted on the liver in close proximity to the penetration suggestive of the broken rib abrasion the liver as a result of mobilization. (Sic.)
THE OFFENCE
302. Manslaughter
A person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances not constituting wilful murder, murder or infanticide is guilty of manslaughter.
Penalty: Subject to Section 19, imprisonment for life.
THE ISSUES
ANTECEDANTS
ALLOCUTUS
SUBMISSIONS
K9000 in cash and goods and kind. This he said is well above the K5000 limit set by the Criminal Law (Compensation) Act 1991.
20. Mr. Mamu said that a starting point for you should be 8 years to bringing it within the range suggest in Category 1 of the tariffs set by the Supreme Court in Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC 789. And because of the fact that you were merely reacting to the deceased’s intrusion into your premises – and you had the right to defend your property - coupled with other mitigating factors head sentences of 4 years should be imposed from which the time you had each spent in custody should be deducted which are as follows:
21. In effect Mr. Mamu submitted that Ambrose and Lazarus should then be sentenced to the rising of the Court while the resultant sentences
for Gilbert and Frank should be suspended.
22. Mr. Done for the State on the other hand submitted that manslaughter is a very prevalent offence. In your case you had displayed
some intention to cause grievous bodily harm when you killed the deceased. He suggested a term between 12 – 14 years, a term
that would fall in between Category 1 & 2 of Manu Kovi because you kicked the deceased on both sides of his rib cage and displayed some intention to cause grievous bodily harm. And whilst
you all expressed concern for your families, counsel said you should have thought about this in the first place. Finally, any suspension
would not be appropriate because the discretion to suspend must be exercised on proper principle.
WHETHER A WORST CASE
23. So is this a worst case that should attract the maximum penalty of life imprisonment? I think it is not such a case, needless to say though every case of unlawful killing is serious because a life had been taken.
24. Life is precious and only lived once. Once someone is killed (often prematurely) a lot of people are left devastated because they will not only lose a loved one, but, in most cases their principal, if not their sole provider. Deceased persons often leave behind widows and children and other relatives whose quality of life is reduced dramatically. So the reason why the law provides the maximum penalty of death for wilful murder and life imprisonment for murder and manslaughter is a reflection of how society, through Parliament, regards the sanctity of life.
25. So if yours is not a worst case, what then should be an appropriate sentence for each of you? Let me first consider you mitigating and aggravating factors.
MITIGATING & EXTENUATING FACTORS
26. I find the following mitigating and extenuating factors in your favour:
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
27. Against you, however, are the following aggravating factors:
DEGREE OF CULPABILITY/STARING POINT
28. The Supreme Court in Manu Kovi v The State (supra) had set guideline sentencing tariffs for the crimes of wilful murder, murder and manslaughter. It set out starting points and sentencing ranges under three categories for each offence and suggested the circumstances in which a sentencing court can impose a sentence within those categories.
29. Your lawyer Mr. Mamu suggested that the circumstances of your offence would fall under Category 1 of the Manu Kovi guidelines for manslaughter and should therefore attract a sentence between 8 – 12 years. The relevant circumstances that should support such a sentence, on a plea in ordinary cases where there are mitigating factors but no aggravating factors are, where no weapon is used, the victim was emotional and under stress and de facto provocation e.g. killings in domestic setting, killing follows immediately after argument, little or no preparation, minimal force used or the victim has pre-existing diseases which caused or accelerated death e.g. enlarged spleen cases.
30. Mr. Done suggested that the circumstances of your case place it in between Category 1 & 2 of the tariffs. Category 2 would attract a sentence between 13 – 16 years. It covers situations whether on plea or trial where there are mitigating factors with aggravating factors, use of offensive weapon, such as a knife on vulnerable parts of body, where the attack is vicious, infliction of multiple injuries, some deliberate intention to cause harm and pre-planning.
31. The circumstances of your case do exhibit some features of both categories. Yours was a trial and there are a few aggravating factors against you - you did exhibit some deliberate intention to cause some harm on the deceased in the manner in which you jointly attacked him by kicking him as he lay helpless on the ground. He ended up with multiple internal injuries – six broken ribs altogether (7th, 8th, 9th ribs on both sides of his rib cage). However, there are mitigating and extenuating factors in your favour as we have seen, so, in the circumstances a starting point should be somewhere between the mid-range of Category 1 and bottom of Category 2 i.e. between 11 – 13 years. I would therefore fix a starting point for all of you at 11 years.
32. Now the actual sentence each of you should get depends again on your mitigating and aggravating factors and your respective degree of participation in the crime. While you are equally guilty, your sentences should reflect what you each individually did. There is some divergence of views on this point because of what the Supreme Court said in Gimble v The State [1988-89] PNGLR 271. At p. 273 the Supreme Court said:
“The general rule is that all active participants in the crime shall be sentenced on the same basis. The Court does not normally stop to consider whether a particular prisoner actually held up the victim, or held the gun, or the iron bar, or was a watchman outside, or was the driver of the get-away vehicle. All are equally guilty because without each playing his part the crime could not be perpetrated.”
33. What Gimble stands for or is generally understood to be saying is that co-offenders will generally be sentenced on the same basis or receive the same sentence because they are equally guilty and it does not matter what each of the offenders actually did. This is the parity principle which stipulates that a similar sentence should be imposed on persons charged with and convicted of the same offence and committed in similar circumstances - the object there being consistency and equality before the law. In other words like cases should be treated alike and different cases differently.
34. The principle has been judicially considered in numerous cases by the National Court and the Supreme Court and I do not have the time nor the intention to enter into those discussions in any great detail, except perhaps, to say that that passage in Gimble needs to be clarified. And to that end I agree entirely with what His Honour Kirriwom J. said in The State-v- Tom Keroi Gurua, David Laiam Bawai, and Joseph Dimagi [2000] N2312 where His Honour chose to depart from Gimble. His Honour was of the view that where two or more persons are charged for the same offence, their sentences should be determined according to their level of criminal culpability. His Honour said:
“The law on sentencing of two or more persons charged and convicted together for the same offence is largely determined according
to the level of their criminal culpability or the degree of their participation and their individual circumstances. This is referred
to as the parity principle and the passage in Gimble’s case needs to be clarified. There is no doubt that it applies more appropriately
to the issue of guilt or innocence but not so in sentence. A grave injustice could result”.
35. I agree that the statement in Gimble more appropriately applies to the question of guilt or innocence and not on the issue of sentencing. On the question of sentencing
it is in my opinion appropriate to take into account the offenders' degree of participation or culpability and their personal circumstances
such as age, and, this of course, will inevitably result in some disparity. Any sense of grievance will in most cases be unjustified,
I should think, unless the disparity is so grave.
36. With that, apart from the fact that Lazarus hit the deceased with a mirror and then proceeded to kick him when he fell to the ground and that the rest of you followed suit, the evidence did not really show how many times you each kicked the deceased let alone the severity of those kicks. It can be inferred, however, that you would have used some medium level force because of the injuries that he sustained. Apart from the injuries shown in the post mortem report no other internal or external injuries or bodily bruises were noted which indicates to me that the kicks were not sustained because if they were then they would have shown at the post mortem. Hence, it appears to me that your level or degree of participation would have been the same.
37. The Supreme Court in Rex Lialu v The State [1990] PNGLR 487, suggested the following matters should be taken into account when considering an appropriate sentence for manslaughter:
(a) The nature and frequency of the attack or assault on the victim.
(b) Whether the injury that caused the death arose directly from the assault, or whether the injury was caused by an object when the deceased subsequently fell.
(c) Whether death was caused by a fist or a weapon.
(d) Whether the offender deliberately set out to hurt anyone.
(e) Whether there was provocation in the non-legal sense.
(f) Whether the deceased had a thin skull.
(g) Whether the deceased had an enlarged spleen.
SENTENCING TREND
38. Neither counsel cited any cases to me to see what the judges have been imposing for manslaughter. But the following are a few cases which I think should provide some idea what the sentencing trend is.
39. The State v Dickson Mondo (2002) N2339: The prisoner pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter. He had been drinking with friends when the deceased passed by. The prisoner asked him whether it was him who stole his radio. The deceased denied that he did and started to run away. The prisoner and his friends chased and caught him. The prisoner grabbed him and held him tight while the other boys started to punch and kick him all over his body. The prisoner admitted punching the deceased only once in the head. The prisoner and his friends were, however, disturbed and the deceased escaped. He was admitted for his injuries at Angau Hospital but died a week later from injuries to the brain and internal bleeding in the brain. His Honour Injia J. (as he then was, considered the appropriate sentence against the principles then prevailing as set in Rex Lialu (supra), Jack Tanga v The State [1999] PNGLR 216 and John Tapil Kapi v The State [2000] SC 635. After considering these principles and the prisoner’s personal circumstances, His Honour imposed a sentence of 13 years. The similarity of that case with the current case is that you were also drunk when you committed your crime.
40. Joe Giamur v The State (2007) SC 884: The appellant appealed against his sentence of 7 years (one of which was suspended) for the manslaughter of his wife. He had killed his wife in a domestic fight using his fist. The medical report showed that the deceased died from a ruptured spleen. On appeal, the Supreme Court (Sevua, Kandakasi, Gabi .JJ), found that the trial judge departed from established principles of sentencing without giving any reasons why he did so. The court found that sentence to be manifestly low and increased the sentence to 14 years.
41. The State v Lawrence Giobun (2009) N3728: There, the prisoner pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter. He punched the deceased (an old man) once in the face. The old man bled heavily and was taken to the Buka General Hospital but died there. The prisoner was drunk. The prisoner was sentenced to 10 years, 6 of which were suspended on terms owing to a good Pre-Sentence Report.
42. The State v Noelyn Anton (2012) N4828: The offender was convicted after trial for the manslaughter of another woman in the course of a fight between the offender and the deceased’s mother. The deceased came in to help her mother. The offender struck the deceased on the side of the body with a piece of bamboo, rupturing her spleen. The deceased died instantly. She had an enlarged spleen. A starting point was set at between 13 – 16 years per the Manu Kovi tariffs. However, due to significant mitigating factors, a sentence of 10 years was imposed of which 3 years were suspended on conditions as Pre Sentence Report showed that deceased’s relatives were prepared to reconcile with the offender.
43. The State v Jacob Jack Poate; CR No. 322 of 2012 (Unreported and unnumbered judgment dated 26th September 2013) I sentenced the prisoner to 11 years for killing the deceased on a plea of guilty. He met the deceased (both were drunk) along Killerton road here in Pondetta Town and an argument ensued between them. The deceased punched the prisoner and he retaliated. When the deceased fell to the ground and was getting up the prisoner kicked him once on the side. The deceased managed to get away, however, later complained of severe abdominal pain. He was taken to the hospital where he died of a ruptured spleen caused by excessive use of force to his back which in turn caused massive internal bleeding.
CURRENT CASE
44. So applying the above to your case, as I have already noted, the evidence does not clearly show the frequency of the kicks you each executed on the deceased, you did not use any dangerous weapons but there was some deliberateness and some intention to cause some harm to the deceased. I do take into account the fact that, especially for Lazarus, he was provoked in the non-legal sense. I take into account too that you all did not instigate the incident that tragically ended up with the deceased dying – that it was the deceased and his son and grandsons who came armed into your area and intending to cause trouble. You reacted and ended up killing the deceased.
45. Because it has not been proven conclusively that your individual culpability was greater than that of the others, I think that you should all get the same sentence. I do accept that Frank Bonema was only 19 when this incident happened. While that is taken into account it must stated here that youthfulness – even though it is still an effective mitigating factor - no longer carries a lot of weight when it comes to punishment because a lot of crimes today are committed by youthful offenders. (see Mandatititip & Anor v The State [1978] PNGLR 128; Acting Public Prosecutor v Clement Maki and Tom Kasen (1981) SC 205).
46. Mr. Mamu urged the Court to impose sentences of 4 years. That I think would be too lenient. A life had been taken and so an appropriate personal as well as general deterrent sentence should be imposed. There is too much killing going on in this province. And as I have remarked elsewhere in other cases that have come before me here, this is reflected by the fact that more than half of our cases on the Crimes List are homicide offences. Most people who commit these offences belong to a Church but the tenets of Christianity seem to have no effect at all when it comes to matters like this. There is no restraint at all by people who profess to be followers of Christ. People too readily resort to violence and end up killing each other.
47. In the circumstances of this case I would think that an appropriate sentence for Ambrose Isorombo, Lazarus Isorobo and Gilbert Beama should be 10 years. I therefore sentence each of you to 10 years imprisonment less the time each of you had spent in pre-trial custody which are - for Ambrose Isorombo and Lazarus Isorombo – 4 years 1 month and 26 days and for Gilbert Beaga – 2 years, 4 months and 3 days.
48. For Frank Bonema, because of your youth and because there is no evidence that you played a greater part in the death of the deceased, you should get a lower sentence. It seems to me that you just wanted to join in when your older friends or relatives set upon the deceased for the sake of it. You have jeopardized your chances of getting a good job and living a secure and fulfilling life. You will now learn the hard way - that following the pack always turns out bad for anybody if the pack plans to or commits a crime. And that is what happened in your case.
49. So in your case I sentence you to 5 years imprisonment. This is well below the minimum of 8 years under Category 1 of Manu Kovi but it must be understood the Manu Kovi tariffs do not bind this court in exercising it discretion under Section 19 of the Code in imposing a sentence that is appropriate to the circumstances of a particular case and the circumstances of the offender. Only Parliament can curtail the sentencing discretion of a sentencing court if it decides to prescribe minimum penalties. The 6 months and 6 days which you spent in pre-trail custody will be deducted from your sentence. (Thress Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC 1017)
50. Finally should any of your resultant sentences be suspended? Suspension of sentences is discretionary. However, this power must be exercised on proper principle and the Supreme Court has held that a suspension can only be considered if it is supported by a favourable Pre-Sentence Report. (Public Prosecutor v Don Hale (1998) SC 564) No such Pre-Sentence Report is before me so none of your sentences will be suspended.
51. You will all serve your sentences at Biru Corrective Institution.
52. Finally, let me address the question of bail. Bails for Gilbert Beaga and Frank Bonema are to be refunded to them in full. Sureties paid by their guarantors will also be refunded.
53. As for bail monies paid by Lazarus and Ambrose Isorombo, your bails are forfeited to the State because you escaped from the cells blocks immediately after your bails were revoked for breach of conditions. Sureties paid by your guarantors will, however, be refunded to them. Bail monies for Gilbert Beaga, Frank Bonema and sureties paid by the respective guarantors will be refunded.
Ordered accordingly.
_______________________________________________________________
The Public Prosecutor : Lawyer for the State
The Public Solicitor : Lawyer for the Prisoners
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