Nambawan Super Ltd v Allan [2014] PGNC 340; N5707 (18 August 2014)

N5707

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS (JR) NO 507 OF 2013

BETWEEN:

NAMBAWAN SUPER LIMITED
(Formerly POSF LIMITED and formerly PUBLIC OFFICERS SUPERANNUATION FUND BOARD)
Plaintiff

AND

HON. BENNY ALLAN, MINISTER FOR LANDS AND PHYSICAL PLANNING
First Defendant

AND

ROMILLY KILA PAT, A DELEGATE OF THE MINISTER FOR LANDS AND PHYSICAL PLANNING
Second Defendant

AND

KEITH LAHUI, CHAIRMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA LAND BOARD
Third Defendant

AND

HENRY WASA, REGISTRAR OF TITLES
Fourth Defendant

AND

THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Fifth Defendant

AND

BERNAL NO. 8 LIMITED
Sixth Defendant

Waigani: Makail, J
2014: 17th July & 18th August

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Review of decision of Land Board – Refusal to renew State lease – Appeal against refusal to renew dismissed by Head of Sate acting on advice – Renewal of lease upon expiration – Expiration of lease – Grounds of – Irregularities – Process of renewal not complied with – Unless exempted, lease must be advertised – Purpose of – Invitation to public to apply – Immediate lessee or leaseholder may reapply – Failure to give proper weight or consideration to development plan for land – Construction of housing estate – No reasons given – Decisions unfair and unreasonable – Land Act, 1996 – Sections 68, 69 & 120.

PROPERTY LAW – State lease – Renewal of lease upon expiration – Expiration of lease – Effect of – Lease reverts to State and becomes vacant – Process of renewal – Unless exempted, lease must be advertised – Purpose of – Invitation to public to apply – Immediate lessee or leaseholder may reapply – Land Act, 1996 – Sections 68, 69 & 120.

Cases cited:

Air Niugini Limited v. The Minister for Lands and Physical Planning: OS No 628 of 2010 (Unnumbered & Unreported Judgment of 01st November 2012)
John Mua Nilkare v. Ombudsman Commission (1996) SC498
Noko No. 96 Ltd v. Sir Puka Temu & Ors an unreported decision of the
Supreme Court of 20th July 2012
Open Bay Timber Limited v. Tzen Plantation Limited (2013) N5109
Papua Club v. Nusaum Holdings Ltd (No. 2) (2004) N2603
Rose Kekedo v. Burns Philip (PNG) Ltd [1988-89] PNGLR 122
Steamships Trading Co. Ltd v. Garamut Enterprises Ltd (2000) N1959
Waigani Centre Pty Ltd v. The State (1997) SC517
West New Britain Provincial Government v. Pepi Kimas & Ors (2009) N3834

Counsel:
Mr I. Shepherd, for Plaintiff
Ms A. Mai, for First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Defendants
Mr C. Raurela, for Sixth Defendant

JUDGMENT

18th August, 2014

1. MAKAIL, J: This case is about a dispute over a portion of land described as Portion 2124 ("the Property") located at 9 Mile outside the city of Port Moresby. The plaintiff Nambawan Super Limited formerly known as Public Officers Superannuation Fund Limited, a company incorporated in Papua New Guinea on 18th December 2002 claims that it was granted an agricultural lease over the property and the sixth defendant also claims a same interest in the property as a result of a decision by the third defendant on 02nd May 2012. Aggrieved by that decision, it appealed to the first defendant. That appeal was dismissed by the Head of State acting on advice of the first defendant on 13th May 2013. It seeks a review of these decisions.

Illegality - Breach of Procedure

2. The plaintiff alleges that as it was the lessee of the property and that as the lease had expired, by law, the land on which the property is on became vacant and available for leasing and ought to have been advertised for tender. It was not and as a result, the decision of the third defendant to recommend a grant of an agricultural lease to the sixth defendant was in breach of the requirement to advertise under section 68 of the Land Act, 1996.

3. In the alternative, it alleges that it is the practice of the first, second and third defendants to entertain and grant applications for renewal for State leases or agricultural leases under section 120(2)(a) of the Land Act, 1996. It says that there is evidence that there were numerous applications for "renewal" at the Land Board Meeting 01/2012. This is contrary to section 120(2)(a) (supra) because there can only be one applicant for renewal and it must be the lessee or lease holder immediately prior to its expiration. In this case, it should have been it and its application should have been the only one for consideration and deliberation by the third defendant. Instead, the third defendant allowed itself to consider other applicants' applications and treated their applications as applications for "renewal" of agricultural lease which had expired. For this reason, the third defendant lacked jurisdiction to recommend a grant of a lease to the sixth defendant under section 120(2)(a) (supra).

4. It further alleges that the decision of the third defendant was actuated by bias because of the manner in which the officers of the second defendant dealt with the sixth defendant and in recommending the grant to the sixth defendant omitted to list the second-choice applicant and third-choice applicant. Finally, the third defendant and the Head of State gave no reasons for their decisions.

5. There is no dispute that the plaintiff's lease for agricultural lease expired in 1996. Its attempt to get it renewed has not been successful because the first, second and third defendants had not clearly indicated whether its application for renewal had been accepted. There is also no dispute that the plaintiff, sixth defendant and three other applicants applied for renewal of the lease for agricultural lease and this is noted from the National Gazette G119 of 05th April 2012. The defence allege that there is nothing wrong or improper for other applicants including the sixth defendant to apply for the lease of the property because the lease had expired and by law, the land on which the property is on became vacant and available for leasing.

6. These competing arguments require a consideration of section 120 and for convenience it is set out in full below:

"120. PAYMENT FOR IMPROVEMENTS ON EXPIRATION OF LEASE

(1) In this section–

"improvements" means improvements made, or in respect of which a payment has been made, by the outgoing lessee, that are suitable to the land and add to its leasing value, other than improvements in respect of which the lessee has received payment under this section;

"value" means the value on the day after the date of expiration of the lease.

(2) Where, after the expiration of the term of a State lease of land on which there are improvements, the lessee is granted–

(a) a further lease of the land; or

(b) a lease of part only, or that includes part only, of the land, the provisions of Section 84 do not apply in respect of the improvements in relation to the further lease, unless he has received payment for the improvements under this section.

(3) Subject to this section, where on the expiration of the term of a State lease of land on which there are improvements the lessee applies for and is not granted a further lease of the land, or is granted a further lease of part only, or that includes part only, of the land, the Minister shall, within six months after the expiration, pay to the outgoing lessee the value of the improvements on the land, or on the part of the land not included in the further lease, as the case may be.

(4) Where, within the period of six months referred to in Subsection (3), a State lease of the land or part of the land the subject of the expired lease is granted to a person other than the outgoing lessee, the Minister shall pay to the outgoing lessee, on or before the date of grant of the new lease, the value of the improvements on the land or that part of the land, as the case may be.

(5) Subject to Subsections (6) and (13), this Section does not entitle a lessee who does not apply for a further lease of the land the subject of his lease to payment for improvements on the land at the expiration of the lease, but he may remove such of the improvements as are severable on or before the expiration, doing as little damage as may reasonably be to the land.

(6) Where a lease is surrendered under this Act, the lessee may remove such of the improvements as are severable on or before the surrender, doing as little damage as may reasonably be to the land.

(7) If the outgoing lessee and the incoming lessee (if any)–

(a) agree as to–

(i) the amount to be paid for improvements for which the outgoing lessee is entitled to receive payment by the State or that he is entitled to remove under this section; and

(ii) the time and manner of payment; and

(b) notify the Minister in writing of their agreement before the date on which a lease is granted to the incoming lessee,

then–

(c) the amount payable in respect of the improvements under Section 84 is payable by the incoming lessee to the outgoing lessee; and

(d) the Minister ceases to be liable under this Section to pay the value of the improvements to the outgoing lessee; and

(e) Section 84 does not apply in respect of those improvements in relation to the new lease.

(8) This Section does not apply to or in relation to a lease that is forfeited under this Act.

(9) Where, between–

(a) the date of the expiration of the term of a State lease of land on which there are improvements for which the outgoing lessee is entitled to receive payment or which he is entitled to remove under this section; and

(b) the date of the grant of a State lease of the land or a part of the land to the outgoing lessee or another person, the State derives revenue, part or all of which is directly attributed to those improvements on the land or that part of the land, the Minister shall pay to the lessee, from time to time as the Minister determines, the revenue or such part of the revenue as is directly attributable to the improvements, less the amount of any expenditure incurred by the State in maintenance and other costs in respect of the improvements.

(10) Without prejudice to any other remedies that are available, the Minister may deduct from moneys payable by him under this section–

(a) moneys due during the term of the lease and outstanding to the State in respect of the term, or in respect of the land the subject of the lease; and

(b) if the outgoing lessee has continued to occupy the land after the expiration of the term of the lease–any occupation fee outstanding.

(11) The lessee of a special purposes lease or mission lease may remove, on or before the expiration of the lease, such of the improvements on the land the subject of the lease as are severable, doing as little damage as may reasonably be to the land, but otherwise is not entitled to payment under this Section in respect of the improvements.

(12) The amount to be paid under this Section shall be determined, and is recoverable, as nearly as may be in the same manner as compensation under Part IV.

(13) For the purposes of this section, where a lease expires and a further lease cannot be granted because the land the subject of the lease is reserved from lease or further lease under this Act–

(a) the lessee shall be deemed to have applied for and not to have been granted a further lease over that land; and

(b) the period of six months specified in Subsection (3) shall be deemed to expire at the end of the period of one month after the date of expiration of the lease." (Emphasis added).

7. Parties accepted that the law is that upon expiration of a State lease, the land becomes vacant and may be available for leasing and must be advertised as required by section 68 (supra). I also refer to Papua Club v. Nusaum Holdings Ltd (No. 2) (2004) N2603 and Waigani Centre Pty Ltd v. The State (1997) SC517 where it was noted that once Town Sub-Division Leases (TSL's) or Urban Development Leases (UDL's) expire the land becomes vacant State land. Once it becomes vacant, the Minister for Lands and Physical Planning may invite tenders for the land.

8. Given that a land subject of a lease becomes vacant upon expiration of the lease, I am of the view that it is open to the first defendant to invite interested applicants to apply for the land. In respect of a lessee or lease holder immediately prior to the expiration of the lease, I am of the further view that section 120(2)(a) (supra) does not grant power to the first defendant, second defendant or third defendant to grant a renewal of a lease. I hold this view because this provision does not expressly state that where on the expiration of the term of a lease, the lessee or lease holder may apply for renewal of the lease.

9. On the contrary, where the lessee or lease holder is not granted a further lease, it imposes an obligation on the first defendant to pay the outgoing lessee the value of the improvements on the land. The payment is essentially to compensate the outgoing lessee for the costs incurred in putting up the improvements during the period of the lease. It also reaffirms the position at law that on the expiration of a lease, the lessee or lease holder's lease ceases and any interest in the land subject of the lease also ceases. For these reasons, I am of the further view that where a lessee or lease holder's lease is due to expire or has expired, the lessee or leaseholder must also apply for renewal but the application cannot be made under section 120(2)(a) (supra) for the above stated reason.

10. Given that a lessee or lease holder's interest in the land ceases upon the expiration of the lease and if the lessee or leaseholder intend to renew the lease, I consider that the application for "renewal" must be made by following the procedure for an application for a new lease under sections 58 to 76 of the Land Act, 1996. This would include the requirement to advertise the land the subject of the lease under section 68, unless it is exempted, for reasons stated in section 69(2) and the lessee or lease holder submitting its application to the Land Board for consideration. Section 68 states:

"68. Advertisement of lands available for leasing

(1) Except where land has been exempted from advertisement under Section 69, the Departmental Head shall give notice, by advertisement in the National Gazette, of all lands available for leasing under this Act.

(2) An advertisement under Subsection (1) shall contain the following information:—

(a) the type of lease available to be granted;

(b) the purpose of the lease;

(c) the length of the lease;

(d) a description of the land to be leased;

(e) the amount of rent (if any) payable for the first period of the lease;

(f) in the case of a special purposes lease—any royalties that are payable;

(g) the terms and conditions of the lease;

(h) the reserve price;

(i) such other information as the Departmental Head thinks fit or the Minister directs.

(3) A statement contained in an advertisement under this Section does not in any way bind the State in the granting of a lease over land the subject of the advertisement or constitute an offer to lease land."

11. Section 68(1) provides that where land has been exempted from advertisement, the Departmental Head shall give notice, by advertisement in the National Gazette, of all lands available for leasing. (Emphasis added). In my view it imposes an obligation on the Departmental Head to advertise all lands available for leasing and given that a land subject of an expired lease is, by operation of law, vacant, it becomes available for leasing and unless exempted, must be advertised. It is therefore incumbent on the Departmental Head and his officers to keep records of the dates of expiration of leases and unless exempted, must advertise the lands when the leases expire. Of course the lessee or lease holder should be weary of the expiration date of the lease and bring it to the attention of the Departmental Head and his officers when expressing an interest to further extend the term of the lease. But the significant point here is that it is the Departmental Head and his officers who must be able to determine from their records the expiration dates of leases and have them advertised as and when they are due.

12. In this case the third defendant treated all the applications including that of the plaintiff as per the advertisement in the National Gazette G119 on 5th April 2012 as "Application under section 120(2)(a) of the Land Act 1996 for renewal of lease for an agricultural lease over portion 2124, Milinch Granville Fourmil Moresby, National Capital District." In my view this is clearly wrong because as I found, section 120(2) (a) has no application. This is the first error. The second error is that the third defendant recommended a grant of a renewal of lease for agricultural lease over the property to the sixth defendant. In addition to the reason that section 120(2) (a) has no application, the sixth defendant could not possibly be granted a renewal of the lease because it was not the previous lessee or lease holder. If anything, it should have applied for and been granted a new lease and if that was the intention, the records of the third defendant do not support it. The point is, the lease has expired and it is up for tender and anyone can apply for it. For this reason, I dismiss the plaintiff's claim that it should have been the only applicant for "renewal" for the lease before the third defendant as being misconceived. In turn and in addition, this practice of issuing new leases after their expiration under section 120(2) (a) must cease.

13. There is no dispute that the first defendant did not advertise the land after it expired and there is no evidence that it was exempted from being advertised. So how did the sixth defendant and other interested applicants know that the land was available for leasing? The evidence of the sixth defendant (Exhibit "D3") which is undisputed is that its Managing Director Mr Wesley Yanum said that in February 2012 he became aware of the availability of the land at the office of the Department of Lands and Physical Planning. He made a number of enquiries through the Allocation Manageress Mrs Mori Kegana and was informed that the lease had expired and the land was being advertised for interested applicants to apply for leasing. As a result, on 02nd March 2012, he submitted on behalf of the sixth defendant an application for an UDL for purposes of a residential development.

14. In his affidavits (Exhibits "D1" and "D2"), the second defendant says that the reason for putting it out for leasing was that the land was vacant without improvements so "it attracted applications from potential developers" but he makes no mention about how the sixth defendant came to know about the vacant land. He only says that the plaintiff and the sixth defendant were notified by letter and produces a letter to each of them dated 05th April 2012 as evidence of the notice. However, in my view these notices fall short of establishing the duty to advertise under section 68(1) (supra) which states that all lands available for leasing must be advertised. I consider that unless exempted, advertising the land is mandatory and is the only way other interested applicants will know that a land is vacant and available for leasing. It is an invitation to the public that land is available for leasing and they may apply for it. By allowing the sixth defendant and other applicants to apply for the land without advertising it, the first defendant breached section 68 (supra) and has committed an error of law.

15. Furthermore, the manner in which the sixth defendant came to know that the land was vacant must be treated with suspicion. Based on the evidence of Mr Yanum, he has given the impression that he knew that the land was vacant prior to his enquiries with Mrs Kegana and as a result, fronted up at the office of the Department of Lands and Physical Planning and was assisted by her with additional information for the purpose of submitting an application for lease to the third defendant. There are three matters of concern to be noted here. Firstly, Mrs Kegana's release of information prior to the advertisement or without the advertisement of the land for leasing was in fact divulging information when such matters are supposed to be confidential and such conduct amounts to a breach of confidentiality. Secondly, it was a breach of the duty to advertise under section 68 (supra).

16. Thirdly, it supports that plaintiff's claim that the decision to award the land to the sixth defendant was actuated by bias. This claim is further supported by the fact that the third defendant in recommending the grant of the lease to the sixth defendant omitted to list the second-choice successful applicant and third-choice successful applicant as required by section 58(b) &(c) (supra). This is what the law states and requires of the third defendant and until and unless the law is changed, it must be complied with and no amount of explanation such as there being no need to include them because the first preferred applicant will accept the decision of the third defendant can remedy the breach.

17. The judicial review power of the Court under section 155(3) and (4) of the Constitution and Order 16 of the National Court Rules is discretionary and is available to correct errors in the decision making process: see Rose Kekedo v. Burns Philip (PNG) Ltd [1988-89] PNGLR 122. The underlying principles of judicial review have been discussed in a number of cases, for example, John Mua Nilkare v. Ombudsman Commission (1996) SC498 which have held that the established grounds upon which administrative decision can be made, amongst others include error of law on the face of the record.

18. The land was not advertised as it is supposed to be under sections 68 and 69 (supra). The third defendant treated their applications as applications for renewal of the agricultural lease when clearly none of the applications were applications for renewal of the agricultural lease. I am satisfied that this was merely a ploy used by the second defendant and his department to avoid advertising the land and attracting, perhaps, many more applicants. I am further satisfied that by not advertising the land for leasing, by entertaining the sixth defendant without advertising the land for leasing and by not listing the second-choice successful applicant and third-choice successful applicant in the third defendant's recommendation, the whole process is ultra vires the provisions of the Land Act and is highly irregular.

19. In West New Britain Provincial Government v. Pepi Kimas & Ors (2009) N3834, His Honour Justice Cannings held that all land available for leasing must be advertised in the National Gazette unless the land has been exempted (section 68(1)(69)(1)). He reinforces his decision in Open Bay Timber Limited v. Tzen Plantation Limited (2013) N5109. The Minister may exempt land from advertising under section 69(2) and His Honour held in both cases that there must be agreement to exempt land evidenced in writing and signed by the Head of State acting on advice of the National Executive Council (NEC) in order to establish compliance with the provisions and avoid the mandatory requirement of advertising.

20. Justice Cannings viewed the case authorities in Noko No. 96 Ltd v. Sir Puka Temu & Ors an unreported decision of the Supreme Court consisting of Davani, Cannings, and Kariko JJ dated 20th July 2012 where the Supreme Court found, inter alia, that the circumstances surrounding the exemption of the relevant land from advertisement and the granting of leases to the fourth defendant gave rise to reasonable grounds for "suspicion and innuendo" which may amount to constructive fraud sufficient to constitute a "case of fraud" for the purposes of the section 33(1) of the Land Registration Act, ie the Supreme Court agreed with Cannings J in his decision in West New Britain Provincial Government's case (supra). In Air Niugini Limited v. The Minister for Lands and Physical Planning: OS No 628 of 2010 (Unnumbered & Unreported Judgment of 01st November 2012) his Honour Justice Kirriwom supported these conclusions, a decision which was upheld on appeal but on other grounds.

21. These irregularities are tantamount to fraud and the second defendant's explanation is unsatisfactory. The lease which is issued to the sixth defendant is, on the interpretation of, for example, Steamships Trading Co. Ltd v. Garamut Enterprises Ltd (2000) N1959, a nullity, because of the irregular manner in which it was issued and this means that the sixth defendant, is not entitled to the protection of section 33 of the Land Registration Act.

Unreasonableness of exercise of power and/decision

22. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that following the decision by the third defendant to award the land to the sixth defendant, it appealed to the first defendant pursuant to section 62 of the Land Act, 1996. The appeal was dismissed by the Head of State acting on advice of the first defendant. In each case, it submits that the decision making authority did not give proper weight or consideration to its development plan for the land which was supported by the National Capital District Commission. As a result, the decision reached in each case is so unfair and unreasonable in the circumstances. On this basis, each decision must be set aside.

23. The defence submits that the plaintiff failed to put up improvements on the land during the period of the lease. For this reason, when the lease expired, the third defendant recommended a grant of a new lease to the sixth defendant. Further, as the plaintiff has failed to put up improvements on the land, it has not come to Court with clean hands and this Court should not grant the relief it seeks.

24. According to the map which is in evidence before me, the land is located amongst a number of portions of land opposite the Northern District Sawmill and 9 Mile Morobe Block adjacent to the main Rouna Road. The plaintiff had submitted to the third defendant a development plan for the land. The plan was supported by the National Capital District Commission to build a housing estate for its members and public. The housing estate would be built on this land including portions of land owned by it in the same area. These portions are 1568, 2123, 2156, 2157, 2158 and 2159 and it calls it the "Moale Valley Housing Project."

25. The sixth defendant's evidence is that after being informed that it was granted a lease for the land, it paid the annual rental fee of K11, 458.90 and K50.00 lease preparation fee. It then proceeded to conduct survey and arrange contractors to clear the land for construction of a housing project. It has contracted a company called Kepmart Hire Plant Ltd to carry out the construction of the project. But there is no evidence as to what proposal was put before the third defendant for consideration and deliberation except Mr Yanum's assertion that he made a presentation at the meeting of the third defendant on 16th April 2012. There is also no evidence of its financial ability to develop the land such as a bank statement before the third defendant. In my view such evidence is important to support its claim that it is capable of developing the land and justifies the third defendant's decision to award the land to it.

26. Evidence of these matters becomes crucial when there is a similar competing claim by the plaintiff before the third defendant for consideration and decision. The absence of these matters leaves open the inference that the third defendant's decision was based on irrelevant matters and ignored the plaintiff's proposal which had the backing of the National Capital District Commission. Similarly, if the reason to award the land to the sixth defendant was that the plaintiff failed to put up improvements on the land which I find was not given to the plaintiff by the third defendant and the Head of State for refusing its application for renewal, evidence of these matters must be forthcoming to justify the decision to award the land to the sixth defendant. In any case, lack of improvements by the plaintiff should not be the sole consideration for the third defendant to refuse the plaintiff's application for renewal of the lease. If the plaintiff continues to fail to put up improvements on the land following renewal of the lease, the fifth defendant can forfeit the lease under section 122 of the Land Act, 1996; such recourse is available and can be avail of any time during the term of the lease.

27. I accept the plaintiff's submission that in granting the lease to the sixth defendant, the third defendant failed to give proper weight or consideration to its development plan for the land. The matter of most concern is that the land is situated amongst other portions of land owned by the plaintiff, in fact in the heart of the land area owned by the plaintiff and looking at the bigger picture, these portions of land will be converted into a housing estate for the plaintiff's members and the public. It is not an unreasonable observation that land is becoming scares in urban areas in the country as population increases due to increase births and rural/urban migration and the city of Port Moresby as the capital of the country is no exception. It is faced with this challenge as part of its evolution and existence. As land becomes scares, the demand for it increases and every available land must be utilised to the maximum benefit. Here, the plaintiff has a plan to develop the available land to its maximum benefit so that at the end of the day, its member and the public who are able to afford will have a roof over their heads. Simply put, this is a massive housing project to be undertaken by the plaintiff given the massive land area it has been allocated by the fifth defendant and to simply allocate a portion of it right in the centre of the project area to another company just does not make sense.

28. Another ground where the Court may interfere with the exercise of power by an administrative body is where the administrative body exercise its power unreasonably or the decision is unfair and unreasonable: John Mua Nilkare's case (supra). Based on the forgoing discussions, I am satisfied that the third defendant failed to give proper weight or consideration to the plaintiff's proposal. I find the decision by the third defendant not to grant a renewal of the State lease to the plaintiff and grant a new lease to the sixth defendant unfair and unreasonable in the circumstances. For the same reasons, I am further satisfied that the decision by the Head of State acting on advice of the first defendant to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal is unfair and unreasonable in the circumstances. Furthermore, these decisions are unfair and unreasonable because no reasons were given.

29. In the origination summons, the plaintiff seeks orders in the nature of certiorari to quash the decisions and that its application for renewal of the State lease be re-heard, de novo by the third defendant as the only application for renewal of the lease for the land. However, given my finding that an applicant for renewal of a lease following its expiration must follow the procedure under sections 58 to 76 (supra), the plaintiff and other interested applicants including the sixth defendant are entitled to apply for the lease in accordance with the procedure as outlined above, including complying with the duty to advertise the land for leasing.

Order

30. For those reasons, I uphold the application for judicial review but instead of directing the third defendant to consider the application of the plaintiff alone, I quash the decision of the third defendant to recommend the grant of lease for portion 2124 to the sixth defendant of 02nd May 2012 and further quash the decision of the Head of State acting on advice of the first defendant of 13th May 2013 to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal against the decision of the third defendant of 02nd May 2012 and direct that applications be submitted to the third defendant in accordance with the procedure under sections 58 to 76 (supra) and decision be made thereafter. The defendants shall pay the plaintiff's costs, to be taxed, if not agreed.
Judgment and orders accordingly.

_______________________________________________________________
Ashurst Lawyers: Lawyer for the Plaintiff
Acting Solicitor-General: Lawyers for the First to Fifth Defendants
Raurela Lawyers: Lawyers for the Sixth Defendants