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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
CR 626 OF 2009
THE STATE
V
AVANA LATUVE, JOEL LOVI & MALO BAGESA (No 2)
Popondetta: Toliken, AJ.
2013: 15th April, 20th June
CRIMINAL LAW – Particular Offence – Wilful Murder – Trial - Deceased suspected of sorcery, reputed to have killed 34 people through sorcery – Deceased apprehended by Police – While in police custody deceased attacked by prisoner - Attack incited other villagers to attack and chase deceased out of village – Prisoner led villagers to chase deceased – Deceased killed by villagers a kilometre out of the village – Prisoner confessed to participating in the killing Criminal Code Act Ch. 262, s 299.
CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence –Mitigating factors - Prisoner first offender – Showed genuine remorse – Belief in sorcery a de facto provocation – Extenuating factor - No evidence of what prisoner actually did when he participated in killing – Aggravating factors - Prisoner instigated the attack and actively partook in the killing – Strong motive and intention to kill – Prisoner attacks deceased while deceased was in police custody – No respect for the law and authority of the police – Prevalence of sorcery related killings
CRIMINAL LAW – Appropriate sentence – Stiff punitive sentence for personal and general deterrence – Sentence of 20 years less time spent in pre-trial custody – Nil suspension - Pleas for suspended sentences in sorcery related killings not to be easily acceded to.
Cases cited:
The State v Jude Gena & 4 Ors (2004) N2649
Thomas v The State (2007) SC 867
The State v. Nickson Sambura & Anor (2002) N2219
The State v Kumbi Koti & Ors CR 94 of 1999 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 17th of November 2000)
State v. John Baiga, CR 733 of 2003(Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 09th & 23rd July 2003)
The State v Sedoki Lota & Anor (2007) N3183
Acting Public Prosecutor v. Uname Aumane & Others [1980] PNGLR 510
The State v Boat Yokum (2002) N2337
Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC 789
The State v. William Kapris
The State v Elison Tayamina CR 302 of 2010 (No.3) (unreported and unpublished judgment dated 10th may 2013)
The State v Avanah Latuve & ORS CR 626 (No.1) of 2009 unreported and unpublished judgment dated 15th April 2013
Counsel:
J W Tamate, for the State
D Mamu and E Yavisa, for the accused
JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE
20th June, 2013
THE FACTS
"... The examination reveals knife wounds on the right hand involving index finger extending to the metacarpal of the middle finger as well.
The deceased also sustained blunt wounds on the right lateral aspects of the base of the head parallel to the right ear thus having contact to the brain leading to head injury and instant death.
Conclusively, the deceased was alleged to have been murdered as a result of trauma to the base of the skull leading to death secondary to internal haemorrhage and head injury."
ALLOCUTUS
SUBMISSIONS
THE LAW
42. The offence of wilful murder is provided by Section 299 of the Code in the following terms:
299. Wilful murder.
(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Code, a person who unlawfully kills another person, intending to cause his death or that of some other person, is guilty of wilful murder.
(2) A person who commits wilful murder shall be liable to be sentenced to death.
43. Wilful murder is the most serious of homicide offence and thus attracts the maximum penalty of death.
44. The courts have consistently given effect to Parliament and society's view through legislation that the offence must be met by stiff punitive sentences principally to punish or deter perpetrators and hopefully deter others as well.
45. The Supreme Court has laid down sentencing principles in the Manu Kovi case, more as a guide than an attempt I guess to tie the hands of the sentencing court in respect of homicide offences.
46. For wilful murder, the Manu Kovi tariffs are:
CATEGORY | WILFULMURDER | SENTENCING RANGE | |
CATEGORY 1 | 15 – 20 YEARS | ||
Plea: Ordinary cases - Mitigating factors with no aggravating factors. No weapon used – little or no pre-meditation or pre-planning – Minimum force used – absence of strong intent to kill. | No weapon used – little or no pre-meditation or pre-planning – Minimum force used – absence of strong intent to
kill. | ||
CATEGORY 2 | 20 – 30 YEARS | ||
Trial or Plea: Mitigating factors with aggravating factors. | Pre-planning – vicious attack – Weapons used – strong desire to kill. | ||
CATEGORY 3 | LIFE IMPRISONMENT | ||
Trial or Plea: Special Aggravating factors – Mitigating factors reduced in weight or rendered insignificant by gravity of the offence. | Brutal killing – Killing in cold blood – Killing of innocent, defenceless or harmless person. Use of dangerous or offensive weapons. Killing accompanied by other serious offence – Victim old or young – pre-plaaning orr pre-meditation – Strong desire to kill.,. | ||
CATEGORY 4 | DEATH | ||
Worst Case – Trial or Plea: Special aggravating factors – No extenuating circumstances – No mitigating factors or mitigating factors rendered completely insignificant by gravity of offence. | |
SENTENCING TREND
47. Killings induced by belief in sorcery have increased markedly over the years and prisoners have been met by appropriately stiff sentences by this court.
48. While it is settled that belief in sorcery is a mitigating factor the courts have not been indifferent to the fact that this type of killings must attract stiff punitive as well as deterrent sentences.
49. In The State v Boat Yokum (2002) N2337, Injia J (as he then was) when sentencing the prisoners to terms of imprisonment ranging from 6 - 10 years for the murder of a reputed sorcerer, apparently with the tacit approval of the community. He said:
In considering the appropriate sentence, I have had regard to and emphasize the deterrent and retribution theory of sentence as is usually done in sorcery killing cases: see Acting Public Prosecutor v. Uname Aumane & Others [1980] PNGLR 510. A strong punitive and deterrent sentence is required to punish the offenders and to send a clear message to their own community; who apparently seem to think that it is alright to kill a sorcerer or a reputed sorcerer for that matter; that it is wrong to kill another person including a sorcerer, reputed or not, and that they will be punished by the Courts, if they do. (emphasis added)
50. In The State v Sedoki Lota & Anor (2007) N3183 Sevua J. expressed much stronger views when he sentenced the prisoners to death for the wilful murder of a reputed sorcerer by the prisoners. His Honour said at paragraph 26:
".... I accept that belief in the power of sorcery is common in many communities in Papua New Guinea today. However, it is my view that with the introduction of Christianity, Western civilization and establishment of Government administration and authorities, the Court should not continue to treat belief in sorcery as a bar to imposing the maximum penalty in a serious wilful murder case, such as the present case."
51. Then at paragraph 35 His Honour continued:
35. In my view, the severity of this crime cannot be limited to the aggravating factors I have alluded to. The prisoners' actions in this case also constituted a blatant violation of the deceased's constitutional rights to the privacy of her home and her right to life. They deprived her of her right to life contrary to s.35(1)of the Constitution. Her right to life had been intentionally deprived without an order of the Court.
52. And further down at paragraph 39 he went on to say:
39. But killing someone is against the law and the Courts have a responsibility in demonstrating through the penalties they impose that the prevalence of a crime like this must be a public deterrence and retribution. The punishment must also show that the law does not approve of killing of sorcerers, no matter how much people believe in sorcery. In my view the Courts cannot continue to be indifferent in considering punishments for killing in belief in sorcery as opposed to the serious nature of such killings. I believe it is time that the Courts stopped saying that because a killing is related to the belief in sorcery, it should not attract the maximum penalty. I do not say that the belief in sorcery is not a mitigating factor, because it is. However I do not think that it should be accepted as a bar to serious punishment for the crime of wilful murder such as this case, so callous and unimaginable as it were.
53. In The State v. John Baiga, CR 733 of 2003(Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 09th & 23rd July 2003) the prisoner was sentenced to life imprisonment.
54. In The State v Kumbi Koti & Ors CR 94 of 1999 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 17th of November 2000) was sentenced to 20 years while the prisoners in The State v. Nickson Sambura & Anor (2002) N2219 were sentenced to 18 years upon plea.
55. In The State v Jude Gena & 4 Ors (2004) N2649 9 (Kapi CJ) the prisoners were mourning the death of Gena's wife. The wife had previously accused the deceased of causing her illness. When the deceased turned up at the funeral, the prisoners were provoked and killed the deceased and disposed of the body to prevent any suspicion. His Honour acknowledged the fact that belief in sorcery was strongly held by people in the prisoners' society and included educated ones but sentenced the prisoners to 20 years imprisonment.
56. In Thomas v The State (2007) SC 867, the appellant appealed against his sentence of 18 years. He was the leader of a group that had killed the deceased whom he believed
to have caused the death of his father through sorcery. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and increased the sentence to 22 years.
57. There are numerous cases of this type some of which the defence cited in their submission.
THE PRESENT CASE
58. In arriving at an appropriate sentence in this case, I consider firstly the factors subjective to the prisoner and his offence.
59. I find the following factors in the prisoner's favour:
60. I also find that while he was the instigator the incident that provoked the community in chasing, attacking and eventually killing the deceased, there is no direct evidence showing what he individually did to the deceased. This I find to be an extenuating factor in his favour.
61. There are, however, aggravating factors. These are:
APPROPRIATE SENTENCE
62. The maximum penalty is death. However, it is trite law that the maximum penalty is reserved for worst category of cases and each case should be treated on the merits of its own circumstances.
63. This is not the worst of cases and hence does not warrant the maximum penalty of death. It however, must attract a sentence that must bring home the need to punish people like him who feel that it is justified to kill sorcerers or reputed sorcerers and to deter the many in his own community and other communities in the country who hold similar views.
64. In this case the prisoner and his community believed that the deceased had caused the deaths of 34 people including the prisoners own brother. He instigated the attack on the deceased who at that time was in the custody of the police when he attacked him, chasing him with a grass knife. His attack obviously incited the rest of the villagers, who, similarly attributed those 34 deaths on the deceased. The community led by the prisoner chased the deceased for about a kilometre and killed him by stoning. This was a sustained act from which it can be reasonably inferred that there was a strong intention to kill.
65. While the belief in sorcery is a mitigating factor, it has been said that this belief ought not to be over-emphasized. It is, however, not a special mitigating factor but only a mitigating one just like other mitigating factors. (Acting Public Prosecutor v Uname Auname & Ors (supra).
66. In The State v Maraka Jackson CR1433 of 2004, unreported and unnumbered, (2006) His Honour Kandakasi J. Said:
"The only thing that makes sorcery related killings special is the believe in sorcery. However, sorcery is neither a fact that can easily and readily be proven or refuted. It is a matter of what one wants to believe and not. The Sorcery Act provides for the way in which people suspected of sorcery should be dealt with. It does not say that those who kill on believe of sorcery should be given special treatment. To do so would be to give sanction and to license some of the most vicious, brutal, merciless and public execution type killings that have thus far occurred. Sorcery is a belief based on custom. The Constitution in Sch. 2.1 (2) dictates that we should retain only those customs that a not inconsistent with a written law and are not repugnant to the general principles of humanity. Murder, intentional or otherwise is an offence proscribe by our Criminal Code in particular ss. 299 (wilful murder), 300 (murder) and 302 (manslaughter), which is a written law. This follows on from the preservation of the right to life under s. 37 of the Constitution. Killings in whatever form or manner, except as may be provided for by law, is a prohibited act world- wide because, it is against the general principles of humanity. Some countries, as in our case, do have provisions in their criminal codes for the death penalty in the worse case of wilful murders. Even these kinds of legislation are now the subject of public and international criticism and debate as to the justification for their retention.
67. In John Baipu v. The State (SCR 71 of 2003 - unreported and unnumbered judgment (2005), the Supreme Court anticipated that as more and more areas in the country are influenced by modern social changes the belief in sorcery will no longer be treated as a significant mitigating factor: It said:
"... we are of the view that all the aspects of social change in Papua New Guinea which have permeated to even remote parts of the country means that it can no longer be assumed that a belief in sorcery will be treated as a significant mitigating factor in every case. The degree to which a belief in sorcery will mitigate a sentence will depend upon the facts of each case. Actions taken on the spur of the moment motivated by fear and self preservation and which have parallels to but perhaps do not amount to provocation as contemplated by s16 of the Sorcery Act are likely to increase the degree of mitigation. But such factors as educational level of the defendant, a place of residence with the availability of village councillors, village courts, police, churches, other educational influences such as radio and television, and other aspects of good order and government which give the defendant alternate remedies to self help and the knowledge that it is unacceptable, may be factors which reduces the mitigating effect of the belief in sorcery. Not because the belief in the effectiveness of the sorcery may diminished, but because the belief that taking the law into the defendant's own hands as the only effective means of dealing with the problem should and ought to be diminished. And the more these factors of social change are present in a defendant's society the less a mitigating factor belief in sorcery should be. The result being that sentences for serious offences involving a belief in sorcery will tend over time to come closer to sentences for the same offence where no belief in sorcery is a factor."
68. This, however, seem to have not been the case at all. Sorcery-belief induced killing have not diminished. If anything killings have become more horrendous as seen from recent public torture and killings such as the much publicized killing of a young mother in Mt. Hagen who was burned to death with a tyre around her neck.
69. Defence counsel in his submission said that the deceased's life was only a single one compared with the 34 that he had taken through sorcery. He seemed to imply firstly that those deaths were in fact caused by the deceased when there is no solid or empirical evidence to prove that. Despite the fact that belief in sorcery may be real it does not necessarily follow that sorcery itself does in fact work or if it works at all those deaths can be attributed to the deceased.
70. Secondly this type of argument can be taken to legitimizing the extra-judicial and summary killings of sorcerers or reputed sorcerers and that such killings are done for benefit and protection of the community at large.
71. This type of thinking is dangerous in a modern State and the rule of law and should be nipped at the outset. They should not be allowed to fester or grow any roots. Any argument in support of such preposterous ideas from the bar table should also be quickly rejected and must not be allowed to see the light of day.
72. We live in a society where the law rules supreme. The State has institutions such as the police and the courts where people can take their grievances to for the lawful and just resolution of disputes.
73. So regardless of how engrained the belief in sorcery is, and, whether the community allows or accepts the extra-judicial killings of suspected sorcerers, nobody should be allowed to take life readily in the manner the prisoner and his community did in this case.
74. In The State v Elison Tayamina CR 302 of 2010 (No.3) (unreported and unpublished judgment dated 10th may 2013), a case I recently heard in Alotau I said:
"While most societies in the country have been exposed to western civilisation and most, if not all, profess to be Christians, these influences do not seem to have had an impact at all in diminishing if not eradicating the belief. The liberating tenets of Christianity in particular have had no effect at all on the masses, who would give no second thought in executing anyone suspected of practicing sorcery.
The recent spate of public executions and killings of suspected sorcerers calls for affirmative action by the courts. As we have seen the courts have expressed strong views that this type of killings must be visited upon with strong punitive and deterrent sentences to impress upon perpetrators that such killings cannot be allowed to continue as they are a denial of the most fundamental of all human rights – the right to life.
75. As seen from the cases reviewed above, the courts have imposed stiff custodial sentences and at least one case warranted a life sentence.
76. So what should be an appropriate sentence in this case?
77. I take into account the mitigating factors in favour of the accused – his belief in sorcery and that the deceased was responsible for his brother's death and others, that he is a first offender and that it has not been shown the exact nature of his attack on the deceased on the road, and that he was only one of the many who caused the deceased's death.
78. I also take into account the adverse effect of his imprisonment on his family's welfare.
79. However, the aggravating factors out-weigh his mitigating factors. He was the instigator of the attack on the deceased. He led the mob in chasing the deceased down for not less than a kilometre and finally killing him. He displayed total disrespect for the law and the authority of the police. Even after they had killed the deceased he could say arrogantly to the Security Personnel and Benson Kadoga that they had already killed the deceased and were returning home. These factors significantly reduce the mitigating factor in his favour.
80. I agree that the circumstances of the case fall under Category 2 of the Manu Kovi tariffs. The only consideration missing there is that there was no pre-planning involved and this I take into account in the prisoners favour. I find that what happened was on the spur of the moment and this I will appropriately take into account.
81. In the circumstances I feel that a starting point should be 20 years. To further demonstrate the need to punish and deter people who kill on the belief in sorcery the head sentence should remain at 20 years.
82. I therefore sentence the prisoner to 20 years imprisonment with hard labour less the period spent in custody which is 5 years and 4 months. He shall therefore serve a term of 14 years and 8 months.
83. There is no doubt that the prisoner's family will be greatly affected by his long period of imprisonment. However, that is the price he has to pay even if it means that people close to him have to suffer for his criminal behaviour.
SUSPENSION
84. The prisoner has asked for the sentence to be suspended or that he will be placed on good behaviour.
85. I do not think that this is an appropriate case for that. The prevalence of this type of killings demands stern punishment hence pleas for suspension should not be readily acceded to.
SENTENCE
86. The prisoner is hereby ordered to serve his resultant sentence of 14 years and 8 months at Biru Corrective Institution.
Ordered accordingly.
___________________________________________________
The Public Prosecutor: Lawyer for the State
Paraka Lawyers: Lawyer for the Prisoner
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