State v Kelly [2009] PGNC 34; N3624 (21 April 2009)

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CRIMINAL LAW - Sentence - Manslaughter - Deceased adult female and co wife - Death arose from domestic dispute setting - Single stab wound - Neck - Use of kitchen knife - Death caused by internal bleeding from stab wound - Presence of very strong de facto provocation - Desertion of offender and children by husband - History of domestic violence and wife bashing - Presence of element of preplanning and viciousness - Sentence of 12 years imposed - Criminal Code - Sections 19 & 302.

Cases cited:
The State -v- Carol Alfred (2009) N3602
The State -v- Philipa Kawage: Cr No 1386 of 2006 (Unnumbered & Unreported Judgment of 12th May 2008)
The State -v- Tauseng Bange: CR No 973 of 2007 (Unnumbered & Unreported Judgment of 10th November 2008)
Manu Kovi -v- The State (2005) SC789
The State -v- Kila Peter (2006) N3018
The State -v- Kopol Hiol:CR No 538 of 2008 (Unreported & Unnumbered Judgment of 12 May 2008)
The State -v- Yuanis Ipiri (2008) N3512
The State -v- Juvenile "D" (2008) N3508
The Public Prosecutor -v- Panikuiaka Nopi [1979] PNGLR 536

1. MAKAIL J: On 16th April 2009, the offender appeared before the Court from remand at Baisu CIS and pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful killing (manslaughter) of one Janet Kombuk on the morning of 21st July 2007 at Bahala village at Minj contrary to section 302 of the Criminal Code. After perusing the Court depositions presented by the State in support of the charge, I was satisfied that the charge was overwhelmingly made out against her, I convicted her and proceeded to hear submissions on sentence.

2. The brief allegations of fact put to her on arraignment, and on which she pleaded guilty are these; the offender and the deceased are married to a common man named William Kaman. The offender is the first wife and the deceased is the second wife. The marriage between the offender and her husband was an unhappy one. There have been numerous occasions where they would argue and fight. The main reason for the arguments and fights is that, the husband had desserted the offender and her three children. He went to reside with the deceased at the deceased’s village, leaving behind the offender to raise the three children on her own.

3. Sometimes immediately prior to the alleged killing on 21st July 2007, the offender had a heated argument with her husband and the deceased. On the morning of 21st July 2007 the offender armed herself with a kitchen knife and went to the residence of the deceased at Bahala village. She approached the deceased and they argued. The argument developed into a fight where the offender produced the kitchen knife and stabbed the deceased on her neck. The stab wound was so serious that the deceased died from internal bleeding.

4. On her allocutus, I think it is useful that I quote in full what she told the Court hereunder and I do so:

"Thank you your Honour to give me or allow me time to speak. I don’t have plenty to say. The small words I wish to say is this. First, in the in the eyes of God, the Court, and the Court officials, I have committed the crime. I have three children and I stayed for 12 years. I have no bride price. I have done a lot of hard work.

My husband instigated this and I committed the crime. Whatever decision your Honour hands down, I will follow. That is all and God bless you".

A person who unlawfully kills another under such circumstances as not to constitute wilful murder, murder or infanticide is guilty of manslaughter.

6. The prescribed penalty for the crime of manslaughter pursuant to section 302 of the Criminal Code is life imprisonment. Depending on the factual circumstances of a case under consideration, the Court can either impose the prescribed maximum life imprisonment or a lesser sentence. This Court is vested with such sentencing discretion under section 19 of the Criminal Code.

7. Mr. Kasito of counsel for the offender first gives an account of the offender’s personal details as follows:

8. Secondly, in mitigation, Mr. Kasito points to the following mitigating features operating in favour of the offender, thus justifying a lesser sentence than the maximum of life imprisonment, which are:

* The offender has pleaded guilty to the charge, thus saving the Court’s time and money to conduct a full trial to determine her guilt;

* She is a first offender, as she has not been in trouble with the law before the commission of the offence;

* She has cooperated with the police during the police investigations into the commission of the crime after she voluntarily surrendered to the police;

* She has expressed remorse for committing this offence. She said sorry to God and to the Court;

* She and her line had paid compensation in the total value of K15,000.00 comprising of K3,684.00 cash and 17 pigs to the deceased’s line;

* There is presence of strong de facto provocation, in that, out of 12 years of marriage to her husband, she has three children, but was not paid bride price and had worked hard to raise the three children on her own whilst the husband was hanging around with the deceased;

* Her husband had assaulted her in front of the deceased and verbally abused her in front of the deceased the previous day, thus causing big embarrassment to her;

* She has spent 1 year, 8 months, 2 weeks and 2 days in pretrial custody and this period of time should be deducted from the head sentence; and

* Since being arrested and detained, she has been denied access to her three children whilst awaiting trial.

9. In his submissions, Mr. Kasito refers to my judgment on sentence in the recent case of The State -v- Carol Alfred (2009) N3602 hand down at Mendi during the last Court circuit in March 2009 where I imposed 10 years imprisonment on the offender for unlawfully killing of her husband after an argument. There, the offender stabbed her late husband, a policeman with a kitchen knife after an argument. The husband had accused her of not preparing dinner for him that evening when he returned home. One of the compelling mitigating factors that persuaded me to impose a sentence of 10 years imprisonment is that, the offender was a victim of domestic violence and wife beating at the hands of her late husband for a long time, a fact that the State conceded. The other reason is that, the killing was accidental as the offender stabbed her late husband on his left upper thigh when they wrestled each other during the scuffle.

10. He submits that given the presents of the mitigating factors in this case, and comparing this case with the case of Carol Alfred (supra), a head sentence of 9 years imprisonment is appropriate. Then, the Court should deduct 1 year, 8 months, 2 weeks and 2 days for time spent in pretrial custody.

11. Mr. Waine of counsel for the State first reminds the Court that the sanctity of human life is more precious and valuable than gold or sliver and no amount of compensation or remorse can compensate life itself. That means that, a death is a death and a killing is a killing. A person’s life is lost forever. It cannot be recovered or returned. Thus, that should be underlying factor that should guide the Court in its assessment of an appropriate sentence to impose on an offender in homicide cases like in this particular case. He says that this underlying factor has been emphasized by the Courts over the years when sentencing offenders in homicide cases.

12. Returning to his submissions on an appropriate sentence for this offender, he points the following aggravating factors:

* The offender used a weapon, namely a kitchen knife to attack the deceased that fateful morning of 21st July 2007;

* The offender went to the residence of the deceased armed with a kitchen knife, which suggest that there was premeditation. That is, she had planned to do grievous bodily harm to the deceased;

* The attack was vicious. This is because, the deceased died on the spot after the stabbing;

* The offender stabbed the deceased on a vulnerable part of the body, namely the neck. It is no wonder, there was little or no chance at all that the deceased would survive; and

* The crime of unlawful killing in a domestic setting is prevalent in this country. This case is just another example of an unlawful killing case and adds to the already long list of unlawful killing cases dealt with by the Court. It is an indication that no matter the increase in the sentences imposed by the Court, there is no deterrent effect on the people, like this offender.

13. For all these reasons, he says that this case falls within the sentencing range of 10 and 13 years imprisonment. An appropriate sentence he says would be 12 years imprisonment for this offender. To support his submission for a sentence of 12 years imprisonment, he cites two past unlawful killing cases that this Court has dealt with, namely, Carol Alfred (supra) and The State -v- Philipa Kawage: CR No 1386 of 2006 (Unnumbered & Unreported Judgment of 12th May 2008).

14. He also cites a murder case of The State -v- Tauseng Bange: CR No 973 of 2007 (Unnumbered & Unreported Judgment of 10th November 2008) where I sentenced the offender to 16 years imprisonment for the murder of her husband’s lover on her guilty plea. It was also a case of domestic setting where the offender suspected her husband of having an extra marital affair, followed her husband and his lover, the deceased to their own house in the night and confronted them. An argument arose between the offender and the deceased followed by the offender attacking the deceased by stabbing her on the chest once with a kitchen knife and she died.

14. I have considered the facts of this case and submissions of both counsel and I think that this case is a straight forward one where I can reach a decision without too much doubt. But first, I must remind the offender by respectfully borrowing the words of Mr. Waine, as I am in complete agreement with his statement that, "The sanctity of human life is more precious and valuable than gold or silver and no amount of compensation or remorse can compensate life itself. That means that, a death is a death and a killing is a killing. A person’s life is lost forever. It cannot be recovered or returned. Thus, that should be underlying factor that should guide the Court in its assessment of an appropriate sentence to impose on an offender in homicide cases like in this particular case".

"................... I must state here for the record that offences of unlawful killing have been a common occurrence and which this Court has been inundated with from time to time. Unlawful killing is the premature termination of one’s life by another. The offender in this case must be reminded that she is responsible for the death of the deceased, no matter how accidental it was. There is only one life to live and once it’s gone, it’s gone! But offenders like her will live with the guilt and shame for the rest of their lives".

16. I also reiterated an interesting observation in Carol Alfred’s case (supra) where I referred to the case of Philipa Kawage: (supra) at p 7 of the judgment where I said:

"The most common cases of unlawful killing arise from cases of domestic setting such as extra marital affairs, polygamous marriages and de facto relationships where most often than not, two women either single or married get entangled and embroiled in the dispute over the right of ownership of one man".

17. For the crime of unlawful killing for which the offender stands before the Court, she should also be reminded that she can be sentenced to life imprisonment because that is the maximum penalty for such crime and this Court may impose that sentence depending on how it considers the seriousness of the crime. But I am not going to impose the maximum penalty in this case because I do not think the facts as presented show that it is a worst case of unlawful killing. For it has been held by the Court in the past that the maximum penalty should be reserved for the worst case.

18. In the present case, this is a typical case of a dispute arising from a domestic setting. It is a classic example of what a polygamous marriage can do to the sanctity of marriage and the family unit. Here is a case of an offender who is happily married for 12 years to a husband until one day, the husband decides that he needs a change of life and goes out of the matrimonial home and finds a second wife for himself. He brings her home to stay but this does not go down well with the offender. The second wife decides to remain in her village so the husband goes to her, leaving behind the offender and her three children. The offender is unceremoniously dumped so to speak by her husband after all these years of marriage for the brighter side of life. She remains at home with the burden of fending for herself and her three children, bearing in mind that the children are not grown ups, the oldest only 9 years old and the youngest, 3. I can imagine, life must have been tough for her.

19. No doubt, she had every right to speak out against the cruelty and inhumane treatment that had besieged her and her children as a result of her husband’s infidelity and act of desertion. What does she get for speaking out? More bombarding and battering from her husband, and this time, the second wife jumps into the fold! The bombarding and battering intensifies every time she speaks out. It reaches a peak and like all things, there must be an end. The end came, and it was not the end they or anyone for that matter had expected. It was death and the offender is the person who will pay the ultimate prize for all.

20. To my mind, this death should not have happened if the husband of the offender stayed put in his matrimonial home so to speak. He walked out, so to speak and the consequence; some body died. In my respectful view, he is partly responsible for the death of the deceased. His actions had led to the offender acting in the way she did. If only there is a law to hold him criminally responsible as well, I will not hesitate to have him brought before me. But my hands are tied so to speak and I can only lament the deep pitfall of this area of law in our criminal laws and the criminal justice system. But what I am legally empowered to do in this case is to decide the offender’s fate and this I do, but with a heavy heart.

I find this case in a number of ways similar to Philipa Kawage’s case (supra). In that case, the offender was convicted on her guilty plea and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment at Buihebi CIS. She had stabbed her late husband, a police officer and at the material time, Commander of Mobile Squad, based at Tari. The offender did that after finding out that her late husband had taken a second wife and was living with that woman in Tari whilst she and her 4 children were living in Port Moresby. She traveled up to Tari and confronted her late husband outside the house at Enobi Police Barracks on 13th April 2006. An argument erupted between the two of them where the offender armed herself with a kitchen knife and attempted to stab him. A struggle took place and the offender was over powered by her late husband and fell down. As she came to a sitting position, with her back to her late husband, she swung the kitchen knife around her back and it struck her late husband’s right groin. The blow severed one of the main blood vessels which led to heavy bleeding and eventual demise of her late husband even though he was rushed to the hospital for treatment.

21. In Philipa Kawage’s case (supra), I sentenced her to 13 years imprisonment after I found one factor operating in her favour and that was, the root cause of the problem was her late husband’s extra marital affair. I also accepted that she acted in the way she did because she was upset, angry and frustrated that her husband had been unfaithful and betrayed her marriage. There was de facto provocation. The second factor that operated in her favour was that she pleaded guilty, thus saving the Court’s time and money to conduct a trial to determine her guilt. The next factor was that she was a first offender. The other factor which operated in her favour was that, her line paid a hefty customary compensation to her late husband’s line. It was K13,000.00, 18 pigs and 1 goat. The other favourable factor was that she did not intend to kill him as it was accidental and finally, she had 4 children to look after.

22. I had found two factors operating against her. The first was, she had used a kitchen knife to stab her late husband. The second one was, the offence of manslaughter is prevalent in the country, especially in cases arising from domestic setting.

23. I also find this case similar in some ways to Carol Alfred’s case (supra). I have already given the brief facts of that case above. But what can be said of that case and of this case is that, there is a long history of domestic violence and wife bashing. The only slight difference between them is that, in Carol Alfred’s case (supra), the deceased was her husband and it was not a case of co wives fighting over a common man, where as in this case, the deceased is a co wife and died as a result of a fight over a common man.

24. The murder case which Mr. Waine refers in his submissions of Tauseng Bange (supra), is a case which I dealt with here at Minj last November. It is a case which has similar factual circumstances as this present case. In that case, I sentenced the offender to 16 years imprisonment for the murder of her husband’s lover on her guilty plea. It was also a case of domestic setting where the offender suspected her husband of having an extra marital affair, followed her husband and his lover, the deceased to their own house in the night and confronted them. An argument arose between the offender and the deceased followed by the offender attacking the deceased by stabbing her on the chest once with a kitchen knife and she died.

25. I suppose the two factual differences are that, first the offender was charged with murder and convicted on her guilty plea, thus attracting a higher sentence as opposed to a case of manslaughter. Secondly, the deceased was not the offender’s husband’s second wife. She was just a lover. But on the whole, there was presence of strong de facto provocation. That is, it was the husband’s extra martial affair coupled with the squandering of her hard earned cash of K2,000.0 from toiling the land that caused her to murder the deceased.

26. In Manu Kovi -v- The State (2005) SC 789, the Supreme Court set out the guidelines for manslaughter cases as follows:

"Manslaughter
No	*Description Tariff*	*Details*

1	Plea – ordinary cases mitigating factors no aggravating factors	-No weapons used - 8-12 yrs offender emotionally under stress - de facto provocation - killing in domestic setting - killing follows straight after argument - minimal force used - victim had pre-existing disease that caused or accelerated death, eg enlarged spleen cases.

2	Trial or plea – mitigating factors with aggravating factors	Use of offensive weapon, eg knife 13-16 yrs on vulnerable parts of body - vicious attack - multiple injuries - some deliberate intention to harm - some pre-planning.

3	Trial or plea – special aggravating factors mitigating factors reduced in weight or rendered insignificant by gravity of offence	Dangerous or offensive 17-25 yrs weapon used, eg gun, axe - vicious and planned attack - deliberate intention to harm little or no regard for sanctity of human life.

4	Worst case - trial or plea special aggravating factors - no extenuating circumstances no mitigating factors or mitigating factors rendered completely insignificant by gravity of offence".	Some element of Life imprisonment viciousness and brutality - some pre-planning and pre-meditation – killing of harmless, innocent person - complete disregard for human life.

27. So, the question is; which category does the offender’s case fall under based on the guidelines set in Manu Kovi’s case (supra)? To my mind, this case falls into the second category of Manu Kovi’s case (supra). That means that the sentence should be with the range of 13 and 16 years imprisonment. This is because first, there is a use of a kitchen knife to stab the deceased. The stabbing was on the neck of the deceased which is a vulnerable part of the human body. The medical report by Dr Scott Dooley of Nazarene Hospital at Kudjip dated 27th July 2007 confirms that the deceased cause of death was from, "internal bleeding from neck stab wound". It is no wonder the deceased did not survive.

28. This leads me on to find that notwithstanding Mr. Kasito’s urging that the killing was not preplanned or premeditated, the fact that the offender stabbed the deceased on her neck shows that she intended to cause serious grievous bodily harm to the deceased. Unfortunately, she died. Further, the fact that the offender armed herself with a kitchen knife and went to the residence of the deceased at Bahala village shows to me that she had planned to harm her. The finding I make is also supported by the fact that prior to the commission of the crime on 21st July 2007, she had a heated argument with her husband and the deceased. The argument was about the husband’s infidelity and act of desertion. It turned out that she came out second best that day. For that, she pursued the deceased to her village on the morning of 21st July 2007 to even the score. Thus, I find that there was an element of preplanning. I hold this factor against the offender.

29. I also find there is some element of viciousness in the sense that, the offender stabbed the deceased at a vulnerable part of the body. It appears from the brief facts as presented by the State which has formed the basis of this plea that, the offender approached the deceased and argued with her. The deceased was unarmed. The blow from the offender was directed at the neck of the deceased. To my mind, whilst it was a single blow, it was also fatal because the blow from the kitchen knife struck a deadly part of the deceased’s body. This, in my view demonstrates the viciousness of the attack on the deceased and I hold this factor against the offender.

30. When combining these two aggravating factors, it makes the case more serious. That means that, unlike the case of Carol Alfred (supra) where the stabbing of the deceased with a kitchen knife by the offender was accidental in the course of the fight, in this case, it was a preplanned or premeditated killing and viciousness. Hence, the sentence I am going to impose in this case will be higher than 10 years imprisonment, which was the sentence I had imposed in Carol Alfred’s case (supra).

31. Next, the offender had used a weapon, namely a kitchen knife to wound the deceased. She wounded her with a kitchen knife just like the offender in the case of The State -v- Kila Peter (2006) N3018 where the offender stabbed her late husband on his back and he died as a result of heavy bleeding. It was a case of domestic killing because the deceased had abandoned the prisoner and child and gone off to live with another woman. On her guilty plea, His Honour Cannings J, sentenced her to 12 years imprisonment but allowed her to apply for suspension of part of the sentence if a good report is made by the Correction and Rehabilitation Service Officer during service of her prison term. A kitchen knife was also used in the cases of Carol Alfred (supra) and Philipa Kawage (supra).

32. As I said in The State -v- Kopol Hiol: CR No 538 of 2008 (Unreported & Unnumbered Judgment of 12 May 2008), a case of grievous bodily harm of the victim with a bush knife, on pages 11 and 12: "I think even picking up a bush (kitchen) knife for that matter every time an argument starts is a practice that should be discouraged by the use of the Court’s sentencing policy". I hold this factor against the offender.

33. Finally, there is the prevalence of the crime that I should not loose sight of. This is a factor that is almost present in the common crimes committed in this country. I can say unlawful killing is one. The crime of unlawful killing is prevalent in this province, and in this part of the region of the country. Last year alone, I dealt with 3 unlawful killing cases one of which is the case of Philipa Kawage (supra). The other two are, The State -v- Yuanis Ipiri (2008) N3512 & The State -v- Juvenile "D" (2008) N3508. In these two cases, the offenders are father and son. Each pleaded guilty to unlawfully killing their own blood relative when they caught him "red handed" stealing their garden food from their garden. They badly assaulted him and chopped him with a bush knife. He died as a result of loss of blood. The father was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and the son to 8 years imprisonment.

34. This year, I had dealt with one which is the case of Carol Alfred (supra) in Mendi in March. I repeat what I said in Carol Alfred’s case (supra) at p 20 of the judgment:

"It is anyone’s guess if one wants to count the other cases of unlawful killing dealt with by other judges for that year and before that. But one thing is certain; the number will far exceed what I had dealt with last year. This is not a very good indication at all, of our country’s law and order situation. The use of weapons or dangerous objects such as bush knives, kitchen knives and so on, to kill another person is prevalent. This case is one of them, which I will add to the long list of past cases of unlawful killing. Thus, I will hold this factor against the offender".

36. I also take into account the mitigating factors operating in the offender’s favour and accepting them as factors favourable to her, I do not wish to repeat them here because, I have already set them out in detail above. I thought I just mention here that the offender and her line have paid a hefty customary compensation to the relatives of the deceased. It is said, K3,684.00 in cash and 17 pigs for a total value of K15,000.00 was given as compensation. An Affidavit of the offender sworn on 16th April 2009 was tendered by consent to verify the payment of compensation and the nature and value of the compensation made to the line of the deceased. As I had taken into account compensation as one of the compelling mitigating factor in the case of Alfred Carol (supra), I will do likewise here. See also Manu Kovi’s case (supra) at pp 7 and 8 of the judgment where the Supreme Court stated:

"Compensation for physical and non-physical injury to a person wrongfully inflicted by another person(s) is widely practiced in many PNG traditional societies. Compensation for injury or damage to personal property is also widely practiced in traditional societies in PNG. Indeed compensation for personal injury and injury to personal property is a universal principle.

Compensation for the loss of human life caused by wrongful actions of another person(s) is practiced in many traditional societies of PNG and more particularly in the Highlands region. It is also a universal principle. Modern nations including Papua New Guinea embrace the principle in statutes which recognize actions such as estate claim, solatium, etc.

Compensation is a relevant mitigating factor. Whilst the Courts acknowledge that compensation should not be used to pay for crime and that no amount of remorse or compensation will restore loss of life, it is an important mitigating factor. The amount or value of compensation will vary depending on the special circumstances and values of each traditional society. The weight to be given to compensation by the Court will also vary depending on different factors involved such as the existence of custom of compensation for death wrongfully caused, request or demand for compensation made by the deceased’s relatives and response given by the deceased’s relatives, the amount or value offered and accepted, expression of genuine remorse accompanying the payment, the amount the offender himself has paid or contributed, promptness of the response or payment, cessation of animosity and restoration of peace between the two sides of the conflict and so on.

In order for compensation to be regarded as an ordinary or special mitigating factor, two important indicators are the form and amount or value of compensation paid. A payment in the form of money is almost indispensable in modern times.

Valuable personal property such as pigs and foodstuff is common. Some societies use land. The use of living human life, as a form of compensation, used in some traditional societies in PNG, even in modern times, is now outlawed.

The amount or value of compensation often varies. In terms of money, it is difficult to fix any specific amount or figure for compensation but some guidance may be obtained from the maximum amount of compensation prescribed under the Criminal Law (Compensation) Act 1991, which is K5,000. Despite the limit fixed by the Act, cases before the Courts show that compensation of amounts in excess of K10,000 are common in homicide cases5. In our view, compensation amount or to the value of between K5000 and K10,000 or over is a substantial payment which would take the payment out of the "ordinary mitigating factor" category and place it in the "special mitigating factor" category". (Underlining is mine).

37. The payment of customary compensation is a sign of the offender’s acceptance of criminal responsibility for the wrong she has done and also a sign of forgiveness by the line of her late husband. This principle was set out in the Supreme Court case of The Public Prosecutor -v- Panikuiaka Nopi [1979] PNGLR 536. That was a case of willful murder of the offender’s 18 months old baby after she attempted suicide because of a long history of domestic violence by the husband.

38. On appeal by the Public Prosecutor on the adequacy of sentence of where the National Court released her after three months in pre trial custody, one of the Supreme Court Judges, His Honour Saldanha J, held that the circumstances of the offender since the sentence including release from custody, forgiveness by the husband, re establishment in the family, the advantages both to the community and for her to allow herself to pose no danger to the community at large outweighed a custodial sentence.

39. Thus, I take into account as a special mitigating factor, the payment of customary compensation between the offender’s line and the deceased’s line as a symbol of peace and the offender’s acceptance of criminal responsibility and also forgiveness by the line of her late husband.

40. The second compelling mitigating factor is the offender’s husband’s infidelity and act of desertion coupled with a history of domestic violence and wife bashing which calls for some leniency by the Court in her case. I note that the State does not dispute that there had existed a history of domestic violence and wife bashing as a result of the husband’s infidelity and act of desertion and the offender had been constantly abused by her husband and the deceased. As I said earlier, the argument and the stabbing of the deceased by the offender on 21st July 2007 was the climax of all the frustration and anger that has built up over a period of time towards her husband and the deceased. In my view, whilst the offender is a victim of domestic violence and abuse, it does not exonerate her, but I will treat it as a special mitigating factor operating in her favour.

41. In all the circumstances of the case and weighing those factors in the offender’s favour and those against her, I consider that the factors in her favour outweigh those against her. As I have pointed out above, there are many factual similarities between the present case and that of Philipa Kawage’s case (supra) which I have taken the liberty to highlight above. The sentence I imposed on Philipa Kawage was 13 years but I will not do that in this case. The offender’s infidelity and act of desertion, coupled with the history of domestic violence and wife bashing at the hands of her husband and the deceased persuades me to impose a sentence less than 13 years.

42. In the end, I consider that 12 years would be appropriate and I so order. The time spent in pretrial custody shall be deducted accordingly. The formal orders are, the offender is sentenced to 12 years imprisonment in hard labour for the unlawful killing of one Janet Kombuk, on 21st July 2007, less 1 year, 8 months, 3 weeks for pretrial custody, leaving a balance of 10 years and 3 months 1 week to serve at Baisu Corrective Institute.

______________________________________
Acting Public Prosecutor: Lawyers for the State
Paraka Lawyers: Lawyers for the Offender

National Court of Papua New Guinea

State v Kelly [2009] PGNC 34; N3624 (21 April 2009)