Giru v Edo [2007] PGNC 211; N5032 (6 July 2007)

N5032

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS NO 281 OF 2007

JOSHUA GIRU
Plaintiff

V

WILLIE EDO
First Defendant

CLEMENT NAKMAI
Second Defendant

Kimbe: Cannings J
2007: 15 June, 6 July

JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – res judicata – abuse of process – whether dismissal by Supreme Court of appeal against National Court decision for want of prosecution precludes further challenges to National Court decision.

JUDICIAL REVIEW – mode of commencement – whether proceedings seeking declaration as to legality of administrative decision should be commenced under National Court Rules, Order 16 – whether plaintiff has a choice – whether notice required under Claims By and Against the State Act.

JUDICIAL REVIEW – challenges to appointments made under Constitutional Laws – appointment of Provincial Administrator – whether proceedings of National Executive Council justiciable – whether National Court has power to make orders regarding appointments.

JUDGES – whether duty to give reasons for decisions – whether a duty to give written reasons.

COSTS – whether parties have been brought needlessly to court – costs improperly incurred – whether losing party's lawyers should be directed to pay costs.

The National Executive Council appointed the plaintiff as a Provincial Administrator. The first defendant, an unsuccessful applicant for the position, sought and was granted leave for judicial review by the National Court; and, later, the National Court quashed the plaintiff's appointment and ordered that the first defendant act in the position and that a fresh appointment be made. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court against the quashing of his appointment but his appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution and the first defendant was restored to the position on an acting basis. The plaintiff then commenced fresh proceedings seeking amongst other relief a declaration that he is the lawfully appointed Provincial Administrator. Four preliminary issues arose concerning the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine the various substantive issues the plaintiff raised as to the legality of his appointment. This judgment covers both the preliminary issues and the substantive issues.

Held:

As to the preliminary issues –

(1) The proceedings were not improperly commenced by originating summons under Order 4 of the National Court Rules.

(2) The plaintiff did not have to give notice under Section 5 of the Claims By and Against the State Act, given the nature of the proceedings.

(3) There had been no previous final determination of the issues concerning the legality of the plaintiff's appointment, so the doctrine of res judicata did not prevent the court addressing the substantive issues.

(4) However, in light of the background of the case and the fact that the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the plaintiff against the earlier decision of the National Court quashing his appointment, the present proceedings were an abuse of process.

As to the substantive issues – obiter dictum –

(5) The National Court made no error of law when it granted leave for judicial review.

(6) The National Court did not act contrary to Section 153(2) of the Constitution or Section 56(1) of the Criminal Code when it quashed the plaintiff's appointment.

(7) The National Court did not act contrary to the Organic Law when it appointed the first defendant as Acting Provincial Administrator.

(8) The Judge who quashed the plaintiff's appointment did not fail in his duty to give reasons for that decision.

(9) Previous National Court proceedings were not conducted contrary to the principles of judicial review.

(10) The plaintiff was not denied natural justice.

(11) There is insufficient evidence that the defendants or their lawyers engaged in unethical or dishonest conduct, resulting in the Supreme Court appeal being dismissed.

The result being –

(12) All claims for relief were refused and the proceedings dismissed.

Cases cited

The following cases are cited in the judgment:

Anderson Agiru v Electoral Commission and The State (2002) SC687
Burns Philp (PNG) Ltd v The State (1989) N769
Central Pomio Logging Corporation Pty Ltd v The State [1990] PNGLR 195
Don Pomb Pullie Polye v Jimson Sauk Papaki and Electoral Commission (2000) SC651
Gia Kewa Piel v Eric Ranpi [1996] PNGLR 396
Haiveta v Wingti (No 2) [1994] PNGLR 197
In the Matter of the Lawyers Act 1986 and In the Matter of an Application by Peter Norman Moore [1993] PNGRL 470
In the Matter Pursuant to Section 18(1) of the Constitution, Southern Highlands Provincial Government v Sir Michael T Somare; Sir Matiabe Yuwi v Sir Michael T Somare (2007) SC854
John Kawi v Jerry Tetaga (2006) N3100
Kaseng v Namaliu and the State [1995] PNGLR 481
Kiee Toap v The State (2004) N2766
Kila Wari v Gabriel Ramoi [1986] PNGLR 112
Mark Ekepa and Others v William Gaupe and Others (2004) N2694
Mision Asiki v Manasupe Zurenuoc and Others (2005) SC797
National Executive Council, the Attorney-General and Luke Lucas v Public Employees Association of Papua New Guinea [1993] PNGLR 264
O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1; [1982] 3 WLR 1096
Orogen Minerals Limited v David Sode, Commissioner General of Internal Revenue and Others (2003) N2467
Papua New Guinea Harbours Board v Breni Kora (2005) N2834
Phillip Aeava v The State (2001) N2136
Public Services Commission v The State [1994] PNGLR 603
Re Election of Governor-General (No 2) (2004) SC728
Re Fisherman's Island [1979] PNGLR 202
SCR No 55 of 2004; James Marabe v Tom Tomiape, 07.05.07, unreported
Siaman Riri v Simion Nurai (1995) N1375
Supreme Court Reference No 3 of 1999; Special Reference under Section 19 of the Constitution by the Ombudsman Commission re Sitting Days of the National Parliament (1999) SC628
Supreme Court Reference No 3 of 2000; Special Reference under Section 19 of the Constitution by the Governor-General re Sitting Days of the National Parliament (2002) SC722
Supreme Court Review No 13 of 2002; Application by Anderson Agiru (2002) SC686
Supreme Court Review No 4 of 1990; Application by Wali Kili Goiya [1991] PNGLR 170
Supreme Court Review No 8 of 2003; Application by Anderson Agiru (2003) SC704
Takai Kapi v Daniel Don Kapi and Electoral Commission (1998) SC570
The State v The Attorney-General and The Electoral Commissioner (2002) N2193
Titi Christian v Rabbie Namaliu OS No 2 of 1995, 18.07.96, unreported
TST Pty Ltd (Provisional Liquidator Appointed) and Tin Siew Tan v Thomas John Pelis and Pelton Investments Pty Ltd (1998) N1747
Willie Edo v Hon Sinai Brown and Others (2006) N3071

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations appear in the judgment:

ALJ – Australian Law Journal
CJ – Chief Justice
DCJ – Deputy Chief Justice
J – Justice
Ltd – Limited
N – National Court judgment
NEC – National Executive Council
No – number
OS – originating summons
PEC – Provincial Executive Council
PNG – Papua New Guinea
PNGLR – Papua New Guinea Law Reports
Pty – proprietary
SC – Supreme Court judgment
SCR – Supreme Court Reference/Review
v – versus
WLR – Weekly Law Reports

ORIGINATING SUMMONS

This was an application for a declaration as to the legality of appointment to a public office.

Counsel

R G Maguire, for the plaintiff
P Kingal, for the defendants

6th July, 2007

1. CANNINGS J: The plaintiff Joshua Giru was appointed by the National Executive Council as Provincial Administrator for West New Britain. His appointment was challenged in court by another candidate for the position, the first defendant Willie Edo. After a series of court proceedings Mr Giru's appointment was quashed and Mr Edo now holds the position on an acting basis. Mr Giru has commenced fresh proceedings against Mr Edo and the second defendant the Governor of West New Britain, Clement Nakmai. Mr Giru is seeking amongst other things, a declaration that he is the lawfully appointed Provincial Administrator for West New Britain.

2. Mr Giru argues that in the previous court proceedings a number of important points of law were not brought to the attention of the courts, that errors were made and that the manner in which the court hearings were conducted, sometimes in his absence, was unfair. He argues that the court order to appoint Mr Edo as Acting Provincial Administrator is unconstitutional.

3. Messrs Edo and Nakmai say that the Judges who dealt with these matters previously made no errors of law and that Mr Giru was dealt with fairly. Mr Giru had the chance to raise these issues earlier but did not, so he cannot come back for a second bite at the cherry. They say that the present proceedings are an abuse of process and the application for a declaration should not be entertained.

THE ISSUES

4. The parties have raised two sorts of issues. First, the preliminary, jurisdictional issues raised by the defendants about whether the application for a declaration should be entertained. Secondly, the substantive issues raised by the plaintiff about whether errors have previously been made and whether the application for a declaration should be granted.

5. The defendants have raised four preliminary issues:

1. Were these proceedings commenced under the wrong provisions of the National Court Rules?
   
2. Did the plaintiff breach the Claims By and Against the State Act?
   
3. Does the doctrine of res judicata apply?
   
4. Are these proceedings an abuse of process?
   

6. Mr Kingal, for Messrs Edo and Nakmai, submitted that all those questions should be answered yes. Mr Maguire, for Mr Giru, submitted that they should all be answered no.

7. The plaintiff has raised eight substantive issues:

1. When the National Court granted leave for judicial review of Mr Giru's appointment, did it make an error of law?
   
2. When the National Court quashed Mr Giru's appointment, did it act contrary to Section 153(2) of the Constitution and Section 56(1) of the Criminal Code?
   
3. When the National Court appointed Mr Edo as Acting Provincial Administrator did it act contrary to the Organic Law?
   
4. Should the National Executive Council's decision to revoke Mr Edo's acting appointment be given effect?
   
5. Did the Judge who quashed Mr Giru's appointment fail in his duty to give reasons for that decision?
   
6. Were previous National Court proceedings conducted contrary to the principles of judicial review?
   
7. Was Mr Giru denied natural justice due to the manner in which the previous court proceedings were conducted?
   
8. Was the Supreme Court appeal dismissed due to unethical or dishonest conduct by the defendants or their lawyers?
   

8. Mr Maguire submitted that all those questions should be answered yes. Mr Kingal submitted that they should all be answered no.

9. Before addressing the issues I need to explain the law on appointment of Provincial Administrators, how Mr Giru was appointed and how the matter has ended up in court again.

THE LAW

10. Provincial Administrators are appointed by the NEC under Section 73(2) of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments, which states:

All substantive appointments to offices of Provincial Administrator shall be made by the National Executive Council from a list of three persons submitted by the Provincial Executive Council concerned from a list of persons recommended to the Provincial Executive Council by the Public Services Commission following procedures prescribed by or under an Act of the Parliament.

11. Detailed appointment procedures, and related procedures for suspension and revocation of appointment, are contained in the Public Services (Management) Act 1995 and in three Regulations made under that Act:

• the Public Services (Management) (Criteria and Procedures for Suspension and Revocation of Appointment of Departmental Heads and Provincial Administrators) Regulation 2003;
  
• the Public Services (Management) (Minimum Person Specification and Competency Requirements for Selection and Appointment of Departmental Heads and Provincial Administrators) Regulation 2003; and
  
• the Public Services (Management) (Selection and Appointment of Departmental Heads and Provincial Administrators) Regulation 2003.
  

12. Section 60 (procedures relating to substantive appointment of Provincial Administrator) of the Act states:

(1) The procedures relating to the substantive appointments to offices of Provincial Administrators referred to in Section 73(2) of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments are as follows:—

(a) where an office of Provincial Administrator becomes vacant or is likely to become vacant, the Departmental Head of the Department of Personnel Management shall, subject to Subsections (2) and (3)—

(i) declare that a vacancy in the office of Provincial Administrator exists or is about to exist; and

(ii) obtain from the Central Agencies Co-ordination Committee the minimum requisites for that office; and

(iii) notify the Commission and the Provincial Executive Council concerned of the vacancy; and

(iv) advertise for applications for the office—

(A) on at least two occasions in a newspaper circulated nationally; and

(B) in such other manner as it considers appropriate;

(b) after consideration and assessment of the applicants and consultation with the Central Agencies Co-ordination Committee, the Departmental Head of the Department of Personnel Management shall—

(i) compile a list of not less than five candidates who have at least the minimum requisites for the office; and

(ii) submit to the Commission for its consideration—

(A) the list under Subparagraph (i); and

(B) all applications received in response to the advertisements under Paragraph (a)(iv);

(c) an assessment of an applicant under Paragraph (b) shall be based on—

(i) the minimum requisites for the position; and

(ii) where available, any appraisal of performance and discipline under Section 24A; and

(iii) prescribed criteria;

(d) the Commission shall consider the list submitted under Paragraph (b)(ii)(A) and all applications received in response to the advertisements under Paragraph (a)(iv) and shall—

(i) compile therefrom a list of up to three candidates in order of preference; and

(ii) submit the list under Subparagraph (i) as a recommendation to the Provincial Executive Council concerned;

(e) the Provincial Executive Council shall—

(i) from the list submitted to it under Paragraph (d)(ii) submit to the National Executive Council a list in order of preference for appointments as Provincial Administrator and the National Executive Council shall make an appointment from the list; or

(ii) where it does not consider any of the persons on the list submitted to it under Paragraph (d)(ii) suitable for appointment, so advise the Commission and the Departmental Head of the Department of Personnel Management and the procedure set out in Paragraph (a)(iv), (b), (c), (d) and (e)(i) shall be followed.

(2) Where—

(a) an office of Provincial Administrator becomes vacant or is likely to become vacant; and

(b) the person holding the office or who held the office immediately before it became vacant is willing and eligible to continue in that office,

the Departmental Head of the Department of Personnel Management shall obtain from the Central Agencies Co-ordination Committee a report under Section 24A on the performance and discipline of that person, and where such report justifies the re-appointment of that person shall notify the Commission accordingly and, subject to Subsection (3)(b), the procedure specified in Subsection (1) shall not be followed.

(3) On receipt of a notification under Subsection (2), the Commission shall recommend to the Provincial Executive Council that the person be re-appointed and—

(a) where the Provincial Executive Council is agreeable to the re-appointment, it shall advise the National Executive Council to re-appoint the person as substantive Provincial Administrator; or

(b) where the Provincial Executive Council is not agreeable to the re-appointment—

(i) it shall so advise the Commission and the Departmental Head of the Department of Personnel Management; and

(ii) the procedure specified in Subsection (1)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) shall be followed.

MR GIRU'S APPOINTMENT: JUNE 2006

13. The NEC appointed Mr Giru Provincial Administrator on 21 June 2006, with effect from 16 June 2006. At the same time, it revoked Mr Edo's acting appointment, which had been in place for a considerable time. The appointment process, which started with the position being advertised, had taken 18 months to complete.

PREVIOUS COURT PROCEEDINGS: JULY 2006-MAY 2007

Application for leave, Lay J: July 2006

14. Shortly after Mr Giru was appointed, Mr Edo, who had applied for the position and been short-listed, filed an application for leave to seek judicial review of the appointment. He filed it in the National Court registry at Waigani. The file reference was OS No 438 of 2006. Lay J heard the application, at Waigani, and on 21 July 2006 granted leave for judicial review (Willie Edo v Hon Sinai Brown and Others (2006) N3071). His Honour held that there was an arguable case that the Minister for Public Service, Hon Sinai Brown, acted unlawfully when he presented a submission to the NEC recommending that Mr Giru be appointed. Under the Public Services (Management) Act, the Minister's proper role is to be a facilitator, to pass the recommendations of the PEC about who should be the provincial Administrator, to the NEC. In this case the PEC gave a shortlist of three candidates to the NEC, putting Mr Edo as its preferred candidate and Mr Giru as its third choice. Lay J held that the Minister arguably went beyond his statutory role by making allegations against Mr Edo in his submission. The Minister alleged that Mr Edo awarded a maintenance contract to a company owned by his wife's relative and that he was facing criminal charges in the Kimbe District Court. Arguably, therefore, the NEC had unauthorised material before it, contrary to the Act; and this caused the whole appointment process to be flawed and tainted from that point onward. Lay J did not quash Mr Giru's appointment but made various orders and directions aimed at expediting the substantive application for judicial review. For the time being Mr Giru remained as Provincial Administrator.

Judicial review, Kandakasi J: September 2006

15. That position was soon to change after the case went before a second National Court Judge, Kandakasi J, on several occasions. His Honour took the view that the issues were clear-cut. He directed the defendants (the Minister, the NEC, the State and Mr Giru) to appear in court and show cause why the relief sought by Mr Edo should not be granted. They failed to appear so on 11 September 2006 his Honour granted the application for judicial review and ordered that:

• Mr Giru's appointment be quashed; and
  
• Mr Edo continue as Acting Provincial Administrator until the process of appointment is complete and a substantive appointment made.
  

Appeal filed: September 2006

16. Two weeks later Mr Giru and the other defendants in OS No 438 of 2006 appealed to the Supreme Court against Kandakasi J's orders. The grounds of appeal were similar to some of the substantive issues Mr Giru raises in the present proceedings. For example:

• the National Court lacked jurisdiction, due to Section 153(2) of the Constitution;
  
• the National Court lacked power to appoint Mr Edo as Acting Provincial Administrator;
  
• Kandakasi J failed to give reasons for his decision;
  
• Kandakasi J misapprehended the National Court's role in judicial review proceedings;
  
• there was a denial of natural justice.
  

Stay order, Kapi CJ: October 2006

17. Having filed the appeal, Mr Giru and the other appellants applied for interim orders to stay Kandakasi J's orders. That application was granted by Kapi CJ, sitting as a single Judge of the Supreme Court, on 9 October 2006. His Honour ordered that, pending determination of the appeal:

• Kandakasi J's orders of 11 September 2006 be stayed; and
  
• Mr Giru remain as Provincial Administrator.
  

18. Kapi CJ also gave directions to settle the appeal book and expedite the appeal, so it could be heard in November 2006. Mr Giru was therefore back as Provincial Administrator.

Appeal dismissed: May 2007

19. The appeal was not heard in November 2006 as planned. Instead in 2007 Mr Edo filed a motion to have the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution. On 3 May 2007 the Supreme Court (Injia DCJ, Manuhu J and Hartshorn J) heard the motion and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The effect of that order was that Kandakasi J's orders of 11 September 2006 were reinstated. Thus Mr Giru again lost office as Provincial Administrator and Mr Edo again became Acting Provincial Administrator.

OS No 281 of 2007 filed: May 2007

20. Mr Giru commenced the present proceedings on 22 May 2007 by filing OS No 281 of 2007 in the National Court Registry at Kimbe, the capital of West New Britain. The matter came before me briefly on 23 May 2007. I ordered, for the avoidance of doubt, that Mr Edo remain as Acting Provincial Administrator and that the hearing of the substantive proceedings be expedited. The hearing was held on 15 June 2007.

Recap

• for a considerable time up to 15 June 2006, Mr Edo was Acting Provincial Administrator;
  
• from 16 June (the date of his appointment by the NEC) to 11 September 2006 (the date of Kandakasi J's orders) Mr Giru was Provincial Administrator;
  
• from 11 September to 9 October 2006 (the date of Kapi CJ's orders) Mr Edo was Acting Provincial Administrator;
  
• from 9 October 2006 to 3 May 2007 (the date of dismissal of the appeal) Mr Giru was Provincial Administrator;
  
• since 3 May 2007 Mr Edo has been Acting Provincial Administrator.
  

21. I will now address the 12 issues identified earlier. Recall that the first four are preliminary, jurisdictional issues raised by the defendants. The next eight are substantive issues raised by the plaintiff.

1 WERE THESE PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED UNDER THE WRONG PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL COURT RULES?

22. Mr Kingal submitted that the present proceedings, which were commenced by originating summons under Order 4 of the National Court Rules, were commenced under the wrong provisions of the Rules. They should have been brought under Order 16, which deals with applications for judicial review. Leave should have been sought and obtained before Mr Giru was permitted to go any further with his application for a declaration.

23. This submission is misconceived. The Supreme Court held in National Executive Council, the Attorney-General and Luke Lucas v Public Employees Association of Papua New Guinea [1993] PNGLR 264 that applications for injunctions or declarations, even if made in relation to matters of public law such as appointments to public offices, do not have to be commenced under Order 16. The Supreme Court followed the seminal decision on this point in O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1; [1982] 3 WLR 1096. Generally speaking, plaintiffs have a choice as to the mode of commencement of proceedings, subject to the power of the court to correct any abuse of its processes that is apparent. In the present case the mode of commencement of the proceedings does not, by itself, involve an abuse of process. Further, Order 16 is the appropriate mode of commencement where the plaintiff is seeking to have an administrative decision reviewed. Here, the plaintiff is not actually wanting any administrative decisions reviewed. He says the administrative decisions made about his appointment were made correctly. What he wants reviewed are judicial decisions, in particular those of Kandakasi J. The plaintiff did not commence the proceedings under the wrong provisions of the National Court Rules.

2 DID THE PLAINTIFF BREACH THE CLAIMS BY AND AGAINST THE STATE ACT?

24. Mr Kingal submitted that the plaintiff should have given formal notice to the State of his intention to commence these proceedings as he was suing the defendants in their official capacities as Acting Provincial Administrator and Provincial Governor, respectively. Notice was required under Section 5(1) of the Claims By and Against the State Act, which states:

No action to enforce any claim against the State lies against the State unless notice in writing of intention to make a claim is given in accordance with this Section by the claimant to —

(a) the Departmental Head of the Department responsible for justice matters; or

(b) the Solicitor-General.

25. No notice was given and therefore the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the application for a declaration, Mr Kingal submitted.

26. I reject that submission. The Supreme Court held in Mision Asiki v Manasupe Zurenuoc and Others (2005) SC797 that the notice requirements of the Claims By and Against the State Act apply only to actions that are founded on contract or tort or a breach of constitutional rights. The present case does not fall into any of those categories. In any event, the plaintiff is not making any claims against the State. He is, if anything, seeking a declaration and other relief to support the State's position, represented by the NEC's decision to appoint him as Provincial Administrator. The plaintiff did not breach the Claims By and Against the State Act.

3 DOES THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA APPLY?

27. Mr Kingal submitted that the common law doctrine of res judicata applies to this case and deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear and determine Mr Giru's application for a declaration about the legality of his appointment. The argument is that all questions about the legality of the appointment were resolved by the previous National Court proceedings, particularly by Kandakasi J's orders and the unsuccessful Supreme Court appeal. Mr Kingal referred to my decision in Mark Ekepa and Others v William Gaupe and Others (2004) N2694. That was a case about management and control of the Porgera Landowners Association. I explained that res judicata can be a defence to a claim, when the following conditions apply:

1. The cause of action (ie the basis of the remedies being sought) in one court case is the same as that relied on in an earlier case. (It does not matter whether the earlier case was decided in the same court or by the same Judge.)
   
2. The earlier case was between the same parties or their "privies". (A privy is someone so closely connected to one of the earlier parties that they have the same interests that are sought to be enforced in the later case.)
   
3. In the earlier case the court made a final determination of the issues between those same parties or their privies.
   

28. In the present case, I consider that condition No 2 is satisfied but not Nos 1 or 3. As to No 1, the causes of action are different. In the first case it was Mr Edo, as plaintiff, who was claiming, as his cause of action, various errors of law made by the Minister for Public Service and the NEC. In the present case Mr Giru's cause of action relates to various alleged errors of law made not by the Minister or the NEC but by the courts, particularly by the National Court. As to condition No 3, Kandakasi J made a final determination of the issues in the sense that he granted the application for judicial review and quashed Mr Giru's appointment. However, I am persuaded by Mr Maguire's submission that the determination was not the result of a trial on the merits and therefore this aspect of res judicata was not present.

29. Mr Maguire also submitted that res judicata, being a common law doctrine adopted as part of the underlying law under Section 18 of the Underlying Law Act 2000, has no application where a plaintiff exposes breaches of written laws, especially Constitutional Laws. The argument is that if a plaintiff is able to prove that breaches of written laws have occurred – such as the alleged errors of law made by the National Court in the previous case – res judicata will not operate to prevent the court making appropriate declarations.

30. I consider that this part of Mr Maguire's submission is misconceived. On at least three occasions the Supreme Court has held that res judicata applies to constitutional issues:

• In Titi Christian v Rabbie Namaliu (unreported, OS No 2 of 1995, 18.07.96), a challenge to amendments to the Constitutional Laws dealing with provincial governments was defeated. The Court held that it was res judicata in light of the earlier decision in Kaseng v Namaliu and the State [1995] PNGLR 481, that the provincial government reforms were not unconstitutional.
  
• In Supreme Court Reference No 3 of 2000; Special Reference under Section 19 of the Constitution by the Governor-General re Sitting Days of the National Parliament (2002) SC722, it was held by a 5:2 majority that the Court had already authoritatively determined many of the issues involving the same parties, not long before. The previous case was Supreme Court Reference No 3 of 1999; Special Reference under Section 19 of the Constitution by the Ombudsman Commission re Sitting Days of the National Parliament (1999) SC628. The majority therefore declined to answer many of the questions raised on the ground of res judicata.
  
• In Supreme Court Review No 8 of 2003; Application by Anderson Agiru (2003) SC704, the Court rejected an application under Section 155(2)(b) of the Constitution for review of the decisions of a leadership tribunal. The Court upheld the Public Prosecutor's defence that the same facts, issues and arguments had been authoritatively determined in a previous case, Supreme Court Review No 13 of 2002; Application by Anderson Agiru (2002) SC686. Therefore res judicata applied.
  

However, I reiterate that I accept the gist of Mr Maguire's submission on res judicata. It does not apply here.

4 ARE THESE PROCEEDINGS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS?

31. This is a related issue to res judicata. Often if a court upholds a defence of res judicata, it will also find that the proceedings are an abuse of process. An example is the Anderson Agiru case, just cited, (2003) SC704. However, rejection of a res judicata defence will not necessarily result in rejection of a submission that the proceedings are an abuse of process.

32. Mr Kingal submitted that irrespective of the outcome of the res judicata issue, the current proceedings are an abuse of process in light of the unsuccessful Supreme Court appeal. These proceedings are, in effect, he submits, an attempt to appeal against the orders of Kandakasi J. However, Mr Giru has already exercised his right of appeal. He lost the appeal. Therefore his rights of redress against Kandakasi J's orders have been exhausted.

33. Mr Maguire, on the other hand, submitted that there is no abuse of process in light of the peculiar background of this case. Kandakasi J's orders were made per incuriam (in error; through want of care). All that Mr Giru is doing is asking the court to correct obvious errors made by another Judge, and uphold the Constitution. The Supreme Court did not determine the appeal on its merits and there is no improper motive on the part of Mr Giru that is driving these proceedings.

34. A good place to start when assessing those competing submissions is the Supreme Court's judgment in Anderson Agiru v Electoral Commission and The State (2002) SC687. The court (Hinchliffe J, Jalina J, Batari J) explained abuse of process in these terms:

... the court's inherent power is its authority to do all things that are necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such inherent power consists of all powers reasonably required to enable the court to perform efficiently its judicial functions and to protect its dignity and integrity. Essential to these inherent powers is the court's duty to protect itself by ensuring that vexatious litigants do not abuse the court's process by instituting frivolous or vexatious suits. ...

The court must ensure that a multiplicity of proceedings is not commenced by unsuccessful litigants. That is that a litigant having selected one mode of proceeding and having failed to obtain a remedy, cannot generally be entitled to then institute an alternative proceeding seeking the same remedy that was denied in the earlier proceeding.

35. To like effect is the Supreme Court's decision in Application by Anderson Agiru (2003) SC704. The applicant, Mr Agiru, a former member of Parliament, was dismissed from office in 2002 after being found guilty of misconduct in office by a leadership tribunal. In 2003 he made an application to the Supreme Court for leave to review, under Section 155(2)(b) of the Constitution, the decision of the National Court (Sheehan J) in March 2002, refusing leave for judicial review of the tribunal's decision. However, leave for a Section 155(2)(b) application had already been refused by the Supreme Court in May 2002 in Application by Anderson Agiru (2002) SC686, Kapi DCJ, Salika J, Sakora J, Injia J; Los J dissenting. In the meantime, in June 2002, the applicant had gone back to the Supreme Court in separate proceedings to enforce Basic Rights, which he claimed were breached by the leadership tribunal. Those proceedings resulted in the decision in Anderson Agiru v Electoral Commission and The State (2002) SC687, referred to above. When, in April 2003, the applicant was in the Supreme Court a third time, in Application by Anderson Agiru (2003) SC704, to agitate what was, in effect, the same grievance, the Court reached the inevitable conclusion that he was, again, abusing the processes of the Court.

36. The principle demonstrated in the Agiru cases is that if a person goes to court and has their case finalised and then goes back to court with the same grievance, such a multiplicity of proceedings will be – in the absence of a good explanation – an abuse of process. As I explained in Kiee Toap v The State (2004) N2766, the idiom "having a second bite at the cherry" means 'to make a second attempt, having failed the first time'. (See D M Gulland and D Hinds-Howell, The Penguin Dictionary of English Idioms, Penguin Books, 1994, page 165.) It is a phrase often used by judges to describe the conduct of parties who go to court, do not get what they want, and then go back to court and try again. Having a second bite is frowned upon. It is demonstrative of an abuse of process. See, for example, Central Pomio Logging Corporation Pty Ltd v The State [1990] PNGLR 195, National Court, Kapi DCJ; Gia Kewa Piel v Eric Ranpi [1996] PNGLR 396, National Court, Injia J; In the Matter of the Lawyers Act 1986 and In the Matter of an Application by Peter Norman Moore [1993] PNGRL 470, National Court, Sevua J; Orogen Minerals Limited v David Sode, Commissioner General of Internal Revenue and Others (2003) N2467, National Court, Sakora J; Takai Kapi v Daniel Don Kapi and Electoral Commission (1998) SC570, Supreme Court, Los J, Salika J, Kirriwom J; Siaman Riri v Simion Nurai (1995) N1375, National Court, Sakora J; Supreme Court Review No 4 of 1990; Application by Wali Kili Goiya [1991] PNGLR 170, Supreme Court, Kapi DCJ, Los J, Sheehan J; The State v The Attorney-General and The Electoral Commissioner (2002) N2193, National Court, Sevua J; TST Pty Ltd (Provisional Liquidator Appointed) and Tin Siew Tan v Thomas John Pelis and Pelton Investments Pty Ltd (1998) N1747, National Court, Kapi DCJ.

37. Mr Maguire submitted, in response to Mr Kingal's "second bite" submission, that Mr Giru has not had one bite, let alone a second. The cases on multiplicity of proceedings being an abuse of process are distinguishable, he submits, as it was not Mr Giru who was the plaintiff in the first National Court case. It was Mr Edo.

38. I agree with Mr Maguire that the present case is a peculiar one. Perhaps it is unique. I don't think any of the previous cases are on all fours with this one. But I also think that Mr Maguire's submission sidesteps the real issue. Mr Giru's ultimate grievance in these proceedings is with the orders of Kandakasi J. He has already taken his grievance about those orders to the Supreme Court. And he lost. That was his first bite at the cherry. There is no right of appeal against a Supreme Court decision. There is no second bite. That's it. End of story – unless he goes back to the Supreme Court under the slip rule and convinces the Supreme Court that it made an error or slip in its dismissal of the appeal (SCR No 55 of 2004; James Marabe v Tom Tomiape, 07.05.07, unreported). Mr Giru is now having a second bite at the cherry. He is engaging in a multiplicity of proceedings that should have terminated with the dismissal of his appeal against Kandakasi J's orders. Dismissal by the Supreme Court of an appeal against a National Court decision precludes further challenges to that National Court decision, particularly challenges initiated by further proceedings in the National Court. This is so, irrespective of whether the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after a full hearing on the merits or dismissed it, as in the present case, for want of prosecution. This is an expression of the general principle that there must be finality in litigation. If there is no finality, we will end up having challenges upon challenges to National Court decisions. It would make no difference even if I were convinced that serious errors had been made by the previous Judge hearing these issues. Even if it were clear that the previous Judge did not get the benefit of full argument or had treated the plaintiff unfairly or that for some other reason the plaintiff had been done an injustice – none of those scenarios would obstruct the conclusion to be drawn from the plaintiff having a second bite at the cherry, that this is an abuse of process. I agree with Mr Kingal's submission that Mr Giru had a right of appeal against Kandakasi J's orders. He exercised his right, then exhausted it when his appeal was dismissed. If he now wants to complain that the Supreme Court got it wrong when it dismissed his appeal for want of prosecution, the only avenue of redress is to go back to the Supreme Court with a slip rule application. That is, he would have to ask the Supreme Court to reopen its decision on the ground that it made a mistake or slip in its decision, which was not due to negligence or inadvertence on his or his lawyers' part. After all that has happened, Mr Giru cannot come back to the National Court to argue the issues that were the subject of his appeal to the Supreme Court. I conclude that these proceedings are an abuse of process and must be dismissed.

39. That completes my determination of the four preliminary issues. The first three were decided in the plaintiff's favour. The last one was decided in the defendants' favour and determines the result of this case. It is not necessary to deal with the substantive issues raised by the plaintiff. But, as detailed submissions have been made, I think it is useful to express a brief obiter dictum (by the way) opinion on them.

5 WHEN THE NATIONAL COURT GRANTED LEAVE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MR GIRU'S APPOINTMENT, DID IT MAKE AN ERROR OF LAW?

40. Mr Maguire took issue with a statement of law made by Lay J in the judgment granting Mr Edo leave for review. Lay J said that under the Public Services (Management) Act the Minister for Public Service is merely a facilitator of the PEC recommendation on who should be a Provincial Administrator. His Honour held that the Minister has no power to add or subtract from the PEC recommendation. Mr Maguire submitted that that statement of law was "simply wrong" as it implies that the Minister could not even orally address matters he wanted to raise at a meeting of the NEC. This would cut across the principles of ministerial responsibility and responsible cabinet government implanted in the Constitution, Mr Maguire submitted.

41. These are interesting points but I do not agree that what Lay J said is wrong. The view that the Minister's role is merely that of a facilitator is consistent with that of Injia DCJ in John Kawi v Jerry Tetaga (2006) N3100. It might sound strange that a Minister is not permitted to include in a submission to the NEC his own recommendations about who should be appointed. But if that is what the Act requires, it is the duty of the courts to give effect to the Parliament's intention. In any event, Lay J was simply determining an application for leave to seek judicial review. His Honour's task was to determine whether Mr Edo had an arguable case that the Minister acted wrongly. There was clearly an arguable case and in my opinion Lay J made no errors of law in granting leave.

6 WHEN THE NATIONAL COURT QUASHED MR GIRU'S APPOINTMENT AND APPOINTED MR EDO, DID IT ACT CONTRARY TO SECTION 153(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OR SECTION 56(1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE?

42. Mr Maguire submitted that two critical laws were not brought to Kandakasi J's attention before his Honour decided to quash Mr Giru's appointment and appoint Mr Edo as Acting Provincial Administrator: Section 153(2) of the Constitution and Section 56(1) of the Criminal Code. Both laws are intended to make the procedures of the NEC non-justiciable (ie not open to challenge in court). They implore the courts to support and recognise the role of the National Executive and respect the separation of powers under Section 99 of the Constitution, he submitted.

43. Section 153(2) of the Constitution is relevant but needs to be interpreted in the context of the whole provision, which states:

(1) Subsections (2), (3) and (4) are subject to any Constitutional Law or Act of the Parliament.

(2) The question, whether the procedures prescribed for the National Executive Council have been or are being complied with, is non-justiciable. [emphasis added]

(3) The question, whether any, and if so what report has been given to the National Executive Council by the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy, is non-justiciable.

(4) No act of a Minister is open to challenge on the ground that he was not empowered to perform the act, if some other Minister, or any Minister, was so empowered.

(5) This section does not limit the jurisdiction or powers of the Ombudsman Commission, or of an authority or tribunal established under Division III.2 (leadership code).

"Non-justiciable" is defined by Schedule 1.7 of the Constitution:

Where a Constitutional Law declares a question to be non-justiciable, the question may not be heard or determined by any court or tribunal, but nothing in this section limits the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Commission or of any other tribunal established for the purposes of Division III.2 (leadership code).

44. Section 56(1) of the Criminal Code states:

Any person who advisedly does any act calculated to interfere with the free exercise—

(a) by the Head of State of the duties or authority of his office; or

(b) by a member of the National Executive Council of the duties or authority of his office as—

(i) a member of the National Executive Council; or

(ii) a Minister of the Parliament,

is guilty of a misdemeanour.

Penalty: Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.

45. Mr Maguire argued, in relation to Section 153(2) of the Constitution, that though the Public Services (Management) Act and the Regulations made under it prescribe procedures for the NEC to follow regarding the appointment of Provincial Administrators, the question of whether those procedures have been complied with is non-justiciable. The only exception would be if a Constitutional Law or Act of the Parliament expressly stated that the question of compliance was justiciable; but no such laws exist, so the question of compliance remains non-justiciable.

46. I follow the logic but that argument, or a very similar one based on Section 86(4) of the Constitution, was carefully considered and rejected 21 years ago in an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court. Section 86(4), which deals with the privileges, powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Queen and Head of State and the Governor-General, states:

The question, what (if any) advice was given to the Head of State, or by whom, is non-justiciable.

47. The Supreme Court held in Kila Wari v Gabriel Ramoi [1986] PNGLR 112 that Section 86(4) only protects advice given which is within the discretion permitted by a Constitutional Law or an Act of the Parliament. If the advice given is inconsistent with a Constitutional Law or an Act, it is not protected. It is justiciable. That principle has been applied consistently since 1986. See, for example: Burns Philp (PNG) Ltd v The State (1989) N769; Haiveta v Wingti (No 2) [1994] PNGLR 197; Phillip Aeava v The State (2001) N2136; In the Matter Pursuant to Section 18(1) of the Constitution, Southern Highlands Provincial Government v Sir Michael T Somare; Sir Matiabe Yuwi v Sir Michael T Somare (2007) SC854.

48. The same reasoning would apply to Section 153(2). If procedures of the NEC are for any particular purpose – eg appointing a Provincial Administrator – prescribed by a Constitutional Law or an Act, and those procedures are expressed in mandatory terms, the question of whether the procedures have been followed is justiciable. It is a well-recognised principle of constitutional law in Papua New Guinea that no person or authority, including the National Executive Council, is above the law. Not even the Queen and Head of State, who by virtue of Section 84 of the Constitution takes precedence in rank over all other persons in the country, is immune from judicial review. Decisions about appointments that Her Majesty the Queen makes are open to judicial review and can be quashed if made in error. The advice given to Her Majesty and the procedures prescribed for the NEC for the purposes of giving that advice are justiciable. A classic example is Re Election of Governor-General (No 2) (2004) SC728. The Supreme Court ordered that the appointment of Sir Pato Kakaraya as Governor-General by the Queen and Head of State was null and void, due to errors of law made by the NEC and the Parliament. The following passage from Salika J's judgment in Public Services Commission v The State [1994] PNGLR 603 makes the point neatly:

It is not the courts' function to interfere with the functions of the National Executive Council in carrying out is duties. However, the courts, as guardians of the law, are duty bound to ensure that the letter of the law is adhered to.

49. If Section 153(2) had been brought to Kandakasi J's attention, I doubt that it would have made any difference to his Honour's determination of the case.

50. Likewise with Section 56 of the Criminal Code. Mr Maguire made a veiled suggestion that Kandakasi J may have acted contrary to the Code by making orders calculated to interfere with the exercise by the members of the NEC of the duties of their offices.

51. In view of my consideration of the Section 153(4) issue, I think this submission is devoid of merit. I strongly doubt that Kandakasi J would have been persuaded by the submission to make a decision differently to the one that he made. In any event, Section 56(1) makes it an offence for someone to interfere in the exercise of the duties of an executive office. I agree with Mr Kingal who argued that in the present case all the court was being asked to do was review the exercise of duties that had already been discharged. Section 56(1) had no relevance to the court proceedings before Kandakasi J. His Honour did not make the orders of 11 September 2006 contrary to Section 153(2) of the Constitution or Section 56(1) of the Criminal Code.

7 WHEN THE NATIONAL COURT APPOINTED MR EDO AS ACTING PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATOR, DID IT ACT CONTRARY TO THE ORGANIC LAW?

52. Mr Maguire submitted that Kandakasi J's order of 11 September 2006, that Mr Edo "continue" as Acting Provincial Administrator until a substantive appointment is made, was made in error as his Honour was actually making an appointment, which he had no power to do. Under the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments the power of appointment, whether it is substantive or acting, resides with the NEC, not with the National Court. Mr Maguire argued that his Honour had usurped the role of the NEC.

53. I see no merit in this argument. Kandakasi J was not making an appointment. When his Honour found that there was error in Mr Giru's appointment, it was within the court's powers to reinstate the previous situation to ensure continuity in the holding of the office of Provincial Administrator for West New Britain. His Honour was simply making an interim order until a proper appointment was made in accordance with law. The court did not act contrary to the Organic Law.

8 SHOULD THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DECISION TO REVOKE MR EDO'S ACTING APPOINTMENT BE GIVEN EFFECT?

54. Mr Maguire submitted that another error in Kandakasi J's reasoning was apparent from the wording of his Honour's order regarding Mr Edo, which was that he "continue" as Acting Provincial Administrator. Mr Maguire pointed out that the NEC had revoked Mr Edo's acting appointment when it appointed Mr Giru, with effect from 16 June 2006. Mr Edo was in effect unemployed from then on. Further, the NEC's decision to revoke his acting appointment was not quashed or set aside by any court order. He was not in a position therefore to "continue" to be the Acting Provincial Administrator.

55. This is a clever argument but I think it is just splitting hairs. Kandakasi J made a considered decision that Mr Edo, who, according to his Honour's decision, had succeeded in his application for judicial review, should be the Acting Provincial Administrator. It was an interim order and an unremarkable one in the circumstances. It could have been worded more precisely but the reasons for making the decision were clearly expressed by his Honour. The order made sense and there was no reason to give effect to the NEC's decision to revoke Mr Edo's acting appointment.

9 DID THE JUDGE WHO QUASHED MR GIRU'S APPOINTMENT FAIL IN HIS DUTY TO GIVE REASONS FOR THAT DECISION?

56. Mr Maguire submitted that Kandakasi J failed in his duty to give proper reasons for his decision. He referred to the judgment of Wilson J in Re Fisherman's Island [1979] PNGLR 202 to support the proposition that all judicial officers have a duty to state the facts as they find them and the reasons for their decisions.

57. That part of Mr Maguire's submission is uncontroversial. All Judges and Magistrates and other officials exercising judicial functions are duty bound to give reasons for their decisions. Indeed, it is now accepted that administrative, as distinct from judicial, decision-makers also have a duty to give reasons as part of their duty to observe natural justice in dealing with people affected by their decisions. If reasons are not given, or if they are given but are scanty and insufficient, the inference is that there are no good reasons available for the decision. A decision made in that way will necessarily be made in error of law (Mision Asiki v Manasupe Zurenuoc and Others (2005) SC797; Papua New Guinea Harbours Board v Breni Kora (2005) N2834). Kandakasi J gave oral reasons for his decision to quash Mr Giru's appointment. His Honour had directed Mr Giru to show cause why Mr Edo's application for judicial review should not be granted. Mr Giru did not show cause. He and his lawyers did not attend court. His Honour felt that the issues were clear-cut and that the flaws in the appointment process had been exposed in Lay J's ruling that leave be granted for judicial review. His Honour's reasons cannot reasonably be labelled scanty or insufficient. They are in my view clear and concise.

58. The learned Judge was not obliged to produce a formal, written judgment detailing his reasons. The writing of judgments is a time-consuming task for a Judge. Often it is a labour of love. The purpose of writing judgments was explained many years ago by Sir Frank Kitto in a famous article in the Australian Law Journal, Why Write Judgments?, 66 ALJ 787. Sir Frank, an eminent Judge of the High Court of Australia, said:

The process of reasoning which has decided the case must itself be exposed to the light of day, so that all concerned may understand what principles and practice of law and logic are guiding the courts, and so that full publicity may be achieved which provides, on the one hand, a powerful protection against any tendency to judicial autocracy and against any erroneous suspicion of judicial wrongdoing and, on the other hand, an effective stimulant to judicial high performance.

59. By publishing their judgments Judges make their reasoning transparent and make themselves accountable for their decisions. It is a noble pursuit. In a perfect world, all judgments would be reduced to writing, edited and published widely. But we are not in a perfect world, and not all judgments get reduced to writing and published. The learned Judge did not have a duty to produce a written judgment. I cannot see how it can profitably be argued that he failed in any aspect of his duty as a Judge to give reasons for his decision.

10 WERE PREVIOUS NATIONAL COURT PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

60. Mr Maguire submitted that Kandakasi J allowed the judicial review process to miscarry by calling upon Mr Giru to show cause why judicial review should not be granted and by turning the process into an appeal by Mr Edo against an employment decision.

61. I don't find much merit in that submission. The "show cause" aspect of the process might look a little unusual but it is clear that the case had been mentioned before the learned judge on a number of occasions before 11 September 2006, when the final orders were made. If Mr Giru was aggrieved by the procedure he should have complained to his Honour beforehand. As for the argument that the process was allowed to become an employment appeal, that was not the case at all. The learned Judge was concerned about the apparently clear-cut errors of law made in the process of appointment, which made the decision to appoint Mr Giru susceptible to judicial review. I do not think the principles of judicial review were breached.

11 WAS MR GIRU DENIED NATURAL JUSTICE DUE TO THE MANNER IN WHICH PREVIOUS COURT PROCEEDINGS WERE CONDUCTED?

62. Mr Maguire submitted that Mr Giru was hard done by as Kandakasi J's orders were made unfairly and without notice, in the absence of his lawyers. Then, later, Governor Nakmai reneged on an agreement to "settle" the appeal to the Supreme Court, and that led to the appeal not being prosecuted at the speed required by the Supreme Court.

63. The first point was a ground of the appeal to the Supreme Court. It has been dealt with by virtue of dismissal of the appeal. As for the alleged settlement of the appeal, there is insufficient evidence before me to form any opinion on what is alleged by Mr Giru. Any alleged denial of natural justice pertaining to the Supreme Court proceedings would have to be determined by the Supreme Court. It is therefore not at all clear to me that Mr Giru has been denied natural justice. The answer, in my opinion, to the question posed, is no.

12 WAS THE SUPREME COURT APPEAL DISMISSED DUE TO UNETHICAL OR DISHONEST CONDUCT BY THE DEFENDANTS OR THEIR LAWYERS?

64. Likewise with this issue. Many serious allegations have been made about the conduct of the defendants and their lawyers. The evidence is insufficient and the issue has been pursued with little vigour and is not properly before the court. The answer is no.

CONCLUSION

65. Nothing in my consideration of the substantive issues affects the conclusion that the present proceedings are an abuse of process and therefore must be dismissed.

COSTS

66. Costs will follow the result of this case, ie the plaintiff will have to pay the defendants' costs of the proceedings. I agree with Mr Kingal who in his closing address submitted that the defendants had been brought back into court needlessly. These proceedings have been frivolous in the sense that the plaintiff abused the processes of the court and started a case that had little or no chance of success. A number of important and interesting issues have been raised but in the wrong forum and at the wrong time. All of Mr Giru's grievances should have been prosecuted before the Supreme Court. It is his fault, or more correctly, it appears, that of his lawyers, that things have not worked out differently.

67. I consider therefore that Mr Giru's lawyers should be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on whether they be directed to repay those costs to him. I will make an order to that effect under Order 22, Rule 65(1)(b) of the National Court Rules, which states:

Where costs are incurred improperly or without reasonable cause, or are wasted by undue delay or by any other misconduct or default, and it appears to the Court that a solicitor is responsible (whether personally or through a servant or agent), the Court may, after giving the solicitor a reasonable opportunity to be heard ... direct the solicitor to repay to his client costs which the client has been ordered to pay to any other party.

(See generally Don Pomb Pullie Polye v Jimson Sauk Papaki and the Electoral Commission (2000) SC651.)

ORDER

68. The order of the court will be:

(1) all of the plaintiff's claims for relief are refused;

(2) the proceedings are dismissed;

(3) for the avoidance of doubt, the orders of the National Court in OS No 438 of 2006, made on 11 September 2006, remain in force, most relevantly, that –

(a) the appointment of Joshua Giru as Provincial Administrator of West New Britain is quashed;

(b) Willie Edo shall be Acting Provincial Administrator until the process of appointment is complete and a substantive appointment made;

(4) previous orders of the National Court in these proceedings, OS No 281 of 2007, are discharged;

(5) the plaintiff shall pay the defendants' costs of these proceedings on a party-party basis, to be taxed if not agreed, subject to a direction, if any, under Order 22, Rule 65(1)(b) of the National Court Rules, that the plaintiff's lawyers repay those costs to the plaintiff.

_______________________________________________
Amet Lawyers: Lawyers for the Plaintiff
Williams Attorneys: Lawyers for the First Defendants
Pius Kingal & Associates: Lawyers for the Second Defendants