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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
CR NO. 1280 of 2004
THE STATE
OBERT POESAN POKANAS
LORENGAU: KANDAKASI, J.
2004: 17th and 23rd September
CRIMINAL LAW – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Cumulative or concurrent sentence – Offences committed against the same victim at the same place, time and date – One transaction – Concurrent sentence appropriate.
CRIMINAL LAW - Sentence – Stealing outboard motor engine after castaway of boat – First time offender – Guilty plea – Property of substantive value – Property recovered – 5 years sentence imposed – Criminal Code s. 372 (5).
CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence- Castaway of vessel – No sentencing guidelines – Devised and applied one – First time offender – Guilty plea - Parents assisted in arrest of prisoner and paid compensation – Parents not seriously supportive of non-custodial sentence – Need for a deterrent sentence - 10 years with option to suspended either a part or whole of it on conditions imposed – Criminal Code ss. 19 and 440.
Cases cited:
The State v. Romney Naptelai Simonopa (29/04/04) N2551.
Gimble v. The State [1988–89] PNGLR 271.
The State v. Irox Winston, (13/03/03) N2347.
Public Prosecutor v. Don Hale, (1998) SC564.
Re Application by Anderson Agiru (08/10/01) SC671.
Application of John Mua Nilkare (15/04/97) SC536.
Avia Aihi v. The State [1981] PNGLR 81.
The State v. Timothy Tio (21/05/02) N2265.
The State v. Robert Kawin (24/12/01) N2167.
The State v. Richard Dusal Bix and Siprian Sipi Karo (06/06/03) N2415.
The State v Edward Toude & 3 Ors (No 2) (18/10/01) N2299.
The State v. Abel Airi (28/11/00) N2007.
The State v. John Micky Lausi (27/03/01) N2073.
The State v. Jimmy Solomon (20/07/01) N2100.
The State v. Rex Rongo (20/12/00) N2035.
The State v. Fredinand Naka Penge (24/05/02) N2244.
Counsel:
A. Kupmain for the State
A. Raymond for the Prisoner
23rd September 2004
KANDAKASI J: You pleaded guilty to one charge of stealing an outboard motor and another charge of casting away of a vessel here in Lorengau on 14th February 2004, which conducts were contrary to s. 372 and s. 440 respectively of the Criminal Code.
The State admitted into evidence, the District Court depositions with your consent. On reading the depositions, I was independently satisfied that, the evidence against you, including your record of interview, supported your guilty plea. I therefore accepted your guilty plea and convicted you on both of the charges presented against you. I then heard from both yourself and your lawyer on sentence. I also heard from the State on that issue as well and I reserved a decision on sentence to today.
The Relevant Facts
The relevant facts giving rise to the charges and your guilty plea and convictions are these. On Monday 09th February 2004, you saw a 23 feet boat with an outboard motor, a 40 horse power, Yamaha brand anchored at the boat shed, here in Lorengau. You noticed no one working on the boat and you decided to steal the motor.
On Saturday 14th February 2004, in the early morning hours around 1:00am you went to the boat shed, checked and ensured that no one was present and watching. Thereafter, you went and untied the rope that was anchoring the boat and let it drift off at sea. The boat drifted to Rara Island, where a third party found it and later recovered to the owner through a number of other third parties including the police.
Before letting the boat drift away, you got on the boat, removed the Yamaha outboard motor, and carried it away onto the shore through the beach in front of the NBC and hid it in the nearby bushes. Then you went looking for a Jerry’s boat along the Lorengau River to take the outboard motor you stole away to your home island, Ahus. Unfortunately, for you, Jerry was not there so you returned to where you hid the outboard motor, took it to Ward 2 and hid it in the bushes near the elementary school.
On 16th February 2004, your father questioned you about the boat and the outboard motor and you told him the above story. Thereupon, your father informed the police and the police came and arrested you. They then took you to the police station where they cautioned you and interviewed you. During the interview, you admitted to the casting away of the 23 feet boat and stealing the outboard motor from the boat before casting it away.
Submissions and Considerations
In your address before sentence, you said sorry for what you did and said you would not do that again. Then, you asked for a lenient sentence in terms of a good behaviour bond.
Your lawyer added that you are 20 years old, single and come from Ahus Island, Manus Province. You are the first born in a family of 5 children. You are of the Roman Catholic faith and have been up to grade 6 formal education, with no formal employment. Your lawyer also informed the Court that, police arrested you on 15th February 2004, soon after the commission of the offence and was in their custody for four months before your release on bail.
Your lawyer then proceeded to make submissions on your behalf for the Court’s consideration before sentence. She urged the Court to note and take into account in your favour the fact that you pleaded guilty to two charges, one of which carries a maximum of life imprisonment. She further urged the Court to note in your favour that, you are a first time offender with no prior convictions. Furthermore, your lawyer submitted that you did not benefit from your offence, because the owner recovered both the outboard motor and the boat. Additionally, your lawyer urged the Court to note that, your father was instrumental in your arrest and the recovery of the outboard motor and the boat. Finally, she urged the Court to note in your favour that your father paid K200.00 to the victim of your offence to assist him to repair the motor.
On top of all of the above, your lawyer referred to the pre-sentence report and submitted that there is community support for a community base sentence. That report suggests that, you be given a non-custodial sentence with community service order returnable on Ahus Island digging toilets and attend counselling.
The State on the other hand points out that the pre-sentence should be taken seriously particularly when it states that you are an unstable person moving from place to place and not staying in one particular place. Further, he pointed out that your parents appear to have lost control of you for about nine years now and appear unprepared to take you into their care and keeping if the Court were to impose a non-custodial sentence. The State pointed out additionally that, the report speaks of you being a person capable of influencing other people into criminal conducts. Further, along with what the State submits, I note that there is no input from the victim.
Mr. Kupmain of counsel for the State then drew the Court’s attention to one of my own judgments, namely The State v. Romney Naptelai Simonopa (29/04/04) N2551 where I imposed a wholly suspended sentence of 3 years in circumstances that were a simple case of armed robbery. Going by that case, Mr. Kupmain submitted that a sentence for the stealing conviction should attract a similar sentence. However, that submission overlooks the fact that the sentence and its suspension was possible because of a well-balanced pre-sentence report with inputs of the victim.
Neither of the counsel was able to draw the Court’s attention to any case on point for assistance in determining sentence for the conviction under s. 440 of the Code. Nevertheless, on the suggestion of the Court, both counsels agreed that the Court should devise and apply guidelines similar to those set by the Supreme Court in Gimble v. The State [1988–89] PNGLR 271, given, the similarities in the character of the offence. The chief similarity between the two is the fact that, they are both property offences, which involved the unlawful removal and or deprivation of the use and enjoyment of one’s property.
At the time of receiving the submissions, I left the option open for you to get your parents to provide details as to who would provide supervision and oversee you complying with any terms, or condition this Court might impose if it were to impose a non-custodial sentence. I also left open the option for your parents to indicate what part they will personally play in your punishment and rehabilitation. These options were left open until today in the light of the State’s submission for the Court to consider the pre-sentence report seriously. Similarly, I left open the option for the victim’s input. As of today, however, I have not received the kind of information required. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to consider. any non-custodial sentence.
The law is clear that, there can be no suspension of sentence unless there is a pre-sentence report representative of the community’s views in relation to sentence supporting such an exercise of the Court’s discretion. As I said in a number of cases as for example, in The State v. Irox Winston, (13/03/03) N2347:
"The Courts are charged with the judicial power of the people under our constitutional framework to appropriately deal with offenders on their behalf. The Courts therefore, have a constitutional duty to seriously take into account the peoples wishes in relation the kind of sentence an offender should receive in each case when they give consideration to the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Not only that, they should ensure at the same time that, the kind of sentence they arrive at is reflective of the people’s wish. This is in addition to taking into account all the other considerations a sentencing judge should take into account and then arrive at a sentence that is reflective of all of those considerations."
In expressing that view, I had regard to the Supreme Court judgments as in Public Prosecutor v. Don Hale, (1998) SC564, Re Application by Anderson Agiru (08/10/01) SC671 and Application of John Mua Nilkare (15/04/97) SC536 citing with approval Avia Aihi v. The State [1981] PNGLR 81.
The Offence and Sentencing Tariffs
(a) Stealing
Turning now to your case, I note that, your first conviction is under s. 372 (1) (5) (c) of the Criminal Code. That provision reads in relevant parts as follows:
"372. Stealing.
(1) Any person who steals anything capable of being stolen is guilty of a crime.
Penalty: Subject to this section, imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.
...
(5) If—
...
(c) the thing is stolen from a vessel, vehicle or place of deposit used for the conveyance or custody of goods in transit from one place to another; ...
...
the offender is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.."
A close reading of this provision makes it clear that an act of stealing generally attracts the penalty of up to 3 years. However, if the offence is committed in the kind of circumstances enumerated in subsection (5), that attracts a penalty beyond the 3 years maximum prescribed under subsection (1) and such a sentence is not to exceed 7 years.
The case of The State v. Romney Naptelai Simonopa (supra) referred to by Mr. Kupmain is one of my latest sentencing decisions in stealing cases. There, I considered in detail the relevant cases, some of which were my own decisions. Of particular application were my judgments in The State v. Timothy Tio (21/05/02) N2265 and The State v. Robert Kawin (24/12/01) N2167.
In the latter case, there were two counts of stealing under subsection (1), rather than subsection 10 of s. 372. It was a case of stealing by forgery and in a breach of a position of trust. In sentencing the prisoner on a plea of guilty to a cumulative sentence of 24 months or 2 years, I noted that there were no sentencing guidelines and I tried to formulate one. In so doing, I said in line with the accepted principles of sentencing that, the maximum prescribed sentence should be for the worse case of an offence under consideration. I then said:
"A worse case of stealing would be one that might have factors like, the total value or the actual amounts of money stolen falls just short of K1, 000.00, thereby escaping an application of the provisions of subsection 10. It would also be a worse case if say an element of a breach of trust whether legal or a defector kind of trust not caught by any of the other subsections in s. 372 exists and the offence is committed in furtherance of an illegal activity or another offence."
At the same time, I also said at the end of the scale, would be simple cases of stealing, such as pocket pickings, or someone leaving some valuable item mistakenly at a place and another person steals it with full knowledge of its owner. Stealing in such a situation should attract a sentence of a few months say about 3 to 4 months. Then in between the worse and the less serious offences would be cases, which are neither serious nor less serious. Such cases might be cases in which, say the amount of money or the value of item stolen is small but the offence is committed in pursuance of an illegal activity or another offence. In this category might be cases where the amount of money or value of item stolen is substantial but not necessarily up to K1, 000.00. In such cases, the sentence could range from more than 4 months and closer to the maximum prescribed sentence of 3 years.
Of course, I said a guilty plea by a first time offender, or a young offender could reduce the kind of sentences suggested. That was again in keeping with a large number of cases though in the context of other serious offences such as armed robbery, as in the case of, Gimble v. The State (supra) at p.275.
In The State v. Timothy Tio (supra), I referred to some case, I did not have the opportunity to refer to and consider before or at the time of the decision in the The State v. Robert Kawin (supra) case. I then noted that, those cases did not provide any guideline for sentencing for any or all of the offences under s.372 of the Code. In the circumstances, I considered what I said in The State v. Robert Kawin case (supra), as a useful guide for adoption with necessary modifications for an offence under subsection (10) or for any of the other offences under s. 372 generally.
I then said, if we consider what I said in The State v. Robert Kawin (supra) in the light of all the other reported cases of stealing, a number of principles emerge:
"First, the maximum prescribed penalty should not be readily imposed. Instead, it should be reserved for the worse type of the offence under consideration. Secondly, guilty pleas, and the offender being a first time young offender and the existence of such good factors operate in favour of sentences lower than the prescribed maximum. Thirdly, if the properties stolen are recovered it may operate as a factor in mitigation of an offender whilst on the other hand if the properties stolen are substantial and or have not been recovered, a higher sentence may be imposed. Fourthly, prevalence and effect of the offence against the victim and the community or society as a whole is an important factor for consideration."
Applying these principles, in The State v. Richard Dusal Bix and Siprian Sipi Karo (06/06/03) N2415, I imposed a sentence of three (3) years against the prisoners. That was in a case of guilty plea by two first time offenders. They were both drunk at the time and had used a piece of timber to scare off a bar attendant and steal a sum of K2,700.00 of which, K800.00 was recovered. I found the circumstances in which the offence was committed closer to armed robbery. I then decided to suspend the whole of the sentence on the condition of a repayment of the balance of the stolen money K1, 900.00. That was supported by a well-balanced pre-sentence report.
In The State v. Romney Naptelai Simonopa (supra) case, I imposed a sentence of 3 years. The commission of the offence was in circumstance similar to armed robbery on a street. The amount of money involved was insignificant and there were no injury to the victim or anybody. The offender pleaded guilty to the charge and was a first time young offender. I left room for a suspension of the whole of that sentence on conditions of a detailed and satisfactory pre-sentence report touching on the details of proposed supervision and avoidance of any breach of conditions for any such suspension.
(b) Your Sentence
Your case is clearly more serious than any of the above cases, given the value of the item you stole and the place from where you stole it. You stole an outboard motor affixed to a boat and was anchored on shore. The value of the outboard motor was certainly beyond K1,000.00. In order to facilitate the commission of your offence, you committed another very serious offence, namely casting a vessel away contrary to s. 440 of the Code. Finally, you were 20 years old at the time of committing the offence, so you were in a position to appreciate that what you set out to do was criminal but went ahead and did it any.
This places your case above those cited and referred to in the judgment in the case of The State v. Romney Naptelai Simonopa (supra). Your case therefore calls for a sentence over and above those imposed in those cases. The average in those cases is 3 years. Accordingly, the sentence in your case has to be beyond that, but not up to the maximum prescribed sentence of 7 years on account of your guilty plea, being a first time offender and the stolen property being recovered to the owner with minimal damage. In these circumstances, I consider a sentence of 5 years appropriate for punishment and deterrent purposes in the kind of circumstances in which you committed the offence.
As I observed in The State v Edward Toude & 3 Ors (No 2) (18/10/01) N2299:
"It is already becoming to common for robberies on land. This is the first case of robbery on a boat. People on the land are being forced to incur substantial amount of costs to build fences to keep out criminals. All people in our country have the right to move around freely but the criminals are locking them in. Most of our people have to travel between places by boats, aeroplanes and motor vehicles. For the obvious risks associated with being on such transportation means, it is a very serious matter for a robbery to take place on any of them. It is not reasonable nor should our people be forced to incur further unnecessary costs in fencing of their shorelines and any sea going crafts. Most of our people are sea going people. Criminals should not prevent them from continuing their lifestyles. I am therefore, of the view that, robberies of these types should be in the worse or serious category and attract the maximum prescribed penalty, unless very good mitigating factors exist. This is to eliminate if possible such offences from ever being committed in the future if it were all possible."
(c) Castaway Offence and Sentencing tariffs
I now turn to consider an appropriate sentence for you in relation to the castaway conviction. Section 440 of the Criminal Code creates the offence and prescribes its penalty in the following manner:
"440. Casting away ships.
A person who—
(a) wilfully and unlawfully casts away or destroys a vessel, whether complete or not; or
(b) wilfully and unlawfully does any act that tends to the immediate loss or destruction of a vessel in distress; or
(c) with intent to bring a vessel into danger—
(i) interferes with any light, beacon, mark or signal used for—
(A) purposes of navigation; or
(B) the guidance of seamen; or
(ii) exhibits any false light or signal,
is guilty of a crime.
Penalty: Subject to Section 19, imprisonment for life."
From the sentence prescribed, there can be no argument, in my view, that, Parliament considered this offence very serious. It is very serious, given the fact that majority of our people are sea-going people and they depend on seagoing vessels. Except for smaller vessels, and where it is convenient, no sea going vessels or crafts can be easily and readily stored away within enclosed and secured environments. Hence, they are often left in the open sea fronts, at wharfs, jetties or such other places where it is easier to take them to the sea for their intended design and purpose. People ought to have confidence in the fact that no one would interfere with their vessels or crafts once anchored. I repeat what I said in The State v Edward Toude & 3 Ors (No 2) (supra) in the terms noted above.
Then, I observe that, this appears to be the first ever case of a conviction and sentence following that under s. 440 of the Code or the offence of castaway generally. Neither of the counsel was able to provide the Court with any assistance in terms of either a local or an overseas case that could be of assistance to this Court in determining an appropriate sentence. I therefore proceed unaided, save only for the counsels agreement that, I should follow the kind of guideline set by the Supreme Court in the much celebrated case of Gimble v. The State (supra).
There, the Supreme Court set sentencing guidelines for armed robbery cases lower than the Parliamentary prescribed maximum of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that on a plea of not guilty by a young first time offender carrying weapons and threatening violence the starting sentence for the robbery of a:
(a) dwelling house should be 7 years;
(b) bank should be 6 years;
(c) store, hotel, club, vehicle on the road or the like should be 5 years, and
(d) person on the street should be 3 years.
Where there are features of aggravation such as actual violence, the amount of money stolen or value of property stolen is large, or where the robber is in a position of trust towards the victim, a higher sentence may be justified. Of course, a plea of guilty may justify a lower sentence.
Whilst it might appear simple, these guidelines are not entirely satisfactory for sentencing under s.440 even though both the offences of armed robbery and castaway carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Robbery could be committed in a number of ways and settings covering a whole range of properties of varying values. On the other hand, castaway is a particular kind of offence restricted to an offence that affects the safety of vessels. Apart from that, the offence can be committed in a number of ways, which could dictate the kind of categories there might be for the offence. In that regard, some of the features in armed robbery cases as identified in the Gimble case would be of common application.
Without limiting the list, I note that the offence of castaway may be categorized in a number of ways. Firstly, the type of vessel may vary from a small dug out canoe at the lower end to an ocean liner at the highest. With that would come, varying ranges and of value the vessels and the extent of any damage or loss of them. Personal injuries to passengers and goods and the kind and type of persons and goods on board would add an additional dimension to the offence. The kind of action or conduct adopted to commit the offence and any ongoing effects of it would also be a relevant factor.
Bearing these factors in mind, I consider a case of castaway may fall into anyone of the following broad categories:
Having in mind the concerns, I have raised in the The State v. Edward Toude & 3 Ors (supra) and repeated again in the foregoing about the offence of castaway, and the need to deter others from committing this offence, I suggest sentences in the following range. A sentence between 6 to 10 years in the first category would be appropriate. As for the second category, I consider a sentence ranging from 11 to 15 years would be appropriate. In the final category, I consider a sentence between 16 years to life imprisonment would be appropriate.
Of course, a guilty plea to the charge by a first time young offender may warrant a sentence below those suggested. However, where there are serious aggravating factors such as substantial loss or damage to the vessel and or its contents, conviction after a trial, injury or death caused to any human beings may warrant a sentence beyond those suggested. Other factors such as premeditation and carefully planning and implementation by a gang and or committing another offence or committing the offence in the course of committing another offence would amount to factors in aggravation, dictating a severe sentence. The opposite of these may warrant a lesser sentence.
(d) Your Sentence - Castaway
Given the particular facts of your case, I find that your case falls in the first category. This attracts a sentence between 6 and 10 years. A range of sentence not very much in dispute between the parties, given the kind of sentences imposed in armed robbery cases. What exactly should be the sentence for you is dependant on considering the factors for and against you.
I first note in your favour that, this is your first ever offence. Secondly, I note that you have pleaded guilty to the charge. Thirdly, you acted alone and did not cause any damage or injury to the vessel or any other property or person. Fourthly, I note that both the vessel and the outboard motor have been recovered to the owner, with the assistance of your father.
Against these are the factors in aggravation against you. Firstly, I note that you committed this offence in the night after planning to steal the vessels outboard motor. This leads to another factor against you and that is the fact that, you committed the offence of castaway in the process of or in the course of committing the offence of stealing. The value of the vessel and the outboard motor would have been some where in the order of K7, 000 to K10,000. There is evidence of your father paying K200.00 to the victim to assist him in repairs to the motor. So there is some evidence of damage to the motor.
Weighing all of the factors for and against you as well as the circumstances in which you committed the offence and the nature of the offence, which calls for a deterrent sentence, I consider a sentence of 10 years is appropriate.
This then gives rise to the question of whether this sentence and that for stealing should be made concurrent or cumulative. The relevant principles on that question are well settled. In The State v. Irox Winston (supra), I summarized the principles in these terms:
"1. The National Court has a discretion whether or not to make a sentence cumulative or not;
In your case, the lawyers make no submission in relation to this issue. I note nonetheless that, the offences you committed were in the one transaction, involved the same victim and committed at the same time, day or date and place. In these circumstances, it is proper to make the sentences for stealing and castaway concurrent and I so order. This effectively leaves you with a total of 10 years to serve in hard labour less the time you have already spent in custody awaiting your trial and sentence.
This is not the end of the matter. I seriously considered the question of suspension of a part or the whole of the sentence. Where first time young offenders are involved, the need for rehabilitation is always a factor for consideration in appropriate cases. This is because, in appropriate cases, a lenient sentence such as a suspended sentence could better meet the important purposes of criminal sentencing namely, rehabilitation and deterrence.
I have covered the principles governing the imposition of a non-custodial sentence as a form of punishment in a number of judgments. The earlier ones are my judgments in The State v. Abel Airi (28/11/00) N2007 and The State v. John Micky Lausi (27/03/01) N2073. Without repeating what I said in those cases, it is useful however, to quote what I consider to be the law, based on authorities on point at page 9 of the judgment in The State v. Micky John Lausi case in the following terms:
"It is erroneous to treat the suspension of sentence for imprisonment as merely an exercise in leniency. Because such order is made in the community interest and is generally designed to prevent re-offending which a prison sentence, standing alone, seldom does. A person so released as an obvious incentive not to re-offend. Therefore, there should be no misconceptions as to what will occur if he does. From time to time, persons charged with more serious offences may be dealt with in this manner by reason of good character, the court's view that there will be no re-offending, that treatment is required outside prison and, at times, by reason of the fact that the court believes that a particular offender will be positively damaged by immediate incarceration."
However, because it calls for an exercise of a judicial discretion, a judge needs to remind him or herself of what the Supreme Court said in Acting Public Prosecutor v. Don Hale (supra). In that case, the Supreme Court, in my view, correctly pointed out that, there should be no suspension of sentences either in part or in whole unless the offender is young, below the age of 19 years and a well-balanced pre-sentence report supports it.
In some of my judgments, I have held that pre-sentence reports with inputs from independent members of the community, in addition to both the offender and the victim’s side are preferable. This would render the report more balanced and reliable and therefore safe for the Court to act on. A reliable pre-sentence report is one that also specifies amongst others, the kind of supervision that is available in terms of the names of the persons available to supervise, where and when, the kind of activity planned and the means available to ensure compliance of any terms and conditions the Court might impose. Some of the cases on point that quickly come to mind in this regard are my judgments in The State v. Jimmy Solomon (20/07/01) N2100; The State v. Rex Rongo (20/12/00) N2035 and The State v. Fredinand Naka Penge (24/05/02) N2244.
In your case, there is a pre-sentence report from the Probation Officer here in Lorengau. That report has inputs only from yourself, your parents and a community leader. There is no input from the victim or anyone form his side. Further, the report provides no details of the kind of punishment your side and the Probation Services propose for you outside the prison system. Similarly, they do not provide any details of any rehabilitation plan along with the details of any such program.
What is clear is that, your parents do not wish to play any part in your rehabilitation and the supervision of any community service orders or such other conditions this Court might impose. All they want this Court to do is impose upon you are non-custodial sentence for you to serve on Ahus Island without providing any proposal with sufficient details as to who will be personally responsible to fulfilling their role as parents. Given that, and the lack of any input from the victim, I am reluctant to suspend either the whole or part of the sentence.
I will however leave that option open for 30 days from today. If within that period the Court receives a supplementary pre-sentence report with the kind of details highlighted above, the Court will consider the question of suspension of either the whole or part of the sentence. Such a report must amongst others show preparedness on your parents’ part to personally assist and play a lead role in the supervision of your fulfilment of any community work orders and any other program designed to rehabilitate you. Provided the Court receives such a report within the specified period and the Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so, it will suspend the whole or part of the sentence as from the date of the Court making that decision and confirms it in writing to the Correction Service here with copies to both counsel. If the Court decides to do that in favour of suspension either the whole or part of your sentence, it will be on the following conditions during the currency of your suspended sentence:
1. you immediately enter into your own recognition to keep the peace;
Until at such time, the Court confirms in writing a suspension of your sentence, you shall serve your sentence in hard labour at the Lorengau Correction Services less the time you have already spent in custody awaiting your trial and sentence. A warrant of commitment in those terms shall issue forthwith.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Lawyer for the State: Public Prosecutor
Lawyer for the Accused: The Public Solicitor
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