Marong v Bismark Industries Pty Ltd [1999] PGNC 20; N1846 (15 April 1999)

Unreported National Court Decisions

N1846

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

WS 410 OF 1996
BETWEEN:LUCAS NEGETIMA MARONG
PLAINTIFF
AND:BISMARK INDUSTRIES PTY TLD
1ST DEFENDANT
AND: MOTOR VEHICLES INSURANCE (PNG) TRUST
2ND DEFENDANT

Kokopo

Salika J
14-15 April 1999

NEGLIGENCE - Motor vehicle accident - liability - riding in unregistered and uninsured vehicle - when going to work - plaintiff no contributory negligence - company fully responsible.

Cases Cited:

Robert Gembal -v- MVIT N828.

Nita Pykali -v- MVIT N1092 both distinguished

Counsel:

Mr O Kivu for Plaintiff

Mr K. Frank for First Defendant

Mr A Kandakasi for Second Defendant

SALIKA J: This is a claim for damages by the plaintiff for injuries he received when a motor vehicle he was riding overturned.

The facts of the case are that on or about 25 September 1995 at about 9:00 am the plaintiff who was then the Surveyor Trainee with the first defendant company was a passenger with other, travelling to his work in a Nissan UD Dump truck owned by the first defendant. Thor vehicle was unregistegistered and uninsured and driven by a David Kubura who was an employee of the first defendant. While tere driving along tong the MERAI road in the Putput logging area on the South Coast of East New Britain the motor vehicle was travelling uphill and before it reached the top of the hill the engine stopped, causing it to roll back, hit the embankment and overturned causing injuries to all the occupants including the plaintiff.

The driver of the motor vehicle David Kubura is alleged to have driven the motor vehicle with the consent, express or implied of the first defendant.

The plaintiff also claimed against the first defendant on the basis of the Wrongs Act Chapter 297, and the Common law principles of negligence as applicable to Papua New Guinea.

At the outset on the date of trial after the matter had been called counsel for the plaintiff and the defendants informed the court of the following;

(i) ـ T60; That the parties are now agreed that the accident took place on a public road; and

(ii) &##160; The parties gre agreed thad that an award of K50,000.00 be made to the plhe plaintiff subject to the issue of contributory negligeo be minedhe court.

After counsel had informed the Court of those concessicessions tons the efhe effect of that is that the second defendant is admitting liability says but that the plaintiff is also partly liable for his own injuries. In other words the secefendefendant raises contributory negligence by the plaintiff.

Counsel for the plaintiff then addressed the court on thatct of the case. But before counddressed thed the court I had asked counsel for the plhe plaintiff whether he was going to call any evidence on the issue of contributory negligence. He informe court that he w he was not calling any evidence but that he would rely on the rely on the affidavits of Mr Sialis Tedor filed on thee 22 March 1999 and the affidavit of Gabriel Polok filed an 22 March 1999. The The plain#8217;s coun counsel also relied on a letter from Young and Williams to Sialis Tedor and Associated dated 24 March 1999.

The affidavit of Mr Tedor and the letter from Young and Williams are the only relevant documents by way of evidence which touch on the issue of contributory negligence. The other two affidavial weal with the question of whether the accident occurred on a public road, which issue has now been agreed upon. Mr Tedor&#82affidavit howe however doesadvance any argument one way or other as far as contributorbutory negligence is concerned. In that l of the 27 Augustugust 1998g and Williams to Sialis Tedor and Associates which is atta attached to Mr Tedor’s affidavit it is clearly stated in the last paph of the letter that the main issue was to be whether thar that accident occurred on a public road. Moreover it was stated thet the issue of contributory negligence would be raised. Mr Tedes not address this this issue in his affidavit, nor does taintiff in his affidavit..

The letter from Young and Williams also raised the issue ssue which is dated the 24th March 1999.&#Young & Williams had poad pointed out to the plaintiff’s lawyer the following;

“The National Court has on a number of occasion held that where plaintiffs ride on motor vehicle which are not registered and therefore not insured, they contribute to the risk of injury or death.”

They relied on the cases of ROBERT GEMBAL -v- MVIT N828 and NITA PYAKALO -v- MVIT N1092 in support of that contention. The secofendant’s la;s lawyers have raised this argument based on the police accident report which showed that the vehicle involved in the accident was overloaded and that it was not registered hat it was uninsured.

As stated at the outset the claim has been agreed upon. The s defendant has generaenerally admitted liability but says the plaintiff also contributed to his own injuries by boarding an unregistered, uninsured and overloadhicle.

I will deal firstly with the argument that that the plaintiff contributed to his own injuries by boarding an unregistered and uninsured vehicle. it was pleaded in the stae statement of claim that the plaintiff was a passenger on an unregistered and uninsured vehicle owned by the first defendant there is no evidence that the plaintiff knew those facts before he boarded the motor vehicle. This claibrought by the plhe plaintiff he ought to have stated clearly by way of evidence if he knew those factors before he boarded the motor vehicle. Because there isvidence ofce of that I have assume that he knew those factors before he boarded the motor vehicle. I restate what has been said before by the Courts that pleadings are not evidence.

rthermore, the parties may may have agreed on the total award on the basis that the plaintiff knew those factors before he boarded ttor vehicle or on the basisbasis of the pleadings. In his pleadthe plaintiff tiff asserted that the motor vehicle was unregistered and uninsured. The second dant has concedonceded that assertion. As the second defendant hns conceded that asserthe plaintiff has merely acly accepted the concession. On that basis I fiat the pthe plaintiff knew the motor vehicle was unregisterd uninsured and boarded the motor vehicle nevertheless.

.

The next argument is that the motor vehicle was overloaded. arguis raised becausecausecause the police accident report which is annexed to Mr Tedor’s affidavit filed on the 22 March 199 the motor vehicle was overloaded. There is no mechanical report to suggest why the enhe engine stopped while the motor vehicle was climbing up the hill. Thereo evidence how many pany people the motor vehicle can carry or how many people were on the le at the material time.&#1e. There very good likelihoodihood that the vehicle was overloaded. A lomotor vehicle will usul usually find it harder to climb a hill. While there is no evidence of overloading, I will have to accept the police accident report the motor vehicle in question was overloaded and that mayt may have been the major cause of the engine stopping before it reached tp because it had difficultyculty climbing up the hill.

The fact that the plaintiff boarded the motor vehicle knowing it be unregistered and therefore uninsured and that it was overloaded in my view does not at this stage automatically render the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent. I am of the view that on thas to look at the circumstances he boarded the motor vehicle? He and others were picked up by the motor vehicle owned by their employer to go to their place of work at the logging sit60; While not supported by d by evidence, it is common for employers involved in logging to transport their workers in one truck without regard for their safety. Pe they thought they were were in the bush and they could do that. I presume this to be one such occasion. I am of the view thatplainplaintiff had no choice. H to get into the motor veor vehicle. Had he refue might have lost his job. There is no evidenct any oany other motor vehicle was avai available after the first vehicle was full.&#1n my the employer must must bear the full responsibility for the overloading of the motor vehiclehicle and the fact that the motor vehicle was unregistered and uninsured. Furthermore the driver of the motor vehicle who is an employee of the first defendant or perhaps their supervisor ought to have supervised the loading.

I distinguish this case to the cases of ROBERT GEMBAL -v-MVI8 and NITA PYAKALO -v- MVIT MVIT N1099 in that the two cases the plaintiffs had the choice to refuse the lift with no detrimental consequences upon themselves. Person who gave them lift were friends or persons known to them. In the case of the plaintnff in this case, it is my view that had the plaintiff refused to board the motor vehicle it would have been his own detrim#160;ost likely would ould have lost his job. He was a mere trainee yor eyor earning K73.4K73.40 per week. The transport was provid t to them to get. It is therefn my view only only fair that the employer must bear the full responsibility. Thloyeran obligato n to mato make sure it’s vehicles were registered and insured and that that they were road worthy. Furthermore an yer h obligobligations to oversee te loading of the motor vehicle and in my view to ensure sure that the motor vehicle was not overlo

The employer however cannot be sued under s54 of the Motor Vehicles InsurInsurance Act. All actions involmotor&#16r vehicle accident shoe brou brought against the Trust if the injured persons decided to bring their actioner the Vehicles cles Insurance Act. If the injured persons decide to bring thng their actions under any law other law, it isiew that they bring it under those other laws for instance the Wrongs Act. They shoulshould decide wlich law they want to invokget their relief.

In

In this case the plaintiff has invoked the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act in thiim. My view is that he ought to have decided which dech defendant to sue either the first defendant or the second defendant. Idecides to sue the first irst defendant then he can bring his actions against the Wrongs Act, if he decides to sue the Moehicles Insurance Trust then it should invoke the provisions of the Motor Vehicles InsurInsurance Act and not the first defendant. I am of the view thatannotannot in this section include the first defendant as a first defendant because he has decided to invoke the provision of the and therefore he can only sue the trust and in the circumstances I find that the second defendant is wrongly included ass a defendant as a defendant in this section and I find the first defendant failed in it as I said earlier in relation to overloading and the fact that the motor vehicle was uninsured and unregistered.

I find that the first defendant failed in its obligations to its employees and such I find that there is not contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. As the first defe is indemindemnified under the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act the second defendant has to bear that responsibility in full.

I accordingly award the plaintiff the K50,000.00 as agreed against the second defendant together with costs and interest at 8 %.

In relation to the claim against the first defendant, I dismiss it and award costs to the first defendant against the plaintiff in relation to having being wrongly included as a defendant.

Lawyers for the Plaintiff: Sialis Tedor & Associates

Lawyers for the First Defendant: Maladina Lawyers

Lawyers for the Second Defendant: Young & Williams