Kaupa v Registrar of Workers Compensation Tribunal [1995] PGNC 5; N1300 (7 February 1995)

Unreported National Court Decisions

N1300

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS 27/95
JOSEPH KAUPA - Plaintiff
v
REGISTER OF WORKERS COMPENSATION - 1st Defendant
CHAIRMAN OF WORKERS COMPENSATION TRIBUNAL - 2nd Defendant
THE STATE - 3rd Defendant

Waigani

Doherty J
7 February 1995

JUDICIAL REVIEW - leave.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Worker’s Compensation Tribunal.

Held:

Judicial review could only lie if there was error by the Tribunal and none was shown. Leave ref

7 February 1995

DOHERTY J: The applicant in this matter seeks judicial review pursuant to Order 16 of the National Court Rules of a decision of the Workers Compensation Commission Trl.

The facts in the statement before the Court show that the applicant was seriouslyously and permanently injured in 1990 in the course of his employment in North Solomons Province and within a few days of his discharge from the hospital he was evacuated to his home province of Chimbu. Owing to his own lack of enowledge he did not lodge a claim in accordance with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. He explains that hilliteraiterate and I well accept that that situation appli a large percentage of the the people in his area and it is not something which we criticise. He wa of those people who who wlucky not to get an opportuportunity of an education that the rest of us have had.

The Tribunal had an opportunity to considerapplication for Workers’ Compensation made during 199g 1994 and did not allow him to bring a claim because it was out of time. They made a ruling pursuant to Section 41 of the Workers Compensation Act. He then wrote ought a revi review of that decision. The Tribunal reconsidered this and several other points concerning witness statements which were on the file and hists about his own lack of knowledge etc. which he put forwarorward. Tibunal again rejected hisd his application making a final decision following a hearing on the 28th September 1994. The actual don was given oven on the 4th October 1994.

The proces in this matter were then then served on the Tribunal although the provisions of Order 16 refer to applications for leave as ex-part60; Since they were served rved they have appeared in this Court. The applicant seeks review of the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal decision and he says at paragraph 20 of his affidavit and statement in support as follows:

“The decision e Workers’ Compensation Tribunal to dismiss my claim laim is very harsh for I have served over 17 years with the Department of Works whom I am still employed with. The Tribunal’s re tore to acknowledge my illiteracy and service would cause a grave injustice by dismissing my claim on a technicality is very unfair and does not compensate a grassroot person like me who han employed as a labourer aner and office boy and now have physical disabilities without been duly compensated.”

He seeks review on the grounds of harshness and relies also on the powers inherent in Section 41 of the Constitution which empowers the Court to review what is a legal decision if it is harsh and oppressive in a particular per case.&#16. The legislative powf the Wthe Workers’ Compensation Tribunal are contained in Section 49 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Tdoptss. 49 provisions fors for appeal under the Distriistrict Court Act. mind this whis would, the, therefore, include the provisio Section 231 (b) of the District Court Act which allow for an application to bring in an apan appeal out of time if there are good re. The applicant beforbefore this Court has not given any explanation why he has come late before the Court or why he did not appeal in accordance with the Workers’ Compensation Act instead of pursuing a certiorari. Tles and the law relating ting to the certiorari and the provisions of Order 16 were considered by Judge Woods in the case of Sulaiman v The PNG University of Teogy Unreported N610. This and sr rulings are rere refe referred to in the Textbook “Administrative Law of Papua New Guinea” by Mr Michael Ntumy. Iin a quotation concerningrning dismissal of a leave application which Mr Ntumy takes from a case of my own re: Eric Gurapa, unreported N856 “Whenever anybody or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to judicially act in excess of the legal authority then the Court has power to review that decision. Certioraes not automaticaltically apply because the applicant thinks that the situation is a harsh or unhappy one”.

There must be grounds shown before a Court can interfere with a decision of a properly constituted body which has reached its decision in accordance with law and after a hearing, examples are noted in the text book eg. acting outside its jurisdiction or when rules of natural justice were not followed. It is my understanding thit this situation has also been reconsidered by the Supreme Court in a recent case of Numapo v Pulpul (SCA 160, 1993) but I understand that a decision has not handed down.

These particular rules of law which hach have been adopted into our administrative law and are referred to in the textbook by Mr Ntumy. Thcept of a certiorari is i is not solely that the unfortunate circumstances of the applicant are such that the Court should review a decision. The applicant musw groundsounds for example, as I have quoted, lack of jurisdiction or failing to follow natural justice.

I have a considerable amount of sympathy with the applicant, lack of education iad and an unfortunate situasituation on which I and no-one else would blame him for. But on the of the record pord presented to this Court I cannot fault the Tribunal in their handling of the case. They took into account tpl applicant’s own sion and reviewed it more than once. Took account ount of the lthe law as prescribed in the Workers’ Compensation Act.&#160 Workers’ Compensation Act states at s. 41 that the lthe limit is 12 months and they appear to have applied this and looked at the applicant’s grounds when assessing their decision. I fore cannot find any fauy fault on the part of the Tribunal which this Court would be empowered to review and quash.

I can only repeat what I and other Judges have said, certiorari is n alternative to an appeal.&eal. The Court can only exercise its powers in a prerogative writ such as certiorari under Order 16 where it is shown that the Tribunal or the Administrative body which made the decision has erred in some way.

On the factore me there is no such errh error and the Tribunal complied with the law in the circumstances of the case. I therefore refuse for juor judicial review.

Lawyers for the Applicant: CaNewell

Lawyers fors for the Defendants: Solicitor General