BomaI, an Infant, by his next friend, Bomai Konga v The State and Ronald Phillip Symonds [1978] PGNC 10; N162 (25 August 1978)

Unreported National Court Decisions

N162

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

(W.S. 36 OF 1978)
BETWEEN:
KONGAI BOMAI AN INFANT BY HIS NEXT FRIEND BOMAI KONGA
PLAINTIFF
AND:
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
FIRST DEFENDANT
AND:
RONALD PHILLIP SYMONDS
SECOND DEFENDANT

Chimbu District

Greville Smith J
22-23 August 1978
25 August 1978

NEGLIGENCE ON HIGHWAY - contributory negligence - boy aged twelve years - apportionment of liability - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1962 s.22(1).

DAMAGES - personal injuries - simple fracture of right femur - superficial facial injuries - complete recovery - quantum - pain and suffering and loss of amenities.

REDUCTION OF AMOUNT UNDER LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT, 1962 S.22(1).

GREVILLE SMITH J: The piff in this action Koon Kongo Bomai, an infant suing by his next friend Bomai Kongo, seeks to recover damages from the first defendant Papua New Guinea and the second defendant Ronald Phillip ds for personal injuries sues sustained by the plaintiff.

It was in part alleged and admitted on the pleadings and in part established to my satisfaction on the undisputed evidence that on the thirtieth day of November, 1974, the plaintiff, a boy then about twelve years of age, was on the old Highlands Highway near Rover Village in the Kerowagi Sub-District when he was struck by a Police short wheel based Toyota motor vehicle driven by the second defendant then (as still) an officer of Police and knocked to the ground thereby sustaining a fracture of the upper third of his right femur and some flesh wounds to his face.

It was alleged and admitted on the pleadings that the vehicle was at the relevant time owned by the first defendant but counsel for the plaintiff, being somewhat uneasy about relying on the provisions of Section 4 of the Motor Vehicles (Administration Liability) Act 1969 (23 of 1969) sought, unopposed, and was granted, leave to amend the Statement of Claim by adding an allegation that at the relevant time as driver of the vehicle the second defendant was the agent of the first defendant acting within the scope of his authority, whereupon counsel for the second defendant admitted that allegation.

Both defendants were represented by the same counsel and the essential evidence relied upon by the first defendant and the essential evidence relied upon by the second defendant did not differ in any respect. The evidence for the plaintiff which was either concurred in or not disagreed from by the other side, and which I accept, together with the gleanings from an inspection by agreement of the ‘locus in quo’ established to my satisfaction what follows in the next and succeeding paragraphs. Before proceeding thereto I record that it was agreed by the parties that for all relevant purposes the road in all its relevant characteristics was the same at the time of inspection as at the time of the accident in question, and I record also that at the end of the inspection and whilst still on the spot I read out to both counsel the notes I had made as to relevant matters observed and invited correction or comment and none was forthcoming.

The road upon which the accident occurred was a built-up earth and stone road in good condition, eighteen feet wide with a margin on each side sloping slightly downwards for a distance of three or four feet. There was no footpath on either side, the surfaces of the margins were strewn with stones, and beyond the margins ware uncultivated grass and scrub. It was a bush road and pedestrians would naturally walk on the road itself and not on the margins or elsewhere. Travelling in the direction of Kerowagi one rounds a corner about 200 yards before reaching what was in this case the point of impact. After rounding the corner the road runs straight, and both before and after the corner it runs uphill, for the last 116 yards at about a ten degree slope and before that more steeply. A vehicle travelling towards Kerowagi does not become visible to a pedestrian on the road who is travelling in the opposite direction at or approaching the point of impact until it rounds the corner, that is until it is two hundred yards away, but it would be both visible and audible to such a pedestrian thereafter, and the pedestrian would be visible to the driver of such a vehicle. At the relevant time which was in the daytime and in fine weather the second defendant drove the vehicle in question around the corner towards Kerowagi. Approaching the point of impact from the opposite direction on the road was a group of male students coming from the Kerowagi High School which had “broken up” for holidays that day. In this group were both younger students of which the plaintiff was one, and older students who might have been taken for adults, one having a beard. There was no evidence as to the proportion of younger students to older and the plaintiff may have been the youngest. The group were in a somewhat festive mood, there was at least one guitar being played amongst them, and there was movement of persons too and from within the group. Beyond the point of impact from the second defendant’s point of view, distant from it about forty four yards, and standing behind his own vehicle which was correctly parked facing towards Kerowagi, was a man named Siwi-Agai a Chairman of Village Courts. This man, who was called as a witness by the plaintiff, to reach the parked position just mentioned, had shortly before driven his own vehicle over the same route as the second defendant had traversed and was traversing at the time of the accident and in doing so had observed many students scattered along the road, all walking on the road, going in the opposite direction to himself, that is in the same direction as the group in question, but ahead of them.

Siwi-Agai stopped where he did for the purpose of letting off some passengers and himself got out of his vehicle and went to its rear in order to assist female passengers to lift out some heavy possessions which they would have had difficulty in doing unaided. As his vehicle was so parked the group of students which included the plaintiff (who however was unknown to and was not individually noticed by Siwi-Agai) passed his vehicle going in the direction of the corner aforementioned.

According to Siwi-Agai’s estimation his vehicle had been parked about six minutes and he was about to return to the driving seat when he both saw and heard the vehicle driven by the second defendant round the corner. He therefore delayed his intended passage along the roadward side of his own vehicle to the driving side door so as to allow the oncoming vehicle to pass unimpeded. The vehicle, after rounding the corner continued along the road in the direction of Siwi-Agai’s car but before drawing level with it it’s near (left) side front extremity struck the plaintiff knocking him down. The plaintiff fell clear of the vehicle which continued on for about thirty yards before halting. It then backed up close to where the plaintiff was still lying and, assisted by Siwi-Agai, the second defendant lifted the plaintiff, unconscious, into the Police vehicle and accompanied by Siwi-Agai took the plaintiff to Kerowagi Hospital from which he was shortly thereafter removed to Kundiawa Hospital.

To the foregoing I should add the following miscellany. The second plaintiff was at the relevant time on his way from Kundiawa to carry out an unheralded inspection of the Kerowagi Police Station. With him in the vehicle was his wife whom he intended letting off at a friend’s residence on the way. Attached to the front of the Police vehicle was a type of guard known as a “bull” bar or “roo” (short for kangaroo) bar. Of this it is sufficient to say that it was made of very heavy galvanized iron piping which would not register by indentation impact with a human being except, perhaps at very high speed, and that it was, generally speaking, rectangular with uprights at each side about twenty inches high and about five inches within the outer alignment of the front mudguards. The inspection of the accident site took place between 3pm and 3.30 pm on Tuesday 22nd August. Over that half hour about a dozen vehicles passed along the road in one direction or the other. Neither counsel objected to my taking notice of this, or argued that such observation was of no value, in addition to the location and nature of the road, in making a rough assessment of the volume of traffic ordinarily carried over the relevant time, i.e. the time of the accident.

The Police vehicle had three forward gears and from before it rounded the corner until the collision with the plaintiff it was proceeding in second gear in which the maximum speed possible was 50 to 60 mph on level ground. The vehicle was new and was being “run in”. After the accident the vehicle was found to have on the outer part of the forward portion of its offside mudguard a slight indentation. I am not satisfied that this was caused by the collision but nothing turns on this.

I now enter upon the area of controversy relating to the facts bearing upon liability. I would remark at the outset that apart from a doctor the only witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiff were the plaintiff himself and Siwi-Agai aforementioned, and for the defendants the second defendant and one other witness, Andrew Bayak. The plaintiff himself stated that he was unable to remember exactly how the accident occurred and the other witness, just mentioned, for the defendants who was the Police officer who investigated the accident had such uncertain recollections (not being able to refresh his memory, the Police file on the matter having been lost) that he was able to give no helpful evidence so that the conflicts of evidence bearing on how the accident occurred were between only Siwi-Agai on the one hand and the second defendant on the other.

No attempt was made by the defendants to explain the absence of the second defendant’s wife from the witness box or by the plaintiff or the defendants to explain the fact that none of the group of persons with whom the plaintiff was walking immediately prior to the accident was called. The others of the group it appeared were from a different place from the accused and to that extent might have been regarded as independent witnesses. However, there was no cross-examination directed to and no submissions made in respect of the absence of potential witnesses, and a variety of possible explanations are available in each instance. In all the circumstances I draw no inference adverse to any of the parties from the failure to call additional witnesses.

The witness Siwi-Agai gave evidence as follows. When the Police vehicle came around the corner it was in the middle of the road but as it approached the students it moved onto its correct side. When the students passed the witness at his motor vehicle their group, which according to the witness’s recollection numbered about six or seven was spread across the road. The Police vehicle was not, by the sound of its engine, in top gear but was travelling at what the witness estimated to be about forty to fifty miles per hour. The witness on one occasion during his evidence said that the Police vehicle was going “too fast” and on another that it was “speeding” and he said that he told the Police officer investigating the accident Andrew Bayak, a day or so after the event that the Police vehicle had been speeding which however, was not confirmed by Mr. Bayak who seemed to remember being told by the witness that it was not travelling very fast or “something like that”.

Siwi-Agai further gave evidence that the Police vehicle did not seem to slacken speed between rounding the corner and colliding with the plaintiff. He said of the students that as the Police vehicle approached “there was too much noise from the guitars and they did not see the Police vehicle coming”. He said that when the vehicle was “close” to the students some of them “saw the Police vehicle” (this was his impression), one of them called out and the students ran to or off their right hand edge of the road. He said that the vehicle sounded its horn, but “very late”. He said that as the students were spread across the road it would have been better if some had gone to their left or stopped where they were, but that the first one went to the right and “the rest just followed” including the plaintiff. He said that he had not expected an accident but one occurred because the plaintiff commenced his run off the road “late”. He said that at the last moment, so to speak, the vehicle swerved to its right and that if it had not done so it would have struck the plaintiff more squarely.

The second defendant gave evidence as follows. He drove the vehicle round the corner in the middle of the road at a speed of about thirty miles per hour and immediately saw “some distance ahead” a group of people walking in his direction and on his side of the road “between my left kerb and the middle” as he put it. Upon seeing the people on the road he slowed his rate of speed. Also, he was immediately apprehensive as there had been a number of wanton attacks on Police vehicles and their occupants in that area in the recent past. However as he continued to approach he saw nothing in the behaviour of the group to alarm him. By that he meant that they did not appear bent on trouble. When about one hundred yards from them he moved onto his right hand (incorrect) side of the roadway as he could see a clear path ahead on that side, and reduced his speed to about 20mph. He remembers the group as consisting of about nine or eleven persons whom he took to be adults. He stated that he noticed in particular that one of them had a substantial beard. When the second defendant was about ten yards from them there were still two or three people close to the centre of the road but not blocking his passage. He sounded his horn once and continued on the same path. He then became aware of a single person standing on the road very close to an imaginary centre line but on the other side of it to the moving vehicle, facing the second defendant’s left hand side of the road, in other words facing away from and at right angles to the path the motor vehicle was travelling. This person suddenly and without warning made a one hundred and eighty degrees about turn and then appeared to take one step forward, which carried him over the aforementioned line and into contact with the left hand front extremity of the moving vehicle. The second defendant had no time to put his foot on the brake pedal before impact. The impact resulted in the plaintiff who was only momentarily in contact with the vehicle being “pushed” by the vehicle back to the vehicles left.

That, the second defendant said, was how the accident occurred. He said further that after impact he continued to drive on for between twenty and twenty five yards then stopped, looked back, failed to perceive any sign of a vengeful inclination on the part of the plaintiff’s companions, backed up, with the assistance of Siwi Agai who was known to him lifted the plaintiff into the Police vehicle, and then drove him to the Kerowagi Hospital accompanied by Siwi-Agai. The second defendant then went to the Kerowagi Police Station and caused a message reporting the occurrence of the accident to be sent to Police Inspector Bayak who was at the time officer-in-charge of the Traffic section at Kundiawa.

The second defendant when giving evidence said nothing in respect of the subject matter of Siwi Agai’s evidence to the effect that there were other groups of students proceeding along the road ahead of the plaintiff’s group and I am satisfied that at the relevant time he knew or should have known that pedestrians were likely to be using the road ahead of his vehicle and also that there might well be young persons such as the plaintiff amongst them.

I regard the account of the behaviour of the plaintiff given by the witness Siwi-Agai as somewhat more probable than that given by the second defendant. Moreover, and independently, I am satisfied, as a matter of probability at an appropriate level, that the witness Siwi-Agai was an independent honest and reliable witness and I accept his evidence in preference where it differs from the evidence of the second defendant and the evidence of the witness Andrew Bayak. Accordingly I find that at the relevant time the second defendant was driving at an excessive speed having regard to the circumstances, that he failed to sound the horn sufficiently early, that he failed to keep a proper lookout, and that he failed to anticipate as he should have done the possibility of the plaintiff, or some other member of the group acting in the manner attributed by Siwi-Agai to the plaintiff. I find that in these respects he failed to act in the circumstances with the prudence with which the hypothetical reasonable man would have acted.

I should mention before proceeding further that the fact that the injury received by the plaintiff was to his right leg is not in my opinion inconsistent with his having been struck from his left side. With the plaintiff in a running position the left hand front mudguard, or the left hand front upright of the “bull” bar could readily have passed behind his left leg, if that were the forward one at the relevant moment, and struck only his right leg, on the inside of the leg.

In the result I find that the second defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a partial cause of the injury to the plaintiff.

I also find the first defendant liable for the negligence of the second defendant.

As for the plaintiff, he gave, as already indicated, evidence that he could not remember exactly how the accident occurred. He said he was walking down the road with other students, some of whom were playing guitars. He himself was not playing a guitar and some or all of the other students were ahead of him. He said he couldn’t remember anything else about the accident, whether he saw the vehicle approaching, or how it came to hit him, and indeed that he could not remember it hitting him. The plaintiff was inclined to insist that this inability to remember was due to the occurrence of the accident, and thus to amnesia, but there was no medical evidence or evidence apart from the plaintiff’s own to suggest amnesia. His inability to remember could quite well be explained by failure on his part to perceive more than momentarily the presence of the vehicle or any danger and I think this second explanation more probable.

However that may be, it is sufficiently clear from the other evidence that if he had been paying due attention to the road ahead, and his own safety, he would have been able to get out of the way of the vehicle in time, as the others did.

In Gough v. ThornN162.html#_edn118" title="">[cxviii]¹, Lord Denning said as follows:

“A very young child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. An older child may be; but it depends on the circumstances. A judge should only find a child guilty of contributory negligence if he or she is of such an age as reasonably to be expected to take precautions for his or her own safety; and then he or she is only to be found guilty if blame should be attached to him or her. A child has not the road sense or the experience of his or her elders. He or she is not to be found guilty unless he or she is blameworthy.”

Dankwerts, L.J. in the same case agreed “with every word which Lord Denning has said”, and Salmon L.J. said (at p.400):

“The question as to whether the plaintiff can be said to have been guilty of contributory negligence depends on whether any ordinary child of 13 ½ could be expected to have done any more than this child did. I say, “any ordinary child”. I do not mean a paragon of prudence; nor do I mean a scatter-brained child; but the ordinary girl of 13 ½. I think that any ordinary child of 13 ½, seeing a lorry stop to let her cross and the lorry driver, a grown-up person in whom she no doubt has some confidence, beckoning her to cross the road would naturally go straight on, no one in my view could blame her for doing so. I agree that if she had been a good deal older and hardened by experience and perhaps consequently with less confidence in adults, she might have said to herself: “I wonder if that man has given the proper signal to traffic coming up?” She might not have gone past the front of the lorry without verifying for herself that it was safe to do so; but it would be quite wrong to hold that a child of 13 ½ is negligent because she fails to go through those mental processes and relies unquestioningly on the lorry driver’s signal.”

On the principles indicated in Gough v. ThornN162.html#_edn119" title="">[cxix]² (supra) laintiff in this acis action might, I am satisfied, reasonably have been expected, without the distractions then present, to have been paying more attention to the road ahead and those distractions were no new or sudden thing. He had been aware of them and had been travelling with them for long enough to have adjusted to them and to have been at the relevant time taking reasonable precautions for his own road safety notwithstanding, which I find that he was not. Nor was the corner with its hazard of a vehicle appearing around it at speed, something with which the plaintiff was suddenly confronted. I therefore find that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

As a result of this finding of contributory negligence the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff must, in accordance with the provisions of Section 22 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1962, be reduced “to such an extent that the Court thinks just and equitable, having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage”.

“When it is necessary to ascribe liability in proportions to more than one person, it is well established that regard must be had not only to the causative potency of the acts and omissions of each of the parties, but to their relative blameworthiness. In the ‘Miraflores and the Abadesa (1967 1 A.C. 826 at p.845) Lord Pearce said ‘... the investigation is concerned with ‘fault’ which includes blameworthiness as well as causation; and no true apportionment can be reached unless both these factors are born in mind.’ ”

(Brown v. ThompsonN162.html#_edn120" title="">[cxx]³). See also Taylor v. MillerN162.html#_edn121" title="">[cxxi]⁴. Blameworthiness in the case of the second defendant is to be measured by the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man (Pennington v. NorrisN162.html#_edn122" title="">[cxxii]⁵) and in the plaintiff the degree of departure from the standard of care reasonably to be expected of an ordinary twelve year old schoolboy of this country (Aubrey v. CarterN162.html#_edn123" title="">[cxxiii]⁶).

In this action, on the basis only of causation, I think that the liability of the plaintiff and the liability of the second defendant were equal. As to blameworthiness, each should have been aware of the danger potential as each approached the blind corner, each should have perceived the presence of the other simultaneously, and each should have been aware of the whole unfolding situation from then on. There was no original negligence on the part of the one or the other, and there was no deliberate negligence. The only distinction I see is the distinction arising from the fact that the plaintiff was a twelve year old and the second defendant was a mature adult.

Taking into account both the matter of relative causation and the matter of relative blameworthiness I think it would be right to diminish any damages awarded to the plaintiff by one fifth.

I come now to the final matter of the assessment of an appropriate sum for damages. I find that the evidence established as follows. The plaintiff was rendered unconscious on impact or a moment thereafter by contact with the road, and did not regain consciousness until in the hospital with his parents present. His face was bandaged but his facial injuries were flesh wounds only and left no noticeable scars although the plaintiff said that when he became conscious they hurt him a lot and he cried. The hospital records relating to the plaintiff had become lost and had not been located by the time of the trial and the duly qualified and registered medical practitioner called by the plaintiff gave his evidence from recent x-rays taken, and examinations made by him of the plaintiff, and from the usual surgical medical and hospital practices that would have been applied. He said he found a healed simple fracture of the upper third of the right femur for which the main treatment had been traction of the limb by the use of a Steinmann pin through the lower leg, that such traction would have been applied within hours of entry to hospital and would have been kept on for six to eight weeks; that the normal period of hospitalisation would have been from three to four months, and that the full power of the limb would have been restored and complete recovery effected three to four months after discharge.

He further said that the fracture had healed well in perfect alignment with no shortening of the leg, loss of function, or loss of strength and with no problems of arthritis or otherwise for the future. He said that the plaintiff’s right leg is now as good as his left and as good as before the accident. He said that without pain killing drugs the plaintiff for the first two weeks would have had “severe” pain but that with painkilling drugs which he thought likely to have been administered there would still have been “some pain”, that during traction the leg would have been in a splint, that the treatment of traction is itself uncomfortable because the patient has to lie in the one position, and that from the completion of traction until the time that the leg fully recovered the lack of power in the leg would make him feel physically uncomfortable. He said that the use of the leg would be restricted heavily at first and as a measure of the progressive diminution of discomfort accompanying the gradual restoration of full use of the leg he said that the plaintiff would have had a stick to move around with (as the plaintiff himself said he had had) for the first three or four weeks after discharge but that then the stick would have been taken away from him. There was no evidence as to when the splint would have been removed.

I accept the foregoing evidence as giving a reasonable accurate picture of the factual situation and reject the plaintiff’s evidence that he still has some pain walking up and down slopes and suggesting vaguely that he may not be able to run.

The plaintiff claimed only for pain and suffering which I take to include the loss of unspecified amenities arising from his having been from time to time and in varying degrees unable to do some things which but for the injury he could have done and might have elected to do. I think that there should be also included in the assessment an element for violation of the integrity of the plaintiff’s body. I propose to award an ‘in globo’ sum in respect of those items as I think that any attempt to separate them out would produce a very artificial result.

Counsel for the plaintiff in this action made his submission concerning the ‘quantum’ of damages in, ‘inter alia’ the following terms:

“It has been the practice of the Public Solicitor’s Office in Papua New Guinea to settle claims involving leg injuries for an amount of K2,500.00 plus. Where the leg injury is a fractured femur and the recovery has involved the treatment of traction and the insertion of a pin, damages are usually around the K3,500.00 mark. This is in cases where no disabilities remain. Where there is a disability such as a shortening of a leg and the plaintiff is a young child, then it is our practice to settle such claims for amounts of K6-K7000.00. These are current figures which we use in our negotiations with the Motor Vehicles Insurance Trust. These figures, for children, have been accepted by the Motor Vehicles Insurance Trust. I seek from Your Honour in the present case a verdict for the Plaintiff in the vicinity of K3,500.00.”

I find the suggested figure of K3,500.00 truly astonishing, and if such a figure does indeed find support, upon a proper analysis, in the settlements effected by the Public Solicitor, then I am firmly of opinion that for this Court to accord with the tenor of such settlements would be to perpetuate fundamental and extreme error.

I would also remark in passing that in any event, not being based to any significant extent on court awards made in this country of which there appears to be an acute dearth, such settlements would be of only slight value as guidance.

Awards for pain and suffering and loss of amenities tend to be low. Simply as indicating this, in England commonly, for purposes of negotiation, compensation for pain and suffering is estimated at between £10 and £20 per week during total incapacity and seldom exceeds £1000; on the other hand awards between £50 and £100 are found in the case of trivial injuries. (Foundations of Tort. Glanville Williams and B.A. Hepple - publication 1976 - at p.81). In Fairbairn v. CumminsN162.html#_edn124" title="">[cxxiv]⁷ the Higrt of Australia said said “Pain and suffering, in general, is soon forgotten and when compensated in retrospect is not well paid.”. The New South Wales Supreme Court in 1973 in ale v. TissenN162.html#_edn125" title="">[cxxv]⁸ awarded general damag ££750 in a case where a girl aged three years suffered fractures to both thighs and completely recovered. This case, ais mentioned only to illustrate the general lowness of awards for pain and suffering.

In considering the amount appropriate as an award of damages in this action I have taken into account as best I am able the general social and economic conditions prevailing in this country at this time including such things as the various relevant standards of living and wage and salary levels, the cost of living, and the industrial approach as exemplified by the monetary compensations for specified injuries set out in the Workers’ Compensation legislation. In this context and against this background an appropriate award in this case seems to me to be K300 and I find accordingly.

On my earlier finding as to apportionment the sum of K300 will be reduced by one fifth.

There will be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants in the sum of K240 with costs as agreed upon, or if not agreed upon to be taxed, and I order that the said sum of K240 be paid into Court to be invested by the Registrar on behalf of the plaintiff and not paid out in whole or in part until the plaintiff reaches the age of twenty one except by order of a Judge of this Court.

I wish to thank Counsel on both sides for the very considerable assistance I have received from each in this action.

Solicitor for the Plaintiff: M. Kapi, Public Solicitor.

Counsel: I.C. McWalters.

Solicitor for the Defendants: C. Maino-Aoae, State Solicitor.

Counsel: J.A. Ross.

N162.html#_ednref118" title="">[cxviii]^{[1966] EWCA Civ 5; (1966) 3 All E.R. 398 (C.A.)}

N162.html#_ednref119" title="">[cxix]^{[1966] EWCA Civ 5; (1966) 3 All E.R. 398 (C.A.).}

N162.html#_ednref120" title="">[cxx] ^{(1968) 2 All E.R. 708 at p. 709 per Winn L.J.}

N162.html#_ednref121" title="">[cxxi]^{[1969] VicRp 120; (1969) V.R. 987.}

N162.html#_ednref122" title="">[cxxii]^{[1956] HCA 26; (1956) 96 C.L.R. 10}

N162.html#_ednref123" title="">[cxxiii] ^{(1962) W.A.R. 51.}

N162.html#_ednref124" title="">[cxxiv] ^{(1961) A.L.R. 205 at p.206.}

N162.html#_ednref125" title="">[cxxv]^{A.L.M.D., October 1973, p34; Britt’s “Comparable Verdicts in Personal Injury Cases” p. 1009.}