None v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust [1990] PGLawRp 317; [1990] PNGLR 561 (9 March 1990)

Papua New Guinea Law Reports - 1990

[1990] PNGLR 561 - Esther None v MVIT 

[1990] PNGLR 561

N832

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

NONE

V

MOTOR VEHICLES INSURANCE (PNG) TRUST

Goroka

Brunton J

9 March 1990

DAMAGES - Measure of - Dependency claim - Infant dependant - Age of dependency - Eighteen years more appropriate than sixteen years - Refusal to sanction compromise.

INFANTS AND CHILDREN - Sanctioning of settlements - Dependency claim - Age of dependency - Eighteen years more appropriate than sixteen years - Refusal to sanction compromise.

On an application for the sanctioning of a compromised damages settlement of a negligence action on behalf of an infant, the age of dependency was proposed at 16 years.

Held

(Refusing to sanction the compromise), that 16 years was an arbitrary figure and did not reflect the economic materiality of the dependency of children upon their parents which was more relevantly 18 years.

Motion

This was an application for court approval of a damages settlement on behalf of infant claimants.

Counsel

S Malaga, for the applicant.

9 March 1990

BRUNTON J: By notice of motion and supporting affidavit, the Court was asked inter alia to approve a compromised damages claim in respect of two dependent children, Mathew None and Gabe None.

By supporting affidavit it was shown that the amounts due in respect of the infants were calculated as follows:

Name	Est age at DOD	Proj yrs of depend	Rel to dec’d	Est econ loss	Initial damage on 3% interest tables	Con	Total
M None	15	1	son	K7.50	K400	nil	K400
G None	10	6	daughter	K7.50	K2152	nil	K2152

It has been a practice in the past to sanction compromises like this, particularly when only small amounts are involved. However a matter of concern arises over the arbitrary fixing of 16 years of age as the time at which a child ceases to be economically dependent upon its parents.

It is an arbitrary figure because the age of consent of a child has now been accepted in this jurisdiction to be 18 years. This is reflected on the face of the notice of motion where the Court was asked to order, in respect of Gabe None, that her money be invested by the Registrar until she reaches the age of 18 years.

The Court can take judicial notice of notorious facts. It is a notorious fact that children do not go to school until they have passed their seventh birthday. It is a notorious fact that a child would spend six years at community school.

It is a notorious fact that Provincial High School has four one year grades. This would, in the normal course of events, produce a dependency up to the age of at least 17 years, and 18 years would not be exceptional. Some children go on to National High School, which is another two years. A small number go to university or other tertiary institutions for between a further four to six years.

A court may also take judicial notice of the fact that jobs for youth are in short supply. Particularly in the towns, the absence of employment forces children to live with their parents, and to become economically dependent upon their parents. In addition parents are expected to bear the economic costs of youth because youth wages, by virtue of the minimum wages award, and other awards, are set below the level of subsistence designated by the minimum wage for adults.

All in all, there is little or no material basis for fixing a child’s age of dependency at 16 years. This is quite arbitrary.

Accordingly, I will not sanction the proposed compromise in its present form.

Orders refused

Lawyers for the applicant: W Neill & Co.