Young v Niugini Nius Pty Ltd [1989] PGLawRp 48; [1988-89] PNGLR 45 (17 February 1989)

Papua New Guinea Law Reports - 1988-89

[1988-89] PNGLR 45 - Dennis Charles Young v Niugini Nius Pty Ltd 

[1988-89] PNGLR 45

N718

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

YOUNG

V

NIUGINI NIUS PTY LTD AND OTHERS

Waigani

Andrew AJ

17 February 1989

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Time - Dispensing with compliance - Shortening of time for filing defence and other pleadings - Defamation proceedings by Speaker of National Parliament - Allegation of National interest - Application based on speculation - Plaintiff's remedy unaffected - Interests of defendants to be protected - National Court Rules, O 1, r 7.

Order 1, r 7, of the National Court Rules provides that the Court may dispense with compliance with any of the requirements of the Rules either before or after the occasion for compliance arises.

The Speaker of the National Parliament commenced proceedings for defamation alleged to be contained in a newspaper article which stated that the Speaker would support an Opposition-sponsored vote of no-confidence in his own Government. He sought to have the proceedings continue according to a timetable which considerably reduced the times allowed by the Rules for filing defences, etc. On the application it was argued that, because of an anticipated no-confidence motion against the Government, it was considered to be a matter of National importance that the proceedings be determined before the motion was put.

Held

(Dismissing the application) As the application was based on speculation and the plaintiff had his remedy in damages whatever occurred in the Parliament, in the circumstances, the National interest was not so affected that it should outweigh the interests of the defendants to be allowed to proceed to conduct their case in the manner provided by the National Court Rules.

It would be very unusual in any circumstances to reduce times for defences to be filed and all interlocutory periods to be reduced.

Motion

This was an application on notice seeking to continue proceedings in defamation commenced by writ of summons by way of a timetable effectively reducing all times for the filing of subsequent pleadings.

Counsel

M Goodman, for the applicant/plaintiff.

P Payne, for the respondent/defendant.

17 February 1989

ANDREW AJ: This is an application by way of notice of motion for:

“Orders and Directions pursuant to order 1, rule 7 of the national court rules that these proceedings continue on the following timetable:

1.       Notices of Intention to Defend to be filed by 4 pm on Monday, 20 February 1989.

2.       Defences to be filed by 4 pm on 24 February 1989.

3.       Any reply to be filed on 27 February.

4.       The matter to be fixed for hearing on 27 February or so soon thereafter as may be available.”

THE BACKGROUND TO THIS MATTER IS AS FOLLOWS

In his substantive action the plaintiff is claiming that he has been defamed by the defendants and he seeks damages. Briefly stated, the defamation alleged is contained in an article appearing in the Niugini Nius in its edition of 3 February 1989. The article refers to the plaintiff, who is the Speaker of the National Parliament, and says that he will support an Opposition-sponsored vote of no-confidence in his own Government. The article goes on to say that the plaintiff's intention was made clear in a letter he wrote to Mr Wingti on Wednesday, 1 February 1989.

The plaintiff then issued a writ of summons dated 6 February 1989 against the defendants who were served with the writ on that day. The plaintiff has now apparently stepped down as Speaker pending the outcome of these proceedings. Parliament is about to commence sitting.

It is said that the purpose of the application is to shorten the interlocutory steps in the proceedings to allow the matter to be heard before an anticipated no-confidence motion against the Government by the Opposition and it is said that the Government considers it a matter of National importance that the proceedings be so determined prior to this anticipated motion. To this effect, evidence has been called from the Prime Minister who also stated that, as the Speaker held the chair of Parliament, it is in the interests of orderly government and of the National Parliament that the Speaker should occupy the chair during the forthcoming session and had requested that he do so. He said that, if this was not possible, then he would like the Speaker to have the matter resolved before Parliament began.

No evidence has been given by the Speaker but his counsel submits that he is concerned that the alleged defamation should not touch the office of Speaker and, if it has been said who he is going to vote for in any no-confidence motion, then this may have an influence upon the Members in the way in which they may vote and could produce a result which might not otherwise have happened.

Order 1, r 7, of the National Court Rules is as follows:

“The Court may dispense with compliance with any of the requirements of these Rules either before or after the occasion for compliance arises.”

What is being asked for, therefore, is that the time for filing notices of intention to defend be reduced from the normal period; that times for defences and replies be drastically reduced; that the periods for the special rules relating to defamation proceedings be similarly reduced; that times for defences and reply be reduced; and by inference that the various rules relating to discovery, interrogatories and admissions and all pre-trial procedures be reduced if necessary.

The first difficulty which the plaintiff faces is that there is no evidence before the Court that a no-confidence motion will be introduced into Parliament when it sits and that the whole application is based on speculation. I accept the evidence of the Prime Minister, a man of obvious integrity and honesty, that he is concerned that the Speaker should hold the chair of Parliament at the next session in the interests of orderly government and of the National Parliament and that this is a matter of National importance. But the plaintiff is really going further than this and says through his counsel that (as I understand his assertion):

“There has been a slur against myself and against the office of Speaker and that this slur may have as a consequence that some Members of Parliament will be influenced in their voting which could produce a contrary result and this would be against the National interest.”

I do not think that that is very likely. The Members must be given credit as intelligent persons who have been elected to represent their people. They will be well aware that the Speaker is disputing the truth of the newspaper article and that he has commenced these proceedings for defamation. I do not think it could be fairly said that they would not be able to vote as representatives of their people in an unbiased way. In addition, there is an office of Deputy Speaker so that the proceedings of Parliament are not going to be interrupted. If there has been such a slur against the Speaker, his remedy is the one he has now commenced and he would receive damages.

But the real point here is that the application, as I have said, is based on speculation and I must also consider the interests of the defendants. It would be very unusual in any circumstances to reduce times for defences to be filed and all interlocutory periods to be reduced. As an example of the difficulty created, it is said that the first defendant has yet to appoint his lawyers and this will depend on consultation with his insurer who is overseas. It seems to me that he would be hopelessly prejudiced if forced to proceed in the times asked for, given the nature of defamation proceedings and proceedings generally.

I therefore find that the application is based on speculation and in the circumstances to which I have referred, the National interest is not so affected that it should outweigh the interests of the defendants who should be allowed to proceed to conduct their case in the manner which is provided to them by the National Court Rules. The plaintiff has his remedy in damages and the defendants are not seeking to stop him pursuing that remedy, but they are entitled to have the matter heard according to the rules.

I therefore dismiss the application. Costs of this application are to be costs in the cause.

Application dismissed

Lawyer for the plaintiff: H B C Love.

Lawyers for the second, third and fourth defendants: Warner Shand.