Christian v Urusemal [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291 (App. 2006) (22 June 2006)

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION
Cite as Christian v. Urusemal, [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291 (App. 2006)

PETER M. CHRISTIAN, in his official official capacityAPPEAL
as the Speaker of the Fourteenth Congress of the
Federated States of Micronesia,
Petitioner,

vs.

JOSEPH J. URUSEMAL, in his official capacity as the
President of the Federated States of Micronesia,
Respondent.

CASE NO. P2-2006

BEFORE:
Hon. Andon L. Amaraich, Chief Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Martin G. Yinug, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Dennis K. Yamase, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Decided: June 22, 2006

APPEARANCES:

For the Petitioner:
T. Lam Dang, Esq.
Legislative Counsel
Fourteenth Congress of the FSM
P.O. Box PS-3
Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96942

For the Respondent:
Janhabi Nandy, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
FSM Department of Justice
P.O. Box PS-105

[14 FSM Intrm. 299]

Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96941

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HEADNOTES

Appellate Review - Decisions Reviewable
The appellate division may consider "direct appeals" in cases of national importance and extreme time sensitivity involving the national government. Christian v. Urusemal, [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291, 293 (App. 2006).

Appellate Review - Motions
Motions may be decided without oral argument. Even an appeal’s merits may be submitted on the briefs and decided without oral argument if the parties agree. Christian v. Urusemal, [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291, 293 (App. 2006).

Constitutional Law - Case or Dispute; Separation of Powers
A President’s reason for vetoing the bills passed during the Fourteenth Congress’s Second Special Session is a non-justiciable issue because when the Constitution has a textually demonstrable commitment of an issue to a coordinate branch of government, it is a nonjusticiable political question not to be decided by the court because of the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution. Christian v. Urusemal, [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291, 294 (App. 2006).

Constitutional Law - Case or Dispute; Separation of Powers
The Constitution does not limit the grounds upon which the President can veto bills. The President can veto any bill for any reason he chooses. The Constitution requires the President to return to Congress, within ten days, a bill he has vetoed along with his objections. Congress then makes its own determination of whether those objections will stand by either overriding or sustaining the veto. Invalidation or nullification of a Presidential veto is textually committed by the Constitution to Congress because the power to override a Presidential veto is expressly delegated to Congress. Christian v. Urusemal, [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291, 294 (App. 2006).

Constitutional Law - Case or Dispute; Separation of Powers
The President’s reasons for vetoing a bill cannot be questioned in the judicial branch. The court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief of declaring the President’s vetoes void regardless of what the President’s objections were. Christian v. Urusemal, [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291, 294 (App. 2006).

Constitutional Law - Case or Dispute
When the Congress Speaker asks the court, before any enactment process has been completed, to advise the parties on exactly where in the process they stand, the Speaker asks the court for an advisory opinion, which it cannot give. The Constitution restricts the FSM Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to actual cases and disputes. It does not sit to render advisory opinions. Christian v. Urusemal, [2006] FMSC 25; 14 FSM Intrm. 291, 294 (App. 2006).

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[2006] FMSC 26; [14 FSM Intrm. 300]

COURT’S OPINION

PER CURIAM:

On April 20, 2006, Fourteenth Congress Speaker Peter M. Christian filed this case as a "direct appeal" in the FSM Supreme Court appellate division. (Due to inconsistencies in the Speaker’s pleadings, the clerks inadvertently filed the case in the trial division and docketed it as Civil Action No. 2006-009. The Chief Clerk, by his May 29, 2006 Notice, "terminated" Civil Action No. 2006-009 and assigned appellate division docket number P2-2006 to this matter.) The appellate division has previously considered "direct appeals" in cases of national importance and extreme time sensitivity involving the national government. See Urusemal v. Capelle, [2004] FMSC 44; 12 FSM Intrm. 577, 582-83 (App. 2004). This direct appeal is therefore before us in the appellate division.

President Joseph J. Urusemal moves to dismiss this case. We grant his motion. Our reasons follow.

I.

The Speaker’s "Complaint" raises two claims. First, his petition asserts that President Urusemal’s vetoes of the bills passed by the Fourteenth Congress during its Second Special Session (February 27 to March 3, 2006) were improper because the vetoes were based on erroneous grounds and the court should order them set aside. The President vetoed the bills on the ground that the bills’ first readings and second readings were held on the same calendar day in violation of the Constitution which provides that "[t]o become law, a bill must pass 2 readings on separate days." FSM Const. art. IX, § 20. pee Sr contends that what while the bills in question were passed on two readings on the same calendar day the readings were held on separate "legislative" daysuse Css starts its days at 10:00 a.m.

Seco>Second, tnd, the Speaker’s petition asserts, in the alternative, that, if we hold that the Constitution requires that bills must pass two readings on separate calendar days, then we must order the President’s vetoes set aside as premature because the bills have not yet passed a valid second reading in Congress.

II.

On May 11, 2006, the President filed his motion to dismiss. On May 15, 2006, the Speaker filed his opposition. On May 19, 2006, the President filed his reply to the opposition. On May 25, 2006, the parties filed a joint motion asking us to decide on the President’s motion to dismiss without oral argument.

Motions may be decided without oral argument. Even an appeal’s merits may be submitted on the briefs and decided without oral argument if the parties agree. FSM App. R. 34(f). We therefore grant the parties’ motion to decide without oral argument the President’s motion to dismiss.

III.

The President’s motion to dismiss raises three grounds: 1) that the bills were not passed in accordance with the Constitution because the only possible meaning of the constitutional provision requiring readings on separate days is that the readings must be on different calendar days; 2) that the court does not have jurisdiction to review a presidential veto’s basis; and 3) that the Speaker does not have standing to bring this case because there is no case or dispute so that any opinion the court could give would be advisory. The Speaker responds that Congress’s procedure in passing the bills was constitutional because Congress can, under its power to make its own rules, FSM Const. art. IX, §;17(b), defi define a day in any manner it chooses and that it chooses to start a day at 10:00 a.m.; and that the FSM Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide this case because the court has the power to issue preemptory writs and what the Speaker seeks

[14 FSM Intrm. 301]

is equitable relief akin to the extraordinary writ of prohibition.

We conclude that the President’s reason for vetoing the bills passed during the Fourteenth Congress’s Second Special Session is a non-justiciable issue. When the Constitution has a textually demonstrable commitment of an issue to a coordinate branch of government, it is a nonjusticiable political question not to be decided by the court because of the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution. Aten v. National Election Comm’r (III)[1993] FMSC 28; , 6 FSM Intrm. 143, 145 (App. 1993).

The Constitution does not limit the grounds upon which the President can veto bills. The President can veto any bill for any reason he chooses. The Constitution requires the President to return to Congress, within ten days, a bill he has vetoed along with his objections. FSM Const. art. IX, § 22. Congresn makes its own own determination of whether those objections will stand by either overriding or sustaining the veto. Invalidation or nullification of a Pentiao is textually committed by the Constitution to C to Congreongress because the power to override a Presidential veto is expressly delegated to Congress. FSM Const. art. IX, § 2(q). The Prnt’s reas reasons for vetoing a bill therefore cannot be questioned in the judicial branch. We have no jurisdiction to grant the Speaker’s requested relief of declaring the Prnt&#8 vetoes void rega regardlesrdless of what the President’s objections were.

We also have no jurisdiction to grant the Speaker’s alternative requested relief - that the President’s vetoes be set aside as premature because the bills have not yet passed a valid second reading in Congress. Congress has neither overridden or sustained the President’s veto. Nor has Congress passed any of the bills on a "second" second reading and contended that those bills have become law. (Congress could also introduce and pass on two separate calendar days bills identical to the ones passed in the Second Special Session and present them to the President for his approval.) The Speaker asks us, before any enactment process has been completed, to advise the parties on exactly where in the process they stand. The Speaker thus asks us for an advisory opinion. This we cannot give. The Constitution restricts the FSM Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to actual cases and disputes. FSM v. Louis, [2000] FMSC 39; 9 FSM Intrm. 474, 481 (App. 2000). We do not sit to render advisory opinions. Fritz v. National Election Dir., [2003] FMSC 37; 11 FSM Intrm. 442, 444 (App. 2003).

IV.

Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to adjudicate the Speaker’s claims or to grant either the relief sought or the alternative relief sought. The President’s motion to dismiss is therefore granted.

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[14 FSM Intrm. 302]