![]() |
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
Magistrates Court of Fiji |
IN THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Criminal Case No. 21 of 2018
STATE
v.
VULI LEVUIWASA
For the State: Constable T. Naicker
For the Accused: Ms. Takinana of the Legal Aid Commission
RULING
The Law
“Before discussing the answers to the above problems as contained in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, it is important to remind ourselves again of the rights of the accused as enshrined in section 14 (2) of the 2013 Constitution, as it relates to this case.”
“Every person charged with an offence has the right –
(g) to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay.”
(Underline added)
“[1] Timely justice is one of the hallmarks of a free and democratic society. In the criminal law context, it takes on special significance. Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms attests to this, in that it guarantees the right of accused persons “to be tried within a reasonable time”.
[2] Moreover, the ... public expects their criminal justice system to bring accused persons to trial expeditiously. As the months following a criminal charge become years, everyone suffers. Accused persons remain in a state of uncertainty, often in pre-trial detention. Victims and their families who, in many cases, have suffered tragic losses cannot move forward with their lives. And the public, whose interest is served by promptly bringing those charged with criminal offences to trial, is justifiably frustrated by watching years pass before a trial occurs.
[3] An efficient criminal justice system is therefore of utmost importance. The ability to provide fair trials within a reasonable time is an indicator of the health and proper functioning of the system itself. The stakes are indisputably high.”
“170. (1) During the hearing of any case, the Magistrate must not normally allow any adjournment other than from day to day consecutively until the trial has reached its conclusion, unless there is good cause, which is to be stated in the record.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), “good cause” includes the reasonably excusable absence of a party or a witness or of a party’s lawyer.
(3) An adjournment under subsection (1) must be to a time and place to then be appointed and stated in the presence and hearing of the party or parties, or their respective lawyers then present.
(4) During the adjournment of a case under subsection (1), the Magistrate may
(a) permit the accused person to leave the court until the further hearing of the case; or
(b) commit the accused to prison; or
(c) release the accused upon him or her entering into a bond (with or without sureties at the discretion of the Magistrate) conditioned for his or her appearance at the time and place to which the hearing or further hearing is adjourned.
(5) If the accused person has been committed to prison during an adjournment the adjournment may not be for more than 48 hours.
(6) If a case is adjourned, the Magistrate may not dismiss it for want of prosecution and must allow the prosecution to call its evidence or offer no evidence on the day fixed for the adjourned hearing, before adjudicating on the case.
(7) A case must not be adjourned to a date later than 12 months after the summons was served on the accused unless the Magistrate (for good cause which is to be stated in the record) considers such an adjournment to be required in the interests of justice.”
7. According to section 170 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Magistrate must not allow any adjournment of a hearing other than from day to day consecutively until the conclusion of the hearing. However, the Magistrate is allowed to adjourn the hearing for another date if she finds a good cause to do so. Section 170 (1) and (2) state:
...
8. Accordingly, the default position is to refuse any adjournment other than from day to day basis until the conclusion. Therefore, an adjournment to another day is an exception under section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.”
“150. A Judge or Magistrate may make any other orders as to costs as may be required in the circumstances: -
(a) defray the costs incurred by any party as a result of an adjournment sought by another party.”
.......................................
Seini Puamau
RESIDENT MAGISTRATE
Dated at Suva this 25th day of October 2023.
[1] Overruled: R. v. Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771; referred to: R. v. Askov, 1990 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199; R. v. Pidskalny, 2013 SKCA 74, 299 C.C.C. (3d) 396; R. v. Godin, 2009 SCC 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Williamson, 2016 SCC 28, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; R. v. MacDougall, 1998 CanLII 763 (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 45; R. v. Conway, 1989 CanLII 66 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659; R. v. Elliott (2003), 2003 CanLII 24447 (ON CA), 114 C.R.R. (2d) 1; R. v. Vassell, 2016 SCC 26, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 625; R. v. Auclair, 2014 SCC 6, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 83; R. v. Rodgerson, 2015 SCC 38, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 760; R. v. Tremblay, 1987 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435; Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429; R. v. Brydges, 1990 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190; R. v. Feeney, 1997 CanLII 343 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 117; Mills v. The Queen, 1986 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209; Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401; R. v. Omar, 2007 ONCA 117, 84 O.R. (3d) 493; R. v. Ghavami, 2010 BCCA 126, 253 C.C.C. (3d) 74.
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJMC/2023/20.html