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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT LAUTOKA
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL CASE NO.: HAA 1 OF 2014
BETWEEN:
STATE
Appellant
AND:
1. SALENDRA SEN SINHA
2. LOMANI DERENALAGI
Respondents
Counsels: Ms. S. Kiran for the Appellant
The 1st Respondent in person
Mr. E. Sailo for the 2nd Respondent
Date of Judgment: 30 June 2014
JUDGMENT
First Count
Statement of Offence
KEEPING IN CONFINEMENT OF ABDUCTED PERSON: Contrary to Section 253 of the Penal Code, Cap, 17.
Particulars of the Offence
SALENDRA SEN SINHA f/n JOGENDRA PRASAD and LOMANI DERENALAGI on the 10th day of July, 2008 at Tauva in the Western Division having abducted Police Constable Vishwa Baran, wrongly confined the said Police Constable Vishwa Baran in vehicle registration number LR 969.
ALTERNATE COUNT
Statement of Offence
WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT: - Contrary to Section 256 of the Penal Code, Cap. 17
Particulars of the Offence
SALENDRA SEN SINHA f/n JOGENDRA PRASAD and LOMANI DERENALAGI on the 10th day of July, 2008 at Tauva in the Western Division wrongfully confined Police Constable Vishwa Baran in vehicle registration number LR 969.
“Even though the request for adjournment is to next week Monday and if it is granted, it still constitutes a delay which is to the detriment of the Accused person’s rights to have their trial begin and conclude without reasonable delay. The issue then arising is whether the reasons given to support an adjournment constitute delay or good cause.”
“I find that the reasons given for the non-attendance of the witness who is supposed to be in court today are unreasonable and is not a good cause in light of the fact that there had been more than enough time for planning and set herself free for the trial date. On the same note, even though the date was set in July 2013, she may have been served summons to witness only a month ago and if so, her plans for the rituals may have been already set.”
“[17] If FICAC or the DPP files an appeal against the acquittal by the Magistrates’ Court in compliance with their statutory right, then there is a presumption that the official decision to prosecute an appeal is made in a principled manner. In those circumstances, there is no logic in requiring a written sanction to validate your own appeal. Written sanction is only required if an appeal is brought in the High Court by a person or institution other than FICAC or DPP. Based on those reasons, we hold that the High Court erred in law in dismissing FICAC’s appeal for want of written sanction.”
(1) During the hearing of any case, the magistrate must not normally allow any adjournment other than from day to day consecutively until the trial has reached its conclusion, unless there is good cause, which is to be stated in the record.
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1) “good cause” includes the reasonably excusable absence of a party or witness or of a party’s lawyer.
(3) An adjournment under sub-section (1) must be to a time and place to be then appointed and stated in the presence and hearing of the party or parties, or their respective lawyers then present.
(4) During the adjournment of a case under sub-section (1), the magistrate may-
(a) Permit the accused person to leave the court until the further hearing of the case; or
(b) Commit the accused to prison; or
(c) Release the accused upon his or her entering into a bond (with or without sureties at the discretion of the magistrate) conditioned for his or her appearance at the time and place to which the hearing or further hearing is adjourned.
(5) If the accused person has been committed to prison during an adjournment the adjournment may not be for more than 48 hours.
(6) If a case is adjourned, the magistrate may not dismiss it for want of prosecution and must allow the prosecution to call its evidence or to offer no evidence on the day fixed for the adjourned hearing, before adjudicating on the case.
(7) A case must not be adjourned to a date later than 12 months after the summons was served on the accused unless the magistrate (for good cause which is to be stated in the record) considers such an adjournment to be required in the interests of justice.
1st Ground of Appeal
“The law in relation to an appeal against the exercise of discretion is settled. The discretion will be reviewed on appeal, if the trial court acts on wrong principle, or mistakes the facts, or is influenced by extraneous considerations or fails to take into account of relevant considerations. In addition, if it should appear that on the facts the order made is unreasonable or plainly unjust, even if the nature of the error is not discoverable, the order will be reviewed (House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 437). Failure to give weight or sufficient to relevant considerations will also vitiate the exercise of a judicial discretion but only if that failure is central to the exercise of the discretion (Charles Osenton & co. v Johnston[1942]AC 130).
“The granting of an adjournment is always the exercise of a judicial discretion. (ROBERT TWEEDLE MACAHILL and REGINAM, (Crim. App. 43/80 FCA). I am of the view that, in the exercise of his judicial discretion the learned Magistrate ought to have granted an adjournment to allow the State to r its absent witnesstnesses. For the learned Magistrate to say that it was a "final" hearing day and he will not budge from that means that he is fettering the exercise of the judicial discretested in him which he cannocannot do. This approach of his is certainly going to cause injustice to the parties. Not only that, this was a very serious offence involving a huge quantity of 'drug' for which the law provides imprisonment for a few years and mandatory custodial sentence if the Respondent is found guilty and convicted. I find that if ever there was a case for the exercise of discretion it was this. On this aspect I refer to the following passage from the judgment of ATKIN L.J. in MAXWELL v KEUN (1928) 1 K45 a645 at 653 C.A.:
"I quite agree the Court of Appeal ought to be very slow indeed to interfere with the discretion of the learned judge on such a question as an adjournment of a trial, andery seldom does so; but, on the other hand, if it appears tars that the result of the order made below is to defeat the rights of the parties altogether, and to do that which the Court of Appeal is satisfied would be an injustice to one or other of the parties, then the court has power to review such an order, and it is, to my mind, its duty to do so."
“As stated earlier the Court has to consider whether in this case it was an appropriate, fitting and lawful exercise of the learned Magistrate's discretion to acquit the accused.”
“A similar situation arose in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal case of ATTORNEY GENERAL v TUNG CHUEN (1987) 987) 2 HKC 349 at 350 and I find the following passage from the judgment of KEMPSTER J.A. pertinent to this case:
One relevant factor must be the durinch an accused perd person hson has been kept in custody. Another must be the gravity of the charges. A third may be the behaviour of the prosecution. We incline to the view that not only must someone sitting in a judicial capacity give an opportunity for the explanation of failure by any party to have a case ready, whether in relation to documents, the availability of witnesses or otherwise but also, unless, for example, a party has shown a contemptuous disregard of his obligation to further the expeditious discharge of business, for that party to put his house in order within a reasonable time.
8220;Here iere it is the Appellant's contention that the learned Magistrate did not exercise his discretion in a judicial way. In R v BIRMINGHAM JUST exu> ex. p LAM & ANOR (1983) 3 AER 23, 28 WOOLF J said:
>"When exercisircising the discretion which they have whether or not to adjourn cases, tstices have to exercise thee their discretion judicially. Doing that, they must be just not only to the defendants but to the prosecution as well. They must not use their powers to refuse an adjournment to give a semblance of justification for their decision to dismiss the prosecution when the refusal of an adjournment means that that is an inevitable consequence."
The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, saying, at page 402:
“The principals upon which an appellate court should act when reviewing a decision by a judge or magistrate to grant or refuse adjournment are well settled. The judge or the magistrate has a discretion as to the proper mode and time of trying an action. The exercise of that discretion should be interfered with by an appellate court only on exceptional circumstances. If it appears that the result of the order made in the court below is to defeat the rights of the parties altogether or to do an injustice to one or other of the parties, the appellate court has a duty to review such an order. Where the refusal of an adjournment would seriously prejudice a party, the application should be granted. If not granted, an appellate court will intervene if the discretion has not been exercised judicially or where its exercise was based on a wrong principle or resulted in an injustice: Maxwell - v - Keun (11 KB 645; G GSA Industries Pty Ltd. - v - NT Gas Ltd. WL NS10.<710.
In the present case we are satisfied that the Magistrate exercised his discretion on a wrong principle. Iapparrom his decision that
we have reproduced above thve that heat he was primarily concerned at the administrative inconvenience and cost to the Court of part
hearing the case, and the Magistrate then being required to return to Tavua to complete the hearing. This was not a proper reason
for denying the State the right to the charges hees heard and determined by the Court. We accept that financial considerations and
the convenience of the Court can be taken into account in determining how and when a case is to ard, but that can never over over-ride
the interests of justice. In the present case, if these factors were considered to be relevant, with the result that a part-hearing
was inappropriate, the correct course was to adjourn the hearing to a date and time when it could be properly heard and determined.
By refusing either to part-hear the case, or to adjourn it, the Magistrate’s decision resulted in an injustice to the State.”
Ground 2
“For clarity I record the formal steps that should be taken by a Magistrate in this situation. (After he refuses the prosecutor’s adjournment application) These rulings by him must be formally noted in the record:
(i) The application for an adjournment is refused;
(ii) The hearing then proceeds by the Magistrate calling upon the Defendants to plead (if they have not already done so) and then calling upon the prosecutor to begin;
(iii) If no evidence is called by the Prosecutor, then the Defendant or Defendants can be acquitted under Section 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code."
Sudharshana De Silva
JUDGE
At Lautoka
30th June 2014
Solicitors: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Appellant
1st Respondent in Person
Koyas for the 2nd Respondent
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