IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
Meredith v Phillips [2025] WSSC 64 (11 April 2025)

Case name: 	Meredith v Phillips	
		
Citation: 	[2025] WSSC 64	
		
Decision date: 	11 April 2025	
		
Parties: 	Richard Meredith and Joseph Meredith businessmen of Levili (Plaintiffs) v Paul Phillips and Vivienne Philllips, business owner of Levili (Respondents)	
		
Hearing date(s): 	11, 12, 13 November and 2 December 2024	
		
File number(s): 		
		
Jurisdiction: 	Supreme Court – CIVIL	
		
Place of delivery: 	Supreme Court of Samoa, Mulinuu	
		
Judge(s): 	Justice Leiataualesa Daryl Clarke 	
		
On appeal from:		
		
Order:	-	For the foregoing reasons:
-	the plaintiffs Statement of Claim and the defendants Counterclaim are dismissed; and
-	As against each other, each party to bear their own costs. 	
		
Representation: 	T Atoa for Plaintiffs
P Fepuleai and F Ioane for Defendants	
		
Catchwords: 		
		
Words and phrases:	civil contempt proceeding involves allegations and counter-allegations of contempt of court arising from alleged breaches of orders stemming.	
		
Legislation cited:		
		
Cases cited:	Meredith v Philips [2015] WSSC 54 (19 May 2015),
Richard Meredith & Joe Meredith v Paul Philips and Vivienne Philips (Unreported Oral Decision, 03 August 2023), Polynesian Airlines v Samoa Observer [1999] WSSC 45 (16 March 1999), Fa’atautua i Le Atua Ua tasi (FAST) Incorporated & Ors v Malielegaoi & Ors [2022] WSSC 7 (23 March 2022), Reynolds v Parklands Properties Ltd [201] NZSC 179.	
		
Summary of decision:		

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
HELD AT MULINUU

BETWEEN:

RICHARD MEREDITH AND JOSEPH MEREDITH, both businessmen of Levili.

Applicants

A N D:

PAUL PHILLIPS AND VIVIENNE PHILLIPS, both business owners of Levili.

Defendants

Representation:	T Atoa for Applicants
P Fepuleai and F Ioane for Defendants

Judgment:		11th April 2025

JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION:
1. 	This civil contempt proceeding involves allegations and counter-allegations of contempt of court arising from alleged breaches of orders stemming from proceedings before Vaai J in 2015 in Meredith v Philips [2015] WSSC 54 (19 May 2015) and Perese CJ in 2023 in Richard Meredith & Joe Meredith v Paul Philips and Vivienne Philips (Unreported Oral Decision, 03 August 2023).  
2. 	The plaintiffs and the defendants are close family members. Vivienne Philips is the plaintiff Richard Meredith’s (“Richard”) niece. Joseph Meredith (“Joseph”), Richard’s son is Vivienne’s first cousin. Vivienne is married to Paul Philips.
3. 	This proceeding is the latest manifestation of a longstanding and deeply acrimonious dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The dispute concerns the use of easements on a sub-division at Levili created by Richard’s father and Vivienne’s grandfather, the late Richard Vincent Meredith (“RV Meredith”). The plaintiffs and the defendants live on the sub-division, lease parts of it out and operate businesses from other parts. The dispute began due to congestion created by the defendants’ customers parking on the easements affecting the plaintiffs access and has degenerated to much more, as the evidence in this case showed. In 2015 in Meredith v Philips [2015] WSSC 54 (19 May 2015), Vaai J described the dispute at the time in paragraph 10 saying:
	“The evidence (documentary and oral) reveals a deplorable situation of which neither side can feel proud, the inability of the parties to understand each other or to resolve the problem in a common sense way, particularly, given that both parties had a common understanding of the reasons why their late father created the unusually extended easements.”
4. 	Nine years later, the dispute has degenerated further with the plaintiffs and defendants now taking contempt proceedings against each other. As Vaai J stated those many years ago, neither side can feel proud of the deplorable situation – one seemingly driven by deep resentment, pettiness and the lack of maturity to resolve their disagreements in a constructive commonsense way. Regrettably, as is too often the case involving family disputes in Samoa, emotion gets the better of common sense in otherwise mature rational people. In the end in disputes of this nature, it almost never ends well.
BACKGROUND:
5. 	In 1981, RV Meredith sub-divided parcel 594 at Levili shown in plan 4385 (exhibit P3). The sub-division is accessed from the main road to the west first to parcel 797 then 798 and onto 593 on plan 4385. Rights of way are created across parcels 797, 798 and onwards to 593. 
6. 	On the first parcel 797 is a building described in exhibit P3 as a “Building Residence”. The remainder of parcel 797 is an easement. Parcel 797 is registered to “R.V. Meredith Products Limited” (Annexure A1, affidavit of Joseph Meredith, exhibit P5). Joseph Meredith claims ownership of parcel 797 as sole shareholder in “R.V. Meredith Products Limited”. The defendants dispute this on the grounds that the registered owner of parcel 797 was a company by the same name: “R.V. Meredith Products Limited” incorporated on 12th April 1983 which changed its name to “Island Sun Products Co Ltd” on 5th May 2004 and was then de-registered on the 26th June 2012.  “R.V. Meredith Products Limited” which Joseph Meredith is the sole shareholder was incorporated on the 29th September 2013.  Whether Joseph Meredith is the beneficial owner of parcel 797 through his shares in the recently incorporated “R.V. Meredith Products Limited” is in dispute. Nothing material however turns on this question in this proceeding.
7. 	To the east of parcel 797 is parcel 798. Parcel 798 has a building described on plan 4385 as a “Bakery and Residence”. Beyond the building, the remainder of parcel 798 constitutes a right of way. In 2015, this parcel was owned by Jewel Cook, Vivienne’s mother. The defendants were then lessee of parcel 798 operating their Pacific Jewel business. In 2020, the defendants bought parcel 798 and continue to operate Pacific Jewel from this site.
8. 	Parcel 800 plan 4385 is a small parcel that abuts to the south of parcels 797 and 798. Parcel 801 east of parcel 800, is also a small parcel that abuts to the south of parcel 798. Both these parcels remain registered in the name of “Richard Vincent Meredith”.  Richard’s uncontested evidence was that the “Sunshine Biscuits” and the “Samoa Meats” building on parcel 593 encroach on to these two parcels.
9. 	The final parcel is 593. This large parcel at the southern part of plan 4385 belongs to Richard. This parcel has two buildings, the Sunshine Biscuits and Samoa Meats buildings together with a substantial right of way that benefit parcels 797 and 798.
THE CONTEMPT CLAIMS:
 Decision: Vaai J
10. 	In 2015, Vaai J heard a dispute between Richard as applicant and Paul, Vivienne and Jewel Cook as respondents. In those proceedings, Richard alleged wrongful interference with the rights of way on plan 4385. Ostensibly, this concerned the alleged obstruction of the rights of way by the defendants’ customers parking on the rights of way. Following the hearing, Vaai J ordered that:
	“1. 	The car parking lots next to and which adjoin the Sunshine Biscuit building to the east and north shall remain and will not be removed.
	2. 	The rest of the car parking lots shall be removed within 7 days.
	The claim for damages is refused.
	Each party shall bear its own costs.”
11. 	The plaintiffs allege that the defendants are in breach of the orders made by Vaai J in the following ways: 
(i) 	The defendants continue to obstruct the easement on parcel 798 for the benefit of the plaintiffs contrary to order 2 made by Vaai J; and
(ii) 	The defendants continue to allow their customers to park on the east side of the building, the same side that Vaai J ordered be cleared.
 Decision: Perese CJ
12. 	In 2023, the plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants for the removal of a wall described by Perese CJ as having been “erected between Lots 800 and 801, across a right of way, which in an earlier decision of His Honour Justice Vaai was determined to be easements for the benefits of each of Lots 797, 798 and 593.”  Perese CJ made the following orders: 
	“…The cutting off of a right of way, at least half of the access space to Lot 593 (owned by Mr Meredith), as between Lots 800-801, is a significant impediment to the use of the right of way and therefore I make the following orders:
1)	I direct that the defendants remove the fence that they erected and return the right of way to its former state within 7 days of the date of this decision.
2)	I do not accept, at this stage, that it is necessary for the making of an order that the car parking which has been used by the defendants with the plaintiffs tacit, if not express consent, and which is now objected to by the plaintiffs should be removed. The parking position is preserved by an agreement of easement parking dated 17.7.2015 and this can continue pending further order of the Court following disposition of the substantive issues.
3)	I order costs in the sum of $1,000.00 be paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs because there is clearly no proper basis for the fence being erected where it is, other than its part of continuing badrelations between the parties.
4)	I also direct that the plaintiffs be warned, at least, and are hereby warned that they should not take any steps to place equipment or plants or otherwise within the right of way because the right of way is for the benefit of all relevant parties being the owners I cited earlier.
5)	…” 
13. 	The plaintiffs allege that the defendants are in breach of Perese CJ orders in the following ways: 
(i) 	The defendants have neglected to remove the wall and repair the damage as ordered and is now parking his vehicle and his staff vehicle “at all hours in front of 801 deliberately blocking the entrance to the Plaintiff’s home and his wife’s business.”; and
(ii) 	defied court order 4 to remove obstructions (the iron bar) and pot plants on easements on 798 and has replaced these obstructions with his own plants and equipment contrary to the court’s directions.
14. 	For good measure, the defendants also allege that the plaintiffs are in contempt of court contravening the orders of Perese CJ where he stated at “2)) under the making of his orders that:
	“The parking position is preserved by an agreement of easement parking dated 17.7.2015 and this can continue pending further order of the Court following disposition of the substantive issues.”
15. 	The defendants for their part counter-claim that the plaintiffs have breached this “order” by having: 
(i) 	Cordoned off by putting up a chain, pot plants and metal structures across Lots 798 and 593 which impedes and obstructs the right of way.
(ii) 	Putting steel barriers to prevent parking in front of Lot 801.
(iii) 	Putting cones to prevent the Defendants’ customers from parking on designated parking areas.
(iv) 	Unlawful access from Lot 801 by the Plaintiff Richard Meredith and his wife through Lot 798 where there is no legal access.
(v) 	Unlawful access from Lot 800 by the tenants of the Plaintiff Joseph Meredith and his wife through Lot 798 where there is no legal access.
(vi) 	Unlawfully erecting and maintaining structures including building extensions and carports over the easements on 797 & 593 blocking these and our access to them and their degradation of the easements.
(vii) 	Unlawful discharge of their stormwater from their building on 801 & 800 onto the defendants property 798 in defiance of the order from PUMA in 2020.
(viii) 	Undertaking building renovations on the building extension on 801 in defiance of the STOP ORDER from PUMA in July 2020. This building extension and the renovations are encroaching on our property on three sides and is the subject of a Court matter.
CONTEMPT OF COURT:
16. 	The law of contempt of Court is well settled and discussed in detail in Polynesian Airlines v Samoa Observer [1999] WSSC 45 (16 March 1999). Sapolu CJ stated that:
	“The ingredients which constitute civil contempt are threefold; these are the terms of the injunction must be clear and unambiguous, the defendant had proper notice of the terms of the injunction, and the terms of the injunction have been disobeyed or breached by the defendant.”
17. 	In Fa’atautua i Le Atua Ua tasi (FAST) Incorporated & Ors v Malielegaoi & Ors [2022] WSSC 7 (23 March 2022), the Court of Appeal stated that it is a contempt of Court “to fail to carry out an act required by a Court order within the time specified or to fail to comply with an order requiring a person to abstain from carrying out a specified act.” 
18. 	As this is a case of alleged civil contempt of court, the onus is on the party who alleges the contempt to prove the contempt and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiffs Allegations of Contempt of May 2015 Judgment by Vaai J 
19. 	On the evidence, I am satisfied that the terms of Vaai J injunction were clear:  
“1. The car parking lots next to and which adjoin the Sunshine Biscuit building to the east and north shall remain and will not be removed.
2.	The rest of the car parking lots shall be removed within 7 days.
3.	…”
20. 	I am also satisfied that the defendants were aware of the terms of the injunction as both defendants were a party to the proceedings before Vaai J in 2015. I am however far from satisfied that the defendants breached that injunction. To the contrary, the defendants in my view have complied with it. In his evidence, Mr Paul Philips stated that following Vaai J’s judgment, he removed the rest of the car parking lots within 7 days. He also confirms this in his affidavit exhibit D1 at paragraph 34. His evidence was confirmed by Joseph Meredith’s evidence who agreed that the car parking lots were removed within 7 days. This frankly is the end of this part of the debate. The evidence that I accept is “rest of the car parking lots” were removed within 7 days and the order of Vaai J thus satisfied.
21. 	The plaintiffs however persist with the contention that the later and continued use of car parking lots removed by the defendants within 7 days constitutes a contempt. It does not. Although the plaintiffs refer to Reynolds v Parklands Properties Ltd [201] NZSC 179 for the proposition that private agreements do not take precedence over court orders, I am not certain what little is seemingly said in that judgment on this point raised by the plaintiffs as relevant to this case. In Reynolds, “the history of dealings” preceded the Court order and not after and was raised as a factor said to be relevant to the consideration of certain statutory requirements.   
22. 	In this case, the defendants had complied with removal of the car parks in accordance with Vaai J’s orders and had therefore satisfied those orders The “Parking Agreement” was then entered into. This agreement was reached between Richard, Viviane Philips and her mother Mrs Suela Cook (annex “F” to the affidavit of Richard Meredith, exhibit P1). That agreement appears to have been one of common sense and reconciliation permitting:
	“All easements for property 797, 798 and 593 can be used for parking, except those areas which have been turned into sheltered car parking and the direct access ways into buildings are exclusive and cannot be used for public parking unless permission is granted by the owner.
	The area in which has been marked as Pacific Jewel Parking cannot be used for tenants of 593 and 797 during working hours unless permission is granted by the owner.
	…”
23. 	The use of the car parks were permitted by the “Parking Agreement” to which Richard and Viviane Philips were both a party. For the plaintiffs to now suggest that having complied with Vaai J’s orders removing “the rest of the car parking lots” and then the defendants later using them in accordance with the Parking Agreement reached with Richard constitutes contempt of court is disingenuous. That there is now a further dispute over the continuation of the “Parking Agreement” is unconnected to the orders made by Vaai J that were satisfied within the 7 days ordered.
Plaintiffs Allegations of Contempt of Oral decision of Perese CJ 3 August 2023
(i) 	I direct that the defendants remove the fence that they erected and return the right of way to its former state within 7 days of the date of this decision.
24. 	There are two aspects to the plaintiffs’ allegations of contempt of this order. First is the removal of the fence. The second is the returning of the right of way to its former state. On the first, there is no dispute between the parties that the “fence” to be removed by the defendants is shown in exhibit D5 photo page 6 and Albina Meredith’s unsworn affidavit exhibit P6 photo “H”. The “fence” relates to the “rebar in the photographs”. This is unambiguous, there is agreement. These photos show the brick (in Mrs Meredith’s affidavit) and rebars springing from the concrete.
25. 	In Mr Philip’s evidence supported by photographs 8 and 9 of exhibit D5, the brick and rebar for the fence was removed by 9th August 2023. The only part that remains is the sign. Ms Atoa spent considerable time cross-examining Mr Philips about the rebar seen in photograph annexure “E” to exhibit P6. As Mr Philips made clear in his evidence which I accept, that rebar seen in annexure “E” was loose and not part of the original “fence” rebars. It was placed there in response to Mrs Meredith removing their sign seen for example in photograph 14 of exhibit D6. Perese CJ’s order refers only to the “fence” and makes no reference to a sign. I am satisfied the “fence” rebars referred to by Perese CJ was removed. The plaintiffs have accordingly failed to satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants have disobeyed or breached this part of Perese CJ’s order.
26. 	The second aspect of the plaintiffs’ allegation of breach of this order is the returning of “the right of way to its former state.” In Albina Meredith’s affidavit at paragraph 20 - 24, the allegation for the plaintiffs in this respect concerns is that the order encompassed the removal of the “Pacific Jewel Parking” sign and the defendants pot plants placed in the front of her shop. I do not read Perese CJ’s ruling to make such a broad direction. As is clear from his ruling, Perese CJ was concerned with the removal of the “fence”. The “return the right of way to its former state” refers to remedial works to return the right of way on which the “fence” was built “to its former state”. The order makes no reference to a “sign” or pot plants nor does it make any reference to not placing any other moveable items in that area.  Such a broad interpretation would mean the defendants were required to return all of the lot 798 right of way “to its former state”. That would be non-sensical and well beyond what Perese CJ was called on to deal with at that point, specifically, the removal of the “fence” rebar. The plaintiffs have failed to satisfy me beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants have breached or disobeyed this aspect of the order.
(ii) 	I also direct that the plaintiffs be warned, at least, and are hereby warned that they should not take any steps to place equipment or plants or otherwise within the right of way because the right of way is for the benefit of all relevant parties being the owners I cited earlier.
27. 	The plaintiffs further allege that the defendants have “defied the orders of the court for the removal of any obstructions, namely, iron bar and pot plants on Easements on 798 and has knowingly replaced these obstructions by his own plants and equipment contrary to the court’s directions.” The plaintiffs’ allegation is that the defendant maintained permanent parking spaces in front of the East Side of the Samoa Biscuits building and placed obstructions of their own on 798 breaching orders 4 of Perese CJ.  
28. 	There are two key problems with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants have breached order 4. First, as is patently clear, order 4 is directed at the plaintiffs, not the defendants. It states: “I also direct that the plaintiffs be warned, at least, and are hereby warned…” The plaintiffs were Richard Meredith and Joe Meredith. The defendants cannot be in breach of a warning directed to the plaintiffs.
29. 	Second, the plaintiffs refer to order 4 as an injunction, but it is also no such thing. Order 4 is simply a direction that the plaintiffs be warned, which Perese CJ then himself issued. Perese CJ warned the plaintiffs, not the defendants, not to obstruct the right of way. The plaintiffs have failed to satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt that (a) there was unambiguous injunction imposed on the defendants; and (b) that the defendants had disobeyed or breached any such injunction. 
30. 	The plaintiffs’ allegations of contempt against the defendants all fail.
The Defendants Counter-Allegations of Contempt
I do not accept, at this stage, that it is necessary for the making of an order that the car parking which has been used by the defendants with the plaintiffs tacit, if not express consent, and which is now objected to by the plaintiffs should be removed. The parking position is preserved by an agreement of easement parking dated 17.7.2015 and this can continue pending further order of the Court following disposition of the substantive issues.
31. 	The defendants counter-allegations of contempt pleaded against the plaintiffs rely solely on paragraph 2 of Perese CJ’s orders.  As CJ Perese expressly stated at “2)” of his decision, “I do not accept, at this stage, that it is necessary for the making of an order…” (emphasis added) He made no order. The court simply stated that in terms of the “parking position”, that can continue in accordance with the parking agreement until further order of the court following final disposition of the substantive issues. As such, I am not satisfied that paragraph “2” under orders involved an unambiguous injunction nor that any such injunction was breached.
32. 	Mr Fepuleai also points to Perese CJ’s ruling at “4)” under orders and alleges this has been breached by the plaintiffs by having:
(a) 	“a. install a barrier and a chain across the right of way (Exhibit D.5 photo 18);
(b) 	b. Install a steel fence across the right of way (Exhibit D.5 photos 19, 20 and 21);
(c) 	c. Place steel pipes in concrete tyres in front of the Sunshine Biscuits Building (Exhibit D.5 photos 25 and 26);
(d) 	d. Place cones in front of the Sunshine Biscuits Building (Exhibit D5 photo 24;
(e) 	e. place steel pipe set in concrete filled tyre with chain (Exhibit D5 photo 28);
(f) 	f. Carports being built around 2021 on the easement (Exhibit D5 photo 33);
(g) 	g. Carport built on the easement around 2018 (exhibit D.5 photo 37).”
33. 	First, this is not pleaded in the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and no leave has been granted to amend the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. Second, even if leave was granted, as I have said in relation to the plaintiffs’ claim, this purported order 4 is not an injunction but a warning. Seemingly, it has not been one that has been heeded by the plaintiffs – but it was a warning nonetheless. As such, I am not satisfied there is an unambiguous injunction against the plaintiffs and the first element is not satisfied.
34. 	The defendants’ counterclaim for contempt against the plaintiffs must also fail.
OBSERVATIONS:
35. 	The easements created by RV Meredith in 1981 shown in Plan 4385 are highly unusual. Not only do the easements provide a “right of way” to pass and re-pass over from one lot to another, but the rights of way have been created to cover all the land of the “servient tenements” beyond the buildings themselves on all those affected lands. This can be seen with lot 797 for example in which the right of way goes well beyond what is required to traverse lot 797 to access the rear lots. The easement arrangements were built for another era and has completely failed it seems the test of time.
36. 	There are a number of businesses on the Levili lands, as well as the homes where parties live. The defendants, plaintiffs, Albina’s business and no doubt other businesses there require parking for themselves and their customers. These are not explicitly provided for because of the easements and will only continue to be a source of immense conflict. As Vaai J urged 9 years ago, the parties should consider whether the easements should be modified to suit their present and future needs. The failure of the parties to do so will only perpetuate the conflict and dispute and bitterness between you all.
37. 	Finally, these proceedings should have been straightforward involving the leading of evidence directly relevant to the orders and purported orders made in 2015 and 2023 allegedly breached. It has however taken considerably more court time and resources then it should have principally because the plaintiffs but also the defendants (though to a substantially lesser degree) have used the court as a venue to air a broad range of grievances against each other irrelevant to the orders made by Vaai J and Perese CJ and these contempt proceedings. The use of the Court’s time and resources in this way is to be strongly discouraged. While I have given considerable thought to sanctioning both parties with substantial Court costs, I have decided not to do so. Parties and counsel should be on notice that future proceedings of this nature wasting the court’s time on irrelevant matters drawing out proceedings unnecessarily may not be so fortunate.
RESULT:
38. 	For the foregoing reasons:
(a) 	the plaintiffs Statement of Claim and the defendants Counterclaim are dismissed; and
(b) 	As against each other, each party to bear their own costs.

JUSTICE CLARKE