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DHL Global Forwarding NZ Ltd v Betham [2015] WSSC 55 (9 June 2015)

SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
DHL Global Forwarding NZ Ltd v Betham 2015 [WSSC] 55


Case name:
DHL Global Forwarding NZ Ltd v Betham 2015


Citation:
2015 [WSSC] 55


Decision date:
9 June 2015 (Reasons for Judgment)
Judgment Conclusions
8 May 2015
Parties:
DHL GLOBAL FORWARDING NZ LTD a duly incorporated company in New Zealand, having its registered office at 18 Verissimo Drive, Mangere, Auckland, New Zealand, and carrying out business as a freight carrier. Plaintiff AND RAYMOND BETHAM of Apia, Samoa, carrying on business as a sole trader in the name of BETHAM FREIGHT & CUSTOM Defendant


Hearing date(s):
20 November 2014


File number(s):
CP82/14


Jurisdiction:
Civil


Place of delivery:
Supreme Court of Samoa, Mulinuu


Judge(s):
Chief Justice Sapolu


On appeal from:



Order:
- It is for the foregoing reasons that I arrived at my conclusion delivered on 8 May 2015 to dismiss the defendant’s strike out motion.


Representation:
S Leung Wai for plaintiff
J Annandale for defendant


Catchwords:
statement of claim – schedule to statement of claim -breach of contract – defendant’s strike out motion – prolix - convoluted –– fact – evidence –material facts - evidentiary facts – subordinate facts or collateral facts – circumstantial evidence –pleadings – reference to law - reference to evidence


Words and phrases:



Legislation cited:



Cases cited:
Arcade Pty Ltd v Carpal Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1423Auckland Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Pauls Ltd [1999] FCA 1750
Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697
City Council v Witherspoon [1989] NZHC 705; [1990] 1 NZLR 76,
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53
Couch v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 2285
Davy v Garett [1878] UKLawRpCh 8; (1877) 7 Ch D 473
Hill v Hart Davis [1884] UKLawRpCh 81; (1884) 26 Ch D 470
Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v One Steel Trading Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 370,
Hamod v State of New South Wales [2001] FCA 157
Heenan Family Trust 1960 v Da Vella June Gore [2007] NZHC 1023
Karam v Parker [2011] NZHC 1016
Philipps v Philipps [1878] UKLawRpKQB 96; (1898) 4 QBD 127
Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd
R v Exall [1866] EngR 22; (1866) 4 F & F 922
R v Irving [2006] NZCA 512,
R v Boshovic [2006] NZCA 519 [19];
R v Smith [2007] NZCA 400
R v Yacob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313
Thompson v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) [1986] 2 PRNZ 505
Perriam v Wilkes [2014] NZHC 2192
Text books
Cross on Evidence (1996) 5th Aust ed by J D Heydon
Cross on Evidence (2013) 9th NZ ed by D Mathieson
Bullen & Leak & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings 12th ed
Bullen & Leak & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings (2004) vol.1 15th ed
Bullen & Leak & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings 17th ed
Black’s Law Dictionary 10th ed by B A Garner
Summary of decision:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
HELD AT MULINUU


CP82/14


BETWEEN


DHL GLOBAL FORWARDING NZ LTD a duly incorporated company in New Zealand, having its registered office at 18 Verissimo Drive, Mangere, Auckland, New Zealand, and carrying out business as a freight carrier.
Plaintiff


A N D


RAYMOND BETHAM of Apia, Samoa, carrying on business as a sole trader in the name of BETHAM FREIGHT & CUSTOMS
Defendant


Counsel:
S Leung Wai for plaintiff
J Annandale for defendant


Hearing: 20 November 2014


Submissions: 28 November 2014, 1 December 2014


Judgment/ Conclusions: 8 May 2015


Reasons for Judgment: 9 June 2015


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF SAPOLU CJ

Introduction

  1. In these proceedings, the Court is concerned with a motion by the defendant to strike out the whole of the plaintiff’s statement of claim or, alternatively, to strike out: (a) paras 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, and (b) Schedule One attached to the statement of claim. Because the statement of claim contains 40 paragraphs, the result if the alternative of the plaintiff’s strike out motion is upheld, is that only paras 1, 2, and 14 of the statement of claim would remain. That will make what remains of the statement of claim non-sensical so that one might as well also strike out the remainder of the statement of claim.
  2. The grounds given in support of the strike out motion are: (a) the statement of claim pleads matters of evidence as opposed to just pleading a summary of material facts, (b) the statement of claim does not disclose a cause of action, and (c) the pleadings in the statement of claim are prolix and convoluted.
  3. On 26 February 2015 I delivered my judgment/conclusion dismissing the strike out motion by the defendant. I also indicated to counsel that my reasons for that conclusion will be reduced to writing and given to them in due course. These are those reasons.
  4. As it will appear from what follows, the issues in these proceedings relate to the law of evidence and the law on pleadings. There is very little Samoan case law in both those areas.

Statement of claim

  1. The action by the plaintiff is founded on an alleged breach of contract, namely, breach of an “agency agreement” between the plaintiff and the defendant. Paras 1 and 2 of the statement of claim explain the parties as DHL Global Forwarding (New Zealand) Ltd (DHL), the plaintiff, and Raymond Betham a sole trader carrying on business in Apia in the name of Betham Freight & Customs, the defendant.
  2. Paras 3-9 of the statement of claim plead the freight agreement (and some of its relevant terms) that was made between the plaintiff and the Corporation of the Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the LDS Church) for managing the air and sea shipment of goods to Samoa by the plaintiff on behalf of the LDS Church. Para 8 pleads that the freight agreement became effective on 1 June 2010. Pursuant to the terms of this freight agreement, the plaintiff had arranged for the shipment of goods to Samoa on behalf of the LDS Church from time to time starting from 2005. It is not clear from the statement of claim how this freight agreement which came into effect on 1 June 2010 could apply backwards to transactions from 2005 to 1 June 2010.
  3. Paras 10 and 11 plead that pursuant to the terms of the freight agreement between the plaintiff and the LDS Church, the plaintiff engaged the defendant as its agent in Samoa from about 25 July 2005 to 3 April 2014 for the air and sea shipment of goods from overseas to Samoa on behalf of the LDS Church. This relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is pleaded as the “agency agreement”.
  4. Para 12 pleads that in accordance with the terms of the agency agreement, the defendant was required: (a) to act as agent for the plaintiff in Samoa in accordance with the terms of the freight agreement between the plaintiff and the LDS Church, (b) to arrange and make payment of any duty, levies, or taxes payable in respect of the shipment of goods to Samoa on behalf of the LDS Church, and (c) for the defendant to invoice the plaintiff for the defendant’s charges, including any duty, levies, or taxes payable in respect of those shipments.
  5. Para 13 of the statement of claim then pleads that between 26 July 2005 and December 2013 the defendant acted as agent for the plaintiff under the agency agreement for the carriage to Samoa of at least 268 shipments of goods by the LDS Church. Particulars of these shipments are set out in schedule one attached to the statement of claim.
  6. Para 14 pleads that duties and taxes are levied by the Ministry of Revenue and Customs Services (the Ministry) on goods imported into Samoa. In the statement of claim, it appears that the terms “Ministry of Revenue and Customs Services,” “ Customs Services,” and “Customs” are used interchangeably to mean the same thing.
  7. Para 15 pleads that the defendant has invoiced the plaintiff for the various shipments of goods to Samoa on behalf of the LDS Church. Those invoices included duty, taxes and levies payable to the Ministry. The plaintiff has paid the defendant for those shipments including the duty, taxes and levies in accordance with the invoices provided by the defendant.
  8. Para 16 then pleads that the plaintiff has billed the LDS Church for the said shipments and the LDS Church has paid the plaintiff in accordance with the invoices provided to the plaintiff by the defendant.
  9. Para 17 of the statement of claim pleads that by letter of 27 August the Ministry advised the LDS Church directly of unpaid duty, taxes and/or levies amounting to $1,178,805.41.
  10. Para 18 pleads that by letter of 6 September 2013 the Ministry provided to the LDS Church a list of imports it believed had not had duty, excise and/or VAGST paid on them and requested payment.
  11. Para 19 pleads that by letter dated 24 February 2014, Customs requested from the LDS Church payment of $1,787,556.65 for outstanding duty, taxes or excise on the said shipments.
  12. Para 20 pleads that the plaintiff was not made aware by the defendant of the letters of 27 August 2013 or 24 February 2014 from the Ministry to the LDS Church until notification was received from the LDS Church on 27 February 2014. Para 21 then pleads that the plaintiff emailed the defendant on 28 February 2014 requesting an explanation for the “unpaid duty”, that is, the unpaid duty, excise or taxes on the said shipments.
  13. Para 22 pleads that by email of 29 February 2014, the defendant advised the plaintiff that he was working with Customs in trying to resolve the matter.
  14. Para 23 pleads that by email of 7 March 2014, the LDS Church requested a meeting with the defendant and for the defendant to produce certain specified information at that meeting.
  15. Para 24 pleads that by email of 11 March 2014, the defendant requested the plaintiff to make the LDS Church aware that the matter would be settled with Customs no later than 14 March 2014.
  16. Para 25 pleads that by a further email of 11 March 2014, the defendant advised the plaintiff that a full report would be presented at the meeting to be held on 14 March 2014. As pleaded in para 26, that meeting was held in Apia between the plaintiff, the defendant and representatives of the LDS Church to discuss the unpaid duty.
  17. As pleaded in para 27, concern was expressed by the plaintiff and the LDS Church at the meeting of 14 March 2014 that no further receipts had been presented by the defendant for any payments he had made to Customs.
  18. Para 28 then pleads that following the meeting of 14 March 2014 the defendant provided receipts for the payment of only ten transactions.
  19. Para 29 pleads that on or about 21 March 2014, a meeting was held in Auckland, New Zealand, between representatives of the plaintiff and the LDS Church in which it was agreed that the plaintiff would pay to Customs the unpaid duty owing on behalf of the LDS Church and will seek to recover the unpaid duty from the defendant. On 21 March 2014, the plaintiff advised Customs that it would take over payment of the unpaid duty.
  20. Para 30 then pleads that by email of 25 March 2014, the plaintiff requested the defendant to produce all receipts for the 296 declarations on the Samoa Customs Unpaid Duties Report. As pleaded in para 32, the defendant has failed and/or refused to produce such receipts as requested by the plaintiff.
  21. By email of 28 March 2014, as pleaded in para 33, the defendant advised the plaintiff that a full report on the outstanding duty/tax would be submitted by 25 April 2015. As pleaded in para 34, the defendant has failed and/or refused to produce any receipts.
  22. Para 35 pleads that by letter of 3 April 2014 the plaintiff terminated the representation the defendant had on its behalf in Samoa. This must be the termination of the agency agreement the plaintiff had made with the defendant pursuant to the freight agreement between the LDS Church and the plaintiff.
  23. Para 36 then pleads that on 16 April 2014 the plaintiff paid the amount of $1,720,046.95 to the Ministry for the unpaid duty.
  24. It is then pleaded in para 37 – 40 of the statement of claim that the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant is for breach of contract which is clearly for the alleged breach of the agency agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. This is for the amount of $1,568,726.98 for duty, excise, and taxes for which the defendant had invoiced the plaintiff and the plaintiff had paid to the defendant on behalf of the LDS Church but the defendant, as alleged, had not paid to Customs. This amount of $1,568,726.98 relates to unpaid duty, excise or taxes which is alleged should have been paid on no less than 268 transactions as further particularised in schedule one attached to the statement of claim.
  25. I will now discuss each of the grounds of the defendant’s strike out motion.

First ground of defendant’s strike out motion – The statement of claim pleads matters of evidence as opposed to just pleading a summary of material facts

  1. In order to be able to deal in a meaningful way with the first ground of the defendant’s strike out motion that the statement of claim is defective because it pleads matters of evidence as opposed to just pleading a summary of material facts, it is necessary to be clear first about what is “fact” and what is “evidence”. Secondly, it is also necessary to determine whether the statement of claim pleads “matters of evidence” as submitted for the defendant. And, thirdly, it is necessary to determine whether it is true that a statement of claim should plead only a summary of material facts and not matters of evidence.

(a) Fact as distinct from evidence

  1. For present purposes, the term “fact” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 10th ed by BA Garner at p.708 to mean:
  2. By contrast to the term “fact”, the term “evidence” is explained in Cross on Evidence (2013) 9th NZ ed by D Mathieson at EVA Intro 1, p.25 as follows:
  3. Even though it is straightforward to define what is “fact” and what is “evidence”, in practice it is not always easy to draw the distinction between the two. This was recognised in Couch v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 2285, where the Court said at [4]:
  4. In Bullen & Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings (2004), vol 1, 15th ed, the learned authors said at 1–31:
  5. Contrary to the submissions by counsel for the defendants that the statement of claim pleads matters of evidence instead of just facts, I am of the view that the statement of claim pleads only facts and no matters of evidence. Paras 1 and 2 of the statement of claim defines who are the parties to this case. Paras 3 – 9 set out the contractual relationship and arrangements between the LDS Church and the plaintiff pursuant to a freight agreement and also set out the relevant terms of that agreement. Paras 10 – 12 plead the agency agreement that was entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant pursuant to the freight agreement and set out the relevant terms of that agency agreement. Clause 13 and schedule one attached to the statement of claim set out how the defendant performed his part of the agency agreement with the plaintiff. Paras 14 – 36 set out how the defendant is alleged to have breached the agency agreement. Paras 37 – 40 then set out the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant for breach of contract. This is then followed by the plaintiff’s prayer for relief.
  6. Throughout the statement of claim only facts are pleaded and no matters of evidence to prove those facts. There are particulars given of the facts pleaded in order to fairly inform the defendant of the claim against him. But those particulars of the facts are matters of fact rather than matters of evidence to prove the facts asserted by the plaintiff.
  7. I therefore do not accept the submissions by counsel for the defendant that the statement of claim pleads matters of evidence instead of just facts. Even though it is not always easy to draw the distinction between “facts” and “evidence” as already pointed out, I am of the clear view that what is pleaded in the statement claim in this case is facts and not matters of evidence.
  8. I have also decided not to accept the submissions by counsel for the defendant that a statement of claim should just plead a summary of the material facts. Before I come to the reasons for not accepting the submissions for the defendant that a statement of claim should plead just a summary of material facts, it would be helpful to know first what the expression “material facts” means.

(b) Material facts

  1. The expression “material fact” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 10th ed by GA Garner at p. 710 to mean:
  2. In the case of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229,Austin J referred at para 172 to Darbyshire v Leigh [1896] UKLawRpKQB 62; [1896] 1 QB 554 where Lord Esher MR said at p.557:
  3. In Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v One Steel Trading Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 370, Habersberger J said at para 16:
  4. In Dymocks Book Arcade Pty Ltd v Carpal Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1423, Ward J said at para 27:
  5. The expression “material fact” or “material facts” is explained in many Australian cases but it is not necessary to refer to any more of those cases. It would be sufficient to say that “material facts” are facts which are necessary to support, identify, or constitute a cause of action.
  6. I come now to the question of whether it is correct, as submitted by counsel for the defendant, that a statement of claim should plead only a summary of material facts.

(c) Should a statement of claim plead only a summary of material facts and not matters of evidence

  1. In the English text of Bullen &Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings (2004) 15th ed vol 1, which is the only edition of that work available to me, the learned authors have this to say at 1-29 to 1-31 about pleading facts, reference to law., and reference to evidence in a claim:
  2. In the most recent publication of Bullen & Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings 17th ed, cited by counsel for the plaintiff in his written submissions, the learned authors state at 1-27:
  3. I have cited at some length from the 15th ed of Bullen &Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings and the passage from the 17th ed of that text quoted by counsel for the plaintiff in his written submissions because this judgment may be the only window for many Samoan lawyers to that text and some of the new rules enacted under the English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR). It would also be clear from the above citations that the position set out in the 12th ed of Bullen &Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings upon which counsel for the defendant relied has changed quite significantly.
  4. I have decided that the plaintiff’s statement of claim does not plead matters of evidence. But even if it does, that is not necessarily fatal. It is no longer necessarily objectionable to refer to matters of evidence in a statement of claim. In fact that could be helpful to inform not only the other party but also the Judge who will hear the case about the plaintiff’s case.
  5. Counsel for the plaintiff also referred in his submissions to Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53 where Stevens J, in delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, stated at [84]:
  6. What is said in Chesterfield Preschools provides much useful guidance to the Samoan bar in the preparation of statements of claim. However, in respect of the third bullet-point requirement in the New Zealand HCR that the statement of claim must not stray into setting out the evidence relied upon, it is not clear how this requirement has been interpreted and applied in practice in New Zealand. If it means that no reference can be made whatsoever in the statement of claim to matters of evidence, then I respectfully prefer the position set out in the new English CPR which has omitted such a prohibition against making any references to the evidence in the statement of claim. From experience, the English position appears to me to be not only flexible but would avoid over concise and inadequately informative pleadings which could lead to surprises at the trial. It could also provide for greater transparency of the plaintiff’s case.
  7. For the foregoing reasons, the first ground of the defendant’s strike out motion cannot be sustained.

(d) Attachment of documents to a statement of claim

  1. For completeness, I will proceed further to deal with two other matters raised in the defendant’s strike out motion in relation to the first ground. Counsel for the defendant seems to suggest that “Schedule One – Particulars of Invoices” attached to the statement of claim should be struck out. That is because there is no mention in the statement of claim of a “Schedule One – Particulars of Invoices”. Para 13 of the statement of claim refers only to a “Schedule One (the Shipments)”. I see no merit in this point. It is clear from reading the whole of para 13 that what is meant by “Schedule One (Shipments)” is the “Schedule One – Particulars of Invoices” attached to the statement of claim. In any event, a pleading is not to be struck out if it can be remedied by an amendment. The discrepancy here can be remedied by a simple amendment.
  2. It is also clear from Bullen &Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings (2004) 15th ed vol 1, 1-31, that a party may attach to his/her statement of case any document considered to be necessary to a claim or defence. Such document where the claim is based on a written contract includes a copy of the contract and general conditions of sale where it is a contract of sale. There is no requirement that such a document should be sworn. In this case, schedule one attached to the statement of claim relates to how the agency agreement was performed by the defendant. It is also relevant to the assessment of the loss claimed by the plaintiff to have resulted from the alleged breach of the agency agreement by the defendant. Schedule one of the statement should therefore not be struck out.

(e) Evidentiary facts

  1. The second matter raised in the submissions of counsel for the defendant is that paras 3-10 and paras 13-40 should be struck out in their entirety or in part because they are “evidentiary facts.” This appears to relate the defendant’s submissions that a statement of claim should not plead matters of evidence. Counsel for the defendant in his submissions maintains that a statement of claim should not plead matters of evidence. He treats evidentiary facts as meaning the same thing as “subordinate facts” and then contrasts that with material facts. I have already dealt with what are “material facts.”
  2. I will now deal with “evidentiary facts” and “subordinate facts”. It is always helpful when dealing with submissions of the kind presented by counsel for the defendant to define or explain first the terms or expressions used.
  3. What is an “evidentiary fact?”. The short answer is, an “evidentiary fact” is “circumstantial evidence”. Circumstantial evidence is a fact from which the existence of a fact in issue may be inferred. So an evidentiary fact, which is the same thing as circumstantial evidence, would be a fact from which the existence of a fact in issue can be inferred. In Cross on Evidence (1996) 5th Aust ed by J D Heydon, the learned author stated at [1100] – [1105]:
  4. The above passages also appear in Cross on Evidence (1995) 6th NZ ed by D Mathieson at 1.21 and 1.22. The classic explanation of circumstantial evidence or evidentiary fact was given in the old English case of R v Exall [1866] EngR 22; (1866) 4 F & F 922, 928 where Pollock CB said:
  5. The authorities cited above show that an “evidentiary fact” is “circumstantial evidence” and explain what is an “evidentiary fact” or “circumstantial evidence”. From this, it should be clear that the plaintiff’s statement of claim does not plea any evidentiary facts or circumstantial evidence, that is to say, facts as evidence from which the existence of a fact in issue may be inferred.

(f) Subordinate or collateral facts

  1. Next, what is a “subordinate fact?”. A “subordinate fact” is also referred to in the relevant case law and legal textbooks as a “collateral fact”. In Cross on Evidence (1996) 5th Aust ed by J D Heydon, the learned author stated at [1090]:
  2. The above passage also appears in Cross on Evidence (1997) 5th NZ ed by D Mathieson at 1.14. In Auckland City Council v Witherspoon [1989] NZHC 705; [1990] 1 NZLR 76, Fisher J said at p.83:
  3. In R v Irving [2006] NZCA 512, Arnold J, when delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, said at [11]:
  4. The same statement of principle in R v Irving was repeated in the New Zealand Court of Appeal decisions in R v Boshovic [2006] NZCA 519 [19]; R v Smith [2007] NZCA 400, [8].
  5. As it would be clear from the authorities cited, a subordinate or collateral fact is a fact which affects the credibility of a witness or the admissibility of certain items of evidence. It is not a fact in issue nor relevant to a fact in issue. On the other land, an evidentiary fact or circumstantial evidence is a fact from the existence of which the existence of a fact in issue may be inferred. A subordinate or collateral fact is therefore different from an evidentiary fact or circumstantial evidence.
  6. It would also be clear from the authorities cited that none of the pleadings in the plaintiff’s statement of claim pleads a subordinate or collateral fact. That is because there is no pleading which bears upon the competence or credibility of a witness, or the admissibility of any item of evidence.
  7. It follows from the above that the submissions of counsel for the defendant to strike out schedule one attached to the statement of claim and the pleadings said to be based on evidentiary facts cannot succeed.

Second ground of defendant’s strike out motion – The statement of claim does not disclose cause of action

  1. The second ground of the defendant’s strike out motion that the statement of claim does not disclose a cause of action is problematic in two respects. In the first place, the submissions of counsel for the defendant do not show and clarify the elements of a cause of action for breach of contract and then explain what element or elements of the cause of action is/are not covered in the statement of claim. This would have provided for clarity and ease of understanding the second ground of the strike out motion. Secondly, is the approach applied in the strike out motion to some of the paragraphs of the statement of claim by saying, for example, that individually paras 37 – 40 of the statement of claim do not disclose a cause of action. The real question is not whether a particular paragraph of the statement of claim discloses a cause of action but whether the statement of claim considered as a whole does disclose a cause of action.
  2. In my view, the plaintiff’s statement of claim does disclose a cause of action. As already explained in para 36 of these reasons for judgment, paras 1 and 2 of the statement of claim defines who are the parties to this case. Paras 3 – 9 set out the contractual relationship and arrangements between the LDS Church and the plaintiff pursuant to a freight agreement and also set out the relevant terms of that agreement. Paras 10 – 12 plead the agency agreement entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant pursuant to the freight agreement and set out the relevant terms of that agency agreement. Clause 13 and schedule one attached to the statement of claim set out and clarify how the defendant performed his part of the agency agreement with the plaintiff. Paras 14 – 36 set out how the defendant is alleged to have breached the agency agreement. Paras 37 – 40 then set out the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant for breach of contract on the basis of the preceding pleadings from paras 1 – 36 of the statement of claim. The prayer for relief then follows.
  3. I am of the clear view that the statement of claim, including paras 37 – 40, does disclose a cause of action for breach of contract. The second ground of the strike out motion is untenable.

Third ground of defendant’s strike out motion – The statement of claim is prolix and convoluted

  1. As to the third ground of the defendant’s strike out motion that the statement is “prolix” and “convoluted,” it is important to be clear first about what is meant by the terms “prolix” and “convoluted” in this context and then determine whether the statement of claim is in fact prolix or convoluted. Sometimes, the two terms, as the relevant case law shows, are used together if the statement of claim is both prolix and convoluted.

(g) Prolix

  1. I start with the term “prolix”. In the old English case of Davy v Garett [1878] UKLawRpCh 8; (1877) 7 Ch D 473, Baggallay LJ said at p.486:
  2. At the same p.486, Thesiger LJ remarked:
  3. In the later case of Hill v Hart Davis [1884] UKLawRpCh 81; (1884) 26 Ch D 470, Cotton LJ said at p.472:
  4. In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Pauls Ltd [1999] FCA 1750, O’Loughlin J, after referring to the above English cases, referred to Re Brazendale (1991) (unreported decision delivered on 31 October 1991) where Northrop J when discussing Order 11 r.4 said:
  5. In the Australian case of Hamod v State of New South Wales [2001] FCA 157, a statement of claim consisting of 500 pages was considered to be too prolix and was struck out on that basis alone.
  6. In the case of Delahey & Garra – Marsh [2014] FCCA 499, Judge Scarlett said at para 19:
  7. In New Zealand in the case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, Stevens J, in delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, said at [90] – [91]:

“The object of obtaining crisp admissions or denials, and thus defining the points at issue, is entirely defeated by a lengthy diffuse narrative, which is likely to elicit only a generalised response”.

[91] Much of the factual material pleaded is irrelevant, provides excessive detail or is evidence rather than pleading. The large tracts of factual information pleaded do not identify the main issues but obfuscate them by adding to the prolix nature of the document and making it burdensome to read. A major concern is the excessive pleading of matters of evidence”
  1. In Heenan Family Trust 1960 v Da Vella June Gore [2007] NZHC 1023, Associate Judge Gendall said at [118]”
  2. In the New Zealand case of Perriam v Wilkes [2014] NZHC 2192, at [12], Woolford J described a statement of claim which contains 137 paragraphs and is 32 pages in length with a 17 pages schedule and was difficult to summarise as prolix and convoluted.
  3. In view of the authorities I have cited in relation to a statement of claim which has the features of being prolix, the statement of claim in this case which contains 40 paragraphs, 6 pages, and a schedule of 14 pages would not fit the description of being prolix. The pleadings in the statement of claim are also not unnecessarily lengthy, tedious, or wordy. Because the matters pleaded in the statement of claim include two agreements, namely, a freight agreement and an agency agreement, together with 268 shipments of goods over a period from 2005 to 2014, one can understand why the statement of claim contains 40 paragraphs, 6 pages, and a schedule.

(h) Convoluted

  1. I turn now to the term “convoluted”. As it appears from the relevant case law, the term “convoluted” in the context of a statement of claim means “unintelligible” or “difficult to comprehend”. In Heenan Family Trust 1960 v Da Vella June Gore [2007] NZHC 1023, Associate Judge Gendall said at [118]:
  2. In Karam v Parker [2011] NZHC 1016,Associate Judge Sargisson said at [20]:
  3. The statement of claim in this case is definitely not unintelligible or difficult to comprehend. It does not fit into the description of a convoluted claim or defence given in the above New Zealand cases. With respect, the statement of claim is therefore not convoluted as submitted by counsel for the defendant.
  4. As the relevant case law in other jurisdiction shows, sometimes a statement of claim is unnecessarily lengthy and wordy as well as being unintelligible and difficult to comprehend. Such a statement of claim would be both prolix and convoluted. So it is not uncommon to find the term prolix and the term convoluted being used together. But as I have found in this case, the statement of claim is not prolix or convoluted or both.

Conclusion

  1. It is for the foregoing reasons that I arrived at my conclusion delivered on 8 May 2015 to dismiss the defendant’s strike out motion.

CHIEF JUSTICE SAPOLU



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