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Supreme Court of Vanuatu |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
HELD AT PORT VILA
(Civil Jurisdiction)
Civil Case No. 67 of 2000
BETWEEN:
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
(Plaintiffs)
AND:
CYCLAMEN LIMITED/p>
(First Defendant)
AND:
PORT VILA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
(Second Defendant)
AND:
(Third Defendant)
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> AND:
(Fourth Defendant)
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> AND:
ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Fifth Defendant)
lass="MsoBoMsoBodyText" align="left" style="text-align: left; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> The plaintiffs and first defendant are the lessees of adjoining plots of land at the edge of the first Lagoon. The views are beautiful. The area has been declared a residential zone. The plaintiffs live in a house on their plot. The other was vacant and is owned by the first defendant. Andrew Hogarth, his wife and brother purchased the shares of Cyclamen Limited, the first defendant. They propose to build and operate a tourist resort on the vacant plot. Some earthworks, concrete foundations and the erection of a building frame have been completed. The plaintiffs seek various interim restraining orders to stop any work pending final determination of the principal action. The first defendant opposes this. The local Municipal Council and the Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Lands are also defendants.
The principal action seeks various declaratand injunctions. In essence it seeks orders that the first defendant can only carry out residential development, that any development must be properly and lawfully permitted, that the zoning remains residential and that any official acts or permissions inconsistent with this be restrained. Similar orders are sought concerning any foreshore development. The interim injunctions sought are in similar terms.
The plaintiffs’ principal argument is that the whole process eeking the various consentssents and permissions was based on false or misleading information supplied by Cyclamen Ltd. They say the original application was only for twelve units when clearly in contemplation was a resort of upto fifty units. The plans supplied at various stages did not shew what Cyclamen had in mind for the site, for example whether two or three story buildings were intended.
The plaintiffs say if public consultation is required to declare a physical ing area (Physical Pl Planning Act Cap 193 section 2 (2)), then it must follow similar consultation is required to alter it. The plaintiffs say that consultation has not taken place. They say there are many residents who object to the change of use from residential to commercial. (This aspect of the plaintiffs’ case is not clearly pleaded in the Amended Originating Summons).
The plaintiffs allege this wrongful rezoning has been relied upon as authority for the procedure for the issue of a fresh lease, a commercial one.
The plaintiffs say the original foreshore development permissid not comply with the Act Act (The Foreshore Development Act, Cap 90). When this was realised they say Cyclamen applied again but no public display of the application for 14 days or at all took place, (as required by section 3 (2)).
Trst defendant rejects these suggestions. It says twelve units was put in an outline pine planning permission application as this was the minimum they understood would be required for such a development. There was no misleading of anyone. When the full planning permission was sought complete plans were lodged (see AJH/10 AND AJH/17, affidavit of Andrew Hogarth). They argue that there could not have been any deception when full, not outline, permission was sought as this was done with the benefit of the full plans.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Counsel for the first defendant says that any remaining action availablthe plaintiffs should have have been commenced by seeking leave to issue a prerogative writ, for example to quash any existing consents. That was not done and is now out of time.
Further, counsel states that nowhere in the legislation ire a duty on any of the various authorities to notifyotify or consult with neighbouring lessees or land owners. The only possible exception is the Foreshore Development Act Section 3 (2), which requires delivery of a copy application to the District Commissioner. This post disappeared at or before Independence. The first defendant says the Physical Planning Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Province and the Municipality were sent copies.
Counsel also argued the plaintiffs have been guilty of delay. As early as March 2001 legal action w was threatened. It was not issued till May. Substantial work has already occurred on the site, work that obviously did not relate to a simple residence, yet interim injunctions were not sought until 7th December. If equitable relief is sought it must be sought promptly.
The first defendant argues the balance of convenience must fall in their favour. If any restraint orders are made undertakings in damages should be obtained.
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Counsel for the other defendants did not wish to address the Courpan>
It is helpful to set out a chronology of some of the main events.
7 July 2000 - &nnbsp;; nbsp;nbsp;&nbp; &nnbsp;inetllannplanning peng permission sought for 12 units. The Hogarths were intending purchasers of the Cyclamen shares.
10th August - &nnbsp; nbsp;&nbbsp;&nbs; &nbs; VFIBoval. Refe ence to 30 o 30 – 40 rooms in stages over 10 years.
22nd
&pt"> nbsp;
25th September - &nbbsp; Application to surrender rder residential lease and create commercial lease.
31st October - &nbs;  p;&nssp; Consent to suto surrender of residential lease
pan lEN-GB" style="font-font-size:size: 12.0 12.0pt">&pt"> nbsp;
29th November bsp;   &nbbp;&nnbp;& Plaintiffs awfs aware some building will take place on the land.
1st February 2001 - &nbssp; Application bion by first defendant for full planning permission and building permit.
1">
8th February (?) -  p; &nbp;&nbp; Approval onning permissionssion and permit . >
12th February - & p; &nsp; &nsp; ; Fipst applicarion re fore foreshore development
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-indent: -105.75pt; margin-left: 5.0cm; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> 27th February - & p;   &nbp; &nnbsp; provpproval” rel” re foreshore development
&nbs> <
20th March - bsp;   &nbbp;&nnbp;& &nbbsp; Lep; Letter fter from plaintiffs to first defendant setting out concerns and stating if nothing heard proceedings would commence in 48 hours.
25th May - &nnbsp;;&nspp;nbsp;nbsp;&nbp; &nnbsp;;&nspp;&nsp; &nsp; Procee isgsed, after furthfurther letter. >
25th
1">
3rd
&nb">
10th September - ;&nspp;&nssp; First court curt conference.
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29thber - &nbp; &nnbsp; &nbssp;&nsp; &nbp; Plain coussel states therethere “ might be judicial review or other amendment”
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-indent: -105.75pt; margin-left: 5.0cm; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> 16th November-& &nbp; &nbsreshore development appt application advertised in Gazette.
7th December - &bsp; &nbbp;&nnbsp; Amended origioriginating summons.
pan lEN-GBle="fize: t">Noof Motion seek seeking ing interinterim inim injunctjunctions.
I have visited the site and seen the state of the cthe current building works, the neighbouring properties and the foreshore area.
class="MsoBoMsoBodyText" align="left" style="text-align: left; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> This court is not deciding whether or notr not it would allow this or any development. No decision is being made as to the final outcome of the case. I am considering interim orders. On the one hand the first defendant says a commercial project will be held up, when all the formalities have been complied with and permissions obtained. There is reliance on whether the correct action has been brought and whether the plaintiffs have delayed. The plaintiffs say that at the least permissions were granted on highly misleading representations by the first defendant. There was no consultation when a change of use was allowed as, impliedly, there should have been. The foreshore application has still not been made properly.
I will take each in turn. I e. I emphasise I am not making final findings.
The original outline application states “ Small tourism project (12 Units)” Whilst this development, 12 or 36 units might be small when compared with the Meridien Hotel or Blue Water Resort it is arguable given the size of the land and its location it was not small. Whatever the reasons for stating 12 units it can be argued that at that time a resort of 30 to 40 units was in contemplation. The outline permission was granted on the basis of “ Small Tourism Project (12 units), Captain Cook Avenue, “ (see the permission dated 22 August 2000).
The question must be raised whed whether this consent was to a change from residential to commercial for the land concerned, or such a change ‘as long as it was only twelve units.’
The application for surrender of the residential lease was made on the basis of that outline permission. Apparently it was granted on that basis. I cannot say whether it would have made any difference to that consent if the permission sought referred to 36 units.
e application for full plan planning permission and a building permit contained a copy of the outline approval and the full plans. It is difficult on a prima facie assessment to ascertain to what extent if at all the outline permission and the consent to lease surrender influenced the full planning approval. The Lands Department observations (AJH/12) and particularly Physical Planning Unit approval (AJH/16) suggest they might have done.
The Physical Planning Act would appear to contemplate a Council declaring Physical Planning Areas. Within those areas development of the kind contemplated by the plan could be undertaken if it was of the kind specified in the Plan. If it was not, permission of the Council is required. Before an Area can be declared, public consultation is required. The Act itself is “ To provide for controlling the development of Land.”
The simple question is whether consultation, wide or naor narrow, is required before a decision is made for a permission inconsistent with the plan. Section 7 deals with such applications. There is no reference to consultation. This is not a matter of interpreting a statutory ambiguity.
On the other hand it might be argued it is against the purpose of the Act and there is little point to a plan if a person can purchase a lease one day in a residential area, and the next find without consultation he is surrounded by commercial development. Is the real purpose of the Act to give the Council control of development or to give it such control after consultation ?
Theresome questions which are eare easy to state but not so easy to distinguish in practice.
First, should the use of a piece of land remain residential or become commercial. That is a question which affects neighbouring owners ands sets precedents for the area.
Second, a separate question is, is, if commercial development is allowed, what actual building and development should be permitted on the land.
class="MsoBoMsoBodyText" align="left" style="text-align: left; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> There is a third possibility, which is a is a blend of the first two, namely where a change from residential to commercial is permitted but only if the development is limited in specified ways.
Whatever is the positiorseas, and what ever might ight be argued to be fair, it is for the Court to apply the law.
A foreshore development cation was made and grantedanted. It clearly did not comply with the Act (the Foreshore Development Act Cap 90). A second was made. There is a difficulty in that a non- existent official should display the application publicly for 14 days. (section 3 (2)). This statute is clear that there should be advertisement and consideration of representations (section 4).
As the evidence currently stands I do not knew wnew when the activities on the foreshore took place, whether after the first ‘invalid’ permission but before the second application was made, or when. It is clear on the evidence that there is currently no foreshore consent in existence. On 25th May 2001 Chief Tenene informed the first defendant of his peoples’ objection to the development. Having visited the site there might be concern as to how far out the development goes. It has clearly started, and there is already some loss of mangrove and not a great deal remaining.
There is the centuestion. If interim injunctjunctions are issued the project is delayed, ultimate operating profits lost and perhaps interest paid or lost on money to be used. However, if the building continues the plaintiffs, if they succed in the main action, are faced with a fait accompli. They could argue no court would consider ordering the demolition of the buildings.
1. Leave is granted for for the plaintiffs to amend again, if required, their Originating Summons to state precisely the grounds of their case. This must be done by 3p.m. on 28th December, together with full supporting affidavits.
2. The pThe plaintiffs must give an undertaking as to damages for any loss occasioned to the first defendant as a result of the interim injunctions.
3. The plaintiffs must act at all all time with the utmost expedition.
4. If there is e is any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff the first defendant may apply to remove the interim injunction.
5. The Court will as far as possibossible ensure the earliest hearing date. The parties must make what representations they wish concerning the judge to try the principal action to the Court in writing by 3p.m. on 28th December.
6. Libertyberty to apply on 48 hours notice.
p class="MsoBoMsoBodyText" align="left" style="text-align: left; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> 7. Costs are reserreserved.
Dated at Port Vila this 21st day of December 2001.
R.J. COVENTRY
Judge
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