Exhibit P.1
&nbs>
Letter referenced NF5/366/03g/WWN-ghd
d18th March 1997 1997 to the Plaintiff by Willie Naripo -
"Dear Hapan>
I write to advise that as
per Board of Directors Meeting datesup>th March, the Dire Directors
took decision to re-employ you and to be a Traffic Staff at Pekoa Airport.
Your re-appointment is
considered as a new employee, and is effective 15th March, 1997.
Please find attached your Job Description and should you have any queries,
please do not hesitate to consult
the General Manager. Your salary will be
in accordance to traffic salary scale.
As a former employee, I
believe you are aware of all company procedures and policies however should
you have any doubt
pleased consulted the Commercial Manager or the General
Manager. I take this opportunity to welcome you and I look forward
to a good
working relationship in future.
On behalf of the Board and
myself."
(b) &nbbsp; Exhibit P.2
Letter dated 26th
March 1997 to the Plaintiff by Karl Kalangis.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
"Ham,
Further to our introduction
on your re-instatement by the Board of Directors on the 21st
March, 1997 at the Hotel Santo, I hereby confirm on the following matters:-
<
(A) &nnsp;&&nsp;;
sp Ypan>Your Annual Salary effective as of 15th March 97 is
600,000vt less 25% on 3 months probation deduction.
(B) ; &nnsp;&&nsp;;&nbp; &nbp;
/s Company will providrovide you with uniform in which you are comply to wear
in according with the employee uniform procedure
and conditions.
(C) p;&nbbsp;&nsp; &nsp; p; &n sp;
You will will not be allow any company benefits on probation period,
discount after 3 months on probation and foc aft montrvicein
the co.
Yours faithfully,
(Signed)
Karl Kalangis
Personnel Manager".
(c) Exhi.it P><spp>
/p>
Letter dated 2>th
March, 1999 by Marokon Alilee to Batick Kark Karl -
"Dear Sipan>
re: Councillor Mr Ham
Japhet Attending Council Meetings
Thank you for your letter
requesting permission for Mr Ham Japhet a Vanair employee to attend the
council meeting. Ham
has been elected councillor of the Luganville
Municipality and will be attending series of meetings for the Council.
Mr Japhet caend the
council meeting at anytime except when he is e is on duty he has to make
alternative arrangement with
another staff at the airport to cover up for
him while he attend the council meeting.
I take this opportunity to
congratulate all the councillors attend the coue council meeting.
ass="Mss="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Yours sincerely,”
This letter wased to
the Personnel/Admin. Manager, Bruno Juno Jean Batise - Santo Branch
Manager, Thompson Peter - Airport Supervisor and Ham Japhet.
(d) &nbssp; &nsp; Exhibit P.4//u><<
Letter da0th
March, 2000 to the Plaintiff by Raynolds Boeson, Operations Manager -
"Dear Ham,
I have been instructed by
our Cha (Moi Dinh) to advise you oyou of our Staff Regulation. According to
our Staff Regulation
page 26 clause 8:11 paragraph 2, any staff elected to
Parliament, Local or Municipal election must immediately resign from
the
company. Your employment with the company is therefore questioned on the
basis that you have have been elected as
a Luganville Councillor. I
therefore recommended that you either resign as a Councillor or from the
Company within one
month from the date of this letter.
Yours faithfully,
(e) ;&nbssp;&nnbsp; bsp; Exhu>Exhibit P.5
>
langGB" style="font-size: 12.0pt">
Letter dated 20th
March, 2000 to the Plaintiff by Hannah Liu, Board Secretary -
"Dear Ham,
RE: TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT
After being informed of our
Staff Regulation as per our staff taff manual on the 10th March, 2000,
the Board of Directors at its meeting on the 17th March, 2000
have decided to terminate your employment with Vanair Limited effective as
of 17th March, 2000 due to breaching Clause 8.11 of page 26
paragraph 2 of the staff manual.
You are entitled to three
months e, severance pay plus annuaannual leave owing as of 17th
March, 2000. We would like to tank you for all your contribution and support
whilst being with the company for the last
three years.
Yours faithfully,"
The Plaintiff gave further
evidence showing that he had ved a cheque from the Defendant company
for the sum osum of vt337,218
but denied that he did so without accepting or
conceding that his termination was lawful or justified. He tendered the
Termination Pay Calculation as Exhibit P.6, the cheque as Exhibit P.7 and
the Payment Voucher as Exhibit P.8.
The Plaintiff gave further
evidence showing that he wcouncillor on the Luganville Municipal
Council from 1rom 1995 to
1998. Further that he was re-elected as Councillor in
December 1999 for a further term of four years. That since his appointment
on 15th March, 1997 he had been attending Council meetings. That
on two occasions in 1997 the Plaintiff had arranged with one Thomson
Peter,
Shift Supervisor to stand in his place while he attended council meetings
and that he made similar arrangements
in 1998.
<
Regardie Staff Regulations
the Plaintiff gave evidence that since he started work with the Dthe Defendant
company he had
requested a copy of it several times but no copy was ever
made available to him. He admitted that he was only sent a copy of
the Staff
Regulation after he was terminated.
The Plaintiff gave further
evidence showing that during the period 20th March, 2000 2000 to
the date of hearing of his action, he has been running a small retail
business on his premises earning
a gross income of vt15,000 to vt20,000 per
month. His wife is unemployed and there is no one living with them who is in
gainful employment.
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Defendant's Evidence
Mr Dinh Moi, Chairman of the
current Board rectors of the Defendant Company gave evidence on behalf
lf
of the Defendant.
His evidence shows basically that the Board of Directors
had met on 17th March, 2000 and resolved to terminate the
Plaintiff's employment. At that meeting all 13 members of the Board were
present
together with the General Manager and the Board Secretary.
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Mr Moi's evi show the
following decision -
"(f) &nThe Chairman made a
p proposal for the termination of Pekoa Staff Ham Japheth since he was a
member
of the Municipal Cl of villein acnce whe
Staff Regulation. Seconded by member DonalDonald Resd Restuetutuetune. Ine. It wast
was resolved that
Ham Japheth be terminated effective 17/3/2000."
This decision is annexed and
marked "c" to the affidavit evidence ofoi.
Mr Moi's further evidence shows
that he became aware of the Plaintiff's position as Councillor on the
Luganville Municipal
Council whilst at the same time occupying the position
of Shift Supervisor with the Defendant Company. He told the Court that
he
had on numerous occasions advised the Plaintiff verbally that he was being
employed contrary to company policy and
that he was given the choice of
either resigning his seat as a Councillor or resigning from his post with
the Defendant
Company. Mr Moi told the Court that only when the Plaintiff
did not respond to those advices that he instructed the Operations
Manager
to write the letter of 10th March, 2000 (Exhibit P.4) and placed
the matter before the Board of Directors for decision. He confirmed that the
Board
took the decision to terminate the Plaintiff and that such termination
was not due to misconduct, but that it was done in accordance
with the
requirements of the Staff Regulation and Company Policies. He confirmed that
the Defendant Company had paid
off all outstanding entitlements of the
Plaintiff which amounted to VT337,218 and that the Plaintiff and no further
claim
against the Defendant. The relevant clause relied upon by the
Defendant was Clause 8.11 “Candidacy to Parliament and Local Government
Council.
ass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Any Staff whom intends to
contest a parliamentary or local government council election should lodge
the interest with
department head at least one month before the closing date
of nomination of candidates. Staff concern will be one unpaid leave
until
the election is held. If elected the staff concern must immediately resign
from the Company, any outstanding remuneration
will be paid less any
deduction owing to the Company."
Issues
I was told by Mr Hakwa that
with the disclosure of the Staff Regulation by the Defendant Company most
facts have been
agreed. The only issues that I had to consider and decide
upon are:-
(a) &nsp; &&nbp;;&nbpp; &nnsp; &nbp; &nb p;
/s Whether or noor not there was a contract of employment between the
Plaintiff and efend/span
lass=ormalle="margin-left: 36.0pt;
marg margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
<
(b)&nbs> &nbbsp; &nsp; &nbbp;&nnbp;& &nb Whan>Whether ther or not the Defendant had breached such contract by
terminathe Piff?
">
(c) &nnbsp; &nnbsp; &nbp; &nbp;
er or not the the Defendant had breached Staff Regon by tering taintispan> ass="MsoNormal" style="margin-lgin-left: eft: 36.0p36.0pt;
mat; margin-rgin-top: top: 1; ma1; margin-bottom: 1">
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
(d) p;&nbbsp;&nsp; &nsp; p; &nnsp;&
sp;
Whan>Whether or not the Defendant had acted lawfully rminathe
Plaintiff?
Plaintiff's Arguments and
Submissions
In a nutshell it was argued on
behalf of the Plaintiff there was a valid contract between the
Plaintiff and Dand Defendant.
It was submitted that the letters tendered into
evidence as Exhibit P.1, Exhibit .2, Exhibit 3, Exhibit 4 and the Staff
Regulations - Exhibit 9 set out the minimum terms and conditions of the
Plaintiff generally. On that basis therefore it
was submitted that the
contract was partly a written contract and that section 9 of the Employment
Act [CAP.160] (the Act) had been complied with. It was further submitted
that in the absence of the contract specifying the term
of the Plaintiff's
employment the term should be implied to be for three years under the
provision of section 15 of the
Act. In relation to the second and third
issues which are closely related, it was argued and submitted that the
Defendant
had breached their contract with the Plaintiff and further that
such termination was not made in accordance with the Staff
Regulation of the
Defendant Company. It was argued and submitted that Clause 8.11 of the Staff
Regulation did not and
does not give any power to the Defendant Company's
Board of Directors to terminate any staff who is a member or a councillor
to
a Municipal Council. It was argued that the power in Clause 8.11 is
restricted to a staff who stands for election
and is elected as a Member of
Parliament and as a councillor to a local government council.
In relation to the fourth issue
it was argued and submitted that inabsence of specific power ower of the
Board of Directors
to terminate the Plaintiff for being a councillor to a
municipal council, that there was no other good and just reason why
the
Plaintiff should be terminated. It was submitted by Mr Hakwa that the
termination of the Plaintiff was therefore
unlawful and that he was entitled
to be paid damages. And he further submitted that the breach committed by
the Defendant
was a serious breach entitling the plaintiff to his full
remunerations and damages under the provisions of section 53(1) of
the Act.
Mr Hakwa also argued and submitted that the plaintiff had not waived his
right to his entitlements and damages
as he had lodged his case within a
reasonable time in accordance with section 53 (2) of the Act.
Mr Hakwa further submitted that
the amount of damages should be calcd in accordance with sectioection 56
(4), (5), (6)
and (7) of the Act. He referred the Court to the case of
Marie Noelle Ferrieux -v- Banque Indosuez Vanuatu Limited 2 VLR, 462 in
which the Supreme Court was urged to consider awarding damages up to 6 times
the amount of severance allowance
which an employee is entitled to. However,
Mr Hakwa also drew the attention of the Court to the case on appeal
Banque Indosuez Vanuatu Ltd -v- Marie-Noelle Ferrieux 2 VLR 490. There
the Court of Appeal had difficulty with applying section 56(4) of the Act
and chose therefore to adopt
the common law principle to award damages as
compensatory and not as punitive or exemplary.
Defendant's Arguments and
Submissions
Basically the Defendant argues
that termination of the Plaintiff was made in compliance with Clause 8.11 of
the Staff
Regulations. It was submitted by Mr Kilu that the Board of
Directors was under a public duty to act as they did in the best
interest of
the public beneficiaries. He argued that the Staff Regulations were in place
to ensure the better running
and management of the company. He submitted
that Clause 8.11 should be given its fair and liberal meaning pursuant to
section 8 of the Interpretation Act [CAP.132] to ensure the attainment of
the object of the Regulations according to its true intent, meaning and
spirit.
He argued that Clause 8.12 of the Staff Regulations expresses a
clear intent and spirit of the Company not to allow political
elements in
the administration of the public company. He argued that Clauses 8.11 and
8.12 when read together have the
intent, meaning and spirit of excluding
local government councils and Municipal Councils and a Member of Parliament.
He referred the Court to Hawke -v- Dunn [1897] UKLawRpKQB 42; (1897) 1 QB 579 outlining the
general principles of construction of statutes. Mr Kilu further argued and
submitted that as the Plaintiff's
case was not a case of misconduct, there
was no need to give him the opportunity of being heard. He argued that even
if the Plaintiff had been given an opportunity to be heard, it would not
have made any difference. He submitted that the Plaintiff's
case fell within
the exceptions to the rule of fair hearing in White -v- Redfern
(1879) 5 QB 15; Schmidt -v- Home Secretary [1969] 2 Ch.149;
Malloch -v- Aberdeen Cpn [1971] 1 WLR 1575 and Cinnamond -v- Airports
Authority [1980] 1 WLR 582.
Finally it was argued that as
the Plaintiff had been pis outstanding entitlements in accordance with
sectioections 49(3)
and (4) of the Employment Act, that the Plaintiff was not
entitled to anything else.
The Law
The relevant law to apply in
this case are the provisions of the Ement Act [CAP.160]. In its
its
Introduction the Staff
Regulations page 1 paragraph 2 it is stated-
(a) &nnsp;&&nsp;;&nspp;&nssp;&nsp;
pan lEN-GB" style="font-size: 12.0pt">
"A contract of employment
may be made in any fany form, whether written or oral:
Provided that a contract of
employment for a fixed term exceeding 6 months or making it necessary for
the employee to
reside away from his ordinary place of residence shall be in
writing and shall state the names of the parties, the nature of
employment,
the amount and made of payment of remuneration, and, where appropriate, any
other terms and conditions of
employment including housing, rations,
transport and repatriation."
Rulinto the First Issue
Applying this provision to the
facts of the case as supported by oral and documentary evidence, it is clear
to me that
the letters exhibited as Exhibits P.1, P.2, P.3 and the Staff
Regulations itself (P.9) contain the minimum terms and conditions
application to the Plaintiff. In my judgement, these amount to a written
contract existing between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant Company and I so
rule. The duration of the contract was not stipulated and therefore for the
purposes of
assessing damages it has to be implied by virtue of section 15
of the Act to be 3 years, renewable unless earlier repudiated
or terminated
by either party in accordance with law. Section 15 of the Act reads -
"The maximum duration of
employment that may be stipulated or implied in any
contract shall is no case
exceed 3 years":
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
(b) style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"">   &nbssp;&nnbp; &nsp; &nbbp;&nnbsp;
Section 48 pro8 provides for termination of contract -
>
"Subject to the provisions
of this Part a contract of employment shall terminate on the last day of the
period agreed
in the contract or on the completion of the piece of work
specified therein".
/p>
Ruling As To The Second Issue
From the evidence the Plain
was employed as a Traffic Staff at Pekoa Airport. His appointment was a
re-appo-appointment
as a new employee and was effective from 15th
March, 1997. This is clear from Exhibit P.1. There was no agreement as to
the period when the contract could and would
terminate. Indeed it seems from
the evidence of Mr Moi that the Plaintiff was previously employed by the
Defendant. Paragraph
2 of Exhibit P.1 also suggests that this is so.
Paragraph 1 of Exhibit P.2 suggests that the appointment was a
re-instatement.
Indeed in his evidence Mr Moi told the Court that he
regretted taking the decision to terminate the Plaintiff because the
Plaintiff was such a good employee that had he resigned as a Councillor he
would have continued to be employed. There
was no evidence to suggest that
the Plaintiff was employed specifically to perform a piece of work. The
position he occupied
was a fixed or permanent position having been confirmed
as such after going through a 3 months probation period. In my judgment
the
contract of employment was for an indefinite period and for the Defendant to
have to terminate Plaintiff earlier
as they did was a breach of contract
entitling the Plaintiff to damages. And I accordingly rule.
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
(c) &nbp; &nnbsp;;&nbp; &nsp; &nnbp;&&nbp;; &n Clan>Clause 8use 8.11 of the Staff Regulation states-
“Any staff whom intends to
contest a parliamentary or local goal government council election should lodge
the interest
with department head at least one month before the closing date
of nomination of candidates. Staff concern will be on unpaid
leave until the
election is held. If elected the staff concern must immediately resign from
the Company, any outstanding
remuneration will be paid less any deduction
owing to the Company".
/p>
This provision is very clear.
It concerns only a staff who contests for and is electedarliament or a
Local ocal Government
Council. If it was intended that a councillor to a
municipal should be included, the Regulation would have said so
specifically.
And the appropriate term to use would have been either
"Municipality" or "Municipal Council". "Municipality"
is defined in the
Interpretation Act [CAP.132] to mean "a municipality in Vanuatu established
by law." It is distinct from a local government council.
Section 2 of the
Local Government Regions (consolidation) Order No.1 of 1996 establishes 6
Local Government Councils.
They do not include the 2 municipal Councils of
the two Municipalities. Municipal Councils are regulated under the
Municipalities
[Act CAP.126]. Local Governments are regulated under the
Decentralisation and Local Government Regions Act [CAP.127].
Section 8 of the Interpretation
Act therefore does not have to be resorted to here. And the principles of
construction outlined in Hawke -v- Dunn are principles of
construction of statutes. These Staff Regulations are not statutes. In
Vanuatu, due to the special
local circumstances existing here it is my
considered opinion that the ruling in Hawke's case be not upheld as
it would cause very disastrous effects as this case itself shows. And I so
rule.
It was submitted on behalf of
the Defendant that Clauses 8.11 and 8.12 read together had the intent,
meaning or spirit
of preventing political elements in the administration of
the company. If that was so then in my judgement those clauses are
unconstitutional. Clause 8.12 regulates politic and religion as follows:-
"No po or religion
activities are to be allow in the companompany premises by any staff, staff
practising such activities
in the company premises will be discipline
according".
This clause does not prohibit
employment of politilements. It prohibits their activities on company
pre premises. Read
together with Clause 8.11, these two clauses are in conflict
with each other. Whereas Clause 8.11 purports to prohibit the
employment or
political elements, Clause 8.12 allows it but makes them subject to
discipline.
<
It is clear that the Board of
Directors of the Defendant did not the power to terminate the the
Plaintiff. Mr Moi gave
evidence that there were some complaints about some
activities of the Plaintiff which called for institution of disciplinary
action. But that is not the course of action taken by the Board of
Directors. Had the Defendant chosen to take that course
then it follows that
they should have given him a right to be heard. But the Defendant admitted
and it is not in issue
that this is not a case of misconduct against the
Plaintiff. Having said all that, it is therefore clear to me that the
Defendant did not comply with the provisions of its Staff Regulations when
it terminated the Plaintiff, and I so rule.
Ruling As To The Fourth Issue
class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
1">
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Having ruled Clause 8.11
did not give powers to the Defendant's Board of Directors to terminate tate the
Plaintiff, and
the Defendant not having proceeded against the Plaintiff
under Clause 8.12, it is my judgment that the termination of the Plaintiff
was unjustified and unlawful, and I so rule.
Damages
The Plaintiff is therefore
entitled to be paid damapart from his full remuneration for the
appropriate iate period of
notice under section 49 which the Plaintiff has
acknowledged receipt of. But the receipt of such payment does not prejudice
his claim to damages for breach of contract which the Plaintiff has sued for
and has been adjudged to be successful in
his action. The relevant provision
is section 53 of the Act which states -
"(1) &nbbsp;& If any any empl
mpl
ill-treats an employeployee or commits some other serious breach of the terms and
conditions of the contract of employmene emp may terminate the
contract forthwith and sand shall hall be entitled to his
full remuneration for the
appropriate period of notice in accordance with section 49 without prejudice
to any claim he
may have for damages for breach of contract.
(2) p;&nssp; p; &nbp; &nbp;
I accept Mr Hakwa's submissi that the Defendant's actions amounted to a serious breach in that the
Plaintiff tiff was terminated
three days earlier than he was so advised.
Furthermore the Plaintiff was granted one month in which to decide to resign
on 10th March, 2000. (Exhibit P.4) Before the Plaintiff had the
opportunity to decide within that period, he was terminated seven days
after
on 17th March without him knowing it until three days later on 20th
March, 2000. That in my judgement is what makes this breach a serious
breach. It was not contended that the Plaintiff
had waived his right to
claim for damages. He filed his action on 26th June, 2000. That
is within a reasonable time.
Quantum
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Counsel for the Defendant was
not prepared to address the Court on the issue of damages. That being the
case I accept
the submissions of Mr Hakwa in relation to damages and its
quantum in their entirety.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
The amount of es is
therefore calculated as follows:-
(a) ; Mynthlla Sanbsp   &nsp; &nbssp; ;&nspp; &nbp; &nbp; ;&nbpp; &nnsp;&&&sp;& p;&nbbsp;bbsp;& p;&nbbsp;
p;&nssp; p;&bsp;&nbs; nbsp;nbsp; &nbss; nbsp;&nbp; &nsp; & - &nnbsp; nbsp; &nbp; &&,8sp1>
p;&nssp; p; &nbp; &nbp;
for a further 3 year years bass based oned on
section 15 of the Act &nbbsp; -sp; - &&bsp;;&bspp; &nnsp; 36p; 36 months>
0pt">(c) p; &nsp; &nbbsp;
span>Entitlemitlement tont to 3 months notice underion 49
of the
Act. &nnsp;&&nsp;;&nspp;&nssp;&nsp; p;&nssp; p; &nbp; &nbp; ;&nbpp; &nnsp;&&nsp; &nbp; &nbbp;&nnbp;&
&nbbsp; &nbp; &nbp; &nbsbbsp;&&nbssp   p;&nbbnbsp&
- &bsp; &nbbp;&nnbp;&&nbp; &nsp;&nsp; bsp; 3 mon3 monthsspan>span>
(d)  &nbs; &nbp; &nbss;&nbbsp; Enp; Entitlemitlement tont to 1
1
month annual leave &nnsp;&&nsp;;&nspp;&nssp;&nsp;
p;&nssp; p; &nbp; &nbp; & p; -&&;&nbpsp;& pnbspp;&nbbsp; 1 month
p>
(e)">(e) Entitlement to 15
d leys leave for 1 year of service -;nbspp;nbssp;nbbsp;nnbsp;nbsp; &nbT30,90an>0pt"> 
p>
Therefore, Monthly
Salary p;&nbbsp; &bspp; &nbs; &nbs; ;&nbpp; &n-sp; p;nbsp; &bsp; &&nbp;p;&nsbsp;,800 an>
Toumber s       &nbssp; &&nsp;;&nsp; &nbp; &nnbp;&&nbp;; &nnbsp;; -&nnbsp; &nbs; ; &nbbsp; 4sp; 40
>
---------
>
VT2,472,000
Entitlement to 1s Leave
+ 30,spa
>
VT2,502,900
<
Less the Plaintiffsses in
36 Months
at VT20,000 p month  p; &nnsp;&&nsp; &np; &nnsp;&&nsp;; &nnbsp; &nbp; &nbp; &nbss;&nbbsp; &nsp; &nbbsp;& p;&nbsbs&nn&nb;;&nbssp;
& &nnsp;&nbs;&&nbp;&nbp;  &nsp; &bsp;;nbspp    -;&bspp; pp;&nbbsp;
720,0720,000 ass="rmal" style="text-indentndent: 36.: 36.0pt; 0pt; margimargin-left: 324.0pt; margin-top: 1; margimargin-botn-bottom: 1">
---------------
Total amount of damages &  &bsp; &bsp; p; &nnsp;&&nsp; - p; - ;nbspp;nbssp;&nnsp; &nsp; &nbbsp; &nbbbsp;& p;bspp;
nbsp; & psp; &  &nsp; &bsp;&bsp; p&nbssp;&nbs; &nsp; &nbs;;nbsp;    VT1,782,900n>: 1">
=pt">===============
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Interests
The Plaintiff claims inter
at the rate of 12% on the amount of damages awarded. In my judgement this
claimclaim is justified
in view of the seriousness of the breach. The rate of
interest claimable on the sum of VT1,782,000 of 12% per annum is allowed.
This will commence from 17th March, 2000 until the whole sum of
VT1,782,000 is paid.
Costs
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
The Plaintiff c also for
costs. In my judgment he is entitled to costs to be agreed or taxed.span>
The Defendant is HEREBY
ORDERED to pay the Plaintiff as follows:-
(1) &nbs; &nbbp;&nnbp;&&nbp;; &nsp; Dpmages in the sum sum of VT1,782,000.
(2) &nnsp;&&nsp;;&nspp;&nssp;
sp;
Interests on VT1,782,000 at the rate of 12% per annum from 17th
March, 2000 until the whole judgment sum is paid.
(3)&nb"> &nnbsp; &nsp; &nbbp;&nnbp;&&nbp;; &nsp;
Costse a beed reed or taxed.
 an>
DATED at Luganville, this 20th
day of October, 2000.
BY THE COURT
OLIVER A. SAKSAK
Judge
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