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Magistrates Court of Vanuatu |
BETWEEN:
DOVAN ANOL LULU
Port Vila
Claimant
Public Solicitor’s office,
Port Vila, Efate
Claimant’s lawyer
AND:
BRAMLEY CONSTRUCTION LIMITED
Port Vila
Defendant
Date of hearing: 30 April 2025
Before: Magistrate P. Toaliu
Copy: Vira. H of the Public Solicitor’s office for the claimant
N H Bramley of Bramley Construction
Decision on leave to file claim out of time
Background
Submissions
Consideration
3. Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain actions
(1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued,
that is to say –
(a) actions founded on simple contract or on tort;
(b) actions to enforce a recognizance;
(c) actions to enforce an award, where the submissions is not by an instrument under seal;
(d) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any Act, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture:
Provided that –
(i) in case of actions for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or
of provision made by or under any Act or independently of any contact or such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff
for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to any person, this
subsection shall have effect as if for the reference to six years there were substituted a reference to three years; and
(ii) nothing in this subsection shall be taken to refer to any action to which section 5 applies.
(2) An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of any matter which arose more than six years before the commencement of the action.
(3) An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the cause of action accrued:
Provided that this subsection shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision
of this Act.
(4) An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the judgment became
enforceable, and no arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after the expiration of six years from
the date on which the interest became due.
(5) An action to recover any penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture, recoverable by virtue of any Act shall
not be brought after the expiration of two years from the date on which the cause of action accrued:
Provided that for the purposes of this subsection the expression "penalty" shall not include a fine to which any person is liable on conviction of a criminal offence.
(6) Subsection (1) shall apply to an action to recover seamen’s wages, but save as aforesaid this section shall not apply to
any cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which is enforceable in rem.
(7) This section shall not apply to any claim for specific performance of a contract or for any injunction or for other equitable
relief, except in so far as any provision thereof may be applied by the court by analogy in like manner as has, prior to the commencement
of this Act, been applied.
20. Period of limitation
No proceedings may be instituted by an employee for the recovery of remuneration after the expiry of 3 years from the end of the period
to which the remuneration relates.
In our opinion s.20 is limited in its operation to periodic payments that become due to employees during the currency of a contract of employment. The expression covers ordinary wages paid periodically whilst an employee is at work but extends to include annual leave and sick leave payments that become due whilst the contract of employment remains on foot: see s.31.
In the context of the Employment Act we are unable to think of any reason why the time limit in s.20 would be merely discretionary. Why should the time limit apply to some payments of remuneration, but not to others, or to some employees and not to others? Further, if the time limit was intended to operate in some but not all situations, it could be expected that Parliament would have given an indication of the factors which should influence the exercise of the discretion and of the purpose that the discretion was intended to achieve. The absence of the indication of this kind lends weight, in our view, to the conclusion that s.20 should be construed as imposing a mandatory time limit. However, as we have already explained, the mandatory time limit only applies in respect of “remuneration”.
Order
DATED at Port Vila this 30 Day of April 2025
BY THE COURT
Magistrate
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/vu/cases/VUMC/2025/8.html