Sapos wan man ino akri blong ol man olsem
representativeg ol kastom owna, imas tale talem ikam long mi or offisa long
Dipatmen blong Rural Lands or District Komisona long ples we land ia istap
long bifo 30 dei ipas.
Mekem long Vila long 22nd dei February
82.
>
Sign: J. S.NVANU.>”
-   &nbssp; ;&nspp; &nbp; &nbp; ;&nbpp; &nnsp;&&nsp;
prior to 1982 Mr. Touru lodged a claim in an “Ared Couat
imes red this ece and in the judgment as an “Area Land
Committee”)
which sach sat at t at JanicJanica. Mra. Mr. Tou. Touru clru claimed customary ownership of
Natinae and other land. He paid
a VT6.000 fee to the Area Land Committee.
Mr. Touru said that there was only one claim lodged with the Committee over
the Natinae land and the Committee declared him to be the custom owner of
it. This decision was conveyed to an officer of
the Department of Lands. No
“appeal” against the decision was advised to the Department Mr. Touru said
the Minister then
declared him to be the custom owner of the Natinae land,
and other adjoining land;
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
- ; &nnsp;&&nsp;;&nbp; &nbp; &nnbp;& &n a an>a counciouncil of chiefsh meteprom22h
88 confirmed that Mr. Touru was a custom stom ownerowner of t of the lahe land. Tnd. The dehe decision
of the council of
chiefs did not name the Appellant as a custom owner;
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
- &nbbsp;&&nsp;;&nsp; &nsp; &nnbp;& &nnbsp; &nbp;
p;
at abou sthe same, iny Feb 1988, the Department of
Lands and Natural Resources wrote to Meso Messrs. srs. TouruTouru, Barnabas
Visi, Moses
Moli, Etiene Tura, Timothy Molbarov and Rukrei iing them that
t
th there had been settlement of the
land dispute concerning titles including
Natinae, and that the Santo Land Council, which had been receiving rents,
would
pay out the moneys in hand to be shared equally between the
addressees. Mr. Valele was not named in that correspondence as
a party
entitled to share in the rents;
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
span lang="EN-GB">- &bsp; ;&nbpp; &&nsp;; &nbp; &nbp; &&nbp;; &n sp;
Mran>Mr. Tour Touru said that the Appellant and his family di seek t rigf cuswnersefore the Utalamba Committee or the meeting
of the council of Chif Chiefs aefs at Dept Deproma.roma.
p>
- &nbp; &nnbsp;;&nbp; &nsp; &nnbp;&&nbp;; &nnbsp; &nbp; &nbp; &nbs ;
span>Mr. Touru conu contended that Court proceedingore tgistr
rt atnvillcerning the sharing of the moneys distributed by thby the
e
Sa Santo Lnto Land Cand Counciouncil, and in
the Supreme Court in June 1990 in an appeal from
that decision, had determined that the custom owners of the Natinae and
adjoining land were Mr. Touru, Barnabas Visi and Moses Moli being the three
people named in the Declaration made on 22nd February 1982.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
- p; &nnsp;&&nsp; &nbp; &nbbp;&nnbp;& &nbbsp;
p;
in summary, Mr. Toontenhat bson o decisions of
the Utulamba Committee (the Area Land Comd Committemittee), te), the dehe decision
of the
council of chiefs at Deproma and the Court procgs, the issue of custom
m
ownership had already been decided,
and the Appellant was estopped from
claiming customary ownership.
In dismissing the Appellant’s claim for a continuation of
the injunctive relief, the primary Judge substantially upheld Mr.
Touru’s
contentions. Further, it was held that the injunction should not have been
granted in any event as the Appellants
had used the wrong Court procedures.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Mr. Touru’s arguments before the primary judge, and
before this Court, commeny stressing the apparent imnt importance of the
Minister’s Declaration made on 22nd February 1982. The primary
Judge recognized that the substance of the Declaration did not come within
the subject matter
of s. 6 of the Land Reform Regulations, 1980 (which was
in the same terms as s. 6 of the Land Reform Act [CAP. 123]). A certificate
validly issued under s. 6 would authorize an alienator to enter into
negotiation with custom
owners. Section 6 is not concerned with appointing a
representative to act in negotiations on behalf of custom owners.
The primary Judge held that the land innd in question was not alienated land. He
correctly recognized that as there was
a dispute as to custom ownership, s.
8 of the Land Reform Regulations (which was in substantially similar terms
of s.
8 of the Land Reform Act) applied. That section provided that the
Minister shall have general management and control over all land not
occupied
by an alienator where custom ownership is disputed.
As the land in question was not alid land, s. 25 of
the Alienated Land Act [CAP. 145] could have no application. That seat section
provides that in the case of alienated land the Minister may appoint
a
person to act as trustee for and to represent the custom owners for the
purpose of that Act, that is for the purpose
of the trustee negotiating with
an alienator or registered negotiator. We do not think that the provisions
of s. 25 are
of any assistance in construing the effect of the Declaration
made on 22nd February 1982.
The primary Judge concluded that thearation must have been made made by the
Minister in exercise of the power in s. 8
of the Land Reform Regulations. As
we understand the reasons for judgment it appears that the primary Judge
concluded
that the appointment of Mr. Touru, Barnabas Visi and Moses Moli to
represent the custom owners was in furtherance of the Minister’s
general
power of management and control of the land. For reasons which follow we do
not agree with that conclusion, but
even if it were correct, the Minister’s
power under s. 8 is one to be exercised in the interests of and on behalf of
the custom owners. The section does not empower the Minister to issue a
certificate, or take any other action, which would
have the effect of
deciding the dispute as to custom ownership. The power is confined to one of
management intended to
preserve the interest of the custom owners until the
dispute is otherwise resolved according to the law of the Republic of
Vanuatu.
We do not agree with the conclusion that that the Minister’s Declaration was
issued under s. 8 of the Land Reform Regulations
for the following reasons.
First, this interpretation of the Declaration is contrary to its terms. The
Declaration purports
to be issued under s. 6 (2) of the Regulations. If that
section does not empower the issue of the Declaration the consequence
would
normally follow that the Declaration was made without authority and is of no
legal consequence. Further, to construe
the Declaration as one issued under
s. 8 of the Land Reform Regulations is to give it an effect which is
contrary to
other evidence which was before the Court.
class="MsoBoMsoBodyText" style="line-height: normal; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Contrary to Mr. Touru’s evidence, he was not the rehe registered lessor of the
Natinae land. The two Lease Titles for
the Natinae land show that the
registered lessor is the Santo Land Council. The Santo Land Council was
established by
the Land Reform (Santo Land Council) Order No.125 of 1981.
That Order was made by the Minister of Lands in exercise of power
under s.
19 of the Land Reform Regulations 1980. That section provided power for the
Minister by order to establish a
corporate body for the better carrying into
effect of the purposes of the Regulation. That power was incidental to the
power of management given to the Minister under s. 8. The promulgation of
Order No. 125 of 1981 indicates that the Minister
had exercised the power of
management by delegating management functions over the land to the Santo
Land Council. It
would be quite inconsistent with that exercise of power for
the Minister at the same time to be delegating overlapping management
functions to other individuals.
The scope of the functions and powers thrs that could be given to a body
corporate established under s. 19 of the Land
Reform Regulations are set out
in a schedule to those Regulations. The functions and powers do not include
a power to
determine disputes as to custom ownership. Order No. 125 of 1981
did not purport to empower the Santo Land Council to resolve
ownership
disputes. The functions and powers of the Santo Land Council were confined
to powers to grant, administer and
manage leases of land, to enter into
agreements, leases and conveyances or transfers of the land, to act as
agents for
the Government, to make recommendation to the Minister for the
good management of the land, to invest funds, to charge fees
and to exercise
powers that are necessary to enable the council to carry out its functions.
The power to enter into leases
of the land specifically required a recital
in each lease that the Council is acting on behalf of the Government or the
custom owners, as the case may be. The Natinae leases contain recitals to
the effect that the leases were entered into on
behalf of the custom owners.
The leases remain registered in the name of Santo Land
ncil as lessor. This is so even though Order No. 125 of 198f 1981 was revoked
on 7th July 1988 by Order No. 31 of 1988 which also provided that
all property owned by the Santo Land Council is now vested in the
Government
of the Republic of Vanuatu. This vesting order has the effect that the
Minister, on behalf of the Government,
has directly resumed general
management and control of the land under s. 8 of the Land Reform Act, and
now holds the land as land where ownership is disputed.
The register of Lease Titles gives no support to the claim by Mr. Touru that
the ownership dispute has been resolved.
It is of course possible that the
ownership dispute has otherwise being resolved and that the determination of
ownership
has not been translated into a change of registered particulars on
the Lease Titles. We therefore turn to the matters which
Mr. Touru relies
upon in support of his assertion that ownership has been determined.
The argument tha Utulamba Committee and itsd its associated “Area Land
Court” or Area Land Committee, and the council
of chiefs which met at
Deproma in 1988 had lawful authority to resolve disputed ownership, and to
make a determination
binding on all claimants rests on the proposition that
these bodies were “appropriate customary institutions or procedures
to
resolve disputes concerning the ownership of custom land” within the meaning
of Article 78 (2) of the Constitution
of the Republic of Vanuatu, and gain
their lawful authority to finally resolve ownership disputes from that
Article.
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
This argument reflecmis-understanding of Article 78.
Article 78 is one of the provisions in Chapter 12 of the
Constitution dealing with lanapter 12 contains provisionisions of central
importance to the citizens of Vanuatu. Chapter 12 includes the following
provisions:
“LAND BELONGS TO CUSTOM OWNERS
p clas class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
nbsp; //i>All
land in the Republic of Vanuatu belongs to the indigenous custom owners and
their descendants.
BASIS OF OWNERSHIP AND USE
<
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
74.   Th
le ruf custom shallshall form the basis of ownership and use of land in the
Republic of Vanuatu.
style="yle="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
PERPETUAL OWNERSHIP
ass="ass="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: -36.0pt; margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
75. only
indigenous citizens of the Republic of Vanuatu who have acquired their land
in accordance with a recognizedem of
tenuall herpet ship of t of their heir land.land.
NATIONAL LAND LAW
76. ;&nbssp; <
Parliament, after consultation with the National Council of Chiefs, sha pe for the implementation of Article 73, 74 and 75
in a national land
law anaw and mayd may make different provision for different categories of land, one
of which shall
be urban land.
COMPENSATION
77. &nnbsp;
P Parliameat shrel prescribe such criteria for the assessment of compensation
and the manner of its payment
as it deems appropriate to person whose
interare aely aed by l by legislation under this Chapter.
>
DISPUTES
78. (1) Wher Where,
consequent on the provisions of this Chapter, there is a dispute concerning
the ownership of alienated
land, the Government shall hold such land until
the dispute is resolved.
<
(2) The Government shall arrange for the appropriate
customary institutions or procedures to resolve disputes concerning the
ownership of custom land.”
Chapter 12 also includes Article 79 which provides that land transactions
between an indigenous citizen and a non-indigenous
citizen or a non citizen
shall only be permitted with the consent of the Government, Article 80 which
provides that the
Government may own land “in the public interest”, and
Article 81 which provides for the Government to buy land from custom
owners
and to redistribute it.
Article 78 must be read as a whole, n light of all the other prer provisions
of the Constitution. In particular, Article
78 (2) must be read subject to
Article 78 (1). Article 78 (1) expressly limits the operation of Article 78
to disputes
concerning the ownership of alienated land. In such a
case the land is held by the Government until the dispute is resolved, and
Article 78 (2) spells out what
the Government is to do whilst it holds the
land. The Government must arrange to have the dispute resolved by ‘the
appropriate
customary institution or procedures’.
The Constitution itself gives guidance abou about the appropriate customary
institution or procedures for resolving disputes
about custom ownership. The
Constitution establishes the framework for the government of the Republic.
It provides for
law making powers through a democratically elected
Parliament, for administration of the State through an executive, and for
the administration of justice, including the resolution of disputes, by
independent Courts. In particular Article 52
provides:
“Parliament
shallshall provide for the establishment of village or island courts with
jurisdiction over customary and other
matters and shall provide for the role
of chiefs in such courts.”
The present case is not concerned with alienated land, and Article 78 has no
application. However, it follows from what
we have said about the
constitutional framework under which the Courts of the Republic are
established that the Constitution
envisages that disputes between citizens,
or between a citizen and the Government, including disputes over custom
ownership
of land, will be finally resolved through the Courts, if they
cannot be settled by agreement between each and every party who
claims a
competing interest.
Pursuant to the directi Article 52 of the Constitustitution, Parliament has
provided for the establishment of island courts
in the Island Courts Act
[CAP. 167]. By s. 8 of that Act, island courts have a civil jurisdiction
relating to land. Section 3 (4) requires that
where the matter before an
island court concerns disputes as to ownership of land, the court shall be
constituted by
a magistrate nominated by the Chief Justice under s. 2A and
three justices appointed by the President of the Republic who are
knowledgeable in custom. Section 10 provides:
“Subject
to the proviprovisions of this Act an island court shall administer the customary
law prevailing within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court so far as
the same is not in conflict with any written law and is not contrary to
justice,
morality and good order.”
Where a dispute over custom ownerof land arises it is to be o be expected
that those involved will do their best to reach
an agreement to settle the
dispute, with such assistance as is possible from customary procedures and
meetings of chiefs.
However, it is clear from the Constitution and from the
Island Courts Act that unless everyone who at any time claims an interest in
the land is prepared to accept a settlement, the only bodies that
have
lawful jurisdiction and power to make a determination that binds everyone
are the Courts, in the first instance
the local Island Court, and if there
is an appeal, the Supreme Court.
This conon immediately points up a up a difficulty with attempted
settlements of ownership disputes arranged through bodies
such as councils
of chiefs that are not part of the constitutional court system. Article 73
of the Constitution provides
that all land in Vanuatu belongs to the
indigenous custom owners and their descendants. Unless an ownership
dispute is determined through the Court system, in the manner provided for
in the Constitution,
a descendant of a party to an ownership dispute that
has been “settled” outside the Court system may reopen the dispute by
claiming a custom enment under Article 73. This kind of difficulty is
not unknown in the law. Where the ithe interests
of children and future
generations relating to land arise, the general law provides that their
interests can only be
affected by a settlement if the terms of the
settlement are approved by a Court as being in the interests of the present
and future children.
It followt neither the Utalamba Comm Committee and its associated “Area Land
Court” or Committee (which was in no sense
a court established under the
Constitution) nor the council of chiefs that sat at Deproma had any
jurisdiction or authority
to make a determination of custom ownership which
bound claimants who disagreed with their ruling.
We turn next to the decision of the Magistrate’s Court concerning the
sharing of the rents from the Natinae and neighbouring
land, and in the
appeal heard by Cooke CJ. in June 1990. In those decisions the claimant
failed to win a share of the
rents on the basis that the custom owners
entitled to the rents were the three men named in the Minister’s Declaration
made on 22 February 1982. It is sufficient to refer to the following
passages from the short judgment of Cooke CJ in the
Supreme Court (Judgment
No. 21 of 1990.).
“I
have read through the judgment in t in this case and the notes on the file. It is
clear that you Timothy Molbarav have
no declaration of ownership of the land
in question. The only declaration I have is that in favour of James Tura,
Barnabas
Visi, and Moses Moli.
lass="Mss="MsoBodyText" style="line-height: normal; margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
Timothy Molbarav had the opportunity of appealing against the Minister’s
declaration but you never did so. It is now too
late to consider any appeal.
Whether you were encouraged not to appeal or not, is not a matter for this
court in this
case.”
Even if the Minister’s Declaration made on 22 February 1982 were to be
considered as one validly made under s. 25 of the
Alienated Land Act, the
terms of the Declaration and the role which those people named as
representatives would assume cannot support a
conclusion that the
Declaration constitutes their title as custom owners. The Declaration merely
appoints them to represent
the custom owners and others having interests in
the land, whoever those people may be. In acting as representatives those
people named in the Declaration act in a fiduciary capacity (whether or not
they are trustees as a matter of strict law).
A person who acts in a
fiduciary capacity cannot use that position or the instrument of appointment
to further personal
interests at the expense of the interests of those who
are being represented. The law is very strict in enforcing that principle
and may set aside transactions where a fiduciary has improperly used his or
her position.
It follows from what we have said about the Declaration and about the
jurisdiction of the Courts as the only bodies recognized
under the
Constitution with power to finally determine disputes over custom ownership
that we are unable to agree with
the reasons of Cooke CJ. In our respectful
view the earlier court decisions relied on by Mr. Touru were wrong and must
be overruled.
In summary, we consider that none of the matters relied on by Mr. Touru
establish that the custom ownership claims of
Mr. Valele and his family have
been finally determined against them. Those claims fall within the
jurisdiction of the
relevant Island Court wherein Mr. Valele has commenced
proceedings. Until that claim is determined according to law the custom
ownership dispute continues.
However, it does not follow from this conclusiolusion that all the evidence put
forward by Mr. Touru is totally irrelevant
in determining who are the true
custom owners of the Natinae land. Our decision only establishes that the
processes and
decisions which have occurred in the past have not finally
determined who are the custom owners. Much of the evidence adduced
by Mr.
Touru would be admissible in the Island Court.
It would be for the IsCourt to decide whether in the
circumstances of the case the alleged inactivity of Chof Chief Titus Valele
and
other members of his family during the processes which occurred in the
1980’s indicates that he and his family do
not truly have interests as
custom owners, or whether there is some other explanation for their
inactivity.
We now turn to the primary js finding that the
application failed in any event because wrong procedures had been been followed
in so far as no Writ had been issued prior to the Appellant seeking
interlocutory Orders. In support of this proposition
the primary Judge
quoted the following passage from the judgment of Vaudin d’Imecourt CJ. in
Deamer v. Unelco Management (1992) 2VLR 554 at 555:
“…… an interlocutory injunction may be granted at any
time after the issue of the Writ to maintain the status quo ……”
The conclusion that a wrong procedure had been followed
is based on a misapprehension of amer v. Unelco Management. The
passage relied on by the primary judge has been taken out of context. A
reading of the judgment as a whole makes
it plain that so long as there is
an existing cause or matter on foot, it does not matter whether the
proceedings were
commenced by Writ or by Originating Summons. Vaudin
d’Imecourt CJ based his decision upon Order 29 rule 1 of the Supreme Court
Practice (the “White Book”) which states that an application for the grant
of an injunction may be made by any party
to a cause or matter, but may only
be made before the issue of the Writ or Originating Summons by which the
cause or
matter is begun in a case of urgency. Order 29 rule 1 (2) provides
that a plaintiff may in the case of urgency make an ex-parte
application on
affidavit. Rule 1 (3) provides that where an injunction is applied for in an
urgent case an injunction
may be granted on terms providing for the later
issue of the Writ or Originating Summons. At p. 557 Vaudin d’Imecourt CJ
said:
“Ex-parte interim injunctions should only be
where there is a reaa real need to give the same. Never without originating
summons or affidavit, save with an undertaking to file the same forthwith.
Always a return date, and a short one at that,
should be given.”
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
In the present casre was an Originating Summons
which had commenced the cause or matter within the Supr Supreme Court. The
primary remedy sought was an account of moneys received by Mr. Touru on
behalf of the custom owners from 2nd February 1982 to the date of
the application. There was no irregularity in the Court procedures adopted
by the Appellant.
Finally, we ob that there seems to have been some
confusion in the proceedings before the primary Jary Judge as to whether the
application was for a permanent injunction or for an interlocutory
injunction. In Deamer v. Unelco Management at 555 Vaudin d’Imecourt
CJ. said:
“As regards time, injunctions are either interlocutory
(or interim) or perpetual. A perpetual injunction is granted only after
the
plaintiff has established his right and the actual or threatened
infringement of it by the defendant; an interlocutory
injunction may be
granted at any time after the issue of the Writ to maintain things in status
quo. The Court must be
satisfied that there is a serious question to be
tried at the hearing, and that on the facts the plaintiff is probably
entitled to relief.”
The last sentence of that quotation appliesplies to the granting of an
interlocutory injunction which is intended to operate
until the final trial
of the cause or matter, at which time the legal rights claimed by the
plaintiff will be established.
class="MsoBoMsoBodyText" style="line-height: normal; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">
It should also be noted that the statement in the athe above quotation that “the
plaintiff is probably entitled to relief”
is based on Nineteenth Century
authority which was not followed by the House of Lords in American
Cyanamide Co. v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] UKHL 1; [1975] AC 396. To establish that there
is a serious question to be tried it is not necessary for the plaintiff to
establish a prima
facie case, or a probability of success. The evidence
available to the Court at the hearing of an application for an interlocutory
injunction is likely to be incomplete. It is given on affidavit and has not
been tested by oral cross-examination. If
the affidavits show that there is
a serious question to be tried, the assessment of the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim
is a matter for the trial at a later date.
In the present case, on 20 September 2000 an
interim injunction was made on an ex-parte application. An . An ex-parte
injunction should always have
an early return date so that the
appropriateness of injunctive relief until trial can be considered at the
hearing where
the defendant is present and can be heard. Even where there is
an interim injunction made in the first instance, the issue
before the Court
when an inter-parties hearing for an interlocutory injunction occurs is
whether there is a serious question
to be tried. If so, the Court must then
consider the balance of convenience between the parties having regards to
the
seriousness of the issues in question, and whether the position of the
defendant can be appropriately protected, by an undertaking
from the
plaintiff as to damages or otherwise, in the event that the plaintiff
ultimately fails at trial. A land claim
which raised questions about the
custom entitlements of present and future children under Article 73 of the
Constitution
may require some modification of the normal practice that a
plaintiff must give an undertaking as to damages as a term for
the grant of
an interlocutory injunction, but it is not necessary in the circumstances of
this case to discuss this.
Generally speaking, it is not appropriate upon an
application for an interlocutojunction for the Court to f to finally decide
disputed questions of fact. That is for the ultimate trial. At the
interlocutory stage it is sufficient that there is
evidence that could be
accepted at trial which raises a serious question to be tried. The
application which the parties
argued before the primary judge was only for
an interlocutory injunction. However, the case was unusual in that the
evidence
put before the primary judge by Mr. Touru raised factual and legal
arguments as to why the claim for an account of moneys received
by him would
inevitably fail. It was necessary in this circumstance for the primary Judge
to go further than would have
normally been necessary and decide the
substance of Mr. Touru’s arguments that custom ownership had already been
finally
determined.
<
The affidavit material before the primary jury judge identified a serious issue
to be tried, namely whether Mr. Valele
and his family are custom owners of
the land, and if so, the extent of their interest. The proper body to
determine that
issue is the Island Court (or its successor in law), but the
Island Court lacks the full extent of the power of the Supreme
Court to
order an account of the past rents received. The originating summons
therefore properly initiated a cause or
matter in the Supreme Court, and the
claim for an interlocutory injunction to hold the position until the Island
Court
determines the ownership dispute was properly made. In our opinion
upon the appellant giving the usual undertaking as to damages,
there should
be an interlocutory injunction in terms of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10
of the originating summons with
liberty to apply on short notice to a single
judge of the Supreme Court. The appeal should be allowed accordingly. The
costs of the hearing before the primary judge should be reserved pending the
resolution of the proceedings in the Island
Court or the land tribunal.
The appellant must now lodge minutes otes of order reflecting the terms of this
judgment to be settled and sealed in the
Registry.
The respondent must pay the appellant’s costs of this
appeal.
<
pan lEN-GB">Dated ated at Port Vila, this 26th
April, 2002.
>
>
Hon. Vincent Lunabek CJ
Hon. Justice John von Doussa
Hon. Justice Bruce Robertson
Hon. Justice Daniel Fatiaki
