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Court of Appeal of Vanuatu |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATUAppellate Jurisdiction
CIVIL APPEAL CASE No.08 of 2001
BETWEEN:
Hon. PAUL REN TARI,
Member of Parliament
AppellantAND:
EDWARD NIPAKE NATAPEI & OTHERS
Respondents
Coram: ce Bruce Robertson
Justice John von DoussaJustice Daniel Fatiaki
Justice Oliver Saksak
Justice Reggett MarumCounsel: Mr. Kalkot Mataskelekele for the appellant
Mr. Silas Hakwa for the defendantsDate of hearing: 25 April 2001
Date of judgment: 25 April 2001ORAL JUDGMENT
There was filed in the Court by the appellant personally a Notice of Appeal in respect “of the judgment imposed and Orders made by the Supreme Court on the 12th April 2001”.
At the beginning of this week a Notice was filed by Mr. Kalkot Mataskelekele advising that he had been instructed to act as advocate in respect of this appeal and asked for it to be adjourned until next session. The Court was not attracted to such option and raised with Mr. Mataskelekele the acceptable possibilities. The Court expressed the preliminary view that it was not in anyone’s interest to have issues of this sort unresolved for a period of six months with the potential for that having a destabilising effect. Mr. Mataskelekele was asked to consider before the matter was recalled today:
(a) the actual issues which the appellant was seeking to have the Court of Appeal deal with;
(b) why there would be no harm in delay; and finally
(c) what is there that required immediate attention;
Mr. Mataskelekele has provided us with a helpful document. It is now apparent that the appeal relates not only to matters which were dealt with on the 12th April 2001 but to a series of Orders made in the Supreme Court between the 6th and the 13th April.
Particularly, it is indicated that the appellant intends to put before the Court of Appeal issues which he identified as:
“1) Were the judgements, orders, rulings or decisions of the Hon. Chief Justice His Lordship Vincent Lunabek in Supreme Court Civil Cases 35 and 49 of 2001 made on 6th, 12th and 13th April 2001 requiring the Speaker of Parliament/the Appellant to convene Parliament to sit, consider, debate and vote on the Motion of No Confidence in the previous Prime Minister subject to the Standing Orders of Parliament or not?
2) Since the Parliament did not suspend its own Standing Orders pursuant to Orders 46 so that it could sit outside of the normal days (Standing Orders 15) and hours (Standing Orders 16) stipulated in those Standing Orders, were the Parliament sittings ordered by the Hon. Chief Justice on the 6th, 12th and 13th April 2001 in effect wholly or partly invalid or not?
3) Did Order 2 of 13 April 2001 in Supreme Court Civil Case No.49 of 2001 requiring imminent arrest of the Speaker of Parliament if he failed to comply with the terms of the Supreme Court Orders of 13th April 2001 beach the Constitutional (Article 27) and or Standing Order (Standing Order 43) and or conventional (if any) and/or customary (if any) approval relating to the Privileges of Members of Parliament?
4) Can Members of Parliament as individuals and or by their counsel waive Parliamentary immunity and privilege in a Court of Law or in any other situation without the approval of Parliament or required process (if any)?
5) What are the possible legal and or practical remedies available to this Honourable Court to decide and what are, or will be or could be their effects if the Court were to find in favour of the appellant on the issues outlined above?”
The issues were discussed between counsel and the Bench when the matter was first called shortly after 9.00am.
It was stood down because it appeared that there was a misapprehension as to the power of an Appellate Court. The powers of an Appellate Court are defined by statute. The first thing which must be clear is that the Court can only comment upon and reach a determination in respect of the Orders which were made. There is no way on an appeal that the Court should or could comment upon consequent action.
We have been at some pains to point out to Mr. Mataskelekele and his client that it appears to us that what he is really identifying in the five points recorded above are issues where it is said there has been a breach of rights under Article 5 of the Constitution for which he is seeking redress on behalf of his client.
It is clear beyond any doubt that such issues can only be considered on the basis of a Constitutional Petition. The Constitution provides that such proceeding must be commenced and advanced in the way described in the Criminal Procedure Code [CAP 136] Section 218. It is a matter to be heard in the Supreme Court with a right of appeal to this Court .
Notwithstanding thea clear indication Mr. Mataskelekele advises that he and his client are insistent that this appeal should be heard. The effect will be that the Courtng heard the parties will either dismiss the appeal, aal, allow the appeal in total, (which will have the effect of vacating the Orders which were made) but with absolutely no effect in law or reality on any action which took place following the making of those Orders.
Everybody who wishes to proceed with this appeal must understand that the Court cannot (and will not) make any orders or declarations which relate to actions subsequent to the granting of the Orders in the Supreme Court. That would be beyond the proper jurisdiction of an appellate Court.
Some will get the clear and unequivocal message that to hear this appeal is only of academic interest. It can do nothing to assist or effect anything which has occurred since the original orders were made.
If there is a genuine worry that there has been a breach of constitutional rights, that can only be dealt with by way of a Constitutional Petition.
However, it is fundamental that where there is a right of appeal (and there is in this case) a Court cannot refuse to hear the appeal even if all the information suggests that it is a futile exercise which can never achieve what is troubling the litigants.
We have done all we can to forewarn everybody of the limit of our power and of the only consequences which, as a matter of law, can possibly flow from this process.
Mr. Mataskelekele advises us that notwithstanding that advice he is insistent that the matter be heard. Accordingly time must be found even if it means that we will have to sit during some unconventional hours to try to accommodate the matter before the Appeal Judges leave the jurisdiction. Sometimes emergencies and exigencies require that the unconventional does have to happen.
The matter will accordingly be listed for hearing for 11.00am on Friday next, the 27th April. There should be written submissions available from the appellant not later than 9.00am on Friday morning to identify the issues and to enable the respondents to know what it is that they are called to answer.
Mr. Mataskelekele then requested that we adjourn until after lunch to have his instructions confirmed in light of what had been said.
At 1.45pm a further request was made to adjourn the appeal to the October Session which was refused.
Leave was then sought to withdraw the appeal.
There was no opposition and leave was granted and the appeal is dismissed.
DATED at PORT-VILA, this 25th DAY of APRIL, 2001
BY THE COURT
J.B. ROBERTSON J
J. von DOUSSA J
D. FATIAKI J
O. SAKSAK J
R. MARUM J
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/vu/cases/VUCA/2001/25.html