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Supreme Court of Tonga |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TONGA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
NUKU’ALOFA REGISTRY
CV 28 of 2020
BETWEEN:
‘ANA TUPOU NISHI - Plaintiff
-and-
KUMAZO NISHI - Defendant
Costs following judgment
RULING
BEFORE: LORD CHIEF JUSTICE WHITTEN QC
Appearances: Mr W.C. Edwards SC for the Plaintiff
Mrs P. Tupou KC for the Defendant
Date of trial: 28 January 2021, 4 and 5 March 2021 and 16 April 2021
Date of judgment: 17 May 2021
Date of costs hearing: 26 May 2021
Date of costs ruling: 26 May 2021
“... There can be no doubt that the usual rule applies that costs follow the event...
There is no dispute that the court has the power to order costs and section 15 of the Supreme Court Act gives the court a discretion to award them subject only to the terms of the proviso which is clearly not relevant in this case. Such a discretion must be exercised judicially and the general rule is that a successful party is entitled to his costs but it must be remembered that rule is qualified. It is instructive to consider, for example, one of the early statements on the exact nature of the rule in Cooper and Whittingham [1880] UKLawRpCh 159; (1880) 15 ChD 501 as put by the then, Master of the Rolls:
‘As I understand the law as to costs it is this, that where a plaintiff comes to enforce a legal right, and there has been no misconduct on his part - no omission or neglect which would induce the Court to deprive him of his costs - the Court has no discretion and cannot take away the plaintiff's right to costs. There may be misconduct of many sorts: for instance, there may be misconduct in commencing the proceedings, or some miscarriage in the proceedings, or an oppressive or vexatious mode of conducting the proceedings, or other misconduct which will induce the court to refuse costs....’
The position as to the court's discretion has since been modified, see for example, Donald Campbell and Co. Ltd v Pollak [1927] 1 AC 723, but the rest of his remarks are still good law.”
4.3 here, there has been no misconduct of the part of the plaintiff in relation to instituting the proceedings, their prosecution or the obtaining of judgment;
4.4 the pleaded defence was obstructive and uncooperative;
4.5 the judgment in favour of the plaintiff is ‘substantial’;
4.6 the second court ordered inspection of a container at the defendant’s parent’s home on 10 March 2021 resulted in the recovery of items 1, 7 and 8, valued at $6,200;
4.7 the defendant was uncooperative throughout the proceeding by failing to return items 1, 7 and 8 until the inspection; and
4.8 therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to an order for the whole of her costs of the proceeding.
“The principles on which costs were to be awarded were (i) that costs were in the discretion of the court, (ii) that costs should follow the event except when it appeared to the court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made, (iii) that the general rule did not cease to apply simply because the successful party raised issues or made allegations that failed, but that he could be deprived of his costs in whole or in part where he had caused a significant increase in the length of the proceedings, and (iv) that where the successful party raised issues or made allegations improperly or unreasonably the court could not only deprive him of his costs but could also order him to pay the whole or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.[1] The fourth principle implied, moreover, that a successful party who neither improperly nor unreasonably raised issues or made allegations which failed ought not to be ordered to pay any part of the unsuccessful party’s costs ...”
“[4] The position as to costs where a party has been partially successful was summarised by Eames J in Pricom Pty Ltd v Sgarioto:[2]
‘As a general rule costs should follow the event, and a successful party should obtain all of the costs of the action even although it failed to establish some of the alternative heads of its claim: Ritter v Godfrey (1920) 2 KB 47. However, in the exercise of its discretion the court may decline to order costs in favour of a successful party, or may order the successful party to pay the costs of the unsuccessful party, where the plaintiff failed to establish discrete heads of claim, or failed to establish issues which it pursued in its claim, although ultimately succeeding on the basis of another discrete head of claim: Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) ATPR 40-748, per Toohey J at 48,136.’
[5] In McFadzean v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union,[3] this Court said:
‘No complaint is made by the appellants about the judge’s method of making a single order in apportioning the costs. It was certainly open to his Honour to do so. Under r 63.04, the judge might have awarded costs in relation to particular questions or parts of the proceeding. We think it appropriate however, with respect, to observe that the approach taken by his Honour, of fixing of a certain proportion of a party’s costs which should be paid by another party, has much to commend it.
In fixing costs a superior court may treat ‘heads of controversy as units of litigation’ and give directions to the taxing master in relation to them, such units not being circumscribed by pleadings, causes of action or issues capable in themselves of leading to the granting of relief. But to avoid the complications of taxation resulting from making orders recognising the entitlements to costs of a party on each action on which they were successful, the orders may be notionally set off against each other or other adjustments made so as to produce an order for a proportion of one party’s costs. This approach to costs orders where an action has had mixed success has been followed in a number of cases. In Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc), Toohey J had regard to the fact that the plaintiff had succeeded on some issues but failed on others, but concluded that: ‘it would be unsatisfactory to attempt to apportion issues and leave the fixing of costs of those issues to the taxing officer. That would impose a very great burden on him and upon the parties’ legal representatives.’ In our view, the judge’s approach to the apportionment of costs was particularly apposite in this case, having regard to the multiplicity of parties, actions, and issues, and the mixed success enjoyed by the plaintiffs. (Footnotes omitted.)’
...
[7] As this Court said in Major Engineering Pty Ltd v Helios Electroheat Pty Ltd (No 2):[4]
‘... Where there is a mixed outcome in the proceeding, such as here, the apportionment of the comparative importance of the relevant claims in the proceeding – here, the claim and the counterclaim – can only be carried out on a broad basis, it being primarily a matter of impression and evaluation, rather than arithmetic precision.’”
| | |
NUKU’ALOFA | M. H. Whitten QC | |
26 May 2021 | LORD CHIEF JUSTICE |
[1] The proviso to s 15 of the Tonga Supreme Court Act provides ‘that the Court shall not order the successful party in an action to pay to the unsuccessful party the costs of the
whole action but the Court may order the successful party notwithstanding his success in the action to pay the costs of any particular
proceedings therein.
[2] Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Eames J, 10 April 1995, 24 April 1995, BC9503266, 5, cited with approval in Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building & Consulting Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 115, [13] and in McFadzean v Construction Mining and Energy Union [2007] VSCA 289, [152].
[3] [2007] VSCA 289 [157]-[158].
[4] [2006] VSCA 114 [5]
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/to/cases/TOSC/2021/79.html