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Court of Appeal of Tonga |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL JURISDICTION
NUKU’ALOFA REGISTRY
AC 8 of 2021
[CV 22 of 2020]
BETWEEN:
ROYCO SHIPPING SERVICES LIMITED Appellant
MATSON SOUTH PACIFIC LIMITED Respondent
Coram: Hansen J Randerson J White J
Counsel: Mr S J Stanton with Mr W C Edwards for the Appellant Mr R Stephenson for the Respondent
Hearing: 22 September 2021 Judgment: 1 October 2021
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the trader supplies services on the condition, or subject to a contract, arrangement or understanding, that the person to whom such trader supplies services shall not acquire services from a competitor of the trader (s 24(2)). Such conduct is unlawful in Tonga unless the written approval of the Director of the Consumer Affairs Division is obtained. Section 24 is not subject to a test that the exclusive dealing have the purpose or effect of lessening competition.
Order for Determination of Separate Issue
“Whether on its proper construction, the agreement between the parties dated 28 April 2017, including any implied term as alleged in paragraph 11 of the Amended Statement of Claim, conferred on the plaintiff an exclusive right to provide stevedoring services for all of the defendant’s vessels at the port of Nuku’alofa during the term of the agreement, including the three month termination period ending on 5 March 2020.”
Royco, submitted that the judge erred in making the order for the determination of the separate issue. He submitted that the effect of the order was to preclude the calling of evidence as to industry practice in Tonga.
The Agreement
“A. The Contractor is a company incorporated in the Kingdom of Tonga which carries on the business of providing (inter alia) stevedoring services in the Kingdom of Tonga as necessary to load and unload the cargo onto and from the Company’s vessels at the Port of Nuku’alofa.
B. The Company is a company incorporated in New Zealand and wishes to engage the Contractor to provide the stevedoring services set out in Schedule One to this Agreement (“Stevedoring Services”) at the Port of Nuku’alofa in the Kingdom of Tonga.”
“STEVEDORING SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED BY CONTRACTOR
Stevedoring services comprising the following:
“...
1.2 The Contractor agrees to provide to the Company the Stevedoring Services.
1.3 The Company agrees to remunerate the Contractor for the Stevedoring Services in accordance with the rates, costs, interest and charges set out in Schedule Two of this Agreement and any other charges provided for (expressly and impliedly) under this Agreement (“Stevedoring Charges”).
...
2.0 This Agreement shall be in force and effect as from the date stipulated and expressed as the “Commencement Date” set out in clause 13 of this Agreement and shall terminate without any further notice required, on the fifth anniversary date of the Commencement Date unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions herein.
3.0 The Contractor will provide sufficient labour for the performance of the Stevedoring Services, but always contingent upon labour being available to the Contractor hereunder. The Contractor shall not be responsible for any loss, damage, delay or non-performance hereunder whatsoever arising from labour shortage, strikes, lockouts, deliberate work slow-down or stoppage or other labour difficulties, including any delays arising from the performance by Port Authority of any of its functions, supervisory or otherwise carried out on or at the
wharf, including, cartage from wharf apron to storage and vice versa
whether pursuant to statute or otherwise.
...
4.1 The company agrees to pay the Stevedoring Charges and other charges provided for in this Agreement for the Stevedoring Services provided or to be provided by the Contractor under the terms of this Agreement at the rates set out in the Schedule Two or elsewhere provided for and forming part of this Agreement.
4.2 All Stevedoring Charges and other charges are based on and are subject to the employment of present labour at the present wage scale and working conditions in the port or ports where stevedoring services are performed.
4.3 Every two years from commencement of this Agreement, a review of Stevedoring Charges shall be carried out and in the vent of an increase or decrease in the scale of wages, fringe benefit payments or changes in working conditions whatsoever, the Parties may resonate the Stevedoring Charges and may agree that the Stevedoring charges will as a consequence be increased or decreased accordingly; retroactively if applicable.
...
5.0 The Contractor will provide all normal gear and equipment for the efficient performance of the Stevedoring Services unless otherwise agreed or stipulated herein or otherwise provided by the carrier located on the ship, including crane-age.
...
13.1 In the event of the failure of Company to pay for services rendered by the Contractor at any time or if Company materially fails to perform its obligations hereunder and in the manner herein specified (a “Company Default”), the Contractor may elect to terminate this Agreement with or without process of law, provided, however, the Company and or Kingdom shall be given thirty (30) calendar days' notice in writing stating the nature of the default in order to permit such default to be remedied by the Company within the said thirty (30) calendar day period (“Cure Period”).
13.2 In the event of the material failure of the Contractor to perform its obligations hereunder and in the manner herein specified, (a "Contractor Default"), the Company may elect to terminate this Agreement at with or without process of the law, provided, however, Contractor shall be given thirty (30) calendar days’ notice in writing stating the nature of the default in order to permit such default to be remedied by Contractor within the said thirty (30) calendar day period ("Cure period").
13.3 During a Cure Period or at any time while a default is continuing, the Party not in default shall be relieved of Its obligations under this Agreement until such time as the default has been remedied by the
other Party. If the Company is in default of its obligations to pay Stevedoring Charges, the Contractor shall not be required to provide further services to the Company unless the. Company pays in advance to the Contractor an amount satisfactory to the Contractor necessary to pay for the charges for such services, which payment may be applied by the Contractor in its sole discretion to reduce outstanding indebtedness incurred under this Agreement or otherwise cure such Company or Kingdoms' Default. Payment by the Company to the Contractor of interest on any charges due and owing under this Agreement shall not cure or excuse the Company's Default in connection with such amounts due and payable. If the Contractor is in default, the Company shall not be obliged to utilise the Contractor to provide Stevedoring Services until the default is remedied. Interest, default and all other remedies of either Party hereunder are cumulative and not in the alternative, and both Parties further reserve any other remedies in the event of a Default whether arising under law, equity, statute or otherwise.
13.4 In addition to the rights of termination set out in sub-clauses 13.1 and
13.2 either Party may at any time terminate this Agreement for any reason or for no reason given upon giving three (3) calendar months' notice in writing to the other.
...
22.0 This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the Parties. This Agreement may only be amended or modified by an instrument in writing signed by an officer of the Company and an officer of the Contractor.
...
24.0 The Commencement date of this Agreement is 13 January 2017 (being the date on which MV Islander, the first of the Company’s ships to do so, arrived at Nuku’alofa and was stevedored by the Contractor during 2017).”
Consideration
1 Re Golden Key Ltd [2009] EWCA 636 at [28]; Mt Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd
(2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 at [51]; Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees
Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544; [2017] HCA 12 at [16]- [17].
2 Colonial Ammunition Co v Reid (1900) NSWR 338; Synergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd v North Sydney Leagues Club Ltd [2009] NSWCA 140; Rehau Pte Ltd v AAP Industries Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 96.
Schedule One and cl 1.2 provided that Royco agreed to provide those services. It was common ground that Royco was obliged to provide the stevedoring services when required by Matson. Prima facie the obligations were to be mutual. That is, Matson, having stated that it wished to engage Royco to provide those services, agreed that it would do so.
“[49] Rather than asking whether excerpt 3 in clause 13.3 may be construed to produce a converse obligation on Matson to use Royco’s services (and on Mr Edwards’ submission, only Royco’s services) whenever Royco was not in default, the starting point in clause 13.3 is in fact the passage in excerpt 1. There, the general statement provides that at any time while a default is continuing, the non-defaulting party shall be relieved of its obligations under the agreement until the default is remedied by the other party.
[50] That calls into sharp focus what were Matson’s obligations under the agreement. As previously identified, the only relevant obligation imposed on Matson by the express terms of the agreement (clauses 1.3 and 4) was to pay Royco for its services in accordance with the schedule of rates annexed to the agreement. As none of the express terms of the agreement required Matson to use Royco’s services exclusively for all of Matson’s vessels berthing at Nuku’alofa, the obligation on Matson stated above must be construed as one in which it was required to pay Royco for such of Royco’s services as matson requested and received.”
default by Royco, Matson was obliged to use Royco’s services. That inference is clearly available and is not rebutted by the absence of any express obligation on Matson to do so, and hence is not qualified by the first sentence of the clause.
“...if a Matson vessel arrived at Nuku’alofa which Royco had agreed to service, but for whatever reason, Royco did not have sufficient labour to service the vessel, Royco would not be in breach of clause 3. As such, excerpt 3 of clause 13.3 (by which Matson would not be obliged to utilize Royco until the default was remedied) would not be engaged. The practical result, on Royco’s hypothesis, would be that Matson would not be able to engage another stevedore, and pursuant to clause 13.2, would have to wait 30 days to be able to terminate the agreement if Royco failed to remedy the default. Further, by the second limb of clause 3, Royco would not be liable to Matson for damages or compensation where a labour shortage was due to any of the causes specified therein. In those circumstances, the only sensible commercial construction of clause 3 would be to permit Matson to engage another stevedore. However, the proposed implied term, in combination with Royco’s interpretation of excerpt 3 in clause 13.3, would prevent Matson from doing so without being in breach. Accordingly, an implied term of exclusivity would conflict with the proper construction and operation of clause 3.”
3 Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [28];
Heydon on Contract, Thomson Reuters, 2019 at [10.10].
express terms that Matson would not be obliged to use Royco’s stevedoring services if Royco were unable to provide them. We do not accept that the possibility of Royco’s being unable to provide stevedoring services due to the insufficiency of available labour displaces the inference that Matson agreed to use Royco’s services for all its vessels.
Director’s approval could be obtained significantly diminishes the weight of this consideration.
Costs
“Whether, on its proper construction, the agreement between the parties dated 28 April 2017, including any implied term as alleged in paragraph 11 of the Amended Statement of Claim, conferred on the plaintiff an exclusive right to provide stevedoring services for all of the defendant’s vessels at the Port of Nuku’alofa during the term of the agreement including the three-month termination period ending on 5 March 2020?”
(2) Appeal allowed.
(3) Set aside the orders of 10 February 2021 that the appellant’s claim be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.
(4) In lieu thereof, order that the separate question be answered, yes.
(5) Remit the proceedings for determination by the Supreme Court in accordance with these reasons.
(6) Order that the costs of the appeal be the appellant’s costs in the proceedings.
(7) Order that costs of the proceedings at first instance, including the costs of the hearing at first instance on the separate question, be reserved for the consideration of the judge who determines the appellant’s claim.
Hansen J
Randerson J
White J
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