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Chapter 9: Power to Arrest

Table Of Contents

[9.0] Introduction

[9.0.1] Police Officers 

Under section 21(3) of the Police Act (Ch.110), a police officer has a duty 'to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisances, to detect and bring offenders to justice, and to apprehend all persons whom he is legally authorized to apprehend and for whose apprehension sufficient ground exists'. 

In that regard, police officers may arrest a defendant with or without a warrant, subject to:

 [i] the provisions of section 5 of the Constitution;

 [ii] the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7); and

 [iii] the common law.

 'Arrest is a serious interference with personal liberty. It is not something to be taken lightly […]', as commented by Ward CJ in Peter Hou v The Attorney – General [1990] SILR 88 at page 90.

An 'arrest' should only be made if it is the arresting officer's intention to prosecute the offender for an offence, see R v Chalkley & Jeffries [1998] 2 AllER 155; [1998] 2 CrAppR 79; [1999] CrimLR 215

The law relating to the 'Decision To Institute Proceedings' is examined commencing on page 110.

If a warrant has been lost or destroyed, a duplicate warrant may be issued, see R v Leish Justices, Ex parte Kara (1981) CrimLR 628.

[9.0.2] Private Persons

The following sections of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) relates to an 'arrest' by a 'private person':

Section 21 states:

'(1) Any private person may arrest any person who is in his view commits a cognisable offence, or whom he reasonably suspects of having committed a felony provided a felony has been committed. 

(2) Persons found committing any offence involving injury to property may be arrested without a warrant by the owner of the property or his servants or persons authorised by him.' (emphasis added) 

Section 22 states: 

'(1) Any private person arresting any other person without a warrant shall without unnecessary delay [t]ake over the person so arrested to a police officer, or in the absence of a police officer shall take such person to the nearest police station. 

(2) If there is reason to believe that such person comes under the provisions of section 18, a police officer shall re – arrest him. 

(3) If there is reason to believe that he has committed a non – cognisable offence, and he refuses on the demand of a police officer to give his name and residence, or gives a name or residence which such officer has reason to believe to be false, he shall be dealt with under the provisions of section 19. If there is no sufficient reason to believe that he has committed any offence he shall be at once released.' (emphasis added) 

A 'Cognisable Offence' means any felony and any other offence for which a police officer may arrest under any law for the time being in force arrest without warrant', see section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7). 

See: Walters v WH Smith & Son Ltd [1911 – 13] AllER Rep 170; [1914] 1 KB 595. 

Refer also to the subsection titled 'Sufficiency Of Evidence Test' commencing on page 115. 

[9.1] Constitution 

Section 5 of the Constitution states (in part):

'(1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorized by law in any of the following cases, that is to say – 

[…] 

(a)                in execution of the order of a court made to secure the fulfilment of any obligation imposed on him by law; 

(e) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court; 

(a)                upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under the law in force in Solomon Islands; 

[…] 

(2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, and in a language that he understands, of the reasons for his arrest or detention. 

(3) Any person who is arrested or detained -- 

(a)                for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court; or 

(b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under the law in force in Solomon Islands, and who is not released, shall be brought without undue delay before a court; […].' (emphasis added) 

Section 10(1)(b) of the Constitution states: 

'Every person who is charged with a criminal offence -- 

(b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in detail and in a language that he understands, of the nature of the offence charged.' 

In Baia Takoa v R (Unrep. Criminal Appeal Case No. 16 of 1998) Palmer J stated at page 2: 

'The starting point [when considering 'powers of arrest'] must be section 5 of the Constitution. This deals with the protection of the right of personal liberty, but indirectly dealing with the situation where a person's liberty may be deprived. Paragraph (f) is the relevant provision which prescribes when a person's liberty may be deprived. 

[…] 

Section 5(1) makes it clear that a person's liberty is to be deprived only where it is authorized by law. That law is to apply in such circumstances as set out in paragraph (f). It is important to appreciate that section 5 of the Constitution sets out the general structure or framework in which a person's liberty may be deprived. To get into specifics the law in application has to be identified. One of these laws is the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).' (emphasis added) [words in brackets added] 

In Billy Gatu v R (Unrep. Criminal Case No. 93 of 1993) Palmer J stated at pages 1 – 2: 

'The key words are "shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable" [in section 5(2) of the Constitution]. The reason why it is important to inform the accused why he has been arrested is because, the lawfulness of that arrest and subsequent detention is dependent on the reasons for the arrest. An arrest and subsequent detention of any person can only be effected in accordance to law. Section 5(1)(f) of the Constitution allows a police officer to arrest and detain an accused person "upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under the law in force in Solomon Islands".' (emphasis added) [words in brackets added] 

At the time of the 'arrest', a police officer need not have to know or be able to specify the specific details of the particular offence for which he/she had in mind, see Chapman v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 89 CrAppR 190; [1988] CrimLR 843. 

At the time of advising the defendant the reason he/she was arrested in compliance with section 5(2) of the Constitution, the arresting officer is not obliged to use precise or technical language regarding the offence. The officer needs only to advise the defendant the reason why he/she was arrested by outlining what the defendant did or did not do that was illegal, see Abbassay & another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis & others [1990] 1 WLR 385; [1990] 1 AllER 193; (1990) 90 CrAppR 250. 

If such information is not provided at the time of arrest, it is to be provided 'as soon as reasonably practicable' at the police station, see R v Kulynycz [1970] 3 AllER 881; [1970] 3 WLR 1029; [1971] 1 QB 367; (1971) 55 CrAppR 34. 

In Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 Lord Simon stated at page 587: 

'(1) If a policeman arrests without warrant upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of other crime of a sort which does not require a warrant, he must in ordinary circumstances inform the person arrested of the true ground of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which is not the true reason. In other words a citizen is entitled to know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized. (2) If the citizen is not so informed but is nevertheless seized, the policeman, apart from certain exceptions, is liable for false imprisonment. (3) The requirement that the person arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained. (4) The requirement that he should be so informed does not mean that technical or precise language need be used. The matter is a matter of substance, and turns on the elementary proposition that in this country a person is, prima facie, entitled to his freedom and is only required to submit to restraints of freedom if he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that this restraint should be imposed. (5) The person arrested cannot complain that he has not been supplied with the above information as and when he should be, if he himself produces the situation which makes it practically impossible to inform him, eg., by immediate counter – attack or by running away. There may well be other exceptions to the general rule in addition to those I have indicated, and the above propositions are not intended to constitute a formal or complete code, but to indicate the general principles of our law on a very important matter.' 

See also: Brazil v Chief Constable of Surrey (1983) 77 CrAppR 237. 

In R v Smith (Joe) [2001] 2 CrAppR 1 [[2001] 1 WLR 1031] Otton LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stated at page 5: 

'To establish a reasonable suspicion it is not necessary for a police officer to possess evidence which amounts to a prima facie case: see Dunbell v Roberts [1944] 1 AllER 326. 

In Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942, PC, Lord Devlin in the Privy Council stated as follows at p. 948: 

"Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking, 'I suspect but I cannot prove'. Suspicion arises at or near the starting – point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end."

In O'Hara v Chief Constable of Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286, Lord Steyn at 293C stated: "… information from an informer or a tip-off from a member of the public may be enough." 

Thus there is only a limited amount that has to be proved in order to establish a reasonable suspicion. This is an objective test and not a subjective test. […] 

Lord Hope in O'Hara adopted with approval the dicta of Sir Frederick Lawton in Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey (The Times, June 15, 1988): 

"suspicion by itself, however, will not justify an arrest. There must be a factual basis for it of a kind which a court would adjudge to be reasonable." 

Other authority shows that suspicion can take into account matters which could not be adduced at all, for example, hearsay evidence.' (emphasis added) 

The law relating to: 

·                     'Fundamental Rights & Freedoms' is examined commencing on page 144; and 

·                     'Bail' is examined commencing on page 378. 

See also: Lewis v Chief Constable of South Wales Constabulary [1991] 1 AllER 206; R v Brosch [1988] CrimLR 743; Chapman v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 89 CrAppR 190; [1988] CrimLR 843 & Director of Public Prosecutions v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166; [1988] 3 AllER 673; [1988] RTR 380; (1989) 88 CrAppR 166; [1989] CrimLR 741. 

[9.2] Arrest Generally 

Section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) states: 

'(1) In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action. 

(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest: 

Provided that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed to justify the use of greater force than was reasonable in the particular circumstances in which it was employed or was necessary for the apprehension of the offender.' (emphasis added) 

In Alderson v Booth (1969) 53 CrAppR 301 [[1969] 2 WLR 1252; [1969] 2 QB 216; [1969] 2 AllER 271] Lord Parker CJ, with whom Blain & Donaldson JJ concurred, at pages 303 – 304: 

'There are a number of cases, both ancient and modern, as to what constitutes an arrest, and whereas there was a time when it was held that there could be no lawful arrest unless there was an actual seizing or touching, it is quite clear that that is no longer the law. There may be arrest by mere words, by saying "I arrest you" without any touching, provided of course that the defendant submits and goes with the police officer. Equally it is clear, as it seems to me, that an arrest is constituted when any form of words is used which in the circumstances of the case were calculated to bring to the defendant's notice, and did bring to the defendant's notice, that he was under compulsion and thereafter he submitted to that compulsion. […] I would only say this, that if what I have said is correct in law, it is advisable that police officers should use some very clear words to bring home to a person that he is under compulsion.' 

The only obligation in arresting a defendant is to make it plain to him/her by what is said and done that he/she is no longer free, see R v Inwood (1973) 57 CrAppR 529 at page 536. 

Section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) states: 

'The person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.' 

[9.3] Enter To Arrest 

Section 11 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) states: 

'(1) If any person acting under a warrant of arrest, or any police officer having authority to arrest, has reason to believe that the person to be arrested has entered into or is within any place, the person residing in or being in charge of such place, shall, on demand on such person acting as aforesaid or such police officer, allow him free ingress thereto and afford all reasonable facilities for a search therein. 

(2) If ingress to such place cannot be obtained under subsection (1), it shall be lawful in any case for a person acting under a warrant, and, in any case in which a warrant may issue but cannot be obtained without affording the person to be arrested an opportunity to escape, for a police officer to enter such place and search therein, and, in order to effect an entrance into such place, to break open any outer or inner door to be arrested or of any other person, or otherwise effect entry into such house or place, if after notification of his authority and purpose and demand of admittance duly made he cannot otherwise obtain admittance.' (emphasis added) 

Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) states: 

'Any police officer or other person authorised to make an arrest may break out of any house or other place in order to liberate himself or any other person who, having lawfully entered for the purpose of making an arrest, is detained therein.' 

In McLorie v Oxford (1982) 75 CrAppR 137 Donaldson LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at page 142: 

'The common law power of entry to effect an arrest without warrant appears to be and to always have been extremely limited. In Swales v Cox (1981) 72 CrAppR 171; [1981] 1 AllER 1115 it was conceded to be limited to four cases only, namely, in order to prevent murder, if a felony had been committed and the felon followed to a house, if a felony was about to be committed and would be committed unless prevented and if an offender was running away from an affray. Mr Morland does not accept that this list is exhaustive, but he has been unable to produce any authority to suggest that it is or even was more extensive.' 

See also: R v Richards & Leeming (1985) 81 CrAppR 125. 

Prior to entering a house, whether by force or otherwise, a police officer should make a formal request to enter, see Swales v Cox (1981) 72 CrAppR 171; [1981] 1 AllER 1115. 

See also: Kynaston v Director of Public Prosecutions; Heron (Joseph) v Director of Public Prosecutions; Heron (Tracey) v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 87 CrAppR 200. 

[9.4] Arrest Without Warrant 

Section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) states (in part): 

'Any police officer may, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest – 

(a)                any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having committed a cognisable offence; 

(b)               any person who commits any offence in his presence; 

(c)                any person who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped or attempts to escape from lawful custody; 

(d)               any person in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property or who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing; 

(e) any person whom he finds in any highway, yard or other place during the night and whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having committed or being about to commit a felony; 

(f) any person having in his possession without lawful excuse the burden of proving which excuse shall lie on such person, any implement of housebreaking; 

(g) any person for whom he has reasonable cause to believe a warrant of arrest has been issued; 

(h) any released convict committing a breach of any provision prescribed by section 40 of the Penal Code ['Police Supervision'] or any rule made thereunder.' (emphasis added) [words in brackets added] 

As defined in section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) a 'Cognisable Offence' 'means any felony and any other offence for which a police officer may under any law for the time being in force arrest without warrant'. (emphasis added) 

As defined in section 4 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) a 'Felony' 'means an offence which is declared by law to be a felony or, if not declared to be a misdemeanour, is punishable, without proof of previous conviction, with imprisonment for three years or more'. (emphasis added) 

In Baia Takoa v R (Unrep. Criminal Appeal Case No. 16 of 1998) Palmer J stated at page 3: 

'The Criminal Procedure Code is one of other Acts which deal directly with the situation described in paragraph 5(1)(f) of the Constitution. It prescribes the situation in which a police officer may arrest without a warrant upon reasonable suspicion or where an offence is about to be committed. Of particular relevance are paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 18. 

These read as follows: 

"Any police officer may, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest – 

(a)                any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having committed a cognisable offence; 

(b)               any person who commits any offence in his presence; …." 

Paragraph (a) above is confined to cognisable offences. 

[…] 

Paragraph 18(c) of the CPC: 

One of the submissions raised against the appeal by learned Counsel Waleanisia was that the Police had power in any event under paragraph 18(c) to effect an arrest without a warrant; in that the Appellant had obstructed the police officers when effecting the arrest. Unfortunately, this overlooked the fact that if the arrest was invalid, then the police officers may be considered as not acting in the line of duty at the said time. 

In other words, if the police officers do not have power to effect an arrest, it may be argued that in attempting to do so, they were not acting in the execution of their duty. The accused therefore had not committed any offence when resisting arrest.' (emphasis added) 

If there is no power to 'arrest without warrant' then an application must be made for the issue of an order from a Court which will be either: [i] a warrant of arrest; or [ii] a summons, under the provisions of section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7), see R v Lionel Rifasia (Unrep. Criminal Case No. 45 of 1976; Davis CJ; at page 3). 

In O'Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] 1 AllER 129 [[1997] AC 286] the House of Lords examined the requirements of legislative provisions which contain the wording such as, 'Any police officer who suspects on reasonable grounds …' 

Lord Steyn stated at page 134: 

'(1) In order to have a reasonable suspicion the constable need not have evidence amounting to a prima facie case. Ex hypothesi one is considering a preliminary stage of the investigation and information from an informer or a tip – off from a member of the public may be enough […]. (2) Hearsay information may therefore afford a constable reasonable grounds to arrest. Such information may come from other officers […]. (3) The information which causes the constable to be suspicious of the individual must be in existence to the knowledge of the police officer at the time he makes the arrest. (4) The executive discretion to arrest or not […] vests in the constable, who is engaged on the decision to arrest or not, and not his superior officers.' 

Lord Hope stated at pages 138 – 139: 

'My Lords, the test […] is a simple but practical one. It relates entirely to what is in the mind of the arresting officer when the power is exercised. In part it is a subjective test, because he must have formed a genuine suspicion in his own mind that the person has been concerned in (the commission of the offence suspected). In part also it is an objective one, because there must also be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. But the application of the objective test does not require the court to look beyond what was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the grounds which were in his mind at the time which must be found to be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed. All that the objective test requires is that these grounds be examined objectively and that they be judged at the time when the power was exercised. 

This means that the point does not depend on whether the arresting officer himself thought at that time that they were reasonable. The question is whether a reasonable man would be of that opinion, having regard to the information which was in the mind of the arresting officer. It is the arresting officer's own account of the information which he had which matters, not what was observed by or known to anyone else.' (emphasis added) 

As regards the issuance of warrants, see sections 91 – 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7). 

The law relating to: 

·                     'Bail' is examined commencing on page 378; and 

·                     'Protection Of Identity Of Informers' is examined commencing on page 130. 

[9.5] Common Law Powers Of Arrest 

In McLorie v Oxford (1982) 75 CrAppR 137 Donaldson LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at page 142: 

'The common law power of entry to effect an arrest without warrant appears to be and to always have been extremely limited. In Swales v Cox (1981) 72 CrAppR 171; [1981] 1 AllER 1115 it was conceded to be limited to four cases only, namely, in order to prevent murder, if a felony had been committed and the felon followed to a house, if a felony was about to be committed and would be committed unless prevented and if an offender was running away from an affray. Mr Morland does not accept that this list is exhaustive, but he has been unable to produce any authority to suggest that it is or even was more extensive.' 

See also: R v Richards & Leeming (1985) 81 CrAppR 125. 

In Baia Takoa v R (Unrep. Criminal Appeal Case No. 16 of 1998) Palmer J stated at pages 4 – 5: 

'Common law powers of arrest form part of the laws of Solomon Islands unless "(a) they are inconsistent with this Constitution or any Act of Parliament; (b) they are inapplicable to or inappropriate in the circumstances of Solomon Islands from time to time; or (c) in their application to any particular matter, they are inconsistent with customary law applying in respect of that matter."

[See paragraph (2) of Schedule 3 to the Constitution].

What are those common law powers of arrest? These include powers to arrest without warrant on a reasonable charge of felony or reasonable suspicion of felony […]. See also Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 17th Edition by J.W.C. Turner at paragraph 698, the learned Author states: 

"Like a private person he may arrest anyone who commits, in his presence, a treason, or felony, or dangerous wounding, and may break doors or use fatal violence if necessary." 

In Russell on Crime 11th Edition at page 733, the same view is expressed; that at common law a constable may arrest a person whom he finds committing a felony, or upon reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed by the person arrested, although no felony has, in fact, been committed. 

The views expressed are all consistent with and have in fact been encapsulated under section 18 of the CPC; in particular paragraphs (a) and (b). 

The learned Author in Russell on Crime (ibid) however, went on to make an interesting observation which I think is quite relevant to this case. At page 733, the learned Author states: 

"A constable is not as a general rule entitled to arrest for misdemeanour after it has been committed, whether the offence be fraud, breach of the peace, etc., nor to arrest on suspicion of misdemeanour. 

He may arrest any person who in his presence commits a misdemeanour or breach of the peace if the arrest is effected at the time when, or immediately after, the offence is committed, or while there is danger of its renewal, but not after the breach, or danger of its renewal, has ceased. He may arrest or start in immediate pursuit if the misdemeanour is a breach of the public place. And he may take into custody persons given in charge to him by persons who have witnessed a breach of the peace if there is danger of its immediate renewal, but not if the affray is over and peace restored." [Emphasis added] 

Where a breach of the peace (this would include misdemeanours) is committed in the presence of a constable, he may effect an arrest without warrant, that is clear from the above passage. It is also clear from the above passage that a constable is not entitled to arrest for misdemeanour or breach of the peace after it had been committed. So where a constable arrives at the scene of the crime after the misdemeanour or breach of the peace had been committed and there is peace, he cannot effect a lawful arrest in those circumstances. 

The above passage however seems to include a situation under common law where a constable may be able to effect an arrest without warrant. This is the situation where there is a danger of the renewal of a misdemeanour or a breach of the peace after it had been committed. In such a situation it seems that a constable would have power to effect an arrest without warrant. 

The learned Author also appears to have extended this to the situation where the police can arrest a person pointed out by witnesses to have committed a breach of the peace and where there is a danger of its renewal. 

In Harris's Criminal Law (ibid) at page 382, the learned Author also appears to identify a similar power. 

"Any person, whether private person or peace officer, may at common law arrest and give into custody – 

(i)                 To stay a breach of the peace which is either being committed in his presence or which he has reasonable ground to believe will be renewed." 

[…] 

The conclusion I am left with it that this is good law to be given effect to.' (emphasis added) [words in brackets added] 

In Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414 [[1966] 3 WLR 17; [1966] 2 AllER 649] Lord Parker CJ stated at page 419: 

'It is also in my judgment clear that it is part of the obligations and duties of a police constable to take all steps which appear to him necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from criminal injury. There is no exhaustive definition of the powers and obligations of the police, but they are at least those, and they would further include the duty to detect crime and to bring an offender to justice.' 

In Albert v Lavin (1982) 74 CrAppR 150 [[1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 AllER 878; [1981] 3 WLR 955] Lord Diplock, with the other Lordships concurred, stated at page 152: 

'[E]very citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being, or reasonably appears to be about to be, committed, has the right to take reasonable steps to make the person who is breaking or threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable steps in appropriate cases will include detaining him against his will. At common law this is not only the right of every citizen, it is also his duty, although except in the case of a citizen who is a constable, it is a duty of imperfect obligation.' 

In R v Howell (1981) 73 CrAppR 31 [[1981] 3 WLR 501; [1982] QB 416; [1981] 3 AllER 383; [1981] CrimLR] Watkins LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, held at page 36: 

'We entertain no doubt that a constable has a power of arrest where there is reasonable apprehension of imminent danger of a breach of the peace, so far for the matter has the ordinary citizen. […] We hold that there is power to arrest for breach of the peace where: (1) a breach of the peace is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest; or (2) the arrestor reasonably believes that such a breach will be committed in the immediate future by the person arrested although he has not yet committed any breach; or (3) where a breach has been committed and it is reasonably believed that a renewal of it is threatened. 

The public expects a policeman not only to apprehend the criminal but to do his best to prevent the commission of crime, to keep the peace, in other words. To deny him, therefore, the right to arrest a person who he reasonably believes is about to breach the peace would be to disable him from preventing that which might cause serious injury to someone or even to many people or to property. The common law, we believe, whilst recognising that a wrongful arrest is a serious invasion of a person's liberty, provides the police with this power in the public interest. 

In those instances of the exercise of this power which depend upon a belief that a breach of the peace is imminent it must, we think we should emphasise, be established that it is not only an honest albeit mistaken belief but a belief which is founded on reasonable grounds.' 

See also: Joyce v Hertfordshire Constabulary (1985) 80 CrAppR 298. 

Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) states: 

'Every police officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing, and shall to the best of his ability prevent, the commission of any offence.' (emphasis added) 

See also the following sections of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7): 

·                     section 50 ['Information of design to cognisable offences']; 

·                     section 51 ['Arrest to prevent cognisable offences']; and 

·                     section 52 ['Prevention of injury to public property']. 

[9.6] Question Of Bail 

Section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7) states: 

'A police officer making an arrest without a warrant shall, without unnecessary delay and subject to the provisions of this Code as to bail take or send the person arrested before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or before an officer of or above the rank of sergeant.' (emphasis added) 

The law in relation to 'Bail' is examined commencing on page 378. 

[9.7] Arrest For Questioning 

In Holgate – Mohammed v Duke (1984) 79 CrAppR 120 Lord Diplock, with whom their Lordships concurred, stated at pages 125 – 126: 

'That arrest for the purpose of using the period of detention to dispel or confirm the reasonable suspicion by questioning the suspect or seeking further evidence with his assistance was said by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in England and Wales in 1981 (Cmnd. 8092) at paragraph 3.66 "to be well established as one of the primary purposes of detention upon arrest." That is a fact that will be within the knowledge of those of your Lordships with judicial experience of trying criminal cases; even as long ago as I last did so, more than 20 years before the Royal Commissioner's Report. It is a practice which has been given implicit recognition in rule 1 of successive editions of the Judge's Rules, since they were first issued in 1912.'