Vuda v Central Islands Provincial Government [2021] SBMC 18; Civil Case 32 of 2021 (25 October 2021)

IN THE CENTRAL MAGISTRATES’ COURT ) Civil Case: 32 of 2021
OF SOLOMON ISLANDS AT HONIARA )
(Civil Jurisdiction)

IN THE MATTER OF: KOILOTUITUNGIA CUSTOMARY LAND ACQUISTION APPEAL (S. 66 of the Land and Titles Act [Cap. 133])

BETWEEN

CHARLES VUDA
Appellant

AND:

CENTRAL ISLANDS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
First Respondent

AND:

WILLIAM SEMU
Second Respondent

AND:

LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
Third Respondent

Date of hearing: October 1, 2021
Date of verbal judgment: October 15, 2021
Date of written judgment: October 25, 2021

Samuel Balea for the Appellant
Pamela Rofeta for the First and Third Respondents
No appearance for the Second Respondent

JUDGMENT

Introduction

[1]. The appellants have filed their appeal on May 4, 2021, contesting the determination of the acquisition officer (“AO”) dated April 25, 2021. The acquisition appeal pertains to the land known as Koilotuitungia Customary Land (hereinafter referred to as “Koilotuitungia”). The acquisition officer found in favor of the Second Respondent and his party, of which the appellant and his party vehemently disputes. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal against the said determination, which is the subject of this judgment. It has been accepted that the appellant’s appeal was filed within the legal timeframe^[1], as such, counsels’ have filed and tendered submissions to succor their arguments. The matter return today for the court to deliver its judgment after full hearing, I now do so.

[2]. The grounds of appeal, as quoted from the Appellant’s appeal petition are itemized below:

1. The Acquisition process was obviously an abuse of the legal procedure based on the following basis:
   1. The Public notice was not put out to the public as required by Land and Titles Act and or if it was published it was not published on public places where the public can see the notice.
      
2. That the land in question is all along subject to dispute between the Second Respondent and the Appellant since 2010 to 2019, hence that fact should not be overlooked in granting the determination. On the same note, the Appellant also forward notice to the Second Respondent regarding the existing dispute over the subject which obviously ignored by the Second Respondent.
   
3. That the determination should be struck on grounds that there was not ample time given between the date on which the purported Public Notice was given out and date on which the Public Hearing was made. The Respondent put out a Notice for Public Hearing on the 12^th of March 2021 and the Public Hearing was held on the 25^th of March 2021, which is only 13 days. This is obviously a breach of the legal procedures regarding Acquisition Hearing.
   
4. That the Public Notice was not served to the community around the area or the vicinity. Such conducts is seen as calculated to deprive the rest of the people of their claims should they have, on the customary land.
   
5. That the purported Public Hearing was not done at a public place where public can have access to the hearing, rather it was held behind closed doors, hence, the public was not allowed in numbers to attend the public hearing.
   
6. That the Third Respondent did not attend the Public Hearing for which he was appointed to carry out. It is certainly a breach of the Land and Titles Act that no Acquisition Officers was present during the purported public meeting. That it was further confirmed that it was only the Provincial Secretary along with First Respondent and family who were present during the hearing and much of the objectors’ objections were not considered for reason we cannot assume at this stage.
   
7. That the time for public hearing was strictly 3 hours from 8am to 11am. Such public hearing should allow the public to state their claim and it is necessary that ample time must be given to present such claims and must not be restricted.
   
8. That the determination as appeared in Form 16 (Public Notice) is fabricated as the meeting was held on a different date than that of the actual public hearing date; on 25^th March 2021 and not 25^th April as shown on the Form.
   

Background facts

[3]. On February 8, 2021, the Provincial Secretary of Central Province, who was the then chairman for the Central Province Tender Board, wrote a letter to one Mr. Genesis Eddie Kofana, a private lands consultant. The essence of the letter was basically, an award of contract for acquisition officer of Koilotuitungia Customary Land by Provincial Tender board. It was awarded to the said Genesis Eddie Kofana.

[4]. After the granting of award, on February 8, 2021, the Provincial Secretary of Central Province appointed Mr. Genesis Eddie Kofana as the Acquisition Officer to act as his agent for the purposes of the acquisition of Koilotuitungia.

[5]. The Acquisition Officer had conducted a demarcation of boundaries on a plan which was attached to the written agreement for lease of Koilotuitungia. The demarcated portion of land known as Koilotuitungia, was measured around 2.5 hectares, and shown color edged in red on the Plan at paragraph 5 of the Agreement.

[6]. On March 12, 2021, the acquisition officer made a written agreement for the lease of the Koilotuitungia customary land, as the purported person or duly authorizes representative of the customary landowners.

[7]. On March 12, 2021, the acquisition officer published public notice under Form CL.3, indicating inter alia, he shall hold a public hearing to decide any claim on 25^th March 2021 at New Uvu Settlement. The public hearing was to determine any claim on Koilotuitungia land, of which the acquisition officer had made an agreement with one Mr. William Semu as the person claiming to represent Hogokiki.

[8]. The copies of the public notice, made under Form CL.3 was also posted at four villages, namely: (i). Salavo village, Sand fly Central Province, (ii). Leitongo village, Sandfly, Central Province, (iii). Dala village, Big Ngela, Central Province, (iv). Sodu’ulu village, Sandfly, Central Province, and (v). Tulagi, Central Province.

[9]. On March 25, 2021, the acquisition officer hold a public hearing at New Uvu Settlement, Central Province. It started at 10:00 a.m. and ended around 12:05 p.m. At 11:00 a.m. the acquisition officer recorded that there was no claim made against William Semu, thus, at 11:30 a.m. he pronounced the close of meeting. He proceeded and determined at 11:50 p.m. that, William Semu will be entered as a representative of his Hogokiki clan to enter into agreement with the Central Province. Thereafter, he officially declared that the 90 days of Public Notice that starts on March 25, will lapse on 25^th June 2021.

[10]. While the acquisition officer and his team were having their refreshment, the appellant and his party arrived and registered their claims. The acquisition officer heard their claims, but advised them that since he had decided the matter, they should file an appeal at the Magistrates Court. Thus, the Appellant and his party left. And the acquisition officer and his team returned to Tulagi.

Relevant Law

[11]. Appeals against an act or determination of an Acquisition officer is provided under s. 66 (1) of the Land and Titles Act:

“Any person who is aggrieved by any act or determination of the Acquisition Officer may within three months from the date of the record or determination appeal to a Magistrate's Court and such court may make such order as it considers just.” (Underlined mine).

[12]. As far as s.66 (4) of the Act^[2]is concerned, any decision or order of the High Court is final and conclusive. Equally, the decision and order of the Magistrate’s Court and Acquisition officer’s determination shall be final and conclusive if not challenged within the legal timeframe of appeal.

[13]. The Magistrate’s Court exercising an appellate jurisdiction under s. 66 (1), must be satisfied that all requirements under sections 60 to 65 are adhered to by the acquisition officer. Failing to comply with these legal requirements would tantamount to a legal wrong, and thereby rendering the totality of the process, and determination a nullity. A case on point is Talasasa v Biku^[3] where Maina, Principal Magistrate (as he then was) stated, “...An acquisition public hearing is quasi-judicial proceeding. Such, therefore require a record of proceeding and obviously for the full compliance of Sections 63 and 64 of the Act. Non-compliance may render the process declared invalid.”

[14]. Likewise, s. 61 (3) of the Act, provides the basis for which the Acquisition Officer, adjudicating over acquisition public hearing, shoulders all the powers of a Magistrate, in administering and taking oaths, affirmations and statutory declarations, securing the production of documents and the attendance and examination of persons whom he believes to be able to give evidence upon any of the matters relevant to the acquisition. The provision gives the Acquisition Officer the quasi-judicial ‘veil’; to preside over a case and be able to accept and consider materials before him, and make a finding or determination on it.

Submissions, and Court’s Consideration

[15]. The Appellant submitted that, because these appeal points are interwoven, he amalgamated appeal grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. In addressing the points together, he first submitted that the notice was not put out in such a manner for the purpose of bringing it to the attention of all persons affected thereby. He further submitted that no public notice was published at Haroro village. Second, he submitted that the Second Respondent have prior knowledge of the previous dispute that the Appellant and himself has had dispute over the Koilotuitungia land in 2019. He further submitted that, being a purported landowner and someone who has an existing dispute with the Second Respondent over Koilotuitungia, the Acquisition Officer should have published the public notice at Haroro village, or a village within the same District. Instead, he submitted that the Acquisition Officer had published the public notice at a different district and Island whilst the hearing took place at a different district and island. It is with this argument, that the Appellant argued the Acquisition Officer’s act has contravened the spirit and intent of s.63 of the Land and Titles Act.

[16]. Ms. Rofeta of counsel for the Crown, representing the First and Third Respondents, vehemently disputes the Appellant’s appeal grounds 1 to 5, and stated that, there was compliance of Part V of the Act^[4] in regards to the Public Hearing for the determination of ownership of Koilotuitungia customary land. She made submission addressing the pertinent issues, and encapsulating appeal grounds 1 to 5. First, the places of which the public notice was published. She submitted that section 63 empowers the Acquisition Officer to publish the notices in a manner, which he may deem adequate to bringing to the notice of interested person or parties. It is apparent before the court that the notices were pinned up in five locations. Four of the sites, Salavo, Leitongo, Dala, and Sodu’ulu are located at the Sandfly Islands, where the Koilotuitungia customary land is situated, whereas, the fifth location, Tulagi, is the capital of Central Province. She further submitted that, the fact that the Appellant acknowledges the public notices at Salavo, and Leitongo village, reinforces the sufficiency of publication of notice. In support of this argument, counsel referred to the case of Churchill v Toitoona^[5] (“Toitoona”), where the Court said “Section 63 of the Lands and Titles Act [Cap. 133] does not restrict or limit place(s) to publish such notices but rather one that the Acquisition Officer considers to be adequate or most effective for the purpose of bringing it to the attention of all persons affected thereby notice. I can only state that those named locations, which the public notice was published, are locations frequented by public, hence, necessary and adequate as far as the meaning under section 63 of the said Act is concerned.”

[17]. Second, the duration of time when the notices were put up, to the time the public hearing was conducted. Ms. Rofeta, pressed forward the argument that, the Act is silent on the time required to put up notice, and the time that the public hearing must be conducted. However, relied on section 54 (1) of the Interpretation, and General Provisions Act [Cap. 85], where it states: “Where no time is prescribed in an Act for the doing of any act or thing, it may be or shall be done, as the case may be, with all convenient speed, and as often as the occasion arises.” As such, she submitted that the time given between the time of the publication of the notice, on 12^th of March 2021, and the time of the public hearing on the 25^th of March 2021 was sufficiently effective in fulfilling the purpose of conducting a public hearing pursuant to section 63 and 64 of the Act. In addition, she argued that, the public hearing was conducted within a convenient time and speed.

[18]. Third, there was an ongoing dispute of ownership over Koilotuitungia customary land, apart from the Acquisition. Ms. Rofeta submitted that the acquisition process is for acquiring the interest to customary land, which may be determined in accordance to the acquisition process pursuant to Part V of the Act. Furthermore, she stated that the Acquisition Officer is liken to that of a Magistrate in which he may make a determination of the ownership of Koilotuitungia customary land, and this need not be stalled due to an ongoing dispute over the ownership of the land. In support of this argument, she relied on the case of Koramata Clan v Land Acquisition Officer-Konide Land^[6], and submitted that an Acquisition Officer having been appointed by the Act is authorized to hear claims regarding customary lands that is acquired for whatever purposes, and to make his ruling. The Acquisition Officer may or may not consider a decision from the Chiefs as seen in the Koramata case where the Acquisition Officer had not considered a decision from the Chiefs, bit the Court had upheld the decision made by the Acquisition Officer.

[19]. Regarding the Koramata case, counsel had submitted that it can be differentiated with the one before court, as there is an ongoing dispute, and a decision is yet to be made. Nevertheless, was of the view that the Acquisition Officer need not rely on any decision made by the Chiefs, and may even make a ruling despite any ongoing dispute due to having the statutory authority himself to conduct a hearing.

[20]. Gleaning from the contested issues before this court, through submissions, I have identified the following matters as being crucial to the appeal and would condense the scatter gun appeal points, except for appeal points 6 and 8. First, the Sufficiency of public notice. The copy of public notice, which was accepted to have been pinned up at five locations, were all, without the actual duration of time for which the public hearing was to be conducted. Simply put, the length of time when the hearing would start and when to end, was not provided to parties under the public notice^[7]. The notice only states the date and venue for hearing. The vagueness as to the timing, or failure to provide a hearing time had affected the Appellant and his party’s attendance to the public hearing. Undoubtedly, the absence of time had conceivably create confusion to those who were intending to make claims, like in this case. The consequential effect of such ambiguity would cause a reasonable person to infer from the date and venue of hearing, that the hearing would occur within 24 hours of the date. This is an error committed by the Acquisition Officer, and could have been rectified easily, if he had allowed time until, perhaps, late evening of the hearing day. Unfortunately, the public hearing was only done in 2 hours; starting around 10:00 a.m. and ended at about 12:05 p.m., which as a result, the Appellant and his party attended to the hearing few minutes after the Acquisition Officer had ended it. Consequently, they were not afforded a right to be heard, after which they were advised that a decision had already been made.

[21]. In addition, the public notice was issued on the 12^th of March 2021, and the public hearing was held 13 days after, on March 25, 2021. As well as, the public notice was not pinned up at the Appellant’s village at Haroro, although the Acquisition Officer had knowledge that the Second Respondent and the Appellant has an ongoing dispute between them on the said customary land and a decision is still pending. I can say that the facts of this case, as far as the publication of notice is concerned, is distinguishable to that of Toitoona, where the public notice were published at Fiu Bridge Canteen and Gwailiki Roadside Canteen; the entrance to the land concerned and places of which those who are connected to the disputed land would frequent. Unlike this case, where the parties had viewed it at different locations, and were rushed to the public hearing venue, only to be told that it had ended after 2 hours. These cumulative conducts demonstrated by the Acquisition Officer, goes to question his integrity, and has affected the expected procedural fairness that is to be accorded to the Appellant and perhaps, other potential claimants.

[22]. In my opinion, providing a ‘time’ for hearing is essential to the parties’ fairness and right to be heard. The Appellant had attended to the hearing, but because of the failure by the Acquisition Officer to provide a time for hearing, and the conduct by the Acquisition Officer to end it within 2 hours, had affected their right to be heard. In the case of Lixia v Attorney-General (“Lixia”), Palmer J (now CJ) stated that, procedural fairness and rules of natural justice are rights entrenched in the proceedings of tribunals and administrative bodies exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions. This has been held to include Public Officers discharging government functions.^[8] Therefore, the Acquisition Officer, adjudicating a public hearing pursuant to s. 64 of the Land and Titles Act, is expected to render a clear and unambiguous public notice to the public, and to conduct a public hearing which corresponds to the time, venue and date, as reflected on the notice. Unfortunately, in this case, the Acquisition Officer had failed to perform what was required, thus, deprived the Appellant’s right to be heard, and the expected procedural fairness.

[23]. Second, there is an ongoing dispute and a decision has yet to be made pertaining to the Koilotuitungia customary land. This is a muddle tied with the above point, in which the Appellant was not able to make his argument on the right of ownership to the Koilotuitungia customary land. However, I will address the merit of it per se. It is undisputed that there is currently a pending dispute over the same customary land, between the same parties before another customary forum, and a decision is yet to be made on the ownership of Koilotuitungia Customary Land. In Manedao v Roroi^[9] (“Manedao”), Palmer J, (as he then was) stated:

“a determination as to the identity of the persons who have the right to sell or lease the customary land and receive the purchase money or rent basically boils down to the question of ownership. This is something peculiar to customary rights and ownership. This is the very reason why the evidence and submissions that came before the Acquisition Officer essentially related directly to the question of ownership of that customary land. It is inevitable that this should be so, for customary rights intrinsically stem from customary ownership.

“...the Acquisition Officer therefore is not only empowered but obliged to hear customary evidence and to make a finding as to the ownership of the customary land. For only by doing that is he able to identify the persons who have the right to sell or lease the land and receive the purchase money or rent. Customary rights as I have said arise from customary ownership.” ^[10] (Underlined mine).

[24]. It is the Acquisition Officer’s duty to determine customary ownership of a land, when identifying the purported landowner to enter into a lease agreement with. However, when there is a contested issue of ownership before a customary tribunal or forum on the land concerned, the Acquisition Officer, if he wishes to make his own finding on customary ownership, must outline and discuss the basis for doing so. This is to provide a proper recording of his deliberation and consideration, for fairness to possible claimants, and assistance to the Magistrate’s Court, in the event the matter is appealed to this court, as in this case.

[25]. I agree with Ms. Rofeta, the Acquisition Officer has the statutory authority to conduct a public hearing, albeit pending matters before the chiefs or other customary forums. But, must say that, where there is a pending contested issue of land ownership before the Chiefs, or other relevant forums, the Acquisition Officer is obliged to consider and outline in his discussion, the extent of his basis for identifying the Second Respondent as the person who have the right to lease Koilotuitungia customary land. This may assist to explain why it would be needless to consider the pending land ownership matter.

[26]. Correspondingly, in Lilo v Panda; Lilo v Ghotokera^[11] (“Lilo”), the court made reference to remarks shared by Davis, C.J., (as he then was) in the case of Samuel KUKU v. Naisi LUNA (C.L.A.C. No.2 of 1979), where he states:

"... In my view the Customary Land Appeal Court was perfectly correct. The only courts with jurisdiction to determine the ownership of customary land in the event of dispute as to such ownership are the Local Courts...”^[12]

[27]. The importance for customary forums, such as, Chiefs, Local Court, and Customary Land Appeal Court to deal with customary matters and those relating to land ownership is mainly due to their familiarity with the customary usages, procedures and practices. It is accepted that they would be well-versed with matters of custom, and most, if not, all of those are people around the locality or perhaps, same province. In this case before me, the Acquisition Officer is a foreigner, a person from Malaita Province. Thus, if he is to discard matters before the customary forums, he must justify how he reached his finding. For without assessing and considering the customary basis of land ownership, or making a rash decision, the Acquisition Officer would run the risk of prematurely deciding on the land ownership issue, without justifiable basis and constructive proof in custom, under the pretext of having statutory authority to do so. The detrimental effect of such an approach would surely frustrate the interest of justice and that of parties. I feel that this is one of those cases.

[28]. Moreover, in Manedao (Supra.), the court had made comments on chiefs’ decisions being persuasive, and the Local Court’s as binding decisions for the Acquisition Officer to consider in making his deliberation. Unfortunately, there is no record before this court, that the Acquisition Officer had hear customary evidence or considered matters for that purpose, before or at the public hearing to justify or explain his determination in custom and law. I also accept that this was partly tied up with the fact that the Acquisition Officer had ended the hearing before the Appellant attended to the venue. What is before the court is that, the Acquisition Officer merely stating that he had a lengthy discussion and inquiry with the Second Respondent, and identified him to be the person whom he should enter into an agreement with for possible lease of the Koilotuitungia customary land.^[13]

[29]. Finally, the acquisition public hearing as a quasi-judicial tribunal. Section 61(3) of the Land and Titles Act [Cap.133], states:

“The Acquisition Officer shall have all the powers of a Magistrate for the purposes of administering and taking oaths, affirmations and statutory declarations, securing the production of documents and the attendance and examination of persons whom he believes to be able to give evidence upon any of the matters relevant to the acquisition; but he shall not be bound by the rules of evidence.”^[14]

[30]. S. 61 (3) gives authority and jurisdiction for an Acquisition Officer to carry out duties similar to that of a Magistrate, although he will not be bound by the rules of evidence. The intent of this provision, is to give the Acquisition Officer the authority to entertain oral or written evidences, which would allow him the legal basis and avenue to rule on what is before him. And alternatively, to avoid deciding on what is not before him, or speculations. Furthermore, this authority would require him, even during an uncontested hearing, to record the same and rely on what appears to be genuine oral accounts, written documents and other relevant materials. For without reliance to such relevant materials, the Acquisition Officer runs the risk of accepting a purported land owner who holds no ownership rights over the customary land. That is why, it is important for him to properly record the proceedings. The permission to proceed without strict rules of evidence is for him to entertain customary history and oral accounts, which are mostly passed down from generations, and would be inadmissible if the rules of evidence is to apply.

[31]. In the case of Talasasa v Biku^[15](“Talasasa”), Maina, P.M. (as he then was) stated in his judgment:

“A record of proceeding is important in the Acquisition process as Section 64 of the Act requires inter alia, that if there is no claim he shall record in writing that fact and date of such record or determination of the claim.” Also Section 65 of the Act requires such or similar record in writing. The brief outline above is not satisfactory. And cannot be taken as record of proceeding or report of this acquisition. What the Acquisition officer may also relied on as his record in Form CL 5 and CL 6 and dated 13^th September 2001 are not a record of proceeding but notices as required by Section 65(d) of the Act. It is my view that the above or what purport to be the record of proceeding of Acquisition is not record of proceeding, but merely a brief outline of what had happened during the acquisition process.”^[16]

[32]. Unfortunately, there is no record of proceedings before this court, rather a record of what happened during the acquisition process. It is but a brief documentation of the process leading up to the hearing date, and what happened that particular day. It is also quite remote to the ownership issue, and not a record of proceeding. I am not satisfied with such a document. Again, it is a legal obligation for the Acquisition Officer to record in writing all that is and is not before him, which he unfortunately, failed to do.

[33]. For all that I have discussed above, I must allow the amalgamated appeal grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7. Appeal ground 5 is dismissed, there is no evidence to state that the public hearing was conducted behind closed doors.

[34]. For appeal grounds 6 and 8, the Appellant submitted that the Third Respondent did not attend the Public Hearing for which he was appointed to carry out. First, he stated that the Acquisition Officer was not present during the purported public hearing, but only the Provincial Secretary along with the Second Respondent. He submitted that most of the objectors’ objections were not considered for reasons unknown. Second, that the determination as appeared in Form 16 (Public Notice) was fabricated as the meeting was held on a different date than that of the actual public hearing date; on 25^th March 2021 and not 25^th April as shown on the Form.

[35]. Mrs. Rofeta of counsel for the First and Third Respondent disputed both appeal grounds, and stated that, the Acquisition Officer was present during the public hearing. And after the public hearing, the Acquisition Officer concluded that there was no claimants who objected to the lease agreement. However, just after he concluded the hearing, a party arrived to make their claim, but since he had already made his determination, he advised that the party if aggrieved, to appeal to the Magistrate’s Court.

[36]. As apparent, there are competing arguments from both parties on the Acquisition Officer’s attendance to the public hearing. I must again reiterate that, this is why the need for proper recording of proceedings cannot be overemphasized. Had there be a proper recording of the parties who attended, those who presided, and the extent of what the parties said and did; it would not have created such confusion and muddle. However, for reasons that I have allowed the above appeal grounds, it is needless to weigh on the truthfulness of their arguments, as it would not change my finding in substance. Therefore, I accept that the Acquisition Officer was present during the public hearing, but failed to prepare a proper record of the proceeding and the deliberation to reach his determination. For this reason, appeal grounds 6 and 8, are hereby dismissed.

DECISION

[37]. Upon considering what I have discussed in this judgment, I make the following orders:

• [1]. Allow appeal grounds; 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7.
• [2]. Dismissed appeal grounds; 5, 6, and 8.
• [3]. Consequent to order [1] above, the Agreements of 12^th March 2021 and 25^th March 2021 respectively, and any determination thereof are accordingly set-aside or quashed.
• [4]. Parties to bear their own costs.
• [5]. 3 months’ right of appeal applies.
• [6]. Order accordingly.

Dated this 25^th day of October 2021.

BY THE COURT

-------------------------------------------------

MR. LEONARD B. CHITE

Principal Magistrate

Central Magistrates’ Court

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^[1] Section 66 (1) of the Land and Titles Act (Cap. 133)
^[2] Land and Titles Act (Cap. 133)
^[3] [2002] SBMC 1
^[4] Above n. 2
^[5] [2020] SBMC 14; Civil Case 02 of 2018 (2 June 2020)
^[6] [1992] SBMC 1 (25 May 1992)
^[7] See Annexure “GEK 01” of Genesis Eddie Kofana’s Sworn Statement dated 4^th of August 2021
^[8] Lixia v Attorney-General [1999] SBHC 14; HC-CC 134 of 1998 (2 March 1999)
^[9] [1993] SBHC 50; HCSI-LAC 2 of 1993 (11 August 1993)
^[10] Ibid.
^[11] [1981] SBHC 12; [1980-1981] SILR 155 (3 June 1981)
^[12] Ibid.
^[13] See Annexure “GEK 06” of Genesis Eddie Kofana’s Sworn Statement filed on 12^th of July 2021
^[14] At section 61 (3) of the Land and titles Act [Cap. 144]
^[15] [2002] SBMC 1 (22 February 2002)
^[16] Ibid.