Sivovilia v Attorney General [2018] SBMC 15; Civil Case 292 of 2015 (12 March 2018)

IN THE CENTRAL MAGISTRATE’S COURT
OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 292 of 2015

IN THE MATTER OF A COMPENSATION MONEY

CLAIM BY SILVERION SIVOVILIA

(ON BEHALF OF THE LATE BENTLEY SEGOVIA)

Applicant/Claimant

V

ATTORNEY GENERAL (Representing the Commissioner of Labour)

First Respondent/Defendant

NEW WORLD LIMITED
Second Respondent/Defendant

Mr. R. Tovosia for the Claimant
Mr. A. Poa for the First Defendant
Mr. E. Toifai for the Second Defendant

Date of Hearing: 2^nd March 2018
Date of Ruling: 12^th March 2018

RULING

1. The claimant files an application for the Court to decide on a preliminary matter and that is; a question of law regarding the interpretation of sections 5 (1) and 6 (a) - (c) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act^[1] where the claim is founded on.
   
2. Since this is a preliminary matter, the outcome of this application will determine whether or not there ought to be a trial. If the application is decided in favour of the claimant then this matter should now be resolved and concluded without going to trial. The converse will also occur if the application is refused.
   
3. The brief summary of the facts that has been conveniently outlined by the claimant is this. The claimant is the biological father of the deceased, Bentley Segovia. The deceased was employed by the second defendant to work for its logging operation in Isabel Province. He died during the course of his employment. There is no issue that he left behind persons who wholly dependent on his earnings for their survival.
   
4. His employer or the second defendant met all the financial expenses for repatriation of his body to the village in Weather Coast, Guadalcanal Province. The second defendant incurred a total expense of $72, 200 for medical, food and transporting of the deceased to the village.
   
5. The first defendant was asked by the second defendant to do a calculation of the total monies entitled to by the deceased pursuant to S. 6 (a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and Legal Notice No. 74 of 2012.
   
6. The first defendant calculated the total amount of monies due and owing to the deceased from the fatal accident and totalled to $108, 098.20. However, the first defendant had went on to decide that the funeral expenses incurred by the second defendant in the amount of $72, 2000 should be deducted from the $108, 098.20. The second defendant relied and acted on this advice and paid the balance of $35,898.20 to the Court. This was eventually paid to the claimant.
   
7. The claimant believes the advice given to the second defendant and eventually, the deduction of the money from the total claimed compensation was wrong and not allowable under S. 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Therefore, the claimant avers that the second defendant’s action was erroneous in law and hence, it should pay the deducted amount of $72,200 to him forthwith.
   
8. The first defendant in its written submission had conceded that the decision rendered to the second defendant was ill-conceived and erroneous. The first defendant agrees with the claimant that the deduction of the monies made by the second defendant was wrong in law and thus, the second defendant should pay the deducted monies to the claimant as sought for in the claim. This admission effectively settles the case against the first defendant.
   
9. The second defendant in its written submission in summary contended that its action to deduct the monies from the total claimed amount was not wrong in law or even ultra vires. The deduction was justified in the circumstances of the case. It was made for various expenses ranging from post-mortem charges, foods, flight charter and transportations from Avuavu airport to the village. Hence, if the application is granted in favour of the claimant then this could be seen as unjust enrichment. Therefore, as said by the second defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought in the application.
   
10. In this application, the overarching issue for me to decide is; whether the deduction for funeral expenses allowed to the deceased workman’s employer made from the sum payable for compensation was validly made in accordance with the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    
11. Without regurgitating matters that are peripheral, I decide to go straight to the assessment of the issue.
    
12. Section 5 (1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA) states:
    

“5.-(1) If in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject as hereinafter provided, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. For the purposes of this Act, an accident arising out of the employment shall be deemed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have arisen in the course of the employment and an accident arising in the course of the employment shall be deemed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have arisen out of the employment.”

13. In this case, the following requirements of S. 5 (1) ) of the WCA are not disputed:
    
    • (a) that the deceased was employed by the second defendant;
    • (b) that he sustained injury during and out of the course of his employment;
    • (c) as a result, he died and,
    • (d) that the second defendant is liable to pay him compensation
      
14. It is only S. 6 of the WCA that needs to be properly construed or examined in order to address this issue.
    
15. Section 6 of the WCA governs compensation payable for fatal cases where death results from injury sustained by an employee. It states:
    

“6 Where death results from the injury -

(a) if the workman leaves any dependants wholly dependent on his earnings, the amount of compensation shall be a sum equal to thirty-six months' earnings or such sum as the Minister may prescribe by order whichever is less:

Provided that in no case shall the amount of compensation under this paragraph be less than such sum as the Minister may prescribe by order:

Provided further that where in respect of the same accident compensation has been paid under the provisions of section 7 or section 8 there shall be deducted from the sum payable under this paragraph any sums so paid as compensation:

(b) if the workman does not leave any dependants wholly dependent on his earnings, but leaves any dependants in part so dependent, the amount of compensation shall be such sum, not exceeding in any case the amount payable under paragraph (a) of this section, as may be agreed upon or, in default of agreement, as may be determined by the court to be reasonable and proportionate to the injury to the said dependants;

(c) if the workman leaves no dependants, the reasonable expenses of the burial of the deceased workman and the reasonable expenses of medical attendance on the deceased workman, not exceeding such sum as the Minister may prescribe by Order, shall be paid by the employer.”

16. The facts of this case merited only subsections (a) and (c) above. These two subsections in my view require literal interpretations of their wordings in order to ascertain their meaning and the intent of the Parliament when enacting the legislation.
    
17. This approach was advocated in Movobule v Tozaka^[2] where Faukona J referred to the decision of Higgins J in Amalgamated society of Engineers V Adelaide Steamships Co. Ltd^[3] echoed:
    

“The fundamental rule of interpretations, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded to the intent of the Parliament that made it; and that intention was to be found by an examination of the language used in the statute as a whole. The question is, what does the language mean and when we find what the language means, in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to obey that meaning, even if we think the result to be inconvenient or impolitic or improbable.^[4]

18. His Lordship then went on to adopt a reasoning of Lord Ester in Queen V Judge of City of London Court^[5] as a guide for construing a legislation even if the meaning is inconvenient, prejudicial or absurd as conveyed in the following words:
    

“If the words of an Act is clear you must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether legislature has committed an absurdity.^[6]

19. The requirements of subsection (a) and (c) of S. 6 of the WCA is very clear and straightforward for purposes of calculating and awarding of the compensation payment to a deceased or workman who died during the course of employment. One is when there is/are dependants who wholly depend(s) on the earnings of the deceased as provided under subsection (a). In this case, the amount equal to thirty six months earnings shall be paid to the dependants as compensation payable to the deceased. Hence, any burial expenses incurred will have to be accrued or shouldered by the dependants themselves and an employer is not obliged to meet any burial or even funeral expenses per se since in practice, this will be covered in the compensation payment. Therefore, any financial assistance rendered by the employer towards the deceased will be at his own free will and this will be considered in addition to the compensation payable to the deceased.
    
20. The other requirement under subsection (c) is when the deceased leaves no dependants, then in this instance, the employer must meet the reasonable expenses of the medical attendance and burial of the deceased or workman in an amount not exceeding the amount prescribed by the Minister which at present, is $12,000 pursuant to Legal Notice No. 74 of 2012.
    
21. Any compensation payment that deviates from these statutory requirements in my view is one that is not sanctioned by law and is erroneous.
    
22. Since the deceased has left dependants, the amount of $108, 098.20 was rightfully calculated and made under S. 6 (a) of the WCA. In so far as the law permits, the employer or the second defendant herein should only pay the compensation payable to the deceased and relinquish its responsibility to the dependants for them to meet all the expenses before and during the burial. The second defendant is not obliged to do so since at the end of the day that compensation payment in any event will cover or include expenses arising from medical, food and the repatriation of the body to the village.
    
23. In this present case, the financial assistance in the sum of $72, 200 rendered and now claimed by the second defendant towards the deceased is purely at its ‘own free will’ in addition to the compensation payable to the deceased. In my view, that cannot be offset from the $108, 098.20. I say this because the WCA does not authorise the second defendant to do so in the circumstance of this case.
    
24. It is my view that the deduction of $72, 200 made by the second defendant from the total claimed amount of $108, 098.20 payable as compensation to the deceased despite having the surviving dependants who wholly depended on his earnings was wrongly deducted. There is no legal basis authorising such deduction. Even if the second defendant had said that it was coerced by the relatives of the deceased to do so, the law does not authorise him to effect any deduction from the total money claimed.
    
25. To make any deduction in contravention to the requirements of S. 6 (b) or even (c) of the WCA is erroneous, unauthorised and unwarranted by law. It is illegal and any claim relying on such deduction when the statutory requirements are not met is unfounded as well.
    
26. The second defendant has urged the Court to consider the implication of unjust enrichment if the application is decided in favour of the claimant taking into account all the financial expenses made towards the deceased prior to burial. Whilst the second defendant is at liberty to mount such an argument, unfortunately, that action is not what the law recognises and allows, and thus, it is only proper for the Court to right the wrong.
    
27. The claimant’s application is clearly entrenched. I am satisfied and therefore grant an order directing the second defendant to pay the claimant the sum of $72, 200 within 14 days as of date.
    
28. Since this is a preliminary matter and the decision reached herein essentially now resolves the matter, I order that this case is now finalised without the need for trial.
    
29. Cost of this application is borne by the second defendant and payable to the claimant on standard basis.
    
30. The claimant is at liberty to apply with reasonable notice for further Orders if these Orders are not complied with.
    
31. No further Orders.
    

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THE COURT

Augustine Aulanga - PM

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^[1] Cap 78
^[2] [2016] SBHC 44; HCSI-CC 456 of 2014
^[3] (1920) HCA 54. (1920) 28 CLR 129
^[4] At paragraph 14 of Movobule’s case
^[5] (1892) 1 B273 at 290
^[6] At paragraph 15 of Movobule’s case