HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Case name: 	Dettke v Sade	
		
Citation:		
		
Date of decision: 	17 February 2025	
		
Parties: 	Horst Heinz Bodo Dettke 	
		
Date of hearing: 	13 February 2025	
		
Court file number(s): 	205 of 2024 	
		
Jurisdiction: 	Civil 	
		
Place of delivery: 		
		
Judge(s): 	Lawry; PJ	
		
On appeal from:		
		
Order:	1. The Amended Petition is dismissed.
2. The Parties bear their own costs.
3. I certify to His Excellency the Governor General, the Electoral Commission and the Speaker that Francis Belande Sade was the duly elected candidate of the North West Guadalcanal constituency on the General Election held on 17 April 2024.	
		
Representation: 	Mr G Suri for the Petitioner
Mr W Rotumana and Mr J Geni for the First Respondent
Mr D Damilea for the Second and Third Respondents	
		
Catchwords: 		
		
Words and phrases:		
		
Legislation cited:	Electoral Act 2018 S 111 (1) (b)
Electoral Petition Rule 2019 r 6 (1) (a), 6(1) (b), 6 (1) (e), r 5 (1),r 19, r 19 (1), 50, r 19 (4), 16 and 19
Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rule 2007, r 5.11, r 5.18, 15.37, 6.1, 7.7
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 S 122 (2) (b), S 160 (d), S 160
Constitution S 4 (1) 	
		
Cases cited:	Haomae v Houenipwela [2024] SBHC 155, Fiulaua v Fuo’o [2025] SBHC 2, In re Application by Minister for Western Provincial Affairs [1983] SBHC 27, IRC v Hinchy [1960] AC 748 at 676, Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HC28, Kutlu v Director of Professional Services Review [2011] 197 FCR 177, Director of Public Prosecution v Marijancevic [2011] 33 VR 440, Silvania Products (Australasia) Ltd v Storey [1990] SBHC 112, Moore and another v Gamgee [1890] 25 QBD 244, Jones v James 19 LJ (QB) 257, 	

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Case No. 205 of 2024

BETWEEN:

HORST HEINZ BODO DETTKE 
Petitioner

AND:

FRANCIS M B SADE
First Respondent

AND:

JAMES TIVA
(Returning Officer for North West Guadalcanal Constituency)
Second Respondent

AND:

GREG DOUGLAS
(Presiding Officer for Visale 2 Polling Station, North West Guadalcanal Constituency
Third Defendant

Date of Hearing: 13 February 2025 
Date of Ruling: 17 February 2025.

Counsel: 
Mr G Suri for the Petitioner
Mr W Rotumana and Mr J Geni for the First Respondent
Mr D Damilea for the Second and Third Respondents
RULING ON FURTHER APPLICATION TO DISMISS AMENDED ELECTION PETITIONINTRODUCTION
1. 	On 8 October 2024 the Court delivered a ruling on matters raised in the First Respondent’s application to dismiss the amended election petition. The First Respondent has filed a further application entitled ‘First Respondent’s Fresh Application to Dismiss/Strike Out Amended Election Petition filed on 13 August 2024’. The application relies on rule 111(1)(b) of the Electoral Act 2018 which provides:
	“The Court:
(a) 	…
(b) 	 May dismiss a petition without a hearing if:
(i) 	The petition is frivolous or vexatious; or 
(ii) 	There are insufficient grounds to warrant the hearing of the petition.”
2. 	The grounds advanced by the First Respondent are all directed to alleged failures to comply with the requirements of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019 [‘the Rules’]. The application contains an alternative basis submitting that the materials placed before the Court do not provide clear and cogent evidence to meet the sufficiency test set out in section 111(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, however no submissions have been put forward on this ground.
3. 	The First Respondent relied on Rule 6(1) of the Rules which provide:
	“6. (1) An election petition shall - (a) state the right of the petitioner to petition; (b) state the holding and result of the election; (c) briefly state the facts and grounds relied on to sustain the order sought; (d) include a statement of: the address within the jurisdiction for service of the petitioner; and, the contact details of the petitioner, or of his advocate or agent;
	(e) clearly identify the respondent or respondents to the petition together with their usual or last known address.
	(2) The petition shall be divided into paragraphs each of which shall be confined to a distinct portion of the subject matter of the petition and each paragraph shall be numbered consecutively.
	(3) The petition shall conclude with the orders sought, for example, that some specified person should be declared duly returned or elected or that the vote shall be recounted or that the election should be declared void or that a return may be enforced (as the case may be).
	(4) The petition shall be signed by all the petitioners.
	FORMS 1, 2 and 3
	(5) The petition may be in Form 1, 2 or 3 with such alterations, additions or omissions as the circumstances require.
	(6) No costs shall be allowed for drawing or copying any petition not substantially in compliance with this rule unless the Court orders otherwise.”
4. 	Counsel for the First Respondent submitted that the word ‘shall’ at the end of the first line of rule 6(1) makes obligations in the paragraphs that follow, mandatory. Counsel further submitted that non-compliance with a requirement in those paragraphs renders the amended petition a nullity.
Rule 6(1) (a) 
5. 	Counsel submitted that the First Respondent failed to comply with rule 6(1) (a). He alleged that the First Respondent failed to state in the amended petition the right the Petitioner had to file the amended petition. Section 108(2) of the Act provides:
	“The following persons are entitled to file an election petition:
	(a) an elector in the constituency to which the petition relates;
	(b) a candidate for the election in the constituency.”
6. 	In the amended election petition the following is recorded after listing the parties to the proceedings: 
	“Election for the Northwest Guadalcanal electoral constituency   held on the 17th day of April 2024. Petition of Horst Heinz Bodo Dettke of Tandai Highway, Honiara City whose name is subscribed.
	1. The Petitioner is a person who was a Candidate at the above election and was also an elector in the above constituency.”
7. 	The Petitioner has clearly identified the name of the constituency and the date of the election. He has identified himself as both a candidate and an elector in the above constituency. He has therefore set out his right to bring the petition. The First Respondent’s submission that the Petitioner was required to include the words “has a right to petition because he is an elector or because he was a candidate in the constituency” has no merit at all. The Petition has clearly set out the information required under rule 6(1) (a).
Rule 6(1) (b)
8. 	The First Respondent then submitted that in breach of rule 6(1) (b), the Petitioner failed to state the holding and result of the election. At paragraph 2 of the petition the following is set out:
	“The Petitioner states that the election was held on the 17 day of April 2024 when Francis Belande Sade (“1st Respondent”) and Heinz Horst Bodo Dettke (“Petitioner”) John Espange, Kasiano Kere, Simon Chottu and Andrew Mua were candidates and the returning officer has returned the said Francis Belande Sade as being duly elected.”
9. 	The purpose of the election in North West Guadalcanal Constituency was for those entitled to vote to choose the candidate who would represent the Constituency as a result of the election. The submission that the Petitioner failed to state the holding of the election is clearly misleading. The Petitioner clearly set out the fact that the election was held identifying both the date and the Constituency. The petition also clearly sets out that the First Respondent was declared to have been duly elected.
10. 	Counsel submitted that in order to comply with the rule the petition was required to set out the number of votes for each candidate. Had the rule referred to ‘the results’ (plural) of the election there may have been an argument to be made. It does not do so. There was an election in the constituency and the result was that the First Respondent was declared duly elected. I note in passing that the sworn statement filed with the Petition in fact included the votes recorded for each candidate. Clearly the result of the election was that the First Respondent was declared the winner.
11. 	The submission on this ground has no merit at all and was misleading.
Rule 6(1) (e)
12. 	The First Respondent then submitted that the petition failed to clearly identify the First Respondent and or his usual or last known address contrary to rule 6(1)(e). As can be seen in the material from the petition already set out, the First Respondent is referred to by his name and as the First Respondent and as the duly elected candidate for the constituency. There is sufficient material provided to clearly identify him. The second half of this submission relating to the usual or last known address of the First Respondent will be dealt with later in this ruling.
Rule 5
13. 	Counsel then submitted that there was no compliance with rule 5(1) of the Rules. That rule provides:
	“5. (1) The presentation of a petition shall be made by filing it with the Registrar, with the original plus one copy and enough copies for service on each respondent and evidence of service in accordance with Rule 19.”
No evidence was put before me to show that the Petitioner failed to file sufficient copies of the petition to allow for service on each Respondent and for the proof of service of the petition. However the First Respondent then relied on rule 19 of the Rules which provide as follows:
	 “19. (1) Every petition, notice of the nature of the security and notice of the first directions hearing issued under Rule 25, shall be served personally on each and every respondent by the petitioner.
	(2) If the petitioner is unable to personally serve the respondent or any one of several respondents the petitioner may, not later than ten days after the presentation of the petition, apply to the Court for an order for substituted service of the petition.
	(3) An application pursuant to sub-rule (2) hereof shall be supported by a sworn statement showing what has been done to effect personal service of the petition and to cause the petition to come to the knowledge of the respondent.
	(4) If the Court J is satisfied that what has been done to cause the petition to come to the knowledge of the respondent, is sufficient to bring the petition to the knowledge of the respondent, the Court may order that what has been done be deemed to be sufficient service of the petition.
	(5) If the Court is satisfied that all reasonable efforts made to effect service upon the respondent have not been successful an order for substituted service may be made: 
	(a) in the manner authorised by the Rules of the High Court; and/or (b) authorising service be effected by posting a notice upon the notice board of the court.
	Form 10
	(6) The notice referred to in sub-rule (5) hereof shall include a statement: as to the presentation of the petition; the orders sought; and the nature of the security, and must be in Form 10.
	(7) Service approved pursuant to sub-rule (4) or service effected in accordance with an order for substituted service pursuant to sub-rule (5) hereof shall be taken as personal service.”
14. 	Counsel submitted that since there was no application for substituted service, rule 19(1) required the petition to be served personally on the First Respondent by the Petitioner.
15. 	On 19 June 2024 the Petitioner through his Counsel caused a sworn statement of Alwin Nimelea to be filed. Mr Nimelea is a police officer. At paragraph 2 of the sworn statement he set out that the documents were hand delivered to the First Respondent when he (Mr Nimelea) was together with another police office named Samantha Qoloni. He then deposed that the First Respondent signed the service form. A copy of that form bearing the signature of the First Respondent is attached to the sworn statement. Mr Nimelea was not required for cross examination. I have no reason to not accept his evidence. Clearly there was evidence of personal service on the First Respondent. The argument of the First Respondent was that the service was required to be carried out by the Petitioner himself.
16. 	The rule makes it clear that personal service must be effected on the First Respondent. In order to determine how a petitioner is to effect personal service on a respondent it is helpful to consider rule 50 of the Rules which provides:
	“50. Wherever these Rules are silent as to the procedure to be followed in particular circumstances the procedures of the Court shall, as near as the circumstances will admit, be the same and the Court has the same powers, jurisdiction and authority as if it were hearing a civil proceeding.”
17. 	The Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 contains similar provisions regarding service. An example is rule 5.11 of those Rules which provides: 
	“If the defendant intends to contest the claim the defendant must file and service a defence on the claimant within the period required by rule 5.37.” 
	At rule 5.18 of those Rules there is the following: 
	“If a claimant wishes to allege further relevant facts after the defence has been filed and served the claimant must file and serve a reply.”
18. 	Rule 6.1 of those Rules provide: 
	“If these rules require a document to be served, the party who filed the document is responsible for ensuring that the document is served.”
19. 	Although the service referred to in these rules is that the defendant or claimant must file and serve a document, that must be interpreted to mean that the claimant or defendant required to effect service is responsible for ensuring that a document is served as required. It does not mean that the claimant or defendant must do the actual service themselves. Returning to rule 19(1) I find that the rule should be interpreted as meaning that the petition must be served personally on the First Respondent if there is not an order for substituted service. That personal service can be deemed to be carried out by the Petitioner if the Petitioner ensures that the petition has been personally served.
20. 	The First Respondent referred to Haomae v Houenipwela [2024] SBHC 155 to support his argument. Counsel referred me to paragraph 24 which was concerned with rule 16 and was concerned with the time for service being 14 days inclusive of the day of filing. The petition was filed on 30 May 2024 and served on 5 June 2024 which is clearly within the 14 days required. He then referred to paragraph [28] of the decision which reads as follows:
	“28. Rule 19(1) of the EPR requires and puts legal obligation on the Petitioners to personally serve the petition and all relevant documents on the First Respondent. The word ‘shall’ is used in that rule. It is therefore a mandatory provision that must be complied with by the Petitioners.”
That paragraph deals with the submission that there must be personal service on the First Respondent. That does not change the obligation on the Petitioner to be other than as set out in the civil procedure rules. That decision does not require the Petitioner to have effected personal service himself.
21. 	Counsel for the First Respondent also relied on Fiulaua v Fuo’o [2025] SBHC 2 where the Chief Justice discussed the requirements of rules 16 and 19. In that case he found that there was no evidence of personal service being effected within the prescribed time frame. In the present case there is clear evidence of personal service within the time frame required. The case is not authority for the proposition that the Petitioner must carry out personal service himself.
22. 	Counsel for the Petitioner drew my attention to the alternative ways provided for serving the petition and in particular to rule 19(4). I do not consider it is necessary to find that the service of the petition is deemed to have been served because it was served personally on the First Respondent. I find that rule 19(1) has been complied with. I find that the sworn statement of Mr Nimelea was filed as required and proved service in accordance with the rules.
23. 	Although the application is to set aside the amended petition, counsel for the First Respondent did not advance an argument that when a petition is amended the amended petition must then be personally served on the First Respondent. That is understandable as after the petition was served the First Respondent has filed an address for service. There is nothing in the rules that counsel has identified that would require fresh personal service of the amended petition.
Address of the First Respondent
24. 	It is common ground that neither the petition nor the amended petition did not set out the usual or last known address of the First Respondent. The Petitioner submitted that the need to do so was not mandatory but directive. It is apparent that both the Petitioner and the First Respondent were of the North West Guadalcanal constituency and it is obvious that the need to identify the address may be more important for someone who is not a candidate. Examples of that are the Second and Third Respondents.
25. 	Rule 6(1) (e) has two requirements. The first is the requirement to clearly identify the Respondent. The second is the need to identify the Respondent’s usual or last known address. There are three Respondents in the petition. The petition names them in the intituling. In the body of the petition the Petitioner has set out details of the identification of the First Respondent but does not identify his usual or last known address. The fact that he was a candidate suggests he may have an address in that constituency however that is not necessarily the case. A person can be registered as an elector in a constituency without their address being in that constituency. A person can be a candidate if nominated by three persons who are registered as electors in the constituency.
26. 	So far as rule 6(1) (e) is concerned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Court should look at the purpose of the requirement. He submitted that the address for the First Respondent was required for two things only, identification of the Respondent and for proper service of the petition. Rule 6(1) (e) is raised only in respect of the First Respondent.
27. 	Interpreting a statutory provision by looking at its purpose was discussed by former Chief Justice Daly in In re Application by Minister for Western Provincial Affairs [1983] SBHC 27. When addressing the submissions Daly CJ said:
	“The second group of submissions is that a ‘purposive’ approach rather than a literal one should be adopted to the interpretation of section 22(2). In other words I am asked to seek out the purpose of Parliament and apply what I think that purpose may be and thereafter to give the words of the subsection a different meaning from their literal meaning. But where does one start on this search other than with the words themselves?
	As Lord Reid said in IRC v Hinchy [1960] AC 748 at 767:
	“But we can only take the intention of Parliament from the words which they have used in the Act and therefore the question is whether these words are capable of a more limited construction. If not then we must apply them as they stand, however unreasonable or unjust the consequences and however strongly we may suspect that this was not the real intention of Parliament”
28. 	Daly CJ then examined all the speeches and said:
	“Thus it was found by Lord Reid that the words in question were ‘flexible’ enough to provide a meaning other than their natural or literal meaning and the Court was required to seek out the intent of Parliament to decide which actual meaning to choose.
	Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest put greater reliance on a strict construction of the words intended to restrict the powers of the Court. Viscount Dilhorne, in a dissenting judgment found that he must give the words their ordinary and natural meaning. Lord Pearson found that ‘the requirements of section 29(3) are only procedural.
29. 	Daly CJ then examined the words used as discussed by Lord Diplock.  He was the only judge who took a purposive approach. Daly CJ then applied the reasoning of the law Lords to the case before him. He referred to the words of the statute with which he was concerned and said
	“Those words have a natural and ordinary meaning. They are not ambiguous. In fact to my mind crystal clear. There is no scope for reading into them the existence of an unexpressed exception. The words are mandatory or imperative and admit of no discretion. They are consistent with the Act. They produce no absurdity. What they may produce in certain hypothetical circumstances is a practical difficulty. But I do not consider it within my powers to read into the section words which may avoid that practical difficulty but which may introduce other practical difficulties. This Court interprets; it does not legislate.”
30. 	The words of rule 6(1) (e) are similarly clear. They have a natural ordinary meaning. They are not ambiguous. There is no scope for reading into those words an unexpressed exception. The words “clearly identify the respondent or respondents to the petition together with their usual or last known address” cannot be read as meaning there is no need to identify the usual or last known address of the First Respondent if he is otherwise clearly identified and if the Court is satisfied he has been personally served with the petition. As there is no reference in the petition of either the usual or last known address of the First Respondent it cannot be said that there has been substantial compliance with the obligation to identify such an address.
31. 	Counsel for the Petitioner has then turned to the development of the literal and purposive approaches as discussed by the High Court of Australia in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28. The Court said that when considering the validity of an act done in breach of a statutory provision:
	“A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was the purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid… In determining the question of purpose regard must be had to the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute.”
32. 	Counsel submitted that so long as the purpose of Rule 6(1) (e) has been met the defect the First Respondent complained of has been cured. It is important then to consider the rest of what was said by the High Court of Australia and how the case has been applied.  The Court went on to say:
	“An act done in breach of a condition regulating the exercise of a statutory power is not necessarily invalid and of no effect. Whether it is depends upon whether there can be discerned a legislative purpose to invalidate any act that fails to comply with the condition. The existence of the purpose is ascertained by reference to the language of the statute, its subject matter and objects, and the consequences for the parties of holding void every act done in breach of the condition.”
33. 	The question in Project Blue Sky v ABA was the legal effectiveness of an Australian content standard made by the Australian Broadcasting Authority purportedly under s 122(2)(b) of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. Under cl 9 of that standard, Australian programs had to comprise 55% of all broadcasts between 6am and midnight. Section 160(d) of the Broadcasting Services Act required the Australian Broadcasting Authority to perform its functions in a manner consistent with Australia’s international obligations. One of those international obligations was a trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand, which provided that Australia and New Zealand would offer equal access and treatment to persons and services of the other country.
34. 	The first factor was whether the statutory requirement regulated the exercise of functions already conferred, or was an ‘essential preliminary’ to the exercise of a function. The judgment held that section 160 of the Broadcasting Services Act merely regulated an existing function, which ‘strongly indicated’ that a breach of s 160 should not invalidate a decision.
35. 	The second factor was the nature of the statutory requirement. In Project Blue Sky, the judgment considered that the obligations imposed by section 160 of the Broadcasting Services Act did not have ‘a rule-like quality’ that could easily be identified and applied
36. 	The third factor was the public inconvenience that would result if non-compliance meant that a decision was legally ineffective. The judgment considered that, in the light of the indeterminate nature of the obligations in section 160 of the Broadcasting Services Act, a finding that non-compliance with section 160(d) invalidated a decision would cause public inconvenience. The judgment held that the Australian content standard was not invalid, despite the breach of section 160(d) of the Broadcasting Services Act. However, that was not the end of the matter. The joint judgment held that the standard, although not invalid, was unlawful. Accordingly, a person with a sufficient interest could apply for a declaration that the relevant clause of the content standard was unlawful, and in an appropriate case could apply for an injunction to prevent the Australian Broadcasting Authority from taking any further action in reliance on that clause.
37. 	In 2011 the full Court of the Federal Court of Australia discussed the issues in Kutlu v Director of Professional Services Review [2011] 197 FCR 177. That was concerned with the effect of the Minister of Health appointing medical practitioners to various medical services committees. The Minister required to consult with the Australian Medical Association before making such appointments but had not done so. Of significance the Minister was not required to follow the advice of the Association in making such appointments. Nevertheless the Court held that the failure to consult was such that the subsequent appointments were invalid and accordingly any decisions of the medical services committees made with appointees concerning whom there had been no consultation, were invalid.
38. 	A second case is the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Director of Public Prosecutions v Marijancevic [2011] 33VR 440. That case considered whether a failure to swear an affidavit filed in support of an application for a search warrant even though it was signed in front of the appropriate person, meant that any evidence obtained under that warrant was inadmissible. Even though there had been a widespread practice of signing rather than swearing affidavits for search warrants the evidence was excluded.
39. 	Kutlu and Marijancevic are striking decisions because, first, significant disruption would follow from invalidating the relevant administrative actions and secondly, the breaches did not seem to be ones that would undermine the quality of the final decisions made (that is, the decisions by the Professional Services Committee, or the contents of the affidavits made in support of the applications for search warrants).
40. 	I consider that as the allegations against an elected official are of election corruption there is a public interest in having allegations brought to light. There is also a public interest in making sure that when such serious allegations are made there is strict compliance with the prescribed rules. A decision that compliance with the rule is necessary is not one that causes significant disruption to the public. I therefore come back to the failure to comply with rule 6(1) (e) and conclude that I must still look at the words of the rule. I conclude that because of the clear requirement with no apparent discretion for non-compliance, the intention behind the rule must be that non-compliance with the rule would make the petition invalid.
Submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court
41. 	Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that the First Respondent has taken significant further steps in the proceedings since the delivery of the decision on the previous application to dismiss the amended petition. His counsel has attended a mention hearing and agreed to direction orders without objection. He has filed a defence to the amended petition. He has filed further sworn statements. He has agreed to the list of witnesses and provided notices for cross examination. He has attended a pre-trial conference that included setting a date for filing objections to the admissibility of evidence. He has filed ten notices of objection. As a result counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the First Respondent has submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court.
42. 	Counsel relied on a decision by Ward J in this Court in Silvania Products (Australasia) Ltd v Storey [1990] SBHC 112 where the Court said:
	“In this case the respondents have clearly taken fresh steps in the action in full knowledge of the defects they now claim; in particular, unconditional appearance was entered. There is ample authority under the old English O.70 (being order 70 of the rules of Court) that such an action by the respondents puts an end to the right to object to the jurisdiction of the Court…”
43. 	In Silvania the issue was whether the case should have been commenced by a writ of summons rather than an originating summons. The judge said:
	“It may well be that the consequential orders sought in the summons are outside the scope of O.58 but the primary relief in the form of declarations of rights certainly does fall within that rule and I cannot regard the whole proceeding as null and void as a consequence.” 
44. 	Silvania therefore was not a case where a prescribed step had not been complied with.
45. 	In Silvania reference was made to Moore and another v Gamgee [1890] 25 QBD 244. In Moore v Gamgee proceedings had been undertaken in the County Court. The objection was that as the defendant carried on business outside the district of the County Court leave was required to proceed against the defendant. The case had been argued and partly decided before the objection was raised. In the Queen’s Bench Division the Court referred to the case of Jones v James 19 LJ (QB) 257 in which it is reported as having been said:
	“Assuming therefore that the order be of doubtful validity, I am of opinion that by thus coming in and pleading, the defendant has deprived himself of the power of examining minutely into the regularity of that process by which he was called upon to appear, and that as against him it must be considered as perfectly valid.”
46. 	In Moore v Gamgee the Court said:
	“there had been no notice of leave having been obtained was served however the defendant know that he lived outside the jurisdiction and therefore knew as a matter of law that there was a want of jurisdiction unless leave had been obtained. Moreover he had done more in the present case, for he had appeared and the case had been argued and partly decided before any objection was taken. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the county court judge arrived at the right conclusion in holding that the defendant had waived the objection to the jurisdiction; and therefore this application for a prohibition must be refused with costs.”
47. 	Counsel for the Petitioner therefore submitted that as the First Respondent has taken the steps set out since challenging the Amended petition he has waived his right to object to the validity of the petition.
48. 	In the present case the application was brought the week before the trial was scheduled to commence. It appears that counsel is submitting that had the application to strike out the amended petition heard on 19 September 2024 included the submission that rule 6(1)(e) had not been complied, that submission could potentially have been argued at that time but now it is too late. Counsel for the First Respondent has made no submissions on this issue which has placed the Court in the position of having to determine the issue without proper assistance from counsel.
49. 	Section 2 of Schedule 3 of the Constitution provides as follows:
	“2.-(1) Subject to this paragraph, the principles and rules of the common law and equity shall have effect as part of the law of Solomon Islands, save in so far as:-
(a) 	they are inconsistent with this Constitution or any Act of Parliament;
(b) 	they are inapplicable to or inappropriate in the circumstances of Solomon Islands from time to time; or
(c) 	in their application to any particular matter, they are inconsistent with customary law applying in respect of that matter.
50. 	As rule 6(1) (e) makes a requirement as to what must be included in the petition, and in the present case that includes clear identification of the First Respondent and identification of his usual or last known address, the Court must give effect to that requirement. The common law then has given guidance about whether there are circumstances when the Court should not give effect to the requirement. The First Respondent has taken full part in the proceedings and not raised the issue until the week before trial. To find that a petition has not complied with the rules but to permit the petition to still be heard is a step that cannot be taken lightly as to do so would undermine the clear direction of the rule. While the principles and rules of the common law and equity have effect as part of the law of Solomon Islands Section 4(1) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution provides:
	“4.-(1) No court of Solomon Islands shall be bound by any decision of a foreign court given on or after 7th July 1978.”
51. 	In the present case the hearing of opening addresses and the presentation of evidence has not yet commenced. The petition has alleged serious allegations against a person elected to represent the North West Guadalcanal constituency. To ignore the requirements of rule 6(1) (e) at this stage, because the First Respondent has continued to take steps in the proceedings, is inappropriate. I do not consider that an invalid petition should be made valid simply because of the time at which the objection has been brought. The Petitioner has not satisfied me that the First Respondent has waived the objection to the validity of the petition.
52. 	The failure to include the usual or last known address of the First Respondent in the petition and indeed in the amended petition is a breach of a mandatory requirement. The amended petition is therefore not a valid petition and is now dismissed.
53. 	There clearly was inadequate notice of the application. With the exception of the failure to identify the usual or last known address of the First Respondent, the grounds advanced either had no merit or were misleading. It was common ground that the petition did not contain identification of the usual or last known address of the First Respondent yet counsel for the First Respondent did not provide any assistance to the Court on the two principal issues for the Court to determine. Those issues were (a) the test to be applied to determine the validity of the petition and (b) whether the First Respondent had waived his right to object to the petition and had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.
54. 	Rule 7.7 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 required the application to be served at least 3 days before the time set for hearing yet the First Respondent filed the application only the day before such hearing. Had the application been filed and served within the time prescribed by those rules the First Respondent might have been in a better position to assist the Court. I mention these matters as they persuade me that in the present case each party should bear their own costs.
Orders
1.	The Amended Petition is dismissed.
2.	The Parties bear their own costs.
3.	I certify to His Excellency the Governor General, the Electoral Commission and the Speaker that Francis Belande Sade was the duly elected candidate of the North West Guadalcanal constituency on the General Election held on 17 April 2024.
By the Court
Hon. Justice Howard Lawry
Puisne Judge