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Tola v Saemanea [2024] SBHC 2; HCSI-CC 538 of 2023 (23 January 2024)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS


Case name:
Tola v Saemanea


Citation:


Date of decision:
23 January 2024


Parties:
Peter Tola, Charles Tola, Peter Kakama and Allen Tola Talakoba v Charles Saemanea, Simon Ngoli, Nelson Matai, Luke Tauto and Daniel Koti, Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil (GPPOL), Guadalcanal Plains Resources Development Association (GPRDA), Attorney General


Date of hearing:
16 January 2024


Court file number(s):
538 of 2023


Jurisdiction:
Civil


Place of delivery:



Judge(s):
Aulanga; Commissioner


On appeal from:


Order:
1. The application to preserve or maintain the ex parte orders of 6th December 2023 is refused forthwith.
2. In consequence thereof, the ex parte orders are set aside and discharged.
3. Having considered the claim is frivolous and vexatious and there is no disclosure of cause of action, and is amounting to an abuse of the Court’s process, this proceeding is entirely dismissed on the Court’s own motion pursuant to Rule 9.75 (a)-(c) of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007.
4. Cost of this application is to be paid by the Applicants to the First Respondents on standard basis.


Representation:
Mr Nickson Sariki for the Applicants
Mr Jack To’ofilu for the First Respondents (not present)
No Appearance for the Second and Fourth Respondents
Mr James Apaniai for the Third Respondent (not present)


Catchwords:



Words and phrases:


Legislation cited:


Cases cited:
American Cynamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] UKHL 1, Karahu v Paeva [1999] SBHC 7.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION


Civil Case No. 538 of 2023


BETWEEN


PETER TOLA, CHARLES TOLA, PETER KAKAMA AND ALLEN TOLA TALAKOBA
(Representing Themselves and Ghaobata Kogamotha Tribe)
Applicants


AND:


CHARLES SAEMANEA, SIMON NGOLI, NELSON MATAI, LUKE TAUTO AND DANIEL KOTI
First Respondent


AND:


GUADALCANAL PLAINS PALM OIL (GPPOL)
Second Respondent


AND:


GUADALCANAL PLAINS RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (GPRDA)
Third Defendant


AND:


ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Representing Commissioner of Lands and Registrar of Titles)
Fourth Respondent


Date of Hearing: 16 January 2024
Date of Ruling: 23 January 2024


Mr Nickson Sariki for the Applicants
Mr Jack To’ofilu for the First Respondents (not present)
No Appearance for the Second and Fourth Respondents
Mr James Apaniai for the Third Respondent (not present)

RULING ON INTER PARTE HEARING:

Commissioner Aulanga

  1. This inter parte hearing follows the granting of ex parte orders on 6th December 2023. It effectively seeks the question of whether or not the ex parte orders should be maintained until the outcome of the trial. The documents the Applicants relied on for this hearing were effectively the ones that had been earlier filed for the ex parte orders, including a claim in Category A which was later filed on 15th December 2023.
  2. Directions were issued on 19th December 2023, requiring parties, especially the First Respondents, to file responsive sworn statement by 18th December 2023 and followed by filing of written submissions by both parties on the following day. This hearing should have been heard on 20th December 2023 but were deferred by consent to 16th January 2024. Except for the written submissions, the First Respondents had complied with the Directions and filed two sworn statements of Simon Ngoli[1], both were relied on for this hearing.
  3. By receipt of the First Respondents’ evidences, the full history and the facts of this case therefore become clearer, enabling this Court to make a proper decision on whether or not the ex parte orders should be maintained.
  4. Counsel for the First Respondents and Third Respondent did not appear for this hearing.

Facts of the case

  1. There are twists and turns regarding the nature of this case in so far as it relates to the ownership of PN 192-008-88 (“disputed land”). It is important to narrate and appreciate the background facts of the ownership of this land since they are critical to the findings and the outcome of this hearing.
  2. The disputed land is situated at Tetere area in the Guadalcanal Province. It has been litigated in five previous High Court cases.[2] In the first two previous cases, the First Respondents’ party was represented by Charles Saemanea. He continued to be named in the subsequent proceedings. This is the sixth time the challenge to the ownership of this disputed land came before this Court.
  3. This disputed land has been sold by members of the First Respondents’ tribe of Buru to the Colonial Government under the British Protectorate. The sales transaction was made under a Deed of Conveyance in 1904 as recorded in HCSI-CC 295 of 1997 or in 1916 as found in HCSI-CC 288 of 2008. It was an alienated land.
  4. Upon Solomon Islands gaining independence, it was reverted back to the landowners. This disputed land was reclaimed and reverted back to its original owners. This arrangement was exercised pursuant to the prevailing Government policy at the relevant time.
  5. Following the reclamation, this land was demarcated and subject to the acquisition process under the Land and Titles Act around the late 1980s. Thereafter, it was registered to the Commissioner of Lands. On or about 13 January 1995, the Commissioner of Lands transferred and registered it to Manedetea. Manedetea then later lost it to Charles Saemanea in a High Court case HC-CC 295 of 1997. The disputed land then was registered to Charles Saemanea in perpetuity after a decision was made in his favour by this Court on 17th May 2001.
  6. Then in 2008, another High Court case in HC-SI CC 288 of 2008 was instituted by another person Serah Kovelau, effectively challenging Charles Saemanea’s ownership of this land including other neighbouring registered lands,[3] claiming that they were registered by fraud and out to be rectified under se150ction 229 of the Land and Titles Act. She claimed that a Local Court had awarded the ownership of the land that contained the registered lands, including the disputed land herein in favour of her group against Kogana (descendant of Kogana 1). Hence, she should be the owner of the land and not Saemanea. The claim was unsuccessful and was entirely struck out on the grounds that it did not disclose a cause of action; no locus standi and that the claim was statute barred. Hence, Saemanea’s title to the disputed land remained intact and unaltered. The Court therein noted that the registration of this land (PN 192-008-88) had occurred around late 1980s pursuant to the provisions and procedures under the Land and Titles Act for the acquisition and registration of customary land.
  7. There was an agreement for transfer of Masa land to the Applicants tribe on 30th May 1992 from James Kogana. However, that agreement does not have any effect or validity following the decision in HC-SI CC 288 of 2008. Also, it was not stamped with stamp duty so pursuant to section 9 of the Stamp Duties Act, it is inadmissible for the purpose of this hearing.
  8. For this present hearing, the Applicants herein or those who sold the land to them did not file any appeal against that acquisition if the disputed land had in fact encroached into their Masa customary land. Nothing has been done and so their right to challenge that registration has been forfeited by the lapse of time and now time barred.
  9. In 2017, members of the Applicants herein commenced ownership claim of the Masa customary land at the Ghaubata Council of Chiefs. The said Ghaubata Council of Chiefs heard the dispute and made a decision that the Applicants’ tribe was the owner of the Masa land and further held that part of the disputed land was in fact inside Masa customary land. In other words, part of the disputed land had overlapped into the Masa customary land. The boundary of the disputed land then became the issue that led to subsequent proceedings at the High Court.
  10. Relying on that Chief’s decision, in 2020, the Applicants applied to the Registrar of Titles to determine the dispute or uncertainty of the boundary under section 97 of the Land and Titles Act. The Registrar then made a determination that there was an error on the boundary of the disputed land because it had overlapped onto the Masa customary land.
  11. In 2021, the Applicants commenced a claim in the High Court in HCSI-CC 324 of 2021 for rectification of the register of the disputed land and for amendment of the map based on the purported overlap of the boundary. For reasons unknown, Charles Saemanea and or the First Respondents as the registered title holder of the land was or were not named or included as a party to the matter. The matter was resolved with a consent judgment and the disputed land was subdivided into two parcels as PN 192-008-121 and PN 192-008-122. Parcel PN 192-008-121 was registered in the names of some of the members of the Applicants of the Ghaubata Kogamotha tribe, while parcel 192-008-122 was registered in the names of some members of the First Respondents of Buru tribe.
  12. The First Respondents disagreed with the subdivision and commenced two separate High Court proceedings in HCSI-CC 259 of 2022 and HCSI-CC 353 of 2022. This was to set aside the consent judgment in HCSI-CC 324 of 2021 and for restoration of the subdivided parcels to its former parcel of PN 192-008-88.
  13. In HCSI-CC 259 of 2022, the Applicants were named as one of the parties while in HCSI-CC 353 of 2022 only involved the First Respondents and the Attorney General as representing the Registrar of Titles.
  14. On 23rd June 2023 by way of Court Direction Order[4], HCSI-CC 259 of 2022 and HCSI-353 of 2022 were consolidated. Thereafter, both matters were heard together in Court.
  15. On 23rd August 2023, the First Respondents resolved the HCSI-CC 353 of 2022 with a consent judgment and later on 19th September 2023, the First Respondents discontinued the proceeding in HCSI-CC 259 of 2022. That consent judgment eventually cancelled the subdivision of the land and had it restored to PN 192-008-88 in the names of the First Respondents as exhibited in “PT11” of Peter Tola sworn statement[5].
  16. By the Court’s record and legal practice, following the consolidation of the matters, both parties and especially the Applicants should have known about the proposal to settle HCSI-CC 353 of 2022 with a consent judgment for restoration of the former parcel number of the disputed land. They should have known about this proposed settlement because discussions regarding the management and progression of both matters to finality occurred in the Court on the same occasion. That was based on the trite legal understanding that both matters had been heard together in the Court following the consolidation. Therefore, it is not correct to say that they were not aware of the terms of the consent judgement in HCSI-CC 353 of 2022.
  17. The Applicants say that they were not a party to HCSI-CC 353 of 2022 and the consent judgment for restoration of the disputed land was done by fraud and without their knowledge and consent. That remained so to be their position despite the matters had been consolidated and ample opportunities were afforded for the Applicants to file an application for joinder of parties before the matter was resolved by a consent judgment.

Applicants’ case

  1. As in the ex parte hearing, the Applicants sought these relevant orders to be continued or preserved until the substantive hearing or trial:
  2. In submission, counsel for the Applicants referred to the case of American Cynamid Co v Ethicon Ltd[6] which has been used and adopted extensively by the Courts of this jurisdiction for injunctive applications. He submitted that the facts of this case favourably warrant the Court to maintain the ex parte orders.
  3. The Applicants submit that there are serious issues for trial. One is the overlap or encroachment of the boundary of PN 192-008-88 into the Masa customary land as found by the Ghaubata House of Chiefs in 2017 which requires delineation of the boundary. The copy of that Ghaubata Chiefs decision was annexed as “PT1” of Peter Tola sworn statement[7]. Then, the restoration of the disputed land in HCSI-CC 353 of 2022 without the knowledge of the Applicants which amounted to fraud, is another serious issue for trial. The Applicants argue that they were not a party to HCSI CC 353 of 2022 and so the restoration of the disputed land by the consent judgment was secretly orchestrated and was done without their knowledge and consent. This, as said by the Applicants, amounted to fraudulent registration of the land.
  4. In terms of whether damage would be an inadequate remedy, the Applicants submitted that the disputed land had been leased for commercial purposes and proceeds from royalties had been derived from the lease. There is no allegation as to the need to preserve the land from environmental damage since the nature of its usage is distinctive from other injunction cases.
  5. However, they responsibly conceded that damage would be an adequate remedy since the proceeds from the royalty derived from the usage of the land can be easily quantified, preserved and paid to the winning party to this proceeding. Therefore, neither party would be affected if the proceeds are to be restrained until the final determination of the matter.
  6. For the balance of convenience, the Applicants submit that they have the propriety interest in the disputed land as a result of their claim of ownership of the part of the land as awarded by the Ghaubata Council of Chiefs. For that reason, the balance of convenience favours the preservation of the interim orders so that it would allow the parties to address the issues surrounding the ownership of the disputed land and to expedite the matter for trial. This same argument and notion, as relied on by the Applicants, also apply for the need to maintain the status quo of the matter, essentially to speed up the matter for trial.
  7. The Applicants submit that they have satisfied the tests expounded in the American Cynamid Co v Ethicon Ltd case referred to earlier and therefore, the interim orders must be maintained.

First Respondents’ case

  1. Counsel for the First Respondents did not attend the hearing. He, however, filed two sworn statements of Simon Ngoli[8] as evidence in rebuttal and in support of their submission to discharge or set aside the interim orders.
  2. The First Respondents aver that their ownership of the disputed land has been recognised in three High Court cases, respectively registered as HCSI CC 295 of 1997; HCSI CC 288 of 2008 and HCSI CC 353 of 2022. The Court in those cases had found in their favour and so by implication, their indefeasibility of title to the land cannot be tampered with by the interim orders.
  3. Then to the matter regarding the Ghaubata House of Chiefs decision, the First Respondents submit that the decision is not binding on them since the Chiefs do not have the power to deal with a registered land as held in Karahu v Paeva[9]. Even by statute, they are precluded from dealing with a registered land. Only the High Court is a Court of first instance to hear ownership disputes involving registered land. Hence, any reliance on that decision to challenge the ownership of the disputed land is of grave futility. In any event, the First Respondents say that the area that the Applicants were claiming is a portion of land at a log pond used by Gallego Resources Company, which is outside the registered land.
  4. The First Respondents also submit that survey report produced by the Fourth Respondent relied on by the Applicants has been quashed in HCSI CC 353 of 2022. That was due to the fact that the Registrar of Titles has limited power under section 97 of the Land and Titles Act for identification of the pegs of a disputed boundary and thus, the Registrar does not have any statutory power to recreate the boundary for the purpose of changing ownership on the existing registered land. Therefore, there is no cause of action in relying on that survey report for the present proceeding.
  5. The First Respondents submit and denied any fraudulent conduct on their part for resolving HCSI CC 353 of 2022 with a consent judgment. They submit that HCSI CC 353 of 2022 was consolidated with HCSI CC 259 of 2022. That consolidation occurred before the matters were finalised without the trial. The Applicants were a party in HCSI CC 259 of 2022 and by appearing in the consolidated matter, they had known of their intention in HCSI CC 353 of 2022 to restore the disputed land to its original parcel number. Thus, there was no secret and fraudulent registration of the land as claimed by the Applicants. Finally, the First Respondents argue that despite having the ownership of the disputed land, their party was not a party to the HCSI CC 324 of 2021 as annexed in “PT9”in Peter Tola’s sworn statement[10] that resulted in the subdivision of the disputed land. The involvement of their party in the subsequent proceedings is to perfect the anomaly that occurred with their land that eventually resulted in the restoration of the disputed land to its former registration number. Based on those reasons, the interim orders should be entirely dismissed.

Court’s findings

  1. For this case, I am mindful of the cardinal legal tests imbued from the American Cynamid Co v Ethicon Ltd[11] that have been adopted by the Courts of this jurisdiction when dealing with injunctive cases. To maintain the interim orders, the Court must ask itself these four main questions and thread through the facts to determine whether or not the orders can be maintained: (1) There is a serious question to be tried; (2) damages would not be an adequate remedy; (3) the injunction must satisfy the balance of convenience; and (4) the applicant provides undertaking as to damages. Other associate considerations are; the locus standi of the parties; the irreparable harm that will result if the orders are not granted; to maintain the status quo of the case and the strength of the party’s case. The granting of the orders at this stage remains largely a discretion of the Court, to be properly exercised on legal principles based on evidence.
  2. The Applicant herein must show upon evidence that this case is not an abuse of the Court’s process, or one that is frivolous or vexatious. It is one that is not hopeless as well. The serious issue required herein must be one that has a real prospect of success if the matter goes for trial.
  3. Let me begin on the premise that in close consideration of this matter, it is to be noted that this case involves a dispute of ownership over part of the registered land, herein, the disputed land. Initially, as found in HC-SI CC 288 of 2008, this land was a customary land before it was registered around late 1980s. Public notices for the purpose of objection were put up and after having satisfied all the legal requirements, it was eventually registered. Upon registration, it has now acquired a new status and protection in law, different from a customary land.
  4. The registration of the land was made pursuant to the Land and Titles Ordinance, the same legal regime as provided under Division 1, Part V of the Land and Titles Act. The processes set out therein also provide for safeguard mechanism and that is, by allowing customary land owners a right of objection and appeal against the determination to acquire that land for registration.
  5. The demarcation of the disputed land was made with care, precision and certainty. The landowners demarcating the land to be acquired and registered knew very well what they were doing at the material time. This goes to the issue of whether or not the demarcation and acquisition of the land for registration purposes at the material time was done by mistake.
  6. Unfortunately, there was no appeal lodged within the 3 months statutory period under the Land and Titles Act either by the Applicants’ tribal members or by Kogana tribe that sold the land to the Applicants herein against this determination if indeed they perceived that the disputed land had encroached or overlapped into their Masa customary land. There is no explanation in the materials relied on by the Applicants about this lack of exercise of their right of appeal against the registration of this land. By the lapse of time since the 1980s and by operation of section 9 (2) of the Limitation Act that gives 12 years to commence action for possession or recovery of land, the Applicants or Kogana’s right to challenge that registration when it was first registered has been nullified and become statute barred. This finding shows one of the reasons the Applicants did not show any serious or bonafide issue for trial.
  7. Even if there is any right available, the case in HC-SI CC 288 of 2008 where the Claimant Serah Kovelau relied on the Local Court decision awarded in her favour against Kogana as the basis to nullify the First Respondents’ title to the land has been nullified by the Court. If Kogana belonged to the tribe that sold the land to the Applicants herein on the 30th May 1992 then it has no legal effect following the outcome of that case.
  8. Another reason is, even if there still an existence of right available to the Applicants, one of the grounds of the Applicants’ case and claim is that the Ghaubata Council of Chiefs has found in their favour that part of the disputed land had overlapped into their Masa customary land. The Applicants perceived and relied on this decision as the legal basis to change the ownership of part of the registered land. This, in my view, is fundamentally flawed in law. The Ghaubata Council of Chiefs, by operation of the Land and Titles Act read together with the Local Court Act, does not have any statutory power to deal with a registered land. This is the law laid down in Karahu v Paeva[12] where Kabui J stated:
  9. I agree with his Lordship’s view that the law only permits the said Ghaubata Council of Chiefs to deal with a dispute involving a customary land. The disputed land herein is a registered land. Thus, it should be excluded from that Chiefs deliberation and settlement. By making a decision that the boundary or part of the Masa customary land was inside the registered land in the light of the authority in Karahu v Paeva[14] is erroneous and flawed in law.
  10. The Applicants pleaded at paragraph 20 of their claim for rectification of title, inter alia, on the ground of mistake. They relied on the said Ghaubata Council of Chiefs decision on site survey regarding this overlap of boundary. In my view and with agreement with the Court in Karahu v Paeva cited above, there should not be any reliance on that Chiefs decision as the basis to change the ownership of this registered land. This is another factor that uncovers no disclosure of a serious issue for trial.
  11. Next is the Survey Report produced by the Registrar of Titles as determination pertaining the dispute over the boundary. The Applicants also relied on this report made on 7th December 2020 as determination under section 97 of the Land and Titles Act regarding the mistake done on the boundary and hence, the need to readjust or delineate the boundary to reflect the Ghaubata House of Chiefs decision. The Registrar of Titles specifically made a determination to delineate the disputed land to reflect the decision of the Ghaubata Council of Chiefs which would lead to the changing of the ownership of the part of the disputed land.
  12. Is the Registrar of Titles under section 97 of the Land and Titles Act permitted to undertake such determination? Section 97 (1) of the Land and Titles Act states:
  13. The above section is applicable to a registered land where adjoining owners cannot agree on the actual boundary especially where the peg cannot be identified. In such as minor dispute situation, the Registrar can determine and confirm the actual boundary of the land. However, as clearly explained by the Court of Appeal in Eagon Pacific Plantation Limited v Haro[15], the powers exercised by the Registrar under that provision “cannot be used to change the ownership of the registered land.”[16]
  14. The determination of the Registrar of Titles herein if it is to be accepted in reality is to change the ownership of significant part of the registered land. In my view, this is precluded or prohibited under section 97 of the Land and Titles Act. For this reason, even if the claim is to be amended, at the end of the day, I do not see any real chance of succeeding. There is no cause of action disclosed. Again, there is no serious issue worthy of investigation at the trial.
  15. Next is the issue of the registration of the disputed land in HCSI CC 353 of 2022 that the Applicants said the First Respondents had executed it on fraud by failing to include them as a party to the proceeding.
  16. It has to be noted that before the disputed land was subdivided into two sublets as PN 192-008-121 and PN 192-008-122 in HCSI CC 324 of 2021. Strangely, the First Respondents were not named as a party. The First Respondents in retaliation then commenced two proceedings in HCSI CC 259 of 2022 and HCSI CC 353 of 2022 to restore the disputed land to its former parcel number, including his right of title that had been interfered with.
  17. In fact, the Applicants’ party was named as the First Respondents in HCSI CC 259 of 2022 since they were the registered title holder of PN 192-008-121. PN 192-008-122 was registered in the names of the First Respondents and that could have been the reason why the Applicants were not named as a party in HCSI CC 353 of 2022.
  18. However, the record is clear that on 23rd June 2023, the two matters have been consolidated and heard together. Thereafter, they were called together in the Court. By the consolidation, matters arising from both cases should not be a secret to all the parties to the consolidated matters. There is no issue regarding the consolidation and the explanation by the Applicants that they were not aware of the intention to restore the disputed land to its original parcel number is not credible and unbelievable. Thus, I do not see any fraud on the part of the First Respondents in the restoration and registration of the disputed land. The consolidation of the matters therefore removed any room for secrecy or meddling in dealing with the matter. I do not have any evidence to show that at the time of restoring the disputed land to its original parcel number, the First Respondents knew well that the land was at all times had been legally and legitimately owned by the Applicants and so the only way to oust them from owning part of that land is by way of fraudulent and deceitful dealing with the registration of the land.
  19. Even if there is a need for the Applicants to be notified in person, the grounds held on the invalidity of the Ghaubata Council of Chiefs decision to deal with a registered land and the erroneous decision of the Registrar of Titles, are sufficient to reach a conclusion that the Applicants do not have a cause of action or any serious issue for trial to litigate this matter in the Court. In my view, the institution of this matter in the Court also amounts to an abuse of the Court’s process in the light of the reasons held.
  20. For the issue of damage would not be an adequate remedy, it is an undisputed fact the land subject to the proceeding was leased for commercial activities at the Tetere area with royalties received from the lease.
  21. The Applicants’ main objective is to rectify the registration in order to revert the subdivision so that they could be entitled to the royalties received from the use of the part of the disputed land they owned. If that is so, I do not see any valid ground raised herein for the preservation of the land from environmental destruction.
  22. Having reached the conclusion that there is no disclosure of serious issue that requires a trial, it must follow that I am not satisfied that damage would not be an adequate remedy if the interim orders are to be discharged.
  23. I also find that the balance of convenience does not favour the preservation of the interim orders. This also applies to the undertaking as to damages. All these factors in fact hinged on whether or not the Applicants have disclosed a serious or bonafide issue worthy to be fully investigated at the trial proper of this matter.
  24. It must follow therefore that the ex parte orders issued on 6th December 2023 are to be entirely set aside and discharged. In light of the reasons expressed, it is my view that the Applicants’ claim Category A is inherently untenable and manifestly weak, so much so that even if leave to amend the claim is to be granted, it would not cure that inherent defectiveness. Hence, I order that this proceeding is entirely dismissed by the Court’s own motion pursuant to Rule 9.75 (a)-(c) of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007.
  25. Cost of this proceeding is to be paid by the Applicants to the First Respondents on standard basis.

Orders of the Court

  1. The application to preserve or maintain the ex parte orders of 6th December 2023 is refused forthwith.
  2. In consequence thereof, the ex parte orders are set aside and discharged.
  3. Having considered the claim is frivolous and vexatious and there is no disclosure of cause of action, and is amounting to an abuse of the Court’s process, this proceeding is entirely dismissed on the Court’s own motion pursuant to Rule 9.75 (a)-(c) of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007.
  4. Cost of this application is to be paid by the Applicants to the First Respondents on standard basis.

Augustine Sylver Aulanga
Commissioner of the High Court of Solomon Islands

[1] Filed on 12th and 18th December 2023.
[2] HCSI-CC No. 295 of 1997; HCSI-CC No. 288 of 2008; HCSI-CC341 of 2021; HCSI-CC No. 259 of 2022 and HCSI-CC No. 353 of 2022.
[3] PN 192-008-86 and PN 192-008-87.
[4] Perfected and signed on 3rd July 2023.
[5] Filed on 27th October 2023.
[6] [1975] UKHL 1; [1975] AC 396.
[7] Foot note (“fn”) 5 above.
[8] Respectively filed on 12th December 2023 and 18th December 2023.
[9] [1999] SBHC 7.
[10] See fn 4 above.
[11] Fn 5 above.
[12] See fn 9.
[13] I bid (at page 1).
[14] Fn 9 above.
[15] [2018] SBCA 12.
[16] At paragraph 29.

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