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Tobajahi Enterprises Ltd v Isabel Customary Land Appeal Court [2022] SBHC 4; HCSI-CC 104 of 2021 (5 April 2022)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS


Case name:
Tobajahi Enterprises Ltd v Isabel Customary Appeal Court


Citation:



Date of decision:
5 April 2022


Parties:
Tobajahi Enterprises Limited and Ben Rickie Kiokimo, Chief Christian Plant, Junior Nokia, Margaret Ella Pentoro, Paterson Rini and Edith Heslyn Gaseforu v Isabel Customary Land Appeal Court, Hon. Dr. Culwick Togamae, Lorreta Kelimana, Judith Siota, Wilson Hane Sedere, Re. Samuel Kelimana, Drummond Theomae, Steward Hamilton, Hilda Roronu, Asa Heusari and Collin Harapuhi, Attorney General


Date of hearing:
2 September 2021


Court file number(s):
104 of 2021


Jurisdiction:
Civil


Place of delivery:



Judge(s):
Lawry; PJ


On appeal from:



Order:
1. The parties will appear for mention on a date to be set by the Registrar in consultation with counsel.
2. The judicial review will be limited to the issues identified in paragraph 35 of this ruling.
3. The parties are to bear their own costs.


Representation:
G. Suri for the First and Second Claimants
Attorney General for First and Third Defendants
A Radclyffe for Second Defendant


Catchwords:



Words and phrases:



Legislation cited:
Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act S 8, S 8 (3) (a) and (b), S 9, S 10 (2), Land and Titles Act S 256 (4), S257, Constitution 1978 S 77 and 84


Cases cited:
Veno v Jino [2006] SBCA 22, Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1968] UKHL 6; [1969] 2 AC 147, Vunagi v Palmer SBCA [2019] 2, Pitabelama and others v Biliki and others SBCA [2007] 21, Kitu v Pitu [2010] SBHC 67, Talasasa v Biku [1988] SBCA 5, O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1, Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2; [1964] AC 40,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION


Civil Case No. 104 of 2021


BETWEEN


TOBAJAHI ENTERPRISES LIMITED
First Claimant


BEN RICKIE KIOKIMO, CHIEF CHRISTIAN PLANT, JUNIOR NOKIA, MARGARET ELLA PENTORO, PATERSON RINI AND EDITH HESLYN GASEFORU
(All of the Nagi Clan of Tobajahi Tribe in Maringe District of Isabel)
Second Claimant


AND:
ISABEL CUSTOMARY LAND APPEAL COURT
First Defendant


HON. DR. CULWICK TOGAMAE, LORRETA KELIMANA, JUDITH SIOTA, WILSON HANE SEDERE, REV. SAMUEL KELIMANA, DRUMMOND THEOMAE, STEWARD HAMILTON, HILDA RORONU, ASA HEUSARI AND COLLIN HARAPUHI
Second Defendant


AND:


ATTORNEY GENERAL
Third Defendant


Date of Hearing: 2 September 2021
Date of Decision: 5 April 2022


G. Suri for the First and Second Claimant
Attorney General for the First and Third Defendant
A Radclyffe for the Second Defendant


Lawry; PJ

RULING

  1. The First Claimant applied to the Commissioner of Forest Resources for a licence authorizing the felling of trees and the removal of timber from land described as Tobajahi, in Isabel Province.
  2. On 4 May 2020 a timber rights hearing in respect of that application was conducted at Buma Village in Isabel Province in accordance with section 8 of the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act [“the Act”].
  3. At that meeting the Executive was not satisfied that the requirements of section 8(3) (a) and (b) of the Act had been satisfied. The effect of their decision was that the Executive recommended to the Commissioner that the application be rejected. Section 9 of the Act then required the Commissioner to reject the application.
  4. The First and Second Claimants appealed that decision to the Isabel Customary Land Appeal Court in accordance with section 10 of the Act. There were 6 grounds of appeal. The First Defendant gave reasoned decisions in relation to all six grounds. All six grounds were dismissed.
  5. The First and Second Claimants have applied for a judicial review of the decision of the First Defendant. The Claimants have filed an amended Claim and the Defendants have filed a defence to that claim. In accordance with rule 15.3.16 the Court called a conference at which it must consider the matters set out in rule 15.3.18. The Court has considered the papers filed in the proceeding and heard argument from the parties.
  6. Mr Radclyffe of counsel for the Second Defendant has submitted that the amended claim is in reality an appeal from the Customary Land Appeal Court brought as a judicial review, no doubt because of the provisions of section 10 (2) of the Act. That section provides:
  7. Mr Radclyffe submits that the effect of section 10(2) is that the decision of the First Defendant is final and is not subject to an appeal to this Court. Section 10(2) of the Act is what has been referred to as an “ouster” clause. Mr Suri of counsel for the Claimants has referred the Court to the Court of Appeal decision of Veno v Jino [2006] SBCA 22 where the Court said:
  8. In Veno v Jino the Court found there had been no decision made in the CLAC and accordingly there was no decision of the Customary Land Appeal Court [“CLAC”] that would have brought the provisions of section 10 (2) into play. What then are “certain limited purposes” that would permit this Court as a Court of general jurisdiction to examine the proceedings in the CLAC? To answer this question, it is helpful to look at the Court of Appeal decision of Vunagi v Palmer SBCA [2019] 2 which concerned a similar clause set out in section 256(4) of the Land and Titles Act. At paragraph 14 the Court said:
  9. At paragraph 15 the Court discussed the case of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1968] UKHL 6; [1969] 2 AC 147. The House of Lords had found that if a tribunal mistook the law applicable to the facts as the Tribunal found them it must have asked itself the wrong question and therefore enquired into an issue it was not empowered to enquire, therefore acting beyond its jurisdiction. Its determination would therefore be a nullity.
  10. Mr Suri referred this Court to Pitabelama and others v Biliki and others SBCA [2007] 21 where the Court of Appeal said:
  11. In Kitu v Pitu [2010] SBHC 67 the High Court referred to the Court of Appeal decision of Talasasa v Biku [1988] SBCA 5 which dealt with the previous equivalent section to section 10(2) of the Act. Goldsbrough J as he then was said in Kitu v Pitu:
  12. In Talasasa v Biku the Court of Appeal said:
  13. At the conclusion of the decision of Talasasa v Biku the Court of Appeal said:
  14. Rule 15.3.1 now calls an order for certiorari a “quashing order”. Rule 15.3.4 permits a claim for a quashing order to be made to this Court for judicial review. Section 10 (2) of the Act then prevents this Court from hearing an appeal but would permit this Court to review a decision of the CLAC made in excess of its jurisdiction.
  15. Mr Suri has referred the Court to the speech of Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1 which in turn referred to the speech of Lord Reid in Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2; [1964] AC 40. Those two cases broadened the scope of tribunals that could be subject to judicial review. In O’Reilly v Mackman Lord Diplock said:
  16. The cases of Ridge v Baldwin and O’Reilly v Mackman both pre-date the decision of the Court of Appeal in Talasasa v Biku. It follows that this Court is bound by the Court of Appeal in Talasasa v Biku. Section 10 (2) therefore prevents an appeal from the decision of the CLAC. However, an application can be made to this Court for the decision to be judicially reviewed if the CLAC has made a decision in excess of its jurisdiction or for errors of law going to jurisdiction. In addition, the Court has a discretion to review a decision when the CLAC has failed to do something it was obliged to do.
  17. As a general rule a judicial review is not to enquire into the merits of a decision rather it is concerned with the lawfulness of the decision.
  18. In the Amended Claim for Judicial Review the Claimants set out in letter A to G the orders the Claimants seek as a result of the review.
  19. The Claimants have abandoned their claim in relation to order A to G which related to the standing to be a party to the appeal to the CLAC.
  20. The second order sought (B) and the fifth (E) will be dealt with later in this decision. ‘B’ concerns the allegation that the First Defendant failed to determine the matters prescribed in section 8(3) (b) of the Act. ‘E’ concerns the allegation that the First Defendant failed to deal with the nature and extent of the timber rights sought.
  21. ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘F’ are all issues going to the merits of the decision and are not relevant on an application for judicial review.
  22. Returning to the second order sought identified as ‘B’, the Claimants submit that the First Defendant failed to determine the matters prescribed in section 8(3) (b) of the Act. Section 8(3) provides:
  23. It is clear that at the timber rights hearing the executive was not satisfied that the persons proposing to grant timber rights were the person and represented all the persons lawfully entitled to grant such rights. On the evidence provided the executive did not go on to discuss and determine with the customary land owners who such persons were. It appears however that the executive may have been clear that those persons were the objectors present at the hearing opposing the grant of the timber rights.
  24. The First Defendant set out its role in paragraph 22 of its decision. It noted the submissions made by the Appellants (here the Claimants) and went on to say:
  25. The First Defendant heard submissions and gave a decision on each ground of appeal that had been put forward. It is necessary to consider the Court of Appeal’s directions given in Talasasa v Biku referred to in paragraph 11, 12 and 13 above. The Court said:
  26. In section 8 (3) (b) the executive had a statutory duty to identify the persons entitled to grant the timber rights. It did not do so. An issue for judicial review is therefore, whether the court of Court of Appeal decision of Talasasa v Biku imposed a duty on the First Defendant to identify the persons entitled to grant timber rights. The failure of the executive to do so was not however an issue raised on the appeal to the First Defendant.
  27. Section 8(3) (c) required the executive to discuss and then determine the nature and extent of any rights to be granted to the applicant. The Claimants submit that the executive and the First Defendant failed to consider objections made at the timber rights hearing relating to this subsection. That argument must fail as the executive considered that no timber rights should be granted to the applicants. The First Defendant agreed with that finding.
  28. Beginning at paragraph 27 the First Defendant said:
  29. At paragraph 29 the First Defendant records that it was satisfied there were competing or unresolved claims over the concession area. It follows that there were no timber rights to be granted to the applicant. The First Defendant was therefore not in error in relation to section 8(3) (c).
  30. Questions about the weight to be given to the decision of the Glave House of Chiefs in the absence of the Second Defendant and the standard of practice and procedure relating to the appeal are not matters relevant to jurisdiction. They are therefore not relevant in the judicial review of the decision of the First Defendant.
  31. The Claimants have submitted that the finality of the decision of the First Defendant as provided in section 10 (2) of the Act should be subject to section 77 and section 84 of the Constitution. Those two provisions respectively provide:
  32. Counsel has referred the Court to Veno v Jino referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above. As set out in the extract from Veno v Jino quoted in paragraph 8 the High Court can examine the proceedings conducted by a tribunal that has an ouster clause “for certain limited purposes”. This is where the role of judicial review comes in. The High Court can review a decision to determine whether the Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction but it does not mean that there is a right to appeal to the High Court. Counsel has not put forward any authority nor has the Court located any authority to support a submission that section 10(2) of the Act is unconstitutional. Section 77 and section 84 are provisions which support the use of the judicial review procedure as supervision of subsidiary Courts and Tribunals. The Court is not persuaded that section 10(2) of the Act contravenes either section 77 or section 84 of the Constitution.
  33. As conceded by counsel the First Claimant had no standing before the First Defendant. Similarly, the First Claimant does not have an arguable case in this judicial review as the First Claimant was not a person whose interests were affected by the decision of the executive. However, the Second Claimant is affected by the subject matter of the claim. The Second Claimant does have an arguable case so far as whether the First Defendant was under a duty to identify the persons able to grant timber rights and failed to do. A further issue if the Second Claimant succeeds in that argument is what the effect of that failure would be.
  34. Identifying the persons legally entitled to grant timber rights over the concession land may make little difference in the end given the finding that there was no agreement between the landowners as to the granting of timber rights. The finding of the Glave House of Chiefs does not help much given previous findings and given the fact that it was made in the absence of the Second Defendant.
  35. This Court is not in a position to determine matters of custom. “The issue to be determined on judicial review in this case is therefore limited to whether the First Defendant was under a duty to make a finding in terms of section 8(3)(b) of the Act and if so what the effect of that failure, if any, may be”. The parties are to appear on a date to be set by the Registrar in consultation with counsel and a date can be set for the hearing of the judicial review for the limited purpose identified. In the circumstances of this case each party will bear its own costs in relation to the Chapter 15 conference hearing.

Orders of the Court

  1. The parties will appear for mention on a date to be set by the Registrar in consultation with counsel.
  2. The judicial review will be limited to the issues identified in paragraph 35 of this ruling.
  3. The parties are to bear their own costs.

By the Court
Justice Lawry
Puisne Judge


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