Gasokesa v Orion Ltd [2019] SBHC 38; HCSI-CC 379 of 2011 (30 April 2019)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Case name:	Gasokesa v Orion Ltd
Citation:
Date of decision:	30 April 2019
Parties:	David Gasokesa, Kipling Tagia Alavae, Ismael Vatomiki, Grenal Sapikana, Samuel Sapa, Frank Vivio, Jimmy Pitakaji, Welma Bradley v Orion Limited, Ismael Vatomiki, Mathew Roqu, Andrew Malasa and Chillion Poloso
Date of hearing:	6-7 June 2017, (3 November , 6 November 8 November 2017 and 25 January 2018 vacated because Mr. Laurere had a mild stroke), 2-3 May 2018, 8 May 2018, 10 May 2018, 5 June 2018, 7 June 2018, 3 September 2018, 28 January 2019
Court file number(s):	CC 379 of 2011
Jurisdiction:	Civil
Place of delivery:
Judge(s):	Faukona
On appeal from:
Order:	The Court hereby declares that the Standard Logging Agreement (SLA) entered on 29th October 2009 by the Claimants and the second Defendants with the first Defendant had been validly terminated by the Claimants, by their letter dated 11th January 2010; the said agreement had, therefore, ceased to be enforceable. That the Defendant’s Felling Licence No. A10404, without a Valid Standard Logging Agreement (SLA), does not convey or vest any right or authority on the first Defendant to enter or carry out logging activities on barokasa customary land situated on Choiseul Island. Dismiss the application by the second Defendant for disclosing no cause of action. Cost of this proceeding is award to the Claimants and be paid by the first and the second Defendants on standard basis.
Representation:	Mr. G Suri for the first and Second Claimants Mr. N Laurere for the for the First Defendants Mr. A Rose for the Second Defendant
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case Number: 379 of 2011

DAVID GASOKESA, KIPLING TAGIA ALAVAE, ISMAEL VATOMIKI, GRENAL SAPIKANA, SAMUEL SAPA, FRANK VIVO, JIMMY PITAKAJI
First Claimant
(Barokasa Determined Trustees)

WELMA BRADLEY
Second Claimant
(As a Customary replacement Trustee)

V

ORION LIMITED
First Defendant

ISMAEL VATOMIKI, MATHEW ROQU, ANDREW MALASA AND CHILLION POLOSO
Second Defendant

Date of Hearing: 6-7 June 2017, (3 November , 6 November 8 November 2017 and 25 January 2018 vacated because Mr. Laurere had a mild stroke), 2-3 May 2018, 8 May 2018, 10 May 2018, 5 June 2018, 7 June 2018, 3 September 2018, 28 January 2019
Date of Judgment: 31 April 2019

Mr. G Suri for the first and Second Claimants
Mr. N Laurere for the for the First Defendants
Mr. A Rose for the Second Defendant

JUDGMENT

FAUKONA J: A claim in category A was filed by the Claimants on 23^rd August 2011. It was then amended on 7^th August 2013 pursuant to Court Order dated 1^st August 2013. Eventually, it was amended the fourth time on 3^rd March 2014.

2. On 21^st April 2004, the Choiseul Provincial Executive (CPE) determined an application by the first Defendant for timber rights acquisition. The persons who were determined to grant timber rights were all of the first Claimants and all of the second Defendants.
3. On 26^th May 2004, the Barokasa tribal trustees signed an initial Timber Rights Agreement with the second Defendant.
4. On 15^th July 2009, the land trustees and the first Defendant entered into a subsequent Standard Logging Agreement (SLA).
5. On 22^nd September 2009, the Commissioner of Forest extended and issued to the first Defendant felling Licence No. A104004 over barokasa customary land owned by the barokasa tribe. The licence was valid until 27^th September 2014, a period of five years.
6. On 29^th October 2009, barokasa landowners complained about breach of agreement by the first Defendant. A letter of the same date was written to the Managing Director of the first Defendant. Four areas were identified as not being complied with. They were: -
   • (1) Failed to pay saleable logs used for bridges and road construction a claim for $45,356.64.
   • (2) No plan for reforestation even after 24 months of operation.
   • (3) No monthly payment of royalties.
   • (4) No monthly statement was provided to the landowners.
7. On 7^th November 2009, the Chairman of barokasa landowners and the management of the first Defendant met to discuss the issue of breaches of the agreement. By a letter of 9^th November 2009, the barokasa landowners granted extension of time for the first defendant to remedy its breaches.
8. On 20^th November 2009, the first Defendant responded to landowners’ complaint. The landowners further responded by a letter dated 26^th November 2009 and argued that first Defendant did not indicate any remedy to rectify the breaches of the agreement. In further correspondences the landowners maintained their stand.
9. On 30^th December 2009, the land Trustees and Barokasa Landowners Enterprise met at Taro Station. They resolved that the agreement signed on 15^th July 2009 be terminated due to breach of agreement by the first Defendant. The decision was taken after letters dated 29^th October 2009 and 30^th November 2009 were issued to the first Defendant.
10. By taking the last option the trustees then signed a letter on 11^th January 2010, addressed to the Commissioner of Forests and copied to the first Defendant. The signatories on the letter are under the microscope or scrutiny by the Defendants as being cut and paste.
11. On 1^st February 2010, Mr Melasa wrote to the Premier of Choiseul Province and stated that the first Defendant had failed miserably to comply with the government requirements and not fulfilling the conditions of the agreement, hence terminated its licence. He did also mention that they had assigned the task with Rano’s Legal Service to deal with the issue and copy of that letter was addressed to Rano Legal Practice.
12. With immediate effect, Mr Rano acted by writing a letter on 10^th February 2010, addressed to the Commissioner of Forest that barokasa landowners had executed a new Timber Rights Agreement with Earthmovers and requested the Commissioner to advise the Provincial Secretary, Choiseul, to formally endorse the agreement.

Had the Standard Logging Agreement terminated.

13. The Counsel for the Claimants pointed out in his submissions that the Standard Logging Agreement (SLA) was validly terminated by the barokasa trustees by three letters from different authors. One was by the barokasa ten trustees who separately endorsed the letter on 11^th January 2010. The second letter was written by the late Kipling Alavae, the Chairman of Barokasa Landowners Association, on 18^th May 2010. And third letter was written by Mr Jacob Kincy, of the Public Solicitor's Office, dated 31th August 2010.
14. The defendants contested the authenticity of Barokasa trustee’s letter of 11^th January 2010 was being succumbed by fraudulent. At the same time deny the processes the barokasa trustees resort to as not in accordance with Clause 38 of the Agreement. I will deal with this issue later.
15. The reasons for serving notice of termination upon the first Defendant were three fold. The issues that were complained of were breaches to Clauses within the agreement which vested obligation upon the first Defendant to comply with. It would appear those Clauses were formulated in a manner to assists the landowners acquire maximum benefit out of their land resources. At the same time, obliged to receive information or report how their resources was managed, used, and what benefit they expect to gain out of it.
16. The first reason for the issuant of the termination letter was because of the first Defendant had failed to pay for saleable logs used to construct bridges contrary to Clause 13 of the Standard Logging Agreement.
17. The first Defendant argues that money had been paid for saleable trees Exh. “OLI” for logs used. Secondly, the first Defendant admittedly relied on the written letter by Mr Haurii, the Legal Advisor in the Ministry of Forestry, dated 21^st April 2010.
18. I have read the clause thoroughly and noted there is no mention of saleable logs to be paid. It merely demands that any bridge to be constructed durable species of trees must be used. That qualification does not extend to saleable logs. However, schedule D as referred to by clause 13 does not exist in the copy tendered to court. In fact, the space is vacant and empty.
19. In any event, if saleable logs were used then there were payments made to remedy, see Exh “OL1”. Whether the payment was made before or after this proceeding was filed makes no difference, at least money had been transacted for that purpose.
20. The second reason is the issue of lack of reforestation programme initiative undertaken by the first Defendant. After about 24 months of operation, reminders were sent to the Managing Director of the first Defendant by Mr Kipling through his letters of 29^th October 2009 and 30^th November 2009. By conduct, the Managing Director seemed to rely on the Legal Advisor’s letter of 21 April 2010. That conduct, however, materialised into an attempt to focus blame on the Commissioner of Lands, Province and landowners and itself single out as more part-taker. That is an absolute total avoidance of obligations. Reforestation programme is on initiative emerged from Clause 21. It places a heavy obligation on the company (D1) to initiate any such programme. In the current case, there was nothing done by the first Defendant at all despite 24 months of logging.
21. Counsel for the first Defendant further argues that any reforestation programme should commence after logging operation has completed. That is totally insane. The common practice which the Counsel ought to acknowledge is after logging operation and all the trees have gone the operator would immediately signed off and left the ground. The expectation that after a one third of the concession area had been logged, the company would then draw up a reforestation programme initiative to be carried out on the logged customary land is an absolute myth. That line of argument is unacceptable and one that is perceived as providing an escape route for the operator to escape.
22. The third reason is whether there were monthly statements issued and provided to the representative of the landowners as provided for in Clause 32 of the Agreement. The statement should contain various species of trees felled, grades, volumes and FOB prices.
23. I noted that late Kipling’s letter of 29^th October 2009 paragraphs 3 and 4 which concerned breaches of monthly royalty payments and monthly statements. The Counsel for the first Defendant advance no submissions in regards to failure to provide monthly statements but submits that royalty payment normally paid after every shipment. I would agree royalties were paid after every shipment. However, should that be the case then Clause 31 need be amended to align with the practical reality of royalty payments after every shipment. In any event disbursement of royalty prompted less consideration because even if nothing was paid monthly, but after every shipment, is sufficient to conclude that there was no failure.
24. The real problem is the production of monthly statement to landowner representative which cannot be denied was not done.
25. The issue of lack of road maintenance was also raised with the Managing Director. In a letter by the late Kipling on 30^th November 2009 was a manifestation of proof. It would appear there was no positive response from the first Defendant. Neither a remedy was propose as an attempt to rectify the issue.
26. All in all, because of the continues failure by the first Defendant, or rather delayed, because of reliance on the ill-advise by the Legal Advisor, the barokasa landowners had determined to issue notice for the breaches with expectation that relevant remedy be taken. In spite of notices, the Managing Director continues to defy. Having exhausted all options the barokasa landowners and representative, therefore, terminated the Standard Logging Agreement.
27. As a party to the agreement the landowners had legitimate right under Clause 38 to issue notice and to terminate the agreement. After 24 months of logging operation and observation, they had taken necessary steps to enforce their rights to ensure the first Defendant honour its obligations under the agreement. As a vulnerable party, which suffered consequences from the action of the investor that was the only option they could resume to.
28. The decision to terminate the logging operation emanated from a meeting held at Taro station on 30^th December 2009, due to breach of the agreement which was continued by the first Defendant.

Was the termination issued in accordance with the requirements in Clause 38?

29. The Counsel for the first Defendant has submitted by disclosing a number of defects in the termination letter dated 11^th January 2010. The first one is that the signatories to the letter (landowners) did not comply with the requirements set out by Clause 38.
30. Clause 38 requires, in a case of breach of the agreement, the representative may give one month notice through a Public Solicitor acting for the first Defendant to comply with the obligations. In default, the company shall be required to be suspended from operation in the concession area. The company after receiving the notice from the Public Solicitor shall forthwith comply with the requirements to obtain a completion certificate and the landowners shall release the company from further obligations.
31. The letter of 11^th January 2010 which the Claimants rely on, as the termination letter, was addressed to the Commissioner of Forest. That is contrary to the first requirement in Clause 38. That letter should have addressed to the first Defendants’ Counsel or Public Solicitor.
32. Since a copy of the intended termination letter was addressed to the Commissioner of Forest, it was expected of that office to require the first Defendant to suspend operation until such time the obligations have been met.
33. The legal expectation why the letter of termination be addressed to a Public Solicitor assuming he being an agent or a Counsel acted on behalf of the first Defendant who was blamed for breaches. Hence his service is required to assist the culprit to comply with the requirements to obtain a completion certificate. There are no other functions identified by the Clause which required the Public Solicitor to perform. Maybe it is expected that the agent Solicitor to mitigate on behalf of the company by presenting a submission to the Commissioner of Forests for a leniency. However, it can be anyone’s guess for lack of function precisely prescribed in the Clause. Therefore what then would be expected of the Public Solicitor to exercise a function under the clause. To my point of view, there is nothing as that was not known or clearly defined.
34. Apparently, it is expected that the Commissioner of Forest upon receipt of a copy of the notice, issued suspension order to suspend the operation. Should the first Defendant continue to fail to rectify the obligations complained of then the Commissioner may vary, concede to, or affirm the termination of the operation.
35. From personal perspective, the Clause only speaks of termination of operation and not revocation or termination of the felling licence. However, it would have probably occurred that the first Defendants’ licence was terminated. Should that be the case, then it could be the Commissioner, after taking further steps, subsequently decided to act. In any event should the action the Commissioner taken was unlawful then it would be prudent that the Commissioner of Forests be a party to these proceedings. There is nothing of that sort.
36. In the alternative, if the process adopted which led to termination commenced by the letter of 11^th January 2010 is defective, then an alternative process had been taken by the Public Solicitor’s Office per Mr Kinai’s letter dated 31^st October 2010. Although the Solicitor may not represent the first Defendant but could be cited as an independent person. What more could be said about the Public Solicitor and his function which is not clear. In that letter, there was a clear implication that the Solicitor was instructed to inform the Commissioner of Forest that the first Defendant had breached clauses of the Agreement. The Solicitor then recommended to the Commissioner that Clause 38 of the Agreement be invoked and the agreement be terminated accordingly. In the exercise of his discretion, the Commissioner may resume to whatever steps he thought fit in the circumstances. If he decided to terminate or suspend the operation then it is up to him. It appears the process commenced by the Public Solicitor by his letter of 31^st August 2010 is proper and as near as possible to the process required by Clause 38 of the Agreement.
37. If the line of action taken by the Commissioner was outside of the process advocated by Clause 38, which is a direct termination, rather than to commence by suspension, then the first Defendant should note that that cannot be questioned in this court. The reason is because the Commissioner of Forest is not a party to this case, and the Claimants cannot be expected to answer on behalf of the Commissioner. It is the function of the Commissioner that is allegedly controversial that him alone will answer any issue raised against the exercise of his functions.
38. Hence, I find there is no vexatious, or defective in the manner the process was applied from the commencement to the termination of the agreement. The significant portion noted is that the first Defendant did continue to breach those clauses inspite of the warnings conveyed by the barokasa landowners and perhaps on that basis, the Commissioner had conceded to termination rather than suspension. And acknowledging the fact that any imposition of suspension would be ineffective and unworkable. As I have stated earlier it was the agreement that was terminated but not the Licence.

Signatories to the letter of 11th January 2010.

39. The second issue raised by the Counsel for the first Defendant is in respect of the persons who signed the termination letter. The Counsel asserted and contested that the first Defendant entered into an Agreement (SLA) with barokasa landowners as trustees and not with Barokasa Enterprise which was not a party and had no right to terminate. He further submitted that Barokasa Landowner Enterprise is a separate legal entity and not the same as barokasa landowners.
40. In part, I would agree with the Counsel’s argument. But, however, if he dares thoroughly observe the letter he would note certain things. The letter carries the address of Barokasa Customary Landowners’ address and not the Enterprise as a legally established separate entity.
41. Secondly, as I would agree, the letter ended by saying, yours faithfully, Barokasa Landowners Enterprise. What the Counsel misconceived is that the ten signatures who signed the letter, none of them was a Managing/Director of the Company. In any correspondence by a Company, the address of the Company must be the major and noticeable information on the letter. Secondly, the correspondence or a letter must be signed by the company Managing/Director. There was nothing can be detected in the letter.
42. The importance of the letter, therefore, was that it was signed by all the barokasa landowner's trustees who were identified and determined as trustees by the Provincial Executive determination after the conduct of the timber rights hearing on 21^st April 2004. Therefore, I cannot see that the company actually issued the termination letter and signed by its Managing Director. The entire truth is that it was issued and signed by all the determined trustees who represented barokasa landowners.

Were signatures on the letter of 11th January 2010 cut and paste.

43. Both Counsels for the Defendants concertedly argue that the signatures on the termination letter were cut and paste, hence, not genuine.
44. This allegation hatched out from the fact that Andrew Malasa denied signing the letter of 11^th January 2010. This was in accordance with his sworn statement filed on 25^th February 2014. The Counsel for the first Defendant, in particular, provided distinguishing features from signatures appeared on the letter addressed to Earth Movers on an unknown date, but must have been after the 25^th March 2011. However, at that time Mr Alavae’s signature was removed and someone actually signed for him, as by then he had died. Mr Malasa and Mr Gapikasa’s signatures were erased from that letter and Mr J. Pitakaji was not available when the termination letter was signed. Mr Pitakaji gave statement to Police of possible fraud but later withdrew his statement.
45. Mr Suri points out occasions when barokasa land trustees and land Enterprise met, which they did at Taro on 30^th December 2009, and resolved that they would serve a termination letter to the first Defendant for breach of the Agreement (SLA). In essence was a reinforcement of the reminders sent to the company by the late Mr Kipling. Derived from the consensus at the meeting, the landowners subsequently signed the termination letter on 11^th January 2010 and addressed to the Commissioner of Forest and copy to the first Defendant.
46. On 1^st February 2010, 20 days after signing of the termination letter, Mr Malasa wrote to the Premier of Choiseul Province and actually informed him the steps taken by the barokasa landowners which resulted in termination of Orion Licence. The reason as he referred to was because the Defendant (Orion) had failed to fulfil the conditions of the agreement (SLA) it made with the landowners.
47. The tone of Mr Malasa’s letter seemed to reflect the reason for cause of action the landowners had taken. Mr Malasa knew of the issuant of the letter and him being participated acknowledged and agree to its issuant. That, in no doubt, summed it all that Mr Malasa was the participatory party and him contributed his signatory to it.
48. He further and finally assigned the task to Rano’s Legal Service to take further steps ensuring legal process was done and complied with.
49. Amidst his own letter to the Premier signed by himself, he denied giving instructions for commencement of this case and denied knowledge of signing the termination letter. Those evidence were entrenched in his first sworn statement filed on 25^th February 2014, four years after the letter of termination was issued and served, and 2 years and 6 months after the claim, in this case, was first filed.
50. I have no doubt Mr Malasa knew of the termination letter. I have no doubt he was also involved in signing it. His letter to the Premier spoke of it all. He also expressed in his letter that they had interest to apply for licence for barokasa landowners. That statement was in paragraph 4 of his letter. That is a clear statement desiring to involve further in a new business dealing, forgetting the relationship they had with Orion under the Agreement (SLR). That affirms the dissolution of the relationship the barokasa landowners had with Orion, hence, should end the logging activities. Simple description relevant in the circumstances is to take away the agreement, and then take away the logging activities.
51. Mr Suri pointed out some reasons why Mr Malasa may have changed his mind. One is because his invoice was not paid by Earthmovers per his letter dated 6^th December 2011.
52. In any event, a critical question to ask is why the landowners created a new relationship with Earthmovers. Mr Malasa’s letter was an implication of a new business dealing with Earthmovers. That will definitely give rise to the core question, what had happened with Orion Ltd. A simple answer anyone could conclude is that its operation had been terminated, paving the way for Earthmovers until the operation was restraint.
53. The point I try to emphasize here is that the termination letter was indeed signed by all the land trustees including Mr Malasa, he cannot deny it. His actions by his correspondences reflect his involvement and his acknowledgment that Orion Agreement had been terminated.
54. In respect to Mr Malasa’s signature on the termination letter, It would appear from certain other documents that he signed on pages 94, 103 and 105 of the Defendant’s book of sworn statement, were not the same. In cross-examination, he agreed that he used short form signatures as well. And he used them in Barokasa Timber rights Agreement and his letter to the Premier of Choiseul Province. That shows inconsistency in the manner he signed his signatures. Therefore his signature on the termination letter resembles his short form signature.
55. By observing the signatures in the original letter (Exh. “A”) shows they are signatures in the original form inspite the ink used were varied. Therefore I am able to conclude based on those facts outlined above, that the signatures are not copied and paste as alleged by the Defendants but were original signatures of all the bakokasa land trustees.
56. From my personal analysis of all the evidence available, it is apparent that Mr Malasa is an influential person. His work experience as a Clerk to Provincial Assembly depicted his level of education.
57. What seems as simple agreement with Orion Ltd as a logging company to operate in barokasa customary land concession, turned out to be a complex and multiple investments dealing with promise, perhaps with arrays of benefits.
58. It commenced with a simple agreement with Orion Ltd, then the agreement was terminated. Then the landowners’ trustees switched allegiance and made another agreement with Earthmovers. Earthmovers operation subsequently was restraint and the landowners became frustrated. Nothing was benefitted from the felling licence acquired.
59. Grievances breed among the landowners and there were signed of interest of returning to the old foe and re-cement the old alliance. By then this case was filed. Note, some of the Claimants renegades and became the second Defendants.
60. The question is why were all the frog leaping occurred? Understandably, because there is someone at the helm of it. It became apparent there were companies at the end of the tug-o-war robe. As a result, there is evidence, the Managing Director of Orion Co. Ltd gone out of his way and attempted to influence the other side to give in and allow revival of the old marriage to prevail.
61. The interference by an investor, in the manner the evidence adduced, do not reflect a genuine investment but promoting animosity among the landowners. This is what actually occurred in this case.
62. I have dealt with two issues in a generic manner. Those issues may not be relevant at this stage but perhaps later.
63. To conclude, in respect to the first application, I have decided that the barokasa landowner trustees have the right to issue and serve the termination letter of 11^th January 2010. The process acceptable actually proceeded through the Public Solicitor Mr Kinai who in turn wrote a letter dated 31^st August 2010 addressed to the Commissioner of Forest with recommendation for termination.
64. Eventually I find on evidence and facts that the letter of termination was signed by all the 10 trustees including Mr Malasa. There was no cut and paste, as the original copy reflected the originality of signatures.

Application by the second Defendant

65. The second Defendant’s application concerns the withdrawal of this case by the Claimants. The Counsel for the second Defendants submits that because the first Claimants, second Claimants, and the second Defendants are from the same tribe it was conceded at a meeting on 18^th October 2016 that the Claimants discontinued this proceeding. The Counsel then refers to R12.2 whether an order should be made to that effect, to reflect the wish of the tribe.
66. I would agree the minutes of the meeting (Exh. “AM1”) was attached to Mr Malasa sworn statement filed on 28^th November 2016. Probably as a result of the meeting four Claimants were granted leave to withdraw and became a party themselves, the second Defendants.
67. In my shortcomings, my personal view is that I do not think a tribe would unduly influence, even a single trustee to pursue his case to finality. It is his right to access to legal system. Whether he wins or loses, in the end, is his choice.
68. In this case, the majority of the Claimants (6 in all) wish to pursue their claim to finality, despite the tribe influencing them to discontinue this proceeding.
69. Since 27^th April 2017 by disobeying the minutes not to pursue amount to no harm or any offence being committed, neither subject to payment of compensation to the tribe for being disobedient to their decision. In fact, the 6 Claimants are exercising their right to seek justice by allowing the court to determine the issues before it.
70. The possible conclusion drawn from all the facts surrounding this case is perhaps, those who attended the meeting were influenced by the motive to sabotage the hearing to conclusion. All the evidence is clear as crystal that that barokasa tribe was divided in two groups with different versions of the real facts of this case. It is an unacceptable practice that the educated elites pull the nose of the less unfortunate educated people who are unable to discern what could occur to them in due course. Likewise, withdrawal of some trustees did not affect the termination letter. The termination occurred before the withdrawal.
71. In conclusion, the application really does not disclose any course of action and therefore must be dismissed accordingly.
72. In regards to further submission by Mr Rose concerning substantive issue. I have dealt with in the first part of this judgment. I need only to point out that the Standard Logging Agreement (SLA) entered into on 15^th July 2009 was validly terminated. If it was validly terminated then Orion Ltd cannot conduct logging operation on barokasa customary land. The licence may be valid but a mere empty licence. Only the Commission of forest will deal with a mere empty licence, whether to revoke or cancel it. Its existence has no value at all.

Orders:

1. The Court hereby declares that the Standard Logging Agreement (SLA) entered on 29^th October 2009 by the Claimants and the second Defendants with the first Defendant had been validly terminated by the Claimants, by their letter dated 11^th January 2010; the said agreement had, therefore, ceased to be enforceable.
2. The court hereby declares that the Defendant’s Felling Licence No. A10404, without a Valid Standard Logging Agreement (SLA), does not convey or vest any right or authority on the first Defendant to enter or carry out logging activities on barokasa customary land situated on Choiseul Island.
3. Dismiss the application by the second Defendant for disclosing no cause of action.
4. Cost of this proceeding is award to the Claimants and be paid by the first and the second Defendants on standard basis.

THE COURT
JUSTICE R. FAUKONA
PUISNE JUDGE