Whiteside v Attorney General [2016] SBHC 84; HCSI-CC 189 of 2013 (3 June 2016)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
(Faukona, PJ)

Civil Case No. 189 of 2013

BETWEEN:

JOHN WHITESIDE
Claimant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Representing Commissioner of Labour)
First Defendant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL
Second Defendant
(Representing the Minister of Commerce, Labour and Immigration)
Third Defendant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Representing the Commissioner of Police)
Fourth Defendant

Date of Hearing: 15th April 2016
Date of Decision: 3rd June 2016

Mr. G. Suri for the Claimant
Mr. S. Banuve for all the Defendants

DECISION ON CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Faukona PJ: The Claimant is a citizen of Fiji Islands. He came to the Solomon Islands in March 2001. In early 2003 he was employed as a General Manager of Russell Islands Plantation Estates Limited (RIPEL).
   
2. Since 2003 he had several work and residence permits expired and renewed. The last, for the purpose of the two documents were to expire on 6^th June 2013.
   
3. Acknowledging the fact that his work permit and residence permit will expire on 6^th June 2013, the Claimant then submitted his application for renewal of work permit by way of a letter, addressed to the Commissioner of Labour on 19^th February 2013.
   
4. There was no response so a follow up letter was sent by the Claimant on 24^th May 2013, and a final follow up on 5^th June 2013, the day before the expiration of his work permit. On this occasion, according to his sworn statement’ he was told that only the Commissioner of Labour would deal with his application.
   
5. On 6^th June 2013, in the morning, the Claimant found a letter in his Heritage Park Hotel room which dated 30^th May 2013. The letter requested that the Claimant provided to the office of the Commissioner of Labour a resolution of the Board of Directors endorsing the continued engagement of the claimant as General Manager of RIPEL. The production of such resolution must be done within forty eight (48) hours.
   
6. By a letter dated 7^th June 2013, the Claimant furnished to the Commissioner of Labour, the Board resolution termed as flying minute at 4:00pm as requested. There is no dispute as to when the 48 hours started to run. Hence I take it; it runs from the time of receipt. If so, the resolution was delivered within 48 hours.
   
7. 7^th of June 2013 was a Friday when the Board Resolution was delivered to the Commissioner of Labour at 4pm.
   
8. On 9^th June, on Sunday, at 2:30 am the Immigration officers and some Police officers raided the Claimant’s residence at Heritage Park Hotel and arrested, abducted and gated him at Rove Correctional Services. That was an attempt to deport the Claimant from the Solomon Islands.
   
9. During the Sunday morning raid, a letter dated 8^th June 2013 signed by Mason Henry Fugui was delivered to the Claimant informing him that his residence permit had been expired and demanded the Claimant to depart voluntarily. Mr. Fugui was the Deputy Director of Immigration Department.
   
10. On Sunday 9^th June 2013, Interim Restraining Orders were obtained from the High Court to stop deportation of the Claimant. The Orders were applied for by Counsel Rano of Rano and Company. The Orders were eventually served on the Deputy Director of Immigration Mr. Fugui at about 12:10pm.
    
11. On the same Sunday, at 1:00pm, Counsel Mr. Nimepo served a copy of the Interim Restraining Orders upon the Immigration Officers at Henderson International Airport.
    
12. At 12:30pm, on Sunday 9^th June 2013, the Claimant was taken from Rove Police Response Team area (PRT) to Henderson International Airport. The intention was to deport him per Air Niugini flight that afternoon.
    
13. At that time, there was no deportation order in possession of the authorities, neither such was served on the Claimant. In fact the deportation order was published on Monday 10^th June 2013, a day after the raid, and a day after the Claimant was taken to the airport to be deported. It was on Monday as well that the Deportation Order was served on the Claimant at 5:40pm.
    
14. After Air Niugini flight had left without the Claimant on board, he was then taken back to Rove for detention, and later arrived at 4pm.
    
15. Roughly at 9pm the Claimant was taken back to his hotel room at Heritage Park Hotel.
    

Issues for determination:

16. (1) No Lawful or Valid reason given by Commissioner of Labour.

(2) Breach of legitimate expectation

(3) Misfeasance in public office

(4) Invalidity of deportation Order

(5) Deprivation of 7 days for judicial review

17. On the outset, I noted that there are arguments in relation to relief sought in terms of orders C, F and G in the amended claim. The rationale advanced by the Counsel for the Defendants is that those orders are allegations against the Minister and the Commissioner of Police. They cannot be sustained on the facts pleaded as in paragraphs 14(a) to (d) under the heading “particulars of misfeasance” in public office by the third Defendant, and paragraphs 15(a) to (f) under the same heading by the fourth Defendant.

18. After assessing the arguments I have decided to deal with the principle of misfeasance in later course of this decision and its applicability to the officials concern, hence, not necessary to venture into depth of the argument for time being. Meanwhile I would rather agree with the Counsel for the Defendants that reliefs sought in paragraphs (F) and (G) in the amended claim be deferred and be included with the reliefs sought in CC 311 of 2013. The reason being they are private law claims which are not included and contemplated under a claim for judicial review.

Basis for Judicial review:

19. Over the years the courts had formulated and subsequently set out the circumstances where they may intervene and set aside, or otherwise declare unlawful, the exercise of administrative discretion. The principles were sat out in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd V Wednesbury Corporation.^[1] The operation of the principles was explored in a number of cases in England. The principles in fact can be summarised as thus;
    

“ Courts will not intervene to quash the decision of a statutory

authority unless it can be shown that the authority erred in law,

was guilty of a breach of natural justice or acted “unreasonably”.

the authority has considered the matters which it is its duty

to consider and has excluded irrelevant matters, its decision is not reviewable unless so absurd that no reasonable authority could have reached it. The principle excludes the court from substituting its own view of the facts for that of the authority.”

20. In law the principles provide a catalyst that a person may go to the Courts to obtain civil remedies for damages, or restitution against public authority, or its officers for a civil wrong which requires judicial review of administrative action (or inaction), which had affected or prejudiced the interest of that person.

21. Recourse may also be had by the courts in order to secure the annulment or variation of administrative orders or determination, or the restraining of unlawful acts by administrative bodies, individuals, or the obtaining of an authoritative declaration on a disputed question of law involving administration, or the issue of mandatory order for the performance of public duty^[2].
    
22. At page 25, paragraph 2, the author of the book “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” 1980, stated,
    

“The Common law prerogative writ of habeas corpus and the former prerogative writ (now orders) of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are linked together by a somewhat tenuous historical association. Habeas corpus lies to secure release from any form of unlawful detention... In modern English administrative law it has been used to impugn orders for the deportation of aliens and Commonwealth immigrants. Certiorari and mandamus are normally obtainable from the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, and prohibition is invariable issued from that Court. Prohibition issues to restraint an inferior tribunal from proceeding further with a matter before it. Both have been adapted in modern times to do the work of supervisory remedies in the field of administrative law. Mandamus, to compel the performance of public duties, has the appearance of a distinctively public law remedy, but it is often used for the purpose of Compelling inferior Courts to exercise their jurisdiction”

23. Paragraph 19, above, is a quote of the English position. The Commonality as a common law notion is that the orders which by virtue of the rules are entrenched in Chapter 15.3, which basically provide for judicial review of Executive or Legislative action. In a claim for judicial review those orders can be sought as reliefs.
    
24. Rule 15.3.2 states, a claim for judicial review must be commenced in the High Court. Such jurisdictional empowerment does not derogate from the Court’s inherent powers by virtue of R13.3.
    
25. Rule 15.3.4 a claim for a mandatory order, prohibiting order, quashing order or a declaration in relation to an Act or subsidiary legislation shall be made by a claim to the High Court for judicial review.
    
26. Rule 15.3.6 states that a claim for judicial review must,
    

(a). set out the grounds for making the claim; and

(b). have with it a sworn statement verifying the facts in which the claim is founded.

27. In the case of Keniapisia V Solomon Islands Football Federation (SIFF)^[3], Brown PJ said,“In Ragi V Maingu (PNG Supreme Court 459/1994) the Court said,

“As a general rule judicial review is used where a public body is relying for its decision making power on a statute or subordinate legislation made under statute. Judicial review is a remedy when the action of a public authority is to be challenged.

“In R v East Berkshire Health Authority, Exparte Walsh [1984] EWCA Civ 6; (1984) 3 All. E.R 425 at 429, “The remedy of judicial review is only available where issue of public law “are involved.” And see O’Reilly V Mackman (1982) 3 All E.R 680 per Lord Dening at P693 and later “Private law rights relate to issues which arise either out of contract or out of tort whereby a private individual is claiming against either a private or public body damages or other remedy for breach of contract or a breach of duty a common law which is owed to him personally”

No Lawful or valid reason given by Commissioner of Labour for delay and decision:

28. Undoubtedly the Claimant is a person directly affected by the decisions of the Commissioner of Labour and the Minister, hence, comes to Court by a way of a claim for judicial review. There is no question as to his locus standi or sufficient interest in this case.

29. The Claimant first arrived in the Solomon Islands in March 2001 and took up a post as General Manager of RIPEL in early 2003. He was granted work permit and residence permit. His first work permit was due to expire on 6th June 2005. Since then he had renewed his work permit several times until 6^th June 2013. Before his work permit could expire on 6^th June 2013, he applied for renewal on 19^th February 2013, 107 days earlier. Since then there was nothing forthcoming from the Commissioner of Labour despite several checks, the last being 5^th June 2013.

30. Until 6^th June 2013, the last date of expiry of the Claimant’s work permit, that a letter from the Commissioner of Labour was delivered to him requesting RIPEL Board resolution affirming that he was still the General Manager. Noted, that 6^th June 2013 was on Thursday. The resolution was to be provided within forty eight (48) hours.
    
31. There is no argument or evidence to proof the letter requesting RIPEL Board resolution was received in good time, or on a day earlier than 6^th June 2013. It would be mined bogging to think and reason out why such letter was not issued 2-3 months earlier. Guess that was what exactly had occurred in this case, on the eleventh hour. What was it that the Commissioner of Labour attempted to proof? Did he expect the Claimant on the eleventh hour to provide a resolution as requested? Would it be possible for the Board to meet within forty eight hours, or was he attempted to find failure to provide him reason to reject the Claimant’s application for a renewal of work permit. Even after the Claimant had provided the resolution requested, there was no determination by the Commissioner of Labour immediately until 21^st June 2013. Human reasoning will definitely negate any valid reasons as basis for the issuant of such request on the eleventh hour. No one by human effort will able to produce what was requested in a short period of time. That questions the purpose of such request and whose benefit will it serve.
    
32. There is argument that the resolution was not signed by the Board members of RIPEL. I have stressed the difficulty in producing the resolution in the last minutes, it serves no purpose. However, at least the Claimant was able to procure a resolution by way of flying minutes and presented on time.
    
33. I have noted the reasons given by the Commissioner for rejecting the Claimant’s application for work permit renewal. The fact that the reasons were contained in a letter dated 21^st June 2013, fifteen days (15) late after the expiry date. Both reasons seemed to reflect what had transpired on 6^th June 2013 when the Claimant’s residence permit was expired and on 8^th June 3013 when the Claimant was declared as prohibited immigrant by the Minister. Both reasons were based on provisions under the Immigration Act. There was nothing expounded, if the Claimant’s application had breached relevant provisions and rules enshrine in the Labour Act, in respect of work permit, which the Commissioner is directly obliged to consider. It would appear without doubt, that the Commissioner was influenced and induced by the events before determination; there is no independent consideration and determination.
    
34. The failure by the Commissioner of Labour to exercise discretion within 107 days under Rule 3(1) to renew or refuse issuant of work permit before expiry date was a performance tainted with ulterior motives. The Claimant’s application was submitted 107 days before his work permit expired. The Commissioner could have done better instead had diminished the quality of his service. Had he exercised his discretion accordingly and expeditiously, the Claimant would have had privilege to appeal to the Minister within 14 days by virtue of S.37(8) of the Labour Act, if the decision was made adversely. To rely on request for production of Board resolution at the last minute was an attempt to discover reasonable excuses which verily did not sound resonant to the circumstances at hand. Had the Commissioner being considerate and conscious of the processes it would set motion for the next step, which in any event guided by law.
    
35. In the case of Attorney General of Hong Kong V Ng Yuen Shiu^[4], a case which was decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The brief facts were that when the respondent was interviewed by an official of the Immigration Department who recommended to the Director that a removal order against him should be made, he was not able to explain the humanitarian grounds for the discretion to be exercised in his favour. He had no opportunity of explaining that he was not an employee but a partner in a business that employed several workers. His evidence in the High Court was that at the interview he was not allowed to say anything except to answer the questions put to him by the official. The Council finally decided,
    

“ The appropriate remedy is not the conditional order of prohibition

made by the Court of Appeal, but an order of certiorari to quash the removal order made by the Director on 31^st October against the respondent. That order of certiorari is of course entirely without prejudice to the making of a fresh removal order by the Director of Immigration after a fair inquiry has been held at which the respondent has been given an opportunity to make such representations as he may see fit as to why he should not be removed.”

36. The decision is a clear reflection of a failure by the official in not performing their duties to the fullest. The Respondent was not asked simple questions as to his status, true representation and of course in relation to humanitarian grounds.
    
37. The Commissioner may have been influenced by certain external elements. I noted RIPEL had been the subject of many disputes including civil litigation suits, involving employees, Unions and Police etc. Henceforth may have unduly influenced by Politicians and trade Unions, see sworn statement of Claimant filed on 17/6/13, paragraphs 10(a)-(b), 45(a)-(f) and 46(a)-(b). Despite circumstances, the Commissioner was expected to act within the bounds of the Labour Act. To deviate from tantamount to abuse of legal duty. In a book material, Administrative Law^[5] the author stated;

“Delay in performing legal duty may also amount to an abuse which the law will remedy.....”

38. All I could describe the Commissioner’s action is that he had failed to perform his duty cautiously and diligently, and that amounts to abuse.
    

There was no explanation by him as to his reasons for the delay and for the adverse decision he took. Section 37(3), Rules 2(1), 3(1), 3(2), set out requirements when filing application for or renew of work permit. Rules 5 and 6 provide grounds upon which the Commissioner may revoke or renew work permit. Note that fees involved play a significant part. It forms part of the reason for not granting work permit. Apart from that, if the Commissioner had other reasons, that has to be expressed concisely and with clarity. That has not been done. Hence the Commissioner has faulted in not complying with the statute that conferred responsibility on him.

Invalidity of deportation Order:

39. The issue to determine is whether the deportation order published in the National Gazette on 10^th June 2013 was unlawful or ineffective.
    
40. The argument advances by the Attorney-General is that the Minster has made a decision to deport the Claimant after necessary process have been instituted. Specifically it was premised on the fact that the permit the Claimant held to enter and reside in Solomon Islands had lapsed. By operation of the law he becomes a prohibited immigrant S. 11(2)(a) of the Immigration Act.
    
41. By a letter dated 8^th June 2013, signed by the Deputy Director of Immigration Mr Fugui, was delivered to the Claimant at the time of the raid at his residence that the Claimant’s permit had expired and demanded that he departed voluntarily. On the same date the Minister had declared the Claimant as prohibited immigrant by virtue of S.11(2)(f) of the Immigration Act, published by an Extraordinary Gazetted dated the same.
    
42. On Monday 10^th June 2013, a deportation order endorsed by the Minister was published in Solomon Islands Gazette as Legal Notice No. 50.
    
43. The Claimant admitted that he did not apply for renewal of his residence permit because of the operation of S.8(1) of the Immigration Act which specifically stated that the residence permit can only be issued subject to the condition that a non-indigenous person has obtained a work permit under S.37(1) of the Labour Act. Reliance on that law hence continued to expect the Commissioner of labour to make a decision so that he would take the next step, whether to appeal against that decision or to apply for residence permit. Unfortunately the Commissioner’s decision was formally delivered to the Claimant on 21^st June 2013 at 4.50 pm, eleven (11) days late more than expected.
    
44. The raid that was carried out on Sunday 9^th June 2013 was intended to deport the Claimant. He was arrested, abducted from his Hotel room and transported to Rove Prison Service where he was detained.
    
45. In spite of series of actions which led to transporting of the Claimant to International airport to be placed on Air Niugini flight, the deportation order was yet to be published; in fact it was published by gazettal the next day being Monday 10^th June 2013.
    
46. The question ought to be asked, was the attempted deportation guaranteed by the relevant laws?
    
47. It could be fairly stated that the Officers could have acted upon the letter by the Deputy Immigration Officer dated 8^th June 2013 and perhaps the declaration declaring the Claimant was a prohibited immigrant gazetted on the same date. In any event, the question to ask is were those two documents sufficient, in the absence of a deportation order, to remove and deport the Claimant by force immediately from Solomon Islands? The simple answer is no.
    
48. Undoubtedly, by operation of law it was unlawful for the Claimant to remain in Solomon Islands after his residence permit was expired. That appears to be the plain effect of section 13 of the Immigration Act. However S.5(3) of Deportation (Amendment) Act 1999, allows seven days for the date of service of the order upon him to apply to the High Court for a review of the order.
    
49. It was assumed the deportation order was served on the Claimant on 10^th June 2013. Attempted deportation was carried out on 9^th June 2013, a day before the deportation order was published. The Claimant should be allowed, until 17^th June to apply to the High court for a review. The fact that the officials had carried out attempted deportation without a deportation order was unlawful. In fact the officials had carried out forced acts prematurely when the deportation orders was yet to be published and the Claimant has yet to exercise his rights to apply within seven days for a review. Any force action should have been carried out after 7 days allowable to apply after 17^th June 2013.
    
50. In applying the restrictive notion of law, once a residence permit is expired the holder of the permit must leave the Country immediately. To stay on is illegal, unless entitled by grant of temporary residence to allow him dealt with other issues pertaining to his residency.
    
51. In brief the Claimants residence permit has expired on 6^th June 2013. He stayed beyond that, of course was unlawful, and therefore deemed to be a prohibited immigrant by virtue of S.6 (2) as read in conjunction with S.13 of the Immigration Act. S.11 (1)(b) and 11(2) described by classification persons who are prohibited immigrants; one of them is not a holder of a valid permit. From hence, the Minister may exercise his discretionary power under S.4 (d) of the Deportation Act, issued a deportation order. In reality the Claimant have found himself encountered with a similar situation in which the Minister had issued a deportation and published in the gazette on 10^th June 2013.
    
52. At face value, the procedure applied may be consistent with the law. However, I am of the view the Minister’s decision to issue declaration and deportation order cannot be read in isolation. Consideration must be had with prior existence events, one of which concerned Claimants application for work permit. The fact that operation of S.8(1) of Immigration Act must take precedent over all others so far as permits are concerned.
    
53. I feel the approach taken in this case premise on the basis that the Claimant had already been in the country and was issued with renewed permits several times before the events in June 2013. His impression and experience on late issuant of his permits at times in the past was a legitimate expectation this time around. That did not occur for reasons that will be narrated in the latter course of this judgment.
    
54. The position of the Claimant opposing the process applied by the Minister is not so clear. However, the only protest advance by the Claimant’s Counsel is that the deportation order does contain sufficient particulars as required by S. 5(1) of the Deportation Act, and that the reasons were deceptively made, hence abuse of process.
    
55. Precise as it may, the Counsel did not oppose the actual three reasons for the grant of the deportation order. Instead embark on what was sighted at paragraphs 3 of the order, which stated, “You have conducted yourself in a manner prejudicial to peace and public order in Solomon Islands....” Counsel’s major argument premise on S. 5(1) of which requires a deportation order must contain sufficient particulars. Whether that statement was the sole purpose for granting the orders? I do not think so. It was a description, which I would agree, contain insufficient particulars. It goes to describe a kind of conduct which ought to be particularised. But does that take precedent over the three reasons expressed in paragraph 4 and which was described as reasons for the deportation order. I do not think so.
    
56. It would appear the reasons for issuant of the deportation orders was specifically stated; at the same time described separately at paragraph 3 the general attitude of the Claimant which was not specifically particularised. In my opinion, even if I find the order does not contain sufficient particulars as required in S. 5 (1) and expressed in paragraph 3, that does not negate the real reasons for deportation as expressly stated in paragraph 4 of the deportation order. So it is in my view a futile exercise to argue one point at its weakest state, whilst the other remains intact without a test of its standing. Therefore, the argument by the Counsel for the Claimant lacks weight on this point.
    
57. Another related issue is whether the reason stated was deceptive in nature. The Counsel for Attorney General submits opposing such issue as not necessary to be inclusive in this case. If so evidence must be adduced to proof deceptive acts. Meantime there is none. In the light of my reasoning above, particularisation of the reasons of the order does not have any effect that will impact the real reasons given in paragraph 4 of the deportation order. As such it is not necessary to consider. If I am legally required to, then a deceptive action is an action needs to be proved by evidence, separately. At this stage I am actually required by law to investigate whether proper foundation was laid, one conferred by law which the Minister had considered and subsequently according to his sound reasoning issued the deportation order. To consider the two separate reasoning as one is incorrect in my view. They appeared and separately expressed premise on different grounds, hence, cannot be consolidated in dealing with them together.
    
58. I do mention earlier that functions required under the Labour Act, the Immigration Act and the Deportation Act need to be consolidated and be considered in the light of the circumstances of this case.
    
59. The simple but constitute set of facts relevant is that Claimant had submitted his application 107 days before his work permit was expired. He did not receive a reply until 21^st July 2013; 15 days after his work permit had expired. He expected the Commissioner of labour to convey his decision earlier so that he would either appeal to the Minister pursuant to S. 37 (8) Labour Act or apply for residence permit under S. 8(1) (a) of Immigration Act. Whilst waiting for the Commissioner of Labour to convey his decision, the Claimant’s work and residence permits were expired. The Minister stepped in and declared the Claimant as prohibited immigrant followed by the issuant of deportation order on 10^th June 2013.
    
60. From the simplicity it was the Commissioner who fails to perform his duties diligently. That sets a course for the unlawful events that occurred as unlawful arrest, abduction, false imprisonment and attempted deportation. Those unlawful actions could have occurred after the deportation order was issued, upon failure by the Claimant to file a review case seven days thereafter. It did not occur according to law as expected.
    
61. The Minister may have rightly and strictly abide by the law, however, had he had knowledge that the Claimants application for extension of his work permit was pending decision, he would have considered S. 8 (1) (a) of the Immigration Act as taking precedent than the action he took.
    
62. Unfortunately the Commissioner of Labour had conveyed his decision late thus undermined the legal rights afforded to the Claimant to exercise under the provisions of law stated in paragraph 53 above. Worst still the unlawful acts were carried out before any deportation order was granted. Because of this prematurely and unlawfully carrying out of the deportation order without considering the rights in law afforded to the Claimant to file a review, the Deportation order
    

Breach of legitimate expectation:

63. The Claimant adduces that the Commissioner of Labour, the Director of Immigration and the Minister of Labour and Immigration together with their sub-ordinates had breached his legitimate expectation to be accorded procedural fairness or natural justice.
    
64. The case of Anash V AG^[6] sets down the principles of which is applied in Solomon Islands and which I extracted most. The concept of “legitimate expectation” was first developed by Lord Denning MR in Schmdt V Secretary of State for Home Affairs^[7] which His Lordship enunciated the general principle in the following terms;
    

“The speeches in Ridge V Baldwin show that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is

offered by their decision an opportunity of making representations.

It all depends upon whether he has some right or interest or,

I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.”

65. In the case O’Relly V MacKman^[8] the House of Lords recognised the application of the concept of legitimate expectation as providing the basis of locus standi in judicial review proceedings.

66. A fuller analysis of the concept was made in the case of Council of Civil Service Unions V Minister for Civil Service^[9] which Lord Diplock stated;

“The decision must affect some other persons either;

(a) By altering rights or obligation of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law or,
(b) By depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either;

• (i) He had been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue

to do unless there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or

(ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker will not be without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that that they should not be withdrawn.

67. In the case of AG of Hong Kong V Ng Yuen Shiu^[10] the court stated;

“when a public authority has promised to follow a certain Procedure, it is in the interest of good administration that it should act fairly and it should implement its promise, so long as implementation does not interfere with its statutory duty”.

68. Courts have defined the phrase “legitimate expectation” and the legal foundation upon which it germinated and how it applies. In the above case of Attorney-General of Hong Kong V Ng Yuen Shiu (Hong Kong)^[11] the Privy Council continue to state,

“The phrase “legitimate expectation” in this context originated in the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Schmidt V Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 CH 149 at page 170F. It is in many ways an apt one to express the underlying principle, though it is somewhat lacking in precision. In Salemi V Mackellar (No. 2) [1977] HCA 26; (1977) 137 C.L.R 396, 404, Barwick CJ constructed the word “legitimate” in that phrase as expressing the concept of “entitlement or recognition by law”. So understood, the expression (as the learned Chief Justice rightly observed), adds little to the concept of a right. With great respect to the learned Chief Justice, their Lordships consider that the word “legitimate” in that expression falls to be read as meaning “reasonable”. Accordingly “legitimate expectations” is this context is capable of including expectations which go beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have some reasonable basis loss of remission of sentence, although he has no legal right to remission, but only a reasonable expectation of receiving it”

69. The Privy Council further stated;

“The expectation may be based upon some statement or undertaking by, or on behalf of, the public authority which has the duty of making the decision, if the authority has through its officers, acted in a way that would make it unfair or inconsistent with good administration for him to be denied such an injury”

70. With assistance of the cases, I am of the view that the concept of legitimate expectation can be applied in Solomon Islands in areas where public authorities are expected to make decisions affecting people’s rights or interest and the decision are made following certain procedures. Those are the views of Chief Justice Sir John Muria in the case of Ansah V AG sited above. I hold the same opinion as expressed by His Lordship.
71. The Counsel for the defendants argues on this particular that there is nothing legitimate expectation from the Commissioner, the Director of immigration and the Minister.

Legitimate expectation from the Commissioner:

72. On the issue of legitimate expectation from the Commissioner, the Counsel for the Defendants submits that legitimate expectation arises out of implied assurance that the Commissioner will decide on the Claimant’s application for work permit. This he had done albeit late. Counsel refers to the case of Ansah V AG^[12]. In Ansa case at page 12, the court stated that “rule 2(1) and (2) confers on the applicant an interest or a legitimate expectation to have his application considered. This interest or legitimate expectation arises out of the implied assurance of the above rules that the Commissioner of Labour will consider the application for the grant or renewal of a work permit, provided the application was made in form1 and the required fee has been paid, both of which had been done.
73. By using the word implied assurance denotes a contractual position. The reality unopposed is that the Commissioner’s action in delaying determination of the application for work permit is not a function that can be implied. It is a duty conferred by law. The Commissioner’s action in delaying determination is not provided by contractual terms, as it appears, so that one can read into it as implied assurance. He is bound by an Act of Parliament that conferred upon him his duties, and expected to perform as the Act specifically stated diligently and without failure. It is an obligation conferred by law.
74. This brings us to a point that S.8 (1) of Immigration Act does not allow issuant of residence permit without obtaining work permit first from the Commissioner under S.37 of Labour Act. The Attorney-General’s argument that though the Commissioner was late to convey his adverse decision until 21^st June 2013, 15 days late is ok. That is absolutely incorrect. Should the law is strictly complied with the Claimant must exercise his rights and be allowed to appeal the Commissioner’s decision to the Minister after 21^st June. In the circumstances of this case that did not happened. I am of the view that any declaration and issuant of the deportation order should be done if the Minister adversely decided the appeal. Whilst waiting for the Minster’s decision, of course the Claimant may apply for a temporary permit to reside awaiting determination, and that is a valid reason for issuant of a temporary permit.
75. The manner in which S. 8(1) of Immigration Act operates is that processes under the Labour Act have to be completed first before moving on to Immigration Act. The Deportation Act functions almost concurrently with Immigration Act.
76. The delay by the Commissioner in conveying a decision within 107 days before the Claimant’s work permit expired was a legitimate expectation to perform his part expeditiously to enable the Claimant either appeal against any adverse decision or apply for renewal of residence permit in time before expiration date.
77. Notably, there is evidence of delay by the Commissioner in granting work permit previously. This time around the Claimant had expected the same to occur. Inevitably, the practice was a bad one, and cannot be accepted. The underlying reason can be deduced from continuous performance of duties. Not that the performance was below par but the law was not complied with in totality. At the end of the day nothing can be expected from non-performance officers. It would be ultimately wrong to continue rely on delays which themselves are contrary to any work ethics and statute. The delay in this case is unreasonable and be upheld as a ground for legitimate expectation.
78. Furthermore, one cannot expect a situation to continue the same year after year. Circumstances may change whenever they arise.

Legitimate expectation from Commissioner of Labour and Director Immigration to give notices:

79. Another point of argument related to legitimate expectation from the Commissioner of Labour and Director of immigration for failure to give notices to make representation. S. 37(3) as read with Rule 2 (1) states that application for grant or renewal of work permit shall be considered by the Commissioner. In reality there is no mention of any issuant of notice for representation. And then S. 37 (8) provides for an appeal to the Minister.
80. In the Immigration Act S. 6 states that a foreigner who possess a valid permit lawfully granted shall enter Solomon Islands. Such permit can be granted by the Director of Immigration pursuant to S. 8(1), and more appropriate to a person who had obtained a work permit under S. 8 (1) (a) of the Act. Should a person aggrieved of the Director’s decision he is accorded appeal rights under S. 17 of the Act.
81. Verily, there is no provision requiring representation. In my opinion, the applications for permits requiring consideration by appropriate authority and then a decision is formulated and conveyed. It is not a situation where allegations are laid against the applicant so that representation is necessary to clarify certain issues. The authorities by law are conferred with discretionary power to make decisions and should any one aggrieved is accorded right to appeal. Therefore, legitimate expectations from the Commissioner or the Director to issue notices are quite remote. I find there is no bad motive displayed that suppresses any representation. To promote fairness, representation is required in all situations, where authority is conferred by legislation to exercise discretionary. However, is it really necessary in this case, it may and it may not be?
82. I noted the letter written by the Deputy Director delivered to the Claimant on the date of arrest contain no determination. It appeared as containing a reminder that the Claimant’s residence permit had expired and should leave Solomon Islands voluntarily.
83. From my reasoning there can be no legitimate expectation from both Officers in relation to giving of notices for representation.

Legitimate expectation from the Minister:

84. As far as the Minister is concerned, he ought to have understood the meaning and operation of S. 8(1) (a) of the Immigration Act and the rights of appeal accorded to the Claimant before issuing the declaration on 8^th June 2013 and deportation order on 10^th June 2013. He would have been informed of the pending application for work permit. If he was not informed, must take initiative to inquire, because the application was from the Claimant seeking extension of his work permit and it was not a new case.
85. If that was not enough, the Minister could have acquainted himself with the procedures conferred by the statute and familiarised himself with them. That he was expected to know that a residence permit will not be issued unless a work permit has been granted, that is the law in S. 8(1) (a), it is clear with precision. The Minister if properly advised or personally acquainted with the law, he should wait until the Commissioner had decided the application. If adverse, an appeal has to be heard before issuant of declaration and deportation Order. Indeed the Claimant had legitimate expectation from the Minister, one which legally required by law.
86. 86. If that is still not enough, the Claimant could have been given appeal rights under S. 5(3) Deportation Act to apply to the High Court for a review. Instead of exercising that right, the immigration Officers and Police Officers had attempted to deport the Claimant by physically arresting him, abducting, imprisoning him and transported him to the airport with intention to deport without any deportation order. The Minister could have known, and expected to know; therefore the publication of the deportation order serves no purpose. That is the main reason in this judgement to invalidate the deportation order which I must grant.

Misfeasance in Public Office:

87. Under this principle of tort, the Claimant is alleging that the Commissioner of Labour, the Director of Immigration, the Minister and the Commissioner of Police and their subordinates had committed the tort of misfeasance in Public Offices.
88. The scope of tort of misfeasance was described in the case of; Three Rivers District Council and Others V Governor and Company of the Banks of England^[13] in which their Lordships described as follows:

Lord Steyn: His Lordship revealed from cases that there were two forms of liability for misfeasance in public office. First is the case of targeted malice by a public Office i.e. conduct intended to injure a person. This type of case involves bad faith in exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public Officer act knowing that he has power to do the act complained of and that the act will infuse the plaintiff.

89. The ingredients of the two forms of tort are not exactly the same. But there are unifying features namely the special nature of the tort, as directed against the conduct of public Officers only and an abuse of public power in bad faith.
90. Lord Hutton: His Lordship added that action for misfeasance in public Officer require the plaintiff must establish the defendant was actuated by malice towards him and intended to injure in discharging his public duty; modern case is referred to as targeted malice.
91. Lord Hobhouse: Further expounded on the official state of mind with regard to effect of his act to other people. His Lordship referred to three limbs which are alternatives and any one suffices. They are targeted malice, untargeted malice and reckless untargeted malice.
92. Targeted malice is where the official acts intentionally with the purpose of causing loss to the plaintiff. The purpose of causing loss is likely to be consistent with the official not having an honest belief that he was exercising the relevant power lawfully.
93. Untargeted malice is an intentional act done being aware that it will in the ordinary course will directly cause loss to the plaintiff. The element of knowledge relates to a result which has yet to occur. The act is done unlawfully which is intentionally done for a different purpose not withstanding that the Official is aware that such injury will, in the ordinary course, be one of consequences.
94. Reckless targeted malice is where the official does the act intentionally being aware of its risk causing loss to the plaintiff and the official disregards the risks. What the official is aware of is that there is a risk involved in the intended act. His reckless arises because he chooses wilfully to disregard the risk.
95. Intentionally in this context mean the mind must go with the act. It does not require specific intent (except in so far as having specific purpose under the first limb imports an intent).
96. The above case has set out the necessary ingredients of the tort. They are; state of mind, bad faith and deliberate act or omission.
97. The element of state of mind is satisfied when the public officer engages in the impugned conduct with the intention of inflicting injury or with knowledge that there is no power to engage in that conduct and that conduct is calculated to produce injury. These are states of mind, which are inconsistent with an honest attempt to perform the functions of the officer.

98. The elements of bad faith are considered as dishonesty and it means acting in bad faith. Deliberate act or omissions is an act or omission done or made by public official in purported performance of the functions of the office. But the act or omission must be a deliberate one involving actual decision and liability will not arise from injury suffered by mere inadvertence or oversight. As well the plaintiff must proof that the public officer foresaw that his action would injure the plaintiff.

99. In summing Lord Hobhouse considered the question whether omission as well as acts can give rise to liability in the tort of misfeasance. He stated the position is the same as in the law of judicial review. If there is an actual decision to act or not to act, the decision is amenable to judicial review and capable of providing the basis for commission of the tort. If there is a legal duty to act and the decision not to act amounts to an unlawful breach of that legal duty, the omission can amount to misfeasance. (Reg. V Dytham (1979) 1 QB 722, at Page 107). What is not covered is a mere failure, oversight or accident. Neglect, unless there is a relevant duty of care, does not suffice and the applicable tort would then be negligence not misfeasance (X Mino’s) V Bedfordshire Country Council [1995] UKHL 9; (1995) 2 AC 633, Mengel at P. 547). The relevant act must be unlawful. This may arise from branch of relevant statutory provisions or from acting in excess of the powers granted or for improper purpose. Here again the test is the same as or similar to that used in judicial review.
100. The Counsel for all the Defendants argues that the claim under the tort of misfeasance cannot be granted. One major reason is that the powers of the Court conferred upon it is limited pursuant to Rule 15.3.1 of the Courts Civil Rules 2007. The claim is a remedy sought under (c) ought to be considered in the private law proceeding in Civil Case No. 311 of 2013, which was segregated by consent to be heard separately.
101. In support of his argument the Counsel refer to the case of O’Reilly V Mackmen^[14];

“The facts except where the claim that a decision was on the ground that the statutory authority or public authority that made the decision failed to comply with the procedure prescribed by legislation under which it was acting or failed to observe the fundamental rules of natural justice or fairness, can seldom be a matter of relevant dispute upon an application from judicial review, since tribunal or authority’s finding of facts, are not open to review by the Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers...”

102. The Counsel further argues that the order sought cannot be sustained on the facts pleaded in paragraphs 14 (a)–(d) and paragraphs 15 (a)-(f) which contain particularisation of misfeasance in public Office by the third and fourth Defendants.
103. A fundamental observation emerge from O’Railley case in my interpretation, is that finding of facts by a tribunal or authority are open to review by the Court but not on the legal consequence of those facts. For instances, failure to comply with procedures prescribed by law, or failure to observe fundamental rules of natural justice.
104. I have scrutinized how the particularisation of the tort is framed in the paragraphs stated above. It would appear the paragraphs the counsel refers to concern the claim for misfeasance by the Director of Immigration and the Commissioner of Police. There is nothing in the submissions to defend the Commissioner of Labour and the Commission of Police against the claim of misfeasance.
105. The significant of this law is that there ought to be a decision made by a tribunal or Public authority in accordance with the legislation that vested functions upon it. If the public authority failed to comply with procedures prescribed by legislation under which it was acting or failed to observe the rules of naturel justice or fairness, then that can be brought before Court by way of judicial review.
106. In this case, the Commissioner of Police had not made any decision concerning the Claimant’s saga. Therefore, there was nothing brought to Court to be reviewed. It is imprudent to include him at this stage, hence, not liable under the tort of misfeasance, but others have to be.

Claim of misfeasance against the Commissioner of Labour:

107. The Claimant had on 19^th February 2013 filed an application to renew or extend his work permit pursuant to S.37(3) Labour Act which was due to expire on the 6^th June 2013. The Commissioner of Labour did not decide on the application until 21^st June 2013 somewhat fifteen days after the Claimant’s work permit had expired.

108. The Commissioner of Labour was vested with the discretionary power to grant or renew a work permit by virtue of Rule 3(1) subject to appropriate fees being paid, Rule 3(2). The evidence reveals that the Commissioner did not make a decision prior to 6^th June 2013, instead on the date of expiry the Claimant received a letter from him requesting RIPEL Board resolution to be provided within forty eight (48) hours. That request was complied with accordingly.

109. There was nothing in the letter which stated that approval of work permit was subject to production of the letter in time. What the letter actually stated was failure to comply with the request in time would mean the Board did not reappoint the Claimant as a General Manager of RIPEL.

110. In any event, there is no specific provision in the Labour Act, which requires the Commissioner to request for further information, though he may do so. However, what he did was quite valid except his request was made in the eleventh hour, quite late. However, requesting further disclosures or documentation did not guarantee that a work permit be granted. The Commissioner’s power under Rule 3(1) is exceptional and takes precedent over all others in determining whether to grant or refuse extension of the work permit. In reality the letter did not contain any decision and there is no statutory requirement to obtain it.

111. On another front, we can describe the Commissioner’s lateness as beyond expectation, and thus breed anxiety and resentment. He would have considered S. 8(1) (a) of the Immigration Act to enable him made a decision avoiding the Claimant being prejudiced of his rights to apply for residence permit or appeal against an adverse decision.
112. Was being late an intended targeted malice to injure the Claimant? On this branch of the issue, there is no argument. Suffice to say that late decision by the Commissioner is not new. The Claimant had experienced delays in getting approvals, which are pretty much the normal practice. See his sworn stated filed a 17^th June 2015, page 6, paragraph 8 (b). On one hand the delay can be perceived as normal without any targeted malice, but on the other hand it can be inferred that the Commissioner had waited until the law under Immigration Act, in particular in respect residence permit come into play, before he could able to make his decision. That is a reflection of fact finding, a targeted malice which he could rely on as basis for his determination. In fact his act and performance did deprive the Claimant from exercising his appeal rights and had caused injure and damages to the Claimant.
113. Is it also a targeted malice where the Commissioner instructed his subordinates that he will deal with the Claimants application and that he could be solely responsible for it? It has to be noted that S. 37 specifically stated that application by non-indigenous workers shall be made to the Commissioner in a prescribe form and the Commissioner exercises discretion whether to grant or not by virtue of Rule 3 (1) of the Labour Act. By S. 6 of the Labour Act, the Commissioner may assign to public Officer any of his function. When the Commissioner instructed that he will deal with the Claimant’s application, that was a function conferred upon him by the labour Act. I find the instruction was not given with targeted malice to injure the Claimant for ulterior motive.
114. On the issue of letter of request to provide RIPEL Board resolution, that was an act perceived as contributing to legitimate expectation of making a positive decision. It cannot be described as a request independent of his own and one not conferred by law. The decision he made refusing to grant work permit was made later in time after the events of attempted deportation without a deportation order. Those were the Commissioner rely on as basis for his decision. In the light the reasoning I could able to foresee that there is deliberate malicious strategy to injure the Claimant causing him to lose his employment. In all I find there is tort of misfeasance against the first Defendant (Commissioner of Labour).

Misfeasance by the Second Defendant (Director of Immigration):

115. The second Defendant’s role played in the whole entire saga was that he signed a letter dated 8^th June 2013, which was delivered to the Claimant on the night of the arrest and attempt deportation the next day. The letter was signed by one Henry Fugui, Deputy Director of Immigration. The letter stated that the Claimant’s presence in Solomon Islands after 6^th June 2013 contravened S. 11(1) as read with S.13 of Immigration Act. It also stated that the Minister had declared the Claimant a prohibited immigrant therefore, should leave on first available transport. Failure to comply will result in his deportation.

116. The letter was not and not part of any decision at all. Indeed it was a warning letter of a forthcoming tragedy, should the Claimant refused to leave. There was no application for residence permit pending determination by the Principal Immigration Officer. Affirmation can be noted by operation of S. 8 (1) of Immigration Act, either of its own, or as in collaboration with S. 37 of the Labour Act.
117. The law is very clear, if there is an actual decision to act or not to act then that decision is amenable to judicial review, capable of providing the basis for commission of the tort of misfeasance. There may be some collaboration with the Minister, which may subsequently led to formulation of a decision to declare and deport which was made by him, not the Director of Immigration. The Director was not in fact involved. Of course collaboration and dissemination of information may transpire between both but declaration and deportation are the sole function of the Minister.

Misfeasance by the third Defendant (The Minister responsible for Labour and Immigration):

118. The Minister is entitled to acquire information from any source including those from outside sources as well, see S. 11 (2) (7) and the case of Rajapakasha V AG^[15].

119. In this case the Minister could have received information from the Director of Immigration or even from the Commissioner of Labour. Having aware of the Claimants case, and the circumstance surrounding it, and the applicable law, issued the declaration pursuant to S. 11(2) (7), that the Claimant was an undesirable immigrant in accordance with S. 11 (1). Follow on; a deportation order was published in the Gazette or 10^th June 2013. The Minister’s actions could be sighted as resulted from operation of the law.
120. What the Minister could have not perceived was the operation of S.8 (1) of the Immigration Act. That section requires that the work permit must be dealt with first before dealing with the residence permit. In other word S.8 (1) prohibits issuance of residence permit until work permit has been obtained from the Commissioner of Labour. What the Minister did by issuing declaration and deportation order prior to issuant of work permit was a breach of the procedures conferred by law. Worst still, the implementation of the deported order, by authorities was an absolute absurdity. An attempt to deport following on from arrest, abduction and imprisonment was made a day before the deportation order was published.
121. This very point is the culmination of the whole entire episode. It would have been proper according to law, for the Minster not to make a decision prematurely but to await the decision by the Commissioner of labour. There are rights, which entitled the Claimant to resort to after the Commissioner’s decision. He would have appealed against an adverse decision, or he would have applied for residence permit should the decision to grant work permit was in his favour. By deciding prematurely, the Minister had breached rights accorded to the Claimant, therefore the he had used public power in bad faith, which consequently injured the Claimant. This is a straight breach of the statutory provision.
122. Apparently, it seemed the Minister was wrongly advised, or totally ignorant of the operation of the law. Therefore, his decision must be reviewed. His actions, therefore tantamount to misfeasance in public Office.

Deprivation of 7 days appeal for judicial review:

123. Section 5 (3) of the Deportation (Amendment) Act 1995 states that a person on whom deportation order is served under subsection (1) or Subsection (2) may, within 7 days from the date of service of the order, apply to the high Court for a review of the order. The High Court has discretionary power either to cancel or affirm the order.
124. By declaring the Claimant as a prohibited immigrant on 8^th June 2013, followed by a deportation order published in the Gazette on 10^th June 2013, were acts conferred upon the Minister by law. The Minister had made a decision to deport by complying with the necessary processes properly instituted. That is the argument which the Attorney-General stands. Unfortunately that precept contains certain fraction of a wider scope of series of events that attached to the attempted deportation. It must be acknowledged that forced deportation can only occur after all other legal avenues are failed though the Claimant had accorded the privileges. The significant aspiration of human dignity is to maintain the status quo by ensuring right guaranteed are available without being prejudiced and under-privileged.
125. The real factual situation is that the attempted deportation, arrest and abduction were conducted on 9^th June 2013 without a deportation order which merely came into existence or 9^th June 2013, a day later. The Claimant has yet to exercise his rights complying with S. 5(3) applying to the High Court for review, if so desired. Without any deportation order the Claimant was transported to the airport to be placed on Air Niugini flight and be deported. Those officers who acted without the authority of law were performing acts that were unlawful.
126. The view of the Court in relation to S. 5(3) and S.7 of the Deportation Act was considered and a ruling was made in that instance by the High Court of Australia in Moti V The Queen^[16]. Regarding S.7 the majority of judges said;

“39. Section 5 (3) of the Deportation Act provided that a person on whom a deportation order was served could apply to the High court, within seven days of the service of the order. Most importantly, S.7 of the Deportation Act gave power to place a person against whom a deportation order was in force “on a ship or aircraft about to leave Solomon Islands” only if that person had not made an application for review within the time prescribed or, if an application from review had been made, the person had failed to have the order set aside.

It follows that S.7 of the Deportation Act (the provision relied on for the appellant’s deportation from Solomon Islands) did not give power to place the appellant on a ship or aircraft about to leave the country until either that time for making application for review had elapsed or, if an application was made, the application was dismissed”.

127. The law is so precise with clarity that a person against whom the deportation order was in force cannot be placed on an aircraft, unless that person had not made an application for review within the period allowable, or if an application was made, the application was dismissed and the order was not set aside.

128. In this case the provisions in the statutes were administered in an adverse direction. On 9^th June 2013 Police and Immigration Officers had incarcerated the Claimant, taken to Rove Prison Service and then transported to Henderson International Airport to be placed on Air Niugini flight to be deported. Unforgivingly, the deportation order was not yet published, or in other words, not formally issued as required by law. This had occurred a day later on 10^th June 2013.

129. On 9^th June 2013, the date attempted deportation was made; there was no deportation order at hand. It was yet to be published in the gazette. And the period to apply for review had not even commensurate. At that point in time application cannot possibly and legally be filed because there was no deportation order yet. Apparently the officers who conducted the arrest, imprisonment and transported the Claimant to the airport to have him deported per Air Niugini flight had no legal power to do so.

130. Therefore, though the Claimant had eventually applied for review within time, prior action taken by Police and Immigration officers had prematurely prejudiced the Claimants rights to apply for a review within seven days. In fact the action taken were not conferred by law, hence they are illegal.

131. In conclusion the responsible officials who subsequently made decisions were the Commissioner of Labour and the Minister. There was no decision made by the Director of Immigration as to whether to refuse or grant the Claimant’s residence permit. In fact, there was no application for renewal of residence permit. I have already implicated the decision and action taken by the Minister was unlawful and prepared to invalidate the deportation order made by him.

132. It is appropriate, in my view that the applicable processes ought to resume anew. My reason for doing so is grounded in the case of AG of Hong Kong V Shiu in which part of the Council’s decision stated, “That order of certiorari is of course entirely without prejudice to the making of a fresh removal order by the Director of Immigration after a fair inquiry has been held at which the respondent has been given an opportunity to make such representation as he may see fit as to why he should not be removed.”

133. In this case the processes have not been completed but marred by noncompliance with statutes, which conferred power upon the authorities. In the case of Wednesbury quoted in paragraph 19 above, that the courts will not intervene to quash the decision of the statutory authority unless it can be shown that the authority erred in law, breach of natural justice or acted unreasonably. Has the Commissioner and the Minister acted unreasonably? I think so. They may have discretion to exercise whether to accept or refuse work permit or make declaration or deport. However, the manner in which they had conducted themselves in performing their tasks were unreasonable, gave rise to other consequences prejudicial in nature, which the Claimant suffered injuries physically, mentally and legally. Accordingly the following orders are hereby made.

Orders:

1. Grant order declaring that there is no lawful or valid reason for Commissioner of Labour to refuse or refrain from granting renewal of the Claimant’s work permit when he applied for on 19^th February 2013, as sought in paragraph A of the amended claim, but does not mean this court grant renewal.
   
2. Grant orders declaring that the Commissioner of Labour and subordinates and the Minister for Commerce, Labour and Immigration breached the Claimants legitimate expectation, with exception of the Director of Immigration and it subordinates.
   
3. Order declaring Deportation Order published in the Gazette on Monday 10^th June 2013, by Legal Notice 50 is unlawful and ineffective. Therefore, must be brought up and be quashed.
   
4. Order declaring that the deportation of the Claimant before lapse of seven (7) days for an application to be made to the High Court, pursuant to section 5(3) of the Deportation Order was and is unlawful.
   
5. (1). Order that the administrative decisions of the Commissioner of Labour be brought up and quashed by this court.
   

(2). There is no decision made by the Director of Immigration so nothing is brought up to be quashed. In fact there is no application for residence permit.

6. (1). Refuse to order Commissioner of Labour to grant work permit to the Claimant.

(2). Refuse to order Director of Immigration to grant renewed work permit to the Claimant.

7. A prohibition order granted that the Defendants and their respective subordinates or agents do refrain from;

(1). Intimidating, harassing, humiliating, assaulting or doing anything contrary that would harm or cause inconvenience to the life, peace and comfort and enjoyment of the Claimant and his wife and children during the period the whole processes recommenced again.

(2). Doing anything contrary to law that will hinder or prevent free movement of the Claimant and his family members, whether within Solomon Islands or when travelling to or from Solomon Islands.

8. The Claimant to resubmit his application for work permit within 14 days to commence the entire process again.
   
9. The Commissioner of Labour to consider the Claimant’s application within 3 weeks after being received.
   
10. Current temporary resident permit granted to the Claimant be continued to be valid until the processes under relevant laws have been completed or until such further orders.
    
    11. Damages to be assessed and costs on indemnity basis.
        

The Court

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^[1] [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223; [1947] 2 All ER 680 CA.
^[2] de Smith, “Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1980, Fourth Edition, Page 22, paragraph 3
^[3] [2004] SBHC 129; HCSI – CC 102 of 2004 (5 April 2004).
^[4] (1983) UKPC 2 (21 February 1983).
^[5] By Sir William Wade, 6^th Edition, Page 439
^[6] (1994) SBHC 14.
^[7] (1969) 2 Ch D 149.
^[8] (1983) 2 AC 237.
^[9] (1985) AC 374.
^[10] (1983) 2 AC 629
^[11] (1983) UKPC 2 [21 February] 1983
^[12] [1994] SBHC 14
^[13] (2001) UKHL 33; (2000) 3 All ER1 [2000] UKHL 33; (2000) 2 WLR 1220 (18 May 2000).
^[14] (2011) SBHC 189; HCSI-CC 39 of 2011 (22 July 2011)
^[15] [2011] SBHC 189; HCSI-CC 39 of 2011 [22 July 2011]
^[16] (2011) HCA HCA 50, 7 December 2011, B 19/2011.