West Rennel Resources Owners Association Trust Board v Asia Pacific Investment Development Ltd [2015] SBHC 74; HCSI-CC 403 of 2014 (29 August 2015)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
(Faukona PJ)

Civil Case No. 403 of 2014

BETWEEN:

WEST RENNEL RESOURCES OWNERS ASSOCIATION TRUST BOARD
First Claimant

AND:

JONATHAN TOHUIKA
(Representing himself, the members of the landownership unit of Geagu/Bapogabo and Niua customary lands)
Second Claimant

AND:

NEWMAN TAGO
(Representing the family and descendants of Malacham Teikanoa (deceased) owners of Tigoa customary land)
Third Claimant

AND:

SANDERS TUHAMANO TENOAEHA
(Representing the family and descendants of Solomon Temega (deceased) who are the owners of Pauta customary land)
Fourth Claimant

AND:

ASIA PACIFIC INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
First Defendant

AND:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
(Representing the Minister of Mines, Energy and Rural Electrification)
Second Defendant

AND:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
(Representing the Director of mines and Minerals Board)
Third Defendant

AND:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
(Representing the Director of Environment)
Fourth Defendant

AND:

APAS PANIO, OBED SAUEHA, NELSON PONGI, TOME PESEIKA, JOSHUA NASIU, JOSEPH TAUPONGI, MOXI TAUMOANA, JASON LUKE, CLYVE TAGOKONA, NIGEL SAUTAHI, EDDIE NGATONGA, SILVANIUS KEIPUA, ATKIN TEMOA, SAU UHI, AUBRY TAUPONGI, GARI TAGOKONA, REX PONGI, LUKE TUATA'A EDDIE TEMAHANA, DICTER MAITAKI andWILLIAM TINO
(As purported owners of customary lands in West Rennell)
Fifth Defendant

Date of Hearing: 28th July 2015.
Date of Ruling:29th August 2015.

Ms K.Siru for all the Claimants.
Mr J. Ivanisevic and Mr M. Klapter for Defendants 1 and 5
Mr Banuve for Defendants 2 to 4

RULING ON APPLICATION FOR DISMISSAL OF CLAIM

Faukona PJ: An amended claim for judicial review under category C was filed by the Claimants on 3rd of December 2014. Relief sought are ten (10) in all. They are in terms of quashing order, order for declaration, restraining order, order for accounting of all minerals derived, order for payment of royalties into a trust account in the name of the parties' solicitors' and consequential order for damages to be assessed. Basically, the claim is to review the decision by the Board, Minister and the Director of Environment.

Background facts:

2. The first Claimant is an incorporated body (Association) set up to oversee the interest of landowners and groups in West Rennell. It was incorporated on 24th June 2014 under the provisions of Charitable Trusts Act.

3. The second Claimant is the current Chairman of the fist Defendant and a member of the landowners unit of Geagu/Bapogabo and Niua customary lands, such lands being situated in Ward 4, West Rennell.

4. The third Claimant is a descendant of Malacham Teikanoa (deceased) the owners of Tigoa customary land in ward 5, West Rennell.

5. The fourth Claimant is a member of the family and descendant of Solomon Temega (deceased) who are the owners of Pauta customary land in ward 5, West Rennell.

6. The first Defendant is a registered company that conducts business in mineral exploration and mining. It holds a Prospecting Licence No.04/08 and Mining Lease No. 02/2014.

7. The second, third and fourth Defendants is the Government's legal representative being sued on behalf of the Minister of Mines Energy and Rural Electrification, the Mines Board, and the Director of Environment. These offices are responsible for the administration of mineral and exploration under the Mines and Minerals Act (Cap.161).

8. The first Defendants are individuals from West Rennell and land owners of various lands within the tenement area and persons who purportedly signed the Surface Access Agreement(SAA) for mining.

9. Sometimes in November 2008 there were meetings held at Lavagu village in West Rennell. On 10th November 2008 a Surface Access Agreement was executed by various landowners. The customary lands the second, third and fourth Claimants claim were included in the Surface Access Agreement.

10. On 5th December 2008 the second Defendant granted Prospecting Licence No. PL-04/08 to the first Defendant. On 4th February 2013 the first Defendant obtained an extension to its Prospecting Licence.

11. On 10th April 2014, Surface Access Agreement for mining was executed. Prior to that, there were meetings carried out by the first Defendant and staff of the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Rural Electrification.

12. By letter of 30th June 2014, the Chairman of the Board informed the first Defendant of the decision to grant to it a conditional mining licence. On 5th September 2014 the Minister approved the issuant of a Mining Lease to the first Defendant.

13. On 10thSeptember 2014 the Chairman of the Board wrote to the first Claimant and explained that it did not advise the Minister of his decision on 5th September 2015 to grant the Mining Lease.

14. The Claimants alleged that the grant of Mining Lease No. 2/14 was illegal, unreasonable or done in bad faith in that it was exercised without the board advising on compliance with the conditions imposed, and that the Minister did not liaise with the Board or Director of Mines on the conditions imposed.

15. Further, they say power under S.11 of the Mines and Minerals Act does not allow the Board to make a conditional approval for Mining lease, at the same time to advise the Minster not to grant the Mining Lease until the conditions were complied with.

16. As against the fourth Defendant it acted ultra-vires its powers under s.17 of the Environmental Act that it did not investigate, take consideration and consult the Director of Mines and the Board on matters related to customary landownership, customary rights and legal requirements of potential consequences of large scale mining.

17. As a consequence of all that were alleged, the Claimants therefore filed this claim for judicial review to review the decisions of the Minister of Mines, the Director of Mines and the Mines and Minerals Board and the Director of Environment.

18. This application was filed by the first and the fifth Defendants to strike out the claim as being frivolous and vexatious which render it an abuse of process Rule 9.75.

19. Counsel on behalf of both Defendants submits that these proceedings are obviously and fundamentally flawed. The flaws are matters which are incapable of being overcome or cured by an amendment to the pleadings. They go to the root of the claims; parties who purported to have entitlement or interest have to agitate them in this Court. Two major issues identified as forming basis of both Defendants application. They are;

1. The first Claimant has no standing.

2. The second, third and fourth Claimants have no standing.

3. The claim is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of court process.

20. It has to be noted that the claim does not include any flaw or irregularity in the acquisition of land process under the land and Titles Act, hence, not an issue in this application.

Claim is frivolous, vexation and an abuse of Court process:

21. Perhaps it is ideal to address this sub-heading first before the other two. Rule 9.75 says, if it can be established and acceded by the Court, that the claim is frivolous and or vexatious, the Court may exercise its discretionary power to dismiss the claim, or generally[1]. In such an application, no evidence is admissible and the Court commonly looks at the pleadings and particulars[2]. However, the Court may receive evidence on hearing of an application for an order under R.9.75. Strictly speaking the Court can accept evidence when considering such application.

22. In exercising its discretion to strike out, the Court should doso only in plain and obvious cases[3] and where no reasonable amendment would cure the defect. Such an application is only appropriate where it is clear that the statement of claim as it stands is insufficient, even if proved, to entitle the plaintiff to what he asks (Chow v Attorney General CC127 of 2000.) The jurisdiction should be exercised where the claim is devoid of all merit and cannot possibly succeed[4]. So long as the statement of claim disclose some cause of action, or raise some question fit to be decided at trial the mere fact it is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking out[5]. The test is set out in the case of Norman v Mathews[6] by Lush J, who stated,

"In order to bring a case within the description it is not sufficient merely to say that the Plaintiff has no cause of action. It must appear that his alleged cause of action is one which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide, and content that he had a grievance which he was entitled to bring before the Court".

23. There are three areas which the Court is urged to review. The first is in respect of a letter dated the 30th June 2014 in which the Chairman of the Board informed the first Defendant of the decision to grant a conditional mining licence. The conditions imposed were (a) proper identification of landowners and land acquisition (b) carrying out community awareness, and (c) Mining licence application be reviewed by a third person. And that the Attorney-General was given time frame to complete the requirements requested.

24. The fundamental of the letter was purposely to securing assurance that the first Defendant's application for mining lease had been approved by the Board. It will be finally granted when the conditions have been fulfilled. Once those conditions had been fulfilled by certain time frame, then a Mining lease is free from any encumbrances, hence it be issued forthwith. It is incumbent on the Chairmen to state that the first condition is critical for obtaining surface access agreement. That had been obtained and executed on 10th April 2014, two and half months back. It is seen as unnecessary at that stage to reverse the process back. Retrospectively the Surface Access Agreement was accomplished and executed after community awareness and consultation program had been done and landowners being identified. Visibly there is no point to review the application for mining lease if the Board had satisfied in its current form and had approved it. There should be nothing more left than granting of the mining lease. If there are irregularities in the application form which need to be reviewed then it is of no sense to approve with conditions. The best option is delay approval until irregularities are cured.

25. Another point of misconception is in respect of land acquisition which the Chairman also blindly uttered in his letter. The Mines and Minerals Act made it plain in S.32 that Surface Access Agreement can be obtained before or after the Mining lease is issued. Where Mining lease is accepted and the applicant has not previously acquired surface access rights, the Minister will inform the applicant in writing his intention to issue the mining lease pending acquisition of surface access rights. In this case the surface access rights had been obtained 2½ months ago, that should not be used as a condition for issuing a full Mining lease.

26. Acquisition of land in terms of compulsory acquisition pursuant to Part 5 Division 2 of the Land and Titles Act can only be done where no prospect of negotiation is concluded on the basis acceptable to the parties, or where the delay at arriving at a satisfactory settlement is not in the public interest. Only then, can the Minister in consultation with Minister in charge of Lands and Titles Act, require the Commissioner of lands to conduct a compulsory acquisition process. The Act does not mention land acquisition process in Part 5 Division 1which is an acquisition by private treaty, a most common process.

27. However where a surface access agreement has been obtained, there is no need for any acquisition process for registration of land. The Mines and Minerals Act is quite plain and very simple about it.

28. It is obvious that Officials from the Ministry of Mines do not know their roles. Unfortunately not well versed with the Mines and Minerals Act and the Regulations. The content of the Chairmen's letter could not have ever thought of by such a decision making body. It would have been better to forgo it because the Minister eventually and formally approved the first Defendant's application for mining lease.

29. The next question ought to ask is, if a review should be done on the decision of the Chairman and the Board, will it change the circumstances and fatal to the mining lease granted to the first Defendant. In my opinion arguments premise on those irregularities will not alter the determination by the Mining Board to approve the mining lease. What seemed transpired is a mere administrative shortfall or lack of understanding the law rather than technical defects which can be tested by trial of the matter. In any event those administrative irregularities are not fatal to the grant of the mining lease and are minimal to change the entire circumstance. The letter by the Minister on 5th September 2015 affirmed the true intention of those responsible to administer processes pertaining to application for mining lease.

30. The point of contention is, there was no consultation between the Minister and the Board on whether the conditions attached to the grant of Mining lease had been fulfilled. I ought to reiterate again that the conditions are not necessary because the surface access agreement had been obtained. Conditions (1) and (2) are part of the processes indulged in before surface access agreement was endorsed. Condition (3) again is not necessary. The Board by consensus a willing stakeholder to grant mining lease. There is no particularisation of which areas in the application for mining lease which ought to be reviewed by a third party. That ambiguity implicates lack of knowledge of the Mines and Minerals Act. Take away the conditions as being perceived minimal, take away the administrative ignorant, the letter by the Minister granting mining lease should prevail. Only if the Court finds the claim is frivolous and vexatious, then it is an abuse of Courts process. In this case it is.

Development Consent:

31. Another front which the Claimants challenge was the issuant of the development consent. There is no copy of such document on file neither attached to any sworn statement deposed. All that is in the file is an endorsed document by two persons as a submission against the grant of development consent to the first Defendant. The report on the outset, demean or disqualify collections and gathering of information, data and research result in entrenchment in the report. The Claimants adduce that grant of development consent is based on Environment Regulations. It also does not meet the requirements of S.23 of the Act. Failure to meet minimum environment standard in terms of marine environment issues and terrestrial biodiversity issues.

32. If facts in terms of information and data's, as prescribed, do not convince the Director of Environment, then there should not be any grant of development consent at all. It is public knowledge that whoever appointed to such a technical position, must no doubt possesses specific qualification or technical know-how before being considered for appointment. To undermine the work of a technical person in the Government Sector by comparing to a scientific report, a precedent gathered from an unknown source and endorsed; does not speak well of the author whether the document is authentic or a print out of someone's property rights (hope is not violation of that right).

33. It is my personal conviction that the Director of Environment has been dealing and issuing development consent in other occasions concerning logging and mining in Solomon Islands. Experience gained from past dealings can be accounted for and useful this time again.

34. The question is, if the environment impact assessment is insufficient and that could not possibly convince the Director to issue the development Consent then it has to be shown that the environment impact assessment is insufficient and that the Director is a person incompetent to perform his duties. This boils down to an embarrassing state, where someone who does not know the background and the qualification of the Director, to insist that the content of any environment impact assessment is insufficient to guide the Director to his right mind whether to grant development consent or not. This may be an issue, however, is it sufficient ground to end or suspend the operation by the first Defendant. Or is it that it can be cured by amendment or a kind of structural administrative understanding to mould proper and acceptable outcome? This is one of the administrative and technical area, which is my opinion, should there are some shortfall yet cannot change the circumstance at all.

35. Mining activities operated on West Rennell is an open cast mining with collection of conglomerated of soil and bauxite ore, and it is this mixture in tonnes normally exported, leaving some kind of land damages. I also note from the report that thickness of deposit is approximately 10 metres, an average 2 - 4 metres. Generally, there can be a lot of damages to the rest of the environment. All these with no doubt had been made available before the Director who had considered and had made his decision by granting the development consent.

Customary Land Ownership

36. It is not a contentious issue that the second, third and the fourth Claimants have rights to certain customary lands located within West Rennell by virtue of decisions from the Chiefs, Local Courts and Customary Land Appeal Court.

37. Ownership by one man (not clan or tribe) is a right acquired in person, and inheritance of that right descended through the children. In most cases rights to land are jointly own by descendants through either male or female of a tribe or clan.

38. The argument pose by the Claimants is that they are the landowners of the respective lands they won in the various courts or Chiefs. They further claim that they have no knowledge of any awareness programme nor did being informed to attend any public forum discussing the issue of surface access agreement and mining. Therefore what transpired in the end is that their lands are among other lands canopied by the tentacle of the mining lease. If those who deal with the first Defendant are not the right owners then the Claimants should utilize s.12 and 13 of the Local Court Act and go before the Chiefs and utilize their rights to their lands. See Simbe –v- North Choiseul Area Council.[7]

39. The flaw of that assertion is that whilst they can be able to maintain their rights of ownership, there was no control of other family members who gave consent by signing the surface access agreement at the initial stage for prospecting licence in 2008 and later as well. In the sworn statement of Solomon Maui filed on 21st January, 2015, deposed in paragraph 14 stating that the Surface Access Agreement executed on 10th November 2008, Pastor Steward Puia, Reverend Jeffery Saueha – second Claimant's uncles signed on his behalf. Mr Topua who is third Claimant's elder brother signed on behalf of the Third Claimant and Cassidy Seguika, Festus Jimmy is fourth Claimants' brothers who signed on behalf of the fourth Claimant.

40. Later in another sworn statement by Mr Maui filed on 9th February 2015, deposed at paragraph 8 that the Claimants and other landowners filed a submission objecting granting of the Mining Lease. With the list of objectors, some also signed the surface access agreement around April 2014. Their names are: Jimmy Puia, David Tago, Steward Puia, Christian Tagaibasa, Joseph Taupongi, Jeffery Suianiu, AjilonNasiu, Tiki Oea, Elliot Tepai, Chris Tagailisasaand George Taukona.

41. To ascertain the truth, cross check was made with the names in the annexures exhibited in SM1; seem to confirm the truth in Mr Maui's sworn statement.

42. It would appear the mining project had divided members of the same families, clans and tribes. No cause is explainable; any guess would be presumptive. But it is something they should sort out themselves. May be because the mindset preferred other Mining Company than the first Defendant. In any event, it seems there will always be a conflict within the families.

43. I also noted that objections filed by the objectors were beyond thirty (30) days. Regulations 5-7 allow objectors to grant of prospecting mining lease to submit their objections to the Minister within thirty (30) days. According to Mr Maui's sworn statement filed on 9th February 2015, there were no objections filed with the Minister at all.

44. To rely on claim of ownership to land to derail the mining lease granted to the first Defendant achieves no strength. Expectation that full family or clan to support one another did not occur. In this case, it works the opposite; some members of the family supports, others objected, thus weakening the claim of ownership to land. No one denies rights of ownership given by the courts, but the contradictory support given weakens the claimants' standing.

45. Armed with the ownership right, the Claimants seek to quash the decision of the Minister and the Board for granting mining lease to the first Defendant. Their reasons for doing so are unmeritorious and lack subsistence. Their privilege to challenge the grants had gone; was not fully utilised either.

46. It has to be noted that s.32 of the Mines and Minerals Act provides simple procedure to adhere to. Sub-section 4 says... "once a commercial discovery has been made; the Director may consult with the applicant (first Defendant) to enter into negotiations with the landowners, or any person, or groups of persons having interest in land to acquire surface access rights, so that payments can be made for surface rental and compensation for damage." That has already been done. There are signatures to the surface access agreement.

47 Where there is no dispute and agreement is reached, and that has been reduced to writing, it shall be an evidence of the names of the landowners having rights over the lands. If there is dispute as to land ownership; two options is available, one go to the Chiefs and secondly, challenge the finding by lodging objections to the Minister within one month from the date ... the surface access agreement was executed. From records, I do not seem to identify infirmities or irregularities, hence the claim of trespass cannot be sustained. From the submissions on behalf of the Claimants, am afraid only one issue is contested; that although the Claimants' lands were included in the Surface Access Agreement, granted on 10th November 2008, Claimants 2-4 were not paid any money. Their concern now is not as to who develop the lands but its money, whoever offers and better offer. If that is the fundamental etiologic for instituting this civil litigation, then it would be best to abandon the approach.

First Claimant's Standing:

48. Paragraph 1 of the statement of case outlines the prime functions of the first Claimant. It pleads that the first Claimant is an Association set up to oversee the interest of all landowning families and groups in West Rennell. It is submitted that the first Claimant has been mandated to represent the interest of the second, third and fourth Claimants in this case.
49.
In contrasting that statement to the Preamble of the Constitution, in particular paragraph 4, there is conflict of territorial jurisdiction from which the Constitution will apply. Preamble 1-3 mention West Rennell whilst Preamble 4 includes Rennell Island as a whole. The same can be cited in Section 4.1 which defines the Board shall comprise trustees representing all political wards in Rennell. If it was the intention of the Association to serve the people of Rennell Island as a whole, then the title of the Constitution should focus to reflect that, and not to confine to West Rennell resources owners only. As it stands, there is ambiguity as to the jurisdiction whereby which the Constitution should apply, whether on West Rennell alone, or including the whole island of Rennell.

50. The second flaw is clearly pointed out in Section 3.1 of the Constitution; and it relates to membership. It is the first time cited in a legal document that women are described as not eligible to be members of the Association, only man in singular grammar. Is that not discriminating womenfolk in West Rennell or Rennell as a whole? There is no provision in the Constitution that provides for gender and number that words importing masculine gender include females. That section confines membership to tribe, clan or sub-clan in West Rennell. Section 3.2 states only members who paid subscription membership fees are entitled to vote. There is no provision in the Constitution either in the preamble nor in the objective and powers, mandated the Board or any member of the Board of the Association to represent the members in any Court proceedings, should a legal issue arise involving any customary land on West Rennell. With no mandating provision, the first Claimant lacks standing in any Court of law.

51. Furthermore, S.2 of the Mines and Minerals Act expressly define that all minerals of every description whatsoever is deemed to have been vested in the people and the Government of Solomon Islands. See Malaita Ma'asina Forum Trust Board Inc. and others –v- Attorney General and Others[8]. It stated:

"..The principles governing the issue of locus standi are clear. It has always been an important limitation on the availability of remedies that they are awarded only to those who have sufficient standing. The law starts from the position that the remedies are correlative with rights and only those whose rights are at risk are eligible to come to Court and seek remedies and no one else. To do otherwise would open flood gates for much litigation. It is not in the public interest that should be so. This simply means that only persons whose rights are under threat have standing to seek remedies. Otherwise, they do not have that."

52. The Constitution which accommodates rights of landowners did not mandate the first Claimant to represent them but a provision entrenched for that purpose. It is not enough to purportedly represent people who have not given it authority to represent them.

53. Another point is that the first Claimant has not been properly constituted and in breach of the condition of its registration. In granting the registration, the Registrar of Companies imposed a condition that trustees allowable at one time should be not more than 6 no less than 2. However, Section 4.1 (b) of the Constitution provides that the Board shall comprise twelve (12) trustees representing all Wards in Rennell Island. That is contrary to the conditions imposed; a contravention to the Registrar's direction and order. Whether such is fatal to the registration or not, is a question of applicability. Whist the Registrar might thought the Association is limited to members of West Rennell landowners, in fact exposes a different and a broader application to canvass the whole of Rennell Island, so they need twelve Board Members. In any event, to rely on a conflict situation surely utilise such registration as a shield to implement hidden agenda in contrary to the intention of the Constitution. That, in my respectable view, should not be permitted, and registration of West Rennell Resource Owners Association should not be done at all, it was done in contravention to the Registrar's direction.

54. I therefore exercises powers conferred upon this Court by R 3.7, rule the first Claimant is not a party and has no locus standi to be a party in this civil suit. The reason being its presence is not necessarily to enable Court to make a decision fairly and effectively, the first Claimant should be removed with the claims purportedly relating to it.

Standing of the Second, Third and Fourth Claimants

55. Paragraphs 3-4 of this ruling outline Claimants 2-4'spositions, their membership related to a landowning group, and describe which customary land they own. From paragraph 6 of the sworn statement of Mr Tohaika filed on 24th November 2014, clearly stated that there are six Wards on West Rennell. By a map Exh. JT-13 shows three customary lands which the Claimants 2-4 represent are located within Wards 4 and 5. So it is apparent they do not represent landowners who own customary lands in Wards 1,2,3 and 6 in West Rennell. Notwithstanding that, the Claimants 2-4 do not represent all customary landowners from West Rennell. Yet they sought Order 6 in the amended judicial review for the Court to restrain the first Defendant, its servants, agents, any person acting under its authority from entering digging or removal of grounds, construction roads, cutting trees or transporting of soil from geagu/babogaho, niua, tigoa and pauta customary lands within Wards 3,4,5 and 6.

56. What Claimants 2-4 are saying is that they represent landowning groups from two Wards (Ward 4 and 5), but claim their rights of representative include other groups who own customary lands located within Wards 1,2,3, and 6. That can't be. As Claimants, their representative is well accounted for in this case. They cannot include their representation to cover other customary lands. That was not pleaded and not defined in their standing as representing a group of landowners, which qualifies them to be a party in this case.

57. Again the representative authority was misused by the Claimant 2-4. The Ma'asina Forum case sets precedent that only persons whose rights are under threat have standing to seek redress. Simply Claimants 2-4 can only represent their landowning groups as they stated in this case. They are not entitled to represent other landowning group. It's none of their business. They have their own tribesmen and clans men to seek remedy if their rights are under threat. To attempt to represent whole of West Rennell landowners with many customary lands, and which not authorised to do so, is a service in futile, it can't be. Logic dictates that Claimants 2-4 has no standing in that course.

58. On another level, Rule 3.42 requires a representative to proof of entitlements to represent in custom. The Rule reads;

"Any person entitled in custom to represent a community, tribe, line or group within Solomon Islands, may sue or be sued on behalf of as representing the community, line or group. But the Court, on application of any party, or on its own initiative, may require that person to provide proof their entitlements in custom to act on such a representative before any further step in the proceeding may take place."

59. The above requirement is an onus on Claimants 2-4 who must discharge. They have failed to plead and failed to show in evidence to substantiate their entitlement in custom. Acceptable practice in Court is anyone entitle in custom to represent line, group or community must show in tangible evidence that he was authorised by that line, group and community. Normally, a minute of a meeting of a line, group or community, show they have unanimously agreed and authorised certain persons to represent them in any Court proceedings.

60. Claimants 2-4 had failed to adduce such material and tangible evidence entitling them to represent geagu/bapogabo, niua, tigoa and pauta clans or tribes. In the absence of that, they are not entitled, therefore, disqualified to represent those clans and tribes. Hence they have no standing or right to represent them in this Court.

Claim for account and royalties.

61. I have decided that all the Claimants have no standing or locus standi to come to Court. Their claims as being entitled to represent their families, descendants and owners of three customary lands in West Rennel have been dismissed.

62. The issue as to who owns the Minerals is well covered in this application. Section 2 (2) of the Mines and Minerals Act is indeed adhered to and well applied. That unmined minerals are owned by the people and Government of Solomon Islands collectively and not by one individual. Any person being a holder of mining lease, by that, extracted mineral ore in the area subject to mining lease that he obtains the property in that mined minerals.

63. Customary claim as to rights to mineral ore is well expounded in paragraphs 36 to 48 in this Ruling. For certain, the Claimants do not have proprietary interest in any minerals in or mined from within Wards 3, 4, 5 and 6. See Ma'asina Forum Trust Board Inc. –v- Attorney General[9]and Knight –v- Attorney General[10]. The Claimants claim in this instance for account and royalty be struck out and dismissed as well.

64. In conclusion, I could draw opinion that all the Claimants have not being well prepared to come to Court. They seem to be in a state of rush. The firs Claimant was incorporated 53 days after the Development Consent was granted, which it seek to quash, and 12 days after the first resolution of the Mines and Mineral's Board which it seeks to quash. The purpose of incorporating the first Claimant was to flaw and to challenge those decisions. In Court, one has to be well prepared before instituting a civil suit. In almost all cases, a party has to comply with the Court Rules and Law as a preliminary requirement. No one should be rushed to the Court and seek remedy. You won't achieve it. You need time to think, what are the preliminaries and laws that you have to comply or fulfilled before you can be fully sure that you are well prepared before coming to Court. The situation the Claimants now face or confronted reflects a seeming unpreparedness, therefore not complied with Rules and Laws. I have no hesitation to determine they all have no locus standi or standing to come to Court.

ORDERS:

1. Order that all Claimants have no locus standi to come to Court.

2. Order that the claim be struck out and be dismissed in its entirety for being frivolous and vexatious and abuse of court process.

3. Cost is payable to all the Defendants on standard basis.

THE COURT.

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^[1]Hubbuch v Wilkinson (1899) 1 Q.B 86, 91
^[2] Wenlock v Moloney (1965) 1 W.L.R 12, 38.
^[3] Ibid (1)
^[4] Willis v Beauchamp (1886) 11 P.D .59
^[5] Moor v Lawson (1915) 31 T.L.R 418
^[6] (1919) 85 L.J.KB 857 Lush J.
^[7] .CA-CCA NO.8 of 1997 (Unreported)
^[8] (2014) SBHC 12
^[9] (2014) SBHC 2
^[10] (2005) SBHC 6