Wale v Attorney-General [2014] SBHC 148; HCSI-CC 337 of 2014 (14 November 2014)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
Civil Case no. 337 of 2014
(Civil Jurisdiction)

Mathew Wale
The First Claimant

And

Solomon Islands Democratic Party
The Second Claimant

V

Attorney-General (Representing the Political Parties Commission)
The First Defendant

And

The Attorney-General (Representing the Registrar of Political Parties)
The Second Defendant

Hearing: 10 November 2014
Judgment: 14 November 2014

Mr. G. Suri for the First and Second Claimants
Mr. J. Muria (Jnr.) and S. Banuve (Solicitor General) for the First and Second Defendants.

PALMER CJ:

1. The first claimant, Mathew Wale ("the Claimant") seeks declaratory orders pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution under section 18 and Chapter 15.9 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 ("the Rules") as follows:
   

"A. Whether section 45(1) - (3) of the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No.9 of 2014) is contrary to section 13 of the national Constitution to the extent that the said section 45(1) – (3):

(i) prohibits the First Claimant from contesting the Aoke Langalanga Constituency as a candidate of the Second Claimant, in association with other interested persons?

(ii) prohibits the Second Claimant from participating in the 2014 National General Election, and hence hinders the First Claimant and other interested persons, without their consent, from being selected, endorsed and nominated as the candidates of the Second Claimant at the 2014 National General Elections?

B. Whether section 19(2) of Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No. 9 of 2014) is contrary to section 13 of the national Constitution to the extent that section 19(2)(a) only allows persons registered under the National Parliament Electoral Provisions Act (Cap. 87) to belong to a political party?

C. Whether the Second Claimant, being an unregistered political party, is a "non-contesting party" within the purport and meaning of that expression as intended by section 55(1) – (2) read in conjunction with section 2 of the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No. 9 of 2014).

D. Whether sections 53, 54 or any other provision in the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No. 9 of 2014) prohibits the Second Claimant, being an unregistered political party, from forming a coalition or signing a coalition agreement with a registered political party and/or with any independent or a group of independent Members of Parliament?"

2. The first question is in two parts. The first part in essence avers that section 45(1) - (3) of the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No.9 of 2014) ("the PPI Act") contravenes the rights of the Claimant to freely associate with other persons and to form or belong to a political party, in this case the Solomon Islands Democratic Party ("the Second Claimant").
   
3. The second part avers that section 45(1) – (3) infringes the rights of the Claimant by preventing him from contesting as a candidate of the Second Claimant.
   

Infringement of section 13 of the Constitution

4. The issue which arises under this provision by virtue of section 45(1) – (3) is whether the right of the Claimant to freely associate with other persons to form and belong to a political party (the Second Claimant) has been contravened?
   
5. Section 13(1) of the Constitution makes clear that the freedom of assembly and association to form or belong to a political party is a fundamental and unfettered right[1]. It is also recognized as an inherent and inalienable right under the International Bill of Human Rights (1978) and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)[2]. Except with the consent of the individual, no one has the right to hinder a person's right of freedom of assembly and association, including which political party he wishes to affiliate with.
   
6. To that extent the right of the First Claimant to be affiliated with the political party of his own choosing cannot be suppressed save by process of law. Those exceptions are more particularly spelled out in subsection 13(2) of the Constitution as follows:
   

"(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision –

(a) to the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;

(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons; or

(c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers,

and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society."

7. The first question to be considered is whether there has been an infringement of that right. But even if the answer is in the positive, the court is still required to consider whether that infringement falls within the exceptions set out in subsection 13(2). If that is the case, the Claimant is further required to show that it is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
   

The freedom of assembly and association.

8. In this particular case this freedom includes the right of an individual to form a political party or to belong to a party. In the Special Reference By Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (ibid) ("the Fly River Special Reference") at paragraph 159, the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea pointed out:
   

"A person's right to hold political beliefs and to enjoy that right individually or in association with likeminded persons, ought not be restricted or prohibited in any democracy."

9. I do not think there is any real dispute about the importance of this freedom as giving rise to fundamental rights to form or belong to a political party.
   

The requirement of registration under section 45 of the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 to contest elections

10. Section 45 of the PPI Act provides as follows:
    

"(1) Unless a political party is registered under this Act, it shall not be eligible to participate in an election and is prohibited from selecting, endorsing or nominating any person as its candidate for election to Parliament.

(2) Unless a person is endorsed or selected by a political party registered under this Act, no person shall contest an election as a candidate of a political party.

(3) Any selection, endorsement or nomination that contravenes this selection is invalid.

(4) Notwithstanding subsection (2), a person may stand as an independent candidate, if he or she is duly nominated as such in accordance with the provisions of the National Parliament Electoral Provisions Act (Cap. 87)."

11. The issue which arises in relation to this section is whether this requirement of registration of a political party infringes the freedom of assembly and association of the Claimant in particular to form or to belong to a party; in this case the Second Claimant.
    
12. This poses an interesting situation for while on one hand it requires a party to be registered to contest and to field candidates in the elections, the effect is that only parties registered can actively participate in an election apart from the category of a non-contesting party, who may be registered but decides not to contest in the election. A party that decides not to register is prohibited by law from participating in the elections and fielding party candidates.
    
13. The question that arises from this is whether that decision by a political party not to register can be equated with, or as amounting to an infringement of the rights of an individual to form or join a political party of his choosing. Are these the same or different?
    
14. To answer this important question, one needs to start with the purpose and objectives of the PPI Act 2014 as well as the law making power of Parliament under section 59 of the Constitution to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Solomon Islands subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
    
15. We enjoy a constitutional democracy where the Constitution is supreme and Parliament obligated to enact laws that do not contravene any Constitutional provisions.
    
16. The importance of recognizing the authority of Parliament to pass laws for the peace, order and good government of Solomon Island is as pointed out by learned Counsel Mr. Muria (Jnr) consequential to the "unsung constitutional obligation" of the State to maintain peace, order and good governance of the country in consort with the paramount duty to protect and properly govern its people.
    
17. In his submissions in opposition to the claim that section 45 of the PPI Act contravenes the freedom of assembly and association of the Claimant, Mr Muria (Jnr) argues that the relevant sections challenged should be viewed from the outset as being in order, consistent with, or in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and that the burden of proof lies with the Claimant to show they infringe his rights, do not come under the exceptions and are such as not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
    
18. I would agree with him on this as the appropriate approach to be taken and that the burden of proof lies with the Claimant. This type of approach was also adopted or used by Judge Miller in the case of Beck v. Edmonton (City), 1993 CanLII 7135 (AB QB) ("Beck's Case"), in which it is referred to as the threshold issue. In that case his Lordship was dealing with the case of a licensed taxi cab operator, Beck who challenged the requirement of a Bylaw introduced by the Edmonton City Council, which required all taxi cab operators to enter into a contractual agreement with a taxi cab broker before they could be issued with a registered taxi cab license plate. Beck argued that the requirement contravened his right under section 2(d) of the Charter of Canada, which guarantees the right of "freedom of association" in Canada.
    
19. Judge Miller in dealing with that question approached it by raising the threshold question at para. 25, "whether in a particular case it is appropriate for the legislature to require persons with similar interests in a particular area to become part of a single group to foster those interests. To put it another way, one must ...first be satisfied that the "compelled combining of efforts towards a common end" is required to "further the collective social welfare"."
    
20. His Lordship continued at para. 25 of his judgment as follows:
    

"Where such a combining of efforts is required, and where the government is acting with respect to individuals whose association is already "compelled by the facts of life", such as in a workplace, the individual's freedom of association will not be violated unless there is a danger to a specific liberty interest ....This approach only applies, however, so long as the association is acting in furtherance of the cause which justified its creation. Where the association acts outside this sphere, different considerations arise."

21. His Lordship ruled against the Bylaw as infringing the rights of Beck under the Charter in requiring him to be associated with a broker as a pre-condition of operating his cab. He held that the "collective social welfare" sought to be achieved through that association was not necessary. The same objectives can still be achieved without having to be compelled under the Bylaw.
    
22. Beck had argued that he had a right to not associate and preferred to run as an independent cab operator under the legislation. The judge also found in his favour that the requirement cannot be demonstratively justified in a free and democratic society.
    
23. I have gone into some length in analyzing Beck's Case to highlight the importance of the approach taken and as being relevant in this instance, that of raising the threshold issue or question, which I would phrase as follows. Does the requirement of registration of a political party under section 45 fall within the exceptions set out in subsection 13(2) of the Constitution and has it been shown that it is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. In other words, is the compelled registration of political parties necessary, reasonable, appropriate and will it foster the collective will inter alia, public safety, public order, the public welfare and enhance the public interest of the people of Solomon Islands?
    
24. Learned Counsel Mr. Suri argues that the PPI Act does not fall within the exceptions provided for in subsection 13(2) of the Constitution. He argues that the only exception which may possibly be relied on is the exception under public order. He submits however that when the definition of public order is considered in the light of breaches of public peace and respect for the rule of law in society or public place, the PPI Act cannot by any standards be regarded as giving effect to those objectives.
    
25. Mr. Muria (Jnr.) on the other hand submits that the PPI Act is necessary having regard to the period of political instability in government and for the purposes of giving effect to the public interest, public order and public welfare of the people of Solomon Islands. He submits that the law is necessary to give effect to the general welfare of the people of Solomon Islands and providing stability in government.
    
26. He says the Act is necessary to require that the State be provided with basic information of political parties as set out in the Act to avoid confusion in the electorate and that correct information is available to the electorate when exercising their right to vote.
    
27. Mr. Muria (Jnr.) submits the court should take into account the fluid nature of the political situation in the country and the political instability.
    
28. He submits that the PPI Act is very much an addendum to the Constitution to facilitate the legal framework and formal establishment of political parties in Solomon Islands. It seeks to provide for the development of the political party system with the intention to improve political governance in Solomon Islands.
    

Public Order, Public Interest and Public Welfare

29. I have had the opportunity to carefully consider the exceptions spelled out in section 13(2) and the constructions sought to be placed, in particular that of public order, which had been relied on by Counsel Suri for the Claimant and the constructions placed on the words public interest and public welfare by Counsel Muria (Jnr.). While the terms public interest and public welfare are not expressly included in subsection 13(2), it is important to point out that the requirement of public interest is an overriding interest set out in section 3 of the Constitution and in my view, any constructions of the exceptions in subsection 13(2) should be read with this in mind.
    
30. As well, although the term public welfare is not expressly mentioned I do not think it is irrelevant in this case for it would seem to be intrinsically intertwined with the concepts of public interest and public order. If it is in the public interest or order, it must surely have the public welfare, the well-being, good order, peace, success and prosperity of society in mind.
    
31. And so when the question is phrased in that context, whether the requirements of registration of political parties under section 45 of the PPI Act, will further enhance, protect or secure the public order, public interest and public welfare of the people of Solomon Islands, I would have to agree with the submissions of Mr. Muria (Jnr.) on this, a fortiori, in the light of events that occurred not so long ago, which I take judicial notice of, in the election of former Prime Minister Snyder Rini in April 2006, the riots which occurred thereafter, the near total destruction of China Town when a lot of shops were burnt and the threats to life, liberty and property which occurred. There was an unfortunate state of lawlessness, criminal activities, mindless looting and a state of uncertainty and instability which persisted at that time and but for the timely intervention of the police with the assistance of the Participating Police Force it could easily have spread to other parts of the City.
    
32. Whenever there is mention of public order, I do not think it can be separated from issues of crime, law and order, peace and stability. These are necessarily tied and linked.
    
33. Whenever there is an indication of movements or changes in political party membership, leadership and formations of government, the country goes into a period of heightened uncertainty, tension and alertness. I do not think anyone can ignore this reality on the ground and the direct links to party formation, membership, existence and activity.
    
34. I agree with submissions of Mr. Muria that the objectives of the PPI Act capture this aspect well as follows:
    

"(a) to provide a framework for the registration, administration, operation and development of political parties as corporate bodies operating under democratic principles and values;

(b) to enhance and facilitate the development and administration of political parties and promote integrity in their operation; and

(c) to constitute a political parties system for the purposes of improving political governance towards a more stable, tolerant and understanding Solomon Islands."

35. I accept these are noble goals to be supported, strengthened, improved upon and enhanced. Having clear guidelines put in place for the administration, supervision and control of political parties can only improve political certainty, focus and stability in governance in Solomon Islands, and in turn public confidence in leadership and governance issues, which in my view are directly connected to issues of law and order, safety, security and the general welfare and well-being of the community.
    
36. In Beck's Case, Judge Miller points out in para. 24 of his judgment that "...there are associations which are accepted because they are integral to the very structure of society. Given the complexity and expansive mandate of modern government, it seems clear that some degree of involuntary association beyond the very basic foundation of the nation state will be constitutionally acceptable, where such association is generated by the workings of society in pursuit of the common interest."
    
37. While membership of a political party is a matter of conscience[3] and choice of an individual citizen, and the formation and establishment of political parties remain as purely voluntary associations, their role and function in the fabric of our constitutional democracy cannot be overstated enough. The very structure of the formation and workings of government in terms of the three groupings of Government, Opposition and Independence demonstrate that the existence and role of political parties is inherently embedded in the structure of our constitutional democracy. Any legislation therefore which seeks to strengthen and enhance the role that political parties perform and are expected to perform in a more transparent, responsible and accountable manner can only support the overriding public interest, public order and welfare of the people of Solomon Islands.
    
38. In Beck's Case, Judge Miller also made reference as an aside to the freedom to not associate as it applied to lawyers and doctors by joining the Law Society or the College of Physicians and Surgeons. In his response to this issue, he agreed with the submission that it was in the overriding public interest to compel lawyers and doctors to associate with their professional associations to maintain standards. He also pointed out that if the legislation told them who to practice with, that it would probably be overstepping the Charter of freedom of association. The judge in that case formed the view that the infringement can be overcome by the need to maintain standards in the public interest.
    
39. In a similar situation involving a requirement of registration of lawyers in Papua New Guinea to the Papua New Guinea Law Society, the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea in Karingu, Enforcement of Rights Pursuant Constitution S57 [1988] PGSC 18; [1988-1989] PNGLR 277 (4 August 1989) found that the compulsory requirement to join or become a member of Papua New Guinea Law Society, contravened the rights of freedom of association of the Applicant under section 47 of the Constitution. That decision however, in my view can be distinguished on the basis that while it compelled the Applicant to join with an association, the Law Society and restricted his rights to not associate with the Law Society, in this instant the PPI Act required political parties wishing to contest in the elections to be registered but did not compel an individual as to who to associate with. The right to belong or not to belong to a political party, which entails the element of choice and conscience, in this case, in my view is preserved and not violated.
    
40. Another case also touched on by Judge Miller, the case of Sigurjonsson v. Iceland (June 30, 1989), "The London Times" July 27, 1993, European Court of Human Rights, can also be distinguished on the facts in this case. In that case, a taxi cab driver complained that an Icelandic law which required him to join a particular trade union as a condition for granting of a taxi cab license was a violation of his rights under arts. 9, 10, and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
    
41. Again in this instance, it would seem to me that the right of the Claimant to join a particular political party of his choice is preserved. What the Act requires is that a political party should be registered if it wants to nominate a candidate in an election, otherwise a person wishing to participate in the elections without having his party registered can do so as an independent. I do not think these amount to the same thing and are separate and distinct.
    
42. This brings me next to compare similar provisions, section 27(1)(a) and (b) in Papua New Guinea under the provisions of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates ("OLIPPAC"), which provides as follows:
    

"(1) A political is required toed to register under Part 4 where &#821>

(a) i(a) it intends to nominate a candidate for election to the Parli; or

(b) it intends to endorse a candidandidate; or...."

43. At para. 159 of the Fly River Special Reference, after making the following observations:
    

"A person' right to hold political beliefs and to enjoy that right individually or in association with likeminded persons, ought not be restricted or prohibited in any democracy."

the Supreme Court went on to make the following pertinent observations at para. 160 as follows:

"OLIPPAC requires a political party that intends to nominate candidates in general elections to be registered with the Commission. Incorporation of a political party under the Associations Incorporation Act (Ch. 142) is a prerequisite for registration under OLIPPAC. Such registration of political parties under OLIPPAC in no way alters the voluntary nature of the political parties and their membership and activities.

161. Under OLIPPAC, a person who is a member of the party, may voluntarily choose to be endorsed by a political party as a candidate or run as an independent." (Emphasis added).

44. What is pertinent to note, is that with a similar requirement of compulsory registration of a political party in Papua New Guinea, the Supreme Court made the observation that such registration under OLIPPAC did not alter the voluntary nature of political parties and their membership and activities. Secondly, the Supreme Court noted that a member of a party not endorsed as a candidate can still run as an independent.
    
45. The only slight distinction in the provision it seems with the PPI Act in Solomon Islands is that if a member of a non-registered party wishes to participate in the elections he can only do so as an independent. I concur with the view of the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea that that does not interfere with the voluntary nature of political parties, their membership and activities in this instance.
    
46. In a report by the European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Guidelines On Political Party Regulation dated 25th October 2010 ("the Guidelines Report") referred to in the submissions of Mr. Muria (Jnr.) the Commission also made some pertinent observations on the requirement of registration as follows:
    

"63. Any limitations on the exercise of free association and expression through the activities and formation of political parties must be consistent with relevant provisions in the international and regional instruments, including ICCPR and ECHR. The set of legitimate grounds under which freedom of association may be limited are restricted to:

"...such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others."

(Note, the set of legitimate grounds referred to here are encapsulated in subsection 13(2) of our Constitution.)

47. At paragraph 64, the Commission continued:
    

"64. Further, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently ruled that, due to their important role in the functioning of democracy, limitations on the formation of political parties should be used with extreme restraint and only when necessary in a democratic society. Given the requirements of proportionality, it must further be proved that any limitation is the least restrictive way of achieving a legitimate regulatory aim."

48. While the Commission noted that some OSCE states do not prescribe any requirements for registration or regulation of party activities, it went on to observe that given administrative necessities related to the functioning of democracy, it is fully justified for a state to enact regulations (often procedural in nature) for political party registration and formation.
    
49. Requirements for registration under the PPI Act therefore are not unique or unusual. At paragraph 65 which dealt with the sub-heading of "Political Party Registration", after observing that some states do not require registration of political parties and that a proper functioning democracy did not require registration, went on to say to make the following pertinent comments:
    

"However, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently ruled that requirements for registration do not, in themselves, represent a violation of the right to free association. As political parties may obtain certain legal privileges, based on their legal status, that are not available to other associations, it is reasonable to require the registration of political parties with a state authority."

50. I do not think this report could be any clearer. Requirements of registration are equally part of a proper functioning democracy to allow and foster the development of political party system in the country but also to better facilitate and enhance the administration of political parties for purpose of improving political governance and in turn a peaceful and stable society.
    
51. As long as the requirements for registration such as the name of the party, address, symbols, organizational structure, constitution etc. are reasonable, the requirement of registration does not infringe the freedom of association.
    
52. Finally, I wish to touch briefly on the exception of "public safety" which was not touched on by counsels in their submissions but which when considered in the light of the fluid nature of the political party situation in the country and the potential risks in political instability and civil unrest and disturbance as a consequence, it would seem that any restrictions imposed by the PPI Act can be legitimately excepted on grounds of public safety and security of people and property.
    

Has it been shown that section 45 is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society?

53. The burden of proof lies with the Claimant/Applicant to show that the provisions of section 45 are such as not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
    
54. In his submissions, Mr. Suri seeks to highlight the difference in the Papua New Guinea Constitution, which deals with the freedom of assembly and association.
    
55. He points out that subsection 47(a) expressly provides for reasonable provisions to be made in respect of registration of all or any associations. He argues that there is no such clause in section 13 of the Constitution and therefore the restriction imposed by section 45 on the registration of political parties to be not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
    
56. I do not need to re-canvass this point in detail for I have dealt with this issue comprehensively in this judgment pointing out that the requirements of registration and limitations imposed do not alter or interfere with the voluntary nature of political parties as to their membership and activities and that the provisions of section 45 do come within the exceptions of public, interest, public order and public safety and that it has not been shown that they not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
    

Section 19(2) of the PPI Act

57. Section 19(2) of the PPI Act requires that when registration of a political party is sought or done, that it must contain no less than 250 members who are registered voters in the register of voters list under the National Parliament Electoral Provisions Act (Cap. 87) and to be certified as such by the Electoral Commission as duly registered voters in a form and manner prescribed by the Commission.
    
58. The submission of Mr. Suri on this is that this requirement only allows registered voters to belong to a political party and therefore interferes with their right to form and belong to a political party but as correctly pointed out by Muria (Jnr.) in his submissions this is a standard requirement and sets out the minimum requirement. It does not prohibit membership of any others whether registered as voter or not to belong to a political party or to contest an election as an independent.
    
59. I take note of the sworn statement filed by the Registrar of Political Parties, Mr. Ziru in which he referred to similar provisions and requirements in other jurisdictions setting out minimum numbers. For instance in Australia, the minimum number is 500 registered members[4] per party, New Zealand 300 registered members[5] per party, Papua New Guinea 500 registered members[6] per party, and Fiji 5,000 members[7] per party.
    
60. The requirements of registration are separate and distinct to membership of a political party as already pointed out in this judgment and do not infringe the rights of association of the Claimant to belong to a party, whether registered or not. The decision to belong to a party is a matter of choice and conscience of the individual and has not been altered by the requirements of registration of political parties under the PPI Act for purposes of contesting an election.
    

Non-contesting party

61. Section 2 of the PPI Act, the definition section defines what a non-contesting party is. It means a registered political party who has decided not to contest an election. Sections 55 – 57 set out in more detail what a non-contesting party can and cannot do. In this instant, the question whether the second Defendant falls within that definition must clearly be answered in the negative.
    

Coalition Agreements

62. Sections 53 and 54 of the PPI Act seeks to control and monitor coalition agreements that can be entered into between or amongst political parties. Schedule 2 of the PPI Act sets out the minimum rules that must be inserted in any coalition agreement. I think it is a given that under that legislation only parties registered under the Act are allowed to enter into negotiations for a coalition agreement to be set up.
    
63. An unregistered political party by choice, is prohibited from entering into a coalition agreement with any registered political party or an independent member in the same way a registered political party is prohibited from entering into an agreement with any independent member or group of independent members of Parliament. It is important to bear in mind that the decision whether to register under the PPI Act or not is a matter of choice of a party. By deciding not to register, the party is deprived of the right to enter into coalition agreements by process of law.
    
64. I do not need to reiterate the rationale and wisdom for those provisions for they have been captured in the objectives[8] of the PPI Act and referred to in this judgment.
    
65. There is no infringement of the provisions of section 13 of the Constitution by virtue of that prohibition under sections 53 and 54 of the PPI Act.
    
66. The questions posed accordingly should be answered as follows:
    

A. Whether section 45(1) - (3) of the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No.9 of 2014) is contrary to section 13 of the national Constitution to the extent that the said section 45(1) – (3):

(i) prohibits the First Claimant from contesting the Aoke Langalanga Constituency as a candidate of the Second Claimant, in association with other interested persons?

Answer: No.

(ii) prohibits the Second Claimant from participating in the 2014 National General Election, and hence hinders the First Claimant and other interested persons, without their consent, from being selected, endorsed and nominated as the candidates of the Second Claimant at the 2014 National General Elections?

Answer: No.

B. Whether section 19(2) of Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No. 9 of 2014) is contrary to section 13 of the national Constitution to the extent that section 19(2)(a) only allows persons registered under the National Parliament Electoral Provisions Act (Cap. 87) to belong to a political party?

Answer: No.

C. Whether the Second Claimant, being an unregistered political party, is a "non-contesting party" within the purport and meaning of that expression as intended by section 55(1) – (2) read in conjunction with section 2 of the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No. 9 of 2014).

Answer: No.

D. Whether sections 53, 54, or any other provision in the Political Parties Integrity Act 2014 (No. 9 of 2014) prohibits the Second Claimant, being an unregistered political party, from forming a coalition or signing a coalition agreement with a registered political party and/or with any independent or a group of independent Members of Parliament?"

Answer: Yes.

The respondents have asked for costs in this matter and that is granted.

The Court.

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^[1] Solomon Islands National Union of Workers v. Honiara Town Council [1989] SBHC 20; [1988-1989] SILR 43 (15 August 1989), Ward CJ.
^[2] Referred to by the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea in the case Special Reference By Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates [201] PGSC 3; SC1057 (7 July 2010)
^[3] Special Reference By Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates [201] PGSC 3; SC1057 (7 July 2010)
^[4] Part XI of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918
^[5] Section 62 of the New Zealand Electoral Act 1993
^[6] Section 28 of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates 2003
^[7] Section 6(3) of The Political Parties (Regulation, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Decree 2013.
^[8] See paragraph 28 in the written submissions of Mr. Muria (Jnr.)