Regina v Manukama [2014] SBHC 143; HCSI-CRC 312 of 2012 (5 September 2014)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
PALLARAS J
Criminal Case Number 312 of 2012

R

V

BENJAMIN MANUKAMA

Coram: PALLARAS J
Crown: Mr A. Kelesi and Mr N. Dhita
Defence: Mr. A. Kesaka
Hearing Dates: 1 September, 2014
Verdict Delivered: 1 September, 2014 (orally) and
5 September, 2014 (in writing).

VERDICT

1. The accused was charged with one count of murder contrary to section 200 of the Penal Code [Cap. 26] in that it was alleged that he murdered his younger brother by stabbing him in the back with a large knife. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

2. After a short trial in which the Crown called only three witnesses and the Defence called no evidence at all, the accused was convicted of the offence as charged.

3. Even although the mandatory penalty upon a conviction for murder is a sentence of life imprisonment, Mr. Kesaka indicated that he wanted to address me before sentence was announced and that he wanted some time to prepare his submissions.

4. After announcing the verdict of guilty, I indicated to the accused that the matter would be adjourned so as to enable his counsel to prepare his submissions. I explained to him that the mandatory penalty for murder was a sentence of life imprisonment and that he should not expect anything else upon the return date. He was remanded in custody for sentencing to a date to be determined.

5. While I gave short reasons prior to announcing the verdict, I indicated that I would deliver written reasons as soon as possible. These are my written reasons for verdict.

6. The Crown called three witnesses who all testified that they saw the killing. The witnesses called were the accused's elder brother, a woman villager who was nearby and the accused's wife.

7. All of the witnesses gave similar evidence. They all testified that the accused was seen chasing the deceased. After a short chase, the accused was seen to stab the deceased in the back with a large knife. It was common ground that the wound inflicted by the accused was the cause of the deceased's death.

8. No evidence was led to contradict the descriptions given by the three witnesses and their cross examination, limited obviously and admittedly by the instructions given to defence counsel, effectively was restricted to testing the recollections of the witnesses. While an alternative scenario of the deceased falling backwards onto the knife which he himself was holding, was put to the Crown witnesses, they all denied that the death had occurred in that way and disputed the allegation that the deceased ever had the knife in his possession. I rejected the scenario that the deceased had met his death by accident as it was totally unsupported by any evidence and was in stark contrast to the common description given by the Crown witnesses.

9. There was no issue of identification raised in the trial. All of the witnesses knew the accused very well, one being his brother, another his wife and the other a fellow villager.

10. There was no issue that the stabbing had caused the death of the deceased with the Post Mortem Report being admitted into evidence by consent.

11. The issue of intention was also not seriously challenged by the defence. Indeed it was conceded that if I were to find that the accused had stabbed the deceased with the large curved knife that was tendered by consent as the murder weapon, then there could be little argument that the intention was not to, at least, cause grievous bodily harm.

12. No issue of self-defence arose in the trial and it was not suggested that the accused's actions were in any way legally justifiable or excusable.

13. As a result, the Crown case was largely uncontested. The evidence of the three Crown witnesses was given credibly and was not weakened in cross examination. They each gave similar evidence as to how the deceased was killed and that it was the accused who killed him. I can find no reason why their accounts should not be accepted as truthful and reliable.

14. Consequently, I find that the Crown has satisfied me beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused and he is convicted of one count of murder contrary to section 200 of the Penal Code [Cap. 26].

15. Counsel for the accused originally asked me to delay sentencing until he had prepared submissions to put before the Court. He has since changed his mind and no longer wishes to make any submissions on sentencing and asks that sentencing proceed.

16. Upon conviction for murder the mandatory sentence is life imprisonment. The accused is hereby sentenced to imprisonment for life.

THE COURT