Regina v Voho [2012] SBHC 65; HCSI-CRC 438 of 2004 (8 May 2012)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
(PALMER CJ.)

Criminal Case Number 438 of 2004

REGINA

-V-

CHRISTOPHER VOHO

HEARING: 11 July, 14 July, 26 - 30 September, 03 – 04 October, 06-07 October 2011
JUDGEMENT: 8 May 2012

R.B. Talasasa (Jnr.), Director of Public Prosecutions for the Crown
M. Waqavonovono and L. Hite for the Defendant

Palmer CJ.

1. The defendant, Christopher Voho ("Voho") is jointly charged with Albert Augustine for the murder of William Suia ("deceased") and in the alternative, assault occasioning bodily harm. The offence was alleged to have been committed on or about 16 October 2002 at Ghaliatu in the Weathercoast of South Guadalcanal.
   
2. There were two accused in this matter but trial had to commence in the absence of the other co-accused, Albert Augustine as he could not be located in time for the trial.
   

The Prosecution Case.

3. The case for the prosecution is that the defendant was present with others, including the co-defendant, who were responsible for the fatal beating of the deceased. This is based on the provisions of section 21(b) and (c) of the Penal Code of aiding and abetting the offence of murder with others.
   

The Requirements of Section 200 of the Penal Code.

4. Section 200 as read with section 202 of the Penal Code require the Prosecution to establish that either:
   
   • (i) there was an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm, or
     
   • (ii) the defendant knew that the act which caused death or grievous bodily harm will probably cause the death of the person killed.
     

Prosecution need only to establish either of these two requirements in order for murder to be proved.

5. In order to prove either of those requirements, Prosecution further rely on the provisions of section 21(b) and (c) of the Penal Code, which provides that anyone "...who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence", or "...who aids or abets another person in committing the offence" may equally be charged with actually committing the offence. Prosecution assert that the defendant was present at the scene of crime and participated and or encouraged the beating of the deceased.
   

The Elements of the Charge.

6. The elements of the charge which prosecution need to prove to the requisite standard can be summarised as follows:
   
   1. that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime; and
      
   2. assisted or encouraged Augustine and others in beating the deceased; and
      
   3. knew that Augustine and or the others intended to kill and or to do grievous bodily harm to the deceased, or
      

knew in any event that the act of beating the deceased would probably cause his death, and

4. that it actually caused the death of the deceased.
   

The Defence Case.

7. The defence of the defendant is that he was not present at the scene of the crime on that day or time and relied on an alibi witness in support of his defence.
   

Evidence of Identity.

8. The prosecution case turns primarily on the evidence of identification of the defendant by prosecution witnesses at the scene of the crime as opposed to the evidence of the defendant that he was not present at the scene of the crime and this courts assessment of the credibility and reliability of the evidence.
   
9. A total of five witnesses, Jacquelyn Suia (wife of the deceased), Margaret Kuva, Mary Korina, Bollen Gatu, and Derek Runi were called in support of prosecution's case on the identification of the defendant at the scene of the crime.
   

Evidence of Jacquelyn Suia

10. The relevant evidence of identification of this witness, Jacquelyn Suia, ("Jacquelyn") can be summed up as follows.
    
    1. That they met up with the defendant and two other men at Ravu village when she, together with her children and the deceased, were escorted along the road from Haliatu village by about nine men, who had started beating her husband with a gun, kicking him and hitting him.
       
    2. She identified those three men as "Kwai", whom she referred to as the defendant, (Christopher Voho), his brother, Albert Augustine and Albert Veloa.
       
    3. That the defendant held a "butcher knife" to the face of the deceased and threatened to kill him with it.
       
    4. She was only about a metre away from the defendant when all these happened.
       
    5. She was able to make a dock identification of the defendant in court.
       
    6. She told the court she knew the defendant from previous encounters with him. That his dad is the deceased's uncle and so he would go to their house on occasions. (It not disputed that the deceased's father and the defendant's father were brothers.) She had spoken with him during those times. She also knew the brother, Albert Augustine from those visits.
       
    7. When she looked back from a distance after being told to leave and go to Malagheti village, she saw the deceased being beaten by those men, using a stick and a gun. This placed the defendant together with those who were beating the deceased.
       

Issues raised in cross examination

11. A number of issues were raised during cross examination regarding the accuracy and reliability of the identification of the defendant by this witness. I will deal with these in the order that they had been raised.
    
    1. The age of the defendant at that time. The case for the defence is that the defendant was at the time of the offence quite young around the age of 13 – 14 years old. When this witness was asked what she thought the age of the defendant was at that time, she estimated it to be around 18-20 years. When this was put to her that it could not be correct, she conceded that she did not know his age but reaffirmed her evidence in chief that it was the defendant who had come to visit their home in the past.
       

I am not satisfied this issue about the age raises any reasonable doubt about the accuracy of her identification of this defendant.

2. The time of the visitations. The defence suggestion seems to be that the visitations could not have occurred in view of the security risk which existed at that time. In her response this witness conceded that she did not recall the exact year of the visitations but remained adamant about the visitations because of the relationship of the defendant and the deceased.
   

It was further suggested to her that she may have mistaken the defendant and his family with that of another family but she also clarified and maintained her view that he would visit them and that other family as well who were also from Ghaliatu village.

This issue and that of his age were primarily raised in cross examination to discredit her evidence of identification of this defendant. This witness's evidence and that of others is critical to the prosecution's case because it is premised on their recognition of him through previous encounters that they had had with him. If a reasonable doubt is raised about the occurrences of those encounters and therefore their recognition of him, then the strength of prosecution's case will be diminished and bound to fail.

This was why it was important that she was given opportunity in cross examination to respond to those queries about the identity of the defendant, his family and the possible time or year that she saw them.

Having listened to her responses and observed carefully her demeanour and behaviour in court, I am not satisfied a reasonable doubt had been raised that she could be mistaken, was uncertain, confused or wrong about the identity of this defendant. She gave very clear, consistent answers throughout, never lost her composure and gave her evidence in a very confident manner despite the trauma that she would have experienced and tragedy which happened to her family. Where appropriate she made concessions, such as forgetting the year, the names or age, but not the critical part of her evidence as to the prior visits from which she was able to recognise the defendant and his presence at the scene of the crime. She also maintained her evidence that she knew his dad, mother, one of his sisters and his brother, the co-defendant. She was unshaken on this that she knew him prior to this incident and recognised him at the scene of the crime.

iii. The fact of death of the defendant's dad sometime in that period. This was put to the witness on the basis that the father of the defendant had already died prior to the year 2000 during the period of the tension and so he could not have been visiting them. In her response this witness clarified that she knew he had died but was not sure of the year although she reiterated her position that they did visit their house when he was alive. This is to be contrasted with the evidence adduced later at trial during cross examination of the defendant when he conceded that his father had died sometime in 2001. This would have meant in any event that the initial suggestion put to this witness that the father had died before the year 2000 was incorrect and that in that period he was still alive. It was improper therefore to put such question to her. I am not satisfied accordingly that this issue raises any reasonable doubt about the credibility of this witness's recollection of events and claim of prior knowledge of this defendant.

iv. That the defendant was not a follower of Harold Keke. This issue was raised to try and cast doubt on the evidence of this witness that because the defendant was not a follower of Harold Keke that he would not be able to move freely around at that time as there was division within the community between those aligned to Harold Keke and those who took sides with Government forces and those with Andrew Te'e's group.

In her response however, this witness pointed out that there were people moving around at that time and did concede that it would not be safe for those who Harold Keke knew were against him and therefore would target. She reaffirmed however that on that particular occasion the defendant was present. I am not satisfied her evidence on the identity of the defendant had been discredited so that any reasonable doubt is raised as to the accuracy of her identification of the defendant at that particular time. Her identification was based on prior knowledge and recognition of this defendant.

v. The accuracy of the evidence about the knife and threat and the discrepancy in her prior statement to police about Albert Augustine. It was put to her in cross examination that she had made a prior inconsistent statement to police about the person who held the knife to the deceased, that it was Albert 'Ray' and nothing about the defendant. In her response however she pointed out that she had told the police that it was the defendant who had held the knife and not Albert Ray. When asked if the statement was read back to her she conceded this but maintained her version that she told the police that it was the defendant who had held the knife out to the deceased. She also explained that she only became aware of this discrepancy in July 2011 when it was brought to her attention to refresh her memory. She immediately notified the lawyer about this and told him that it was the defendant who had threatened the deceased with the knife.

She explained in court that she had mentioned this to others in her group about the discrepancy and also told police about it when she was required to attend court.

I am satisfied she had been consistent throughout her evidence and even during cross examination was not shaken about the accuracy of her memory and observations as to the identity of the defendant at the scene of the crime.

I am also satisfied she gave satisfactory and reasonable explanation of the discrepancy in her statement under cross examination and was never in doubt or uncertain of her observations. I am satisfied her credibility and integrity as a witness had not been discredited and I accept her evidence.

12. When asked if she was merely recounting something she had heard from others, she emphatically denied this and told the court that her evidence was based on what she had seen with her own eyes. When repeatedly asked if she was not mistaken she denied this and reiterated that it was the defendant that she saw.
    
13. I am not satisfied that her evidence of identification of the defendant had been discredited so that a reasonable doubt had been raised to render it unreliable.
    

Evidence of Margaret Kuva

14. The evidence of Margaret Kuva ("Kuva") can be summarised as follows.
    
    1. That she was present at the time the deceased was beaten at Ravu village.
       
    2. She also saw the defendant at that time with a knife.
       
    3. She recognised him from prior knowledge and encounters with the defendant. She told the court the defendant and his brother used to visit them at their village prior to this incident. It wasn't the case therefore of seeing him there for the first time. She also told the court that they are related, (meant cousins).
       
    4. She left the scene when she saw the defendant with what she described as a big knife.
       

Issues raised in cross examination.

15. One of the crucial matters raised in cross examination with this witness was in relation to the accuracy of her evidence on identity. Ms. Waqavonovono had sought to suggest to this witness that because of the tense situation on the ground at that time it would be quite difficult for people to move around. Secondly, it was suggested to her that the defendant never came around to her place.
    
16. In her response, however she pointed out that by that time Harold Keke with his group had moved out but maintained her version that because they were related, they would go to their place and vice versa. She remained firm in her evidence that it was the defendant that she saw at that time and that she recognised him from previous encounters.
    
17. When asked about the distance between them, she pointed out that they were only about 3 metres distance from her.
    
18. When asked if it may have been Albert that she saw, she explained that Albert was there as well but it was the defendant that she saw with the knife that day.
    
19. The second issue which was raised in cross examination related to her statement to police in which she mentioned the name of a person "Robert" who was holding the knife and also identifying his father's name as Ray. Ms. Waqavonovono pointed out to this witness that at no time did she mention the name of "Kwai" to the police. In her response she maintained her view that she told them the defendant's name but they may have got it wrong. She also pointed out that she was not aware of his other name "Christian Voho" which they were referring to in the interview. She however maintained in her responses that the person she was referring to was none other than this defendant. She also pointed out that when she was being interviewed she was giving her statement in her dialect and was being translated.
    
20. Having listened carefully to her responses and observed her demeanour and behaviour in court, I am not satisfied her credibility had been discredited. I accept her explanation that in the course of translation some misunderstanding may have arisen about the names of the persons she was referring to or describing as opposed to the name "Christian Voho" which the interviewers may have used. It would seem that the person referred to as "Robert" in her statement was this defendant, which would be consistent with her description that his father was Ray. The late father of this defendant was called Ray Augustine. Further, it would seem that she was not aware of the name "Christian Voho" that was being referred to in the interview and it was most likely that confusion would have easily set in as to which person was being referred to. There was no confusion however in the mind of this witness as to which person she was referring to in her statement to police.
    
21. It was also put to her in cross examination that she had changed her story in court but she maintained her position that she was recounting what she saw with her eyes.
    
22. It was also put to her that she was recounting what another witness, Jacquelyn had told her to say but this was also denied by her.
    
23. I am not satisfied her identification of this witness had been discredited either through mistake, confusion, uncertainty, or, that she may have been wrong about the defendant's presence at the scene of crime. The defendant was known to her and she was able to recognise him easily at that time. I am satisfied her evidence on this crucial part can be relied on.
    

Evidence of Mary Korina

24. The third witness who identified the defendant at the scene of the crime was Mary Korina. This witness was also present at Ravu when the deceased was beaten. This has not been disputed. She also confirmed seeing the defendant with others at the scene of the crime.
    
25. She told the court that she recognised him from previous encounters she had with him. She had seen him at various locations at Malaheti, Haliatu and Kolokiki on previous occasions. She told the court that they are related, from the same line, that she knew the defendant's brother Albert Augustine and that she was not far from where the incident happened.
    
26. In cross examination it was put to her she had not mentioned that she was at Ravu but at Ghaliatu on that day. She however explained and maintained her version that she was at Ravu on that day. She is however from Ghaliatu village.
    
27. It was also put to her that she had not mentioned the name of the defendant in her statement to the police but she maintained her version that he was one of the five that were there and that she recognised him at the scene of the crime.
    
28. When it was put to her that she had made up the evidence recently or that she was repeating what others had recounted to her, she denied this emphatically.
    
29. I have had the opportunity to observe her in court and satisfied that her evidence can be accepted as credible, accurate and reliable in terms of her identification of the defendant. He was no stranger, she had met him and seen him previously and knew him from previous encounters. I am not satisfied a reasonable doubt had been raised in my mind that her evidence was made up, false or mistaken.
    

Evidence of Bollen Gatu.

30. This witness is the husband of Mary Korina. He told the court he was present at the scene of the crime at Ravu and saw the defendant there. His presence at the scene has not been disputed. Naturally he was with his wife at that time.
    
31. His identification of the defendant was also based on prior knowledge and familiarity. He told the court he had seen him on many occasions in the past at Malaheti and Holokiki. He also says that he knew his father and mother.
    
32. Under cross examination he was asked why he did not mention the defendant's name in his statement to the police. In his response he told the court that he did mention his name when he gave them his statement. When it was suggested to him that he may have been mistaken, or that his evidence in court was made up, he denied this. He maintained his position that the defendant was present at the scene before he left for fear of his life.
    
33. It was also put to him that he may have been recounting something that someone may have told him but he denied this emphatically.
    
34. I have had the opportunity to consider the evidence of this witness also and his demeanour in court. I am not satisfied that the fact he did not expressly mention the name of the defendant in his statement, to be fatal to the credibility, accuracy or reliability of his evidence in court. He did say there were other men apart from those specifically identified in his statement. I am not satisfied he had anything to hide or motive to lie in court about his evidence. He remained adamant that he was present at Ravu at the time of the beating of the deceased and that his identification was based on prior knowledge and recognition. The chances of being mistaken are therefore greatly minimised in such situation. In this instance, I am not satisfied that a reasonable doubt had been raised in my mind about his evidence of the crime scene and identification of this defendant. I also accept his evidence as truthful and accurate.
    

Evidence of Derek Runi

35. This is the only witness who started off in chief identifying the defendant clearly and confirming the evidence of other witnesses as well as confirming the identification of the defendant through recognition and familiarity, but then during cross examination faltering and recanting on his evidence on identification.
    
36. In cross examination it was put to him that he had told police that it was Albert, the brother of the defendant who was holding the knife and that he had not mentioned the name of the defendant. In his initial response to this discrepancy in his statement, he told the court that he had been under a lot of pressure during that time as he was also a suspect and so had been reserved about making specific identifications of those involved. Later on under intense cross examination by Ms. Waqavonovono, he conceded he may have been mistaken about who actually threatened the deceased with the knife.
    
37. I have observed this witness carefully in court and note the following matters. While on one hand during examination in chief, he appeared sure and confident about his identification of the defendant, during cross examination, he started to falter, became hesitant, reserved and evasive. An instance of this was when asked if he had made a mistake about who held a knife, he agreed it was a mistake and that he was confused. When it was further put to him if he did not see the defendant that day he simply said that he did not know.
    
38. In re-examination, when asked if both Albert and the defendant were there and were holding knives, he hesitated for sometime before responding that both may have been there and holding knives but was not sure. When asked if he had made a statement to the police identifying the defendant, he answered in the affirmative. When further asked if the defendant had done anything to the deceased, he answered in the affirmative and volunteered that he kicked him. When asked to clarify what he meant by not being clear in his responses during cross examination, he volunteered the answer, that while Albert was there, the defendant may also have been there.
    
39. It is fairly obvious, that this witness during cross examination changed tact and became evasive, to give the impression that he was confused and not clear, or sure about the events that occurred that particular day and in particular his identification of the defendant, though in re-examination he re-affirmed his identification of the defendant at the scene of the crime.
    
40. In view of his uncertainty during cross examination about the identification of the defendant I have decided not to rely on his evidence on this particular issue, although it would seem that the ring of truth is that he knew the defendant was there and that he saw him there but somehow decided to change his version in cross examination.
    

The evidence of the defence

41. In contrast the evidence of this defendant on oath and his witness on his alibi, equally on oath needed to be balanced carefully against the direct eye witness accounts of the prosecution witnesses.
    
42. I have had the opportunity to consider carefully the evidence of the defence in this matter. It is simply that he was not there at the scene of the crime and was not even anywhere near where everything was happening for he was hiding away in the bush with his mother and his two sisters. He only would come down to the coastal area to their garden and collect food and return. He had no idea of what was happening.
    
43. His witness a school teacher also gave evidence that he would visit him on occasions and somehow was certain that on the particular day of the crime, he happened to visit him at his hideout in the bush and so he could not be in two places at the same time.
    
44. The defendant denies outright his presence at the scene and involvement in the killing of the deceased.
    

Assessment of the evidence.

45. This case turns on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as against the denial of this defendant of his presence and involvement in the crime.
    
46. It is for prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the crime scene and took part by assisting and encouraging the beating of the deceased of which he subsequently died.
    

The defence case.

47. The credibility and integrity of the denial by the defendant of his identity by the crown witnesses, flies in the face of familiarity and being recognised through family ties, being related to them and having been known and seen previously.
    
48. Possible defences raised have been that those witnesses were mistaken, simply making up their evidence, or rehearsing what others had told them. Having observed the witnesses giving their evidence, I am simply not satisfied that any doubts, more importantly one that is reasonable, raised that their evidence of identity had been wrong, mistaken or false.
    
49. In his evidence the defendant had alleged that the evidence adduced by prosecution witnesses had been false. No background material however has been raised to substantiate that. As well, it was never put to these witnesses that they were lying, merely mistaken. It was not open therefore to him to accuse the prosecution witnesses of lying unless he was prepared to provide evidence to support his claim. Those witnesses repeatedly and consistently told the court that they were simply recounting events they saw and witnessed occurring virtually before their eyes, at very close proximity.
    
50. Any inconsistencies raised were either satisfactorily explained or accounted for and were insubstantial or fatal to the underlying evidence of identification that they gave of the presence of this defendant at the crime scene. Apart from Derek Runi, who in my view changed his version to suit his own ends, all the other Prosecution witnesses did not falter, were shaken, confused or contradicted themselves about their identification of the defendant.
    
51. In contrast, in his evidence, the defendant denied any such family relationships, connections, prior visitations or familiarity with those crown witnesses, apart from the short lady, Mary Korina, that he recognised. Indirectly therefore, this concession merely strengthened her evidence as a witness of credibility when she said that she recognised the defendant form former associations and prior knowledge. It would seem that the thrust of defence case was that the defendant was only a young boy of about 13-14 years old at the time of the crime and therefore they could not have recognised him. What has been overlooked however is the fact that the evidence of identification and recognition was not based on any major gap or lapse of time in between events but a continuation of and connection of events that were current at that time.
    
52. I am not satisfied that a reasonable doubt had been raised about the fact that they could have been mistaken about his identity. They recognised him, his brother, his late father, uncle and others that were also present.
    
53. His other defence of an alibi witness given by a friendly former school teacher who cared enough for him to be able to remember clearly the date that he visited him in his bush hideout at the crucial day that the deceased was killed, but could not recall the year he taught the defendant or when the school closed, to be unconvincing, not credible or carrying the ring of truth and smacks more of fabrication than actual events. He could not recall the place where his family were hiding but could remember somehow where the defendant was hiding and somehow his visit which occurred infrequently happened to fall on the day the deceased was killed. Everything seemed to be focused on the particular day of the killing when they both remembered clearly what they were doing, the coincidental visit to the hideout in the bush and raising this defence for the first time in court.
    
54. I do not believe the defendant's evidence or that of his alibi witness.
    
55. The prosecution or the police did not receive timely notice it seems of this defence and became aware of this only at the commencement of the trial. It seems that the alibi defence was raised at the eleventh hour of the defence. Either he was present at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses or he was not. If he was not there, then one of the following possibilities may have occurred.
    
56. First, the prosecution witnesses may have been mistaken; they mistook him for someone else. In that event, this raises the question as to who was the person they saw as being the defendant, bearing in mind that they separately identified his brother, Albert Augustine, his uncle Albert Veloa and others. I note no evidence has been adduced by defence as to who else this person could possibly be. They knew him and were familiar with him and did not show any sign of being confused or uncertain of this fact when cross examined. It is simply so improbable to contain any truth, that all of them would be mistaken about his identity.
    
57. Secondly, they may have fabricated their evidence, and thirdly, were lying to the court about their identification of this defendant. This raises the question of motive. Why would they lie or fabricate evidence? I note nothing of significance or relevance had been raised in relation to these, which raises any reasonable doubt that they were lying or fabricated evidence. All prosecution witnesses with the exception of Derek Runi were adamant, remained firm and confident, in their conviction about the identity of the defendant.
    

Malice aforethought

58. Has it been established to the requisite standard that the defendant intended to cause the death of or, grievous bodily harm to the deceased, or knew that the unlawful act which caused death will probably cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to the deceased.
    

Evidence of intention.

59. Intention can be deduced from words or conduct of the offending party and from the surrounding circumstances.
    
60. I am satisfied that in the minimum, there was evidence of an intention to cause grievous bodily harm. There is uncontested evidence that the group that was looking for the deceased, and which the defendant joined later, in the course of events, were armed, serious and meant business. The nine men that Jacqueline met at the start had threatened her in the presence of her children to bring her husband to them or they would kill him. Out of fear she brought her husband to them, who immediately set upon him to beat him.
    
61. She heard them threatening to kill him when they were beating him up. She had pleaded with those men to spare her husband's life but they ignored her. This has not been contested.
    
62. There is evidence that the deceased was threatened with a knife by the defendant to kill him. Jacqueline gave evidence of this, as well as the witness Margaret Kuva, who told the court that when she saw him holding a knife she ran away as she was frightened.
    
63. There was evidence of swearing or bad words being used against the deceased, which is consistent with an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm; it was obvious there was bad blood against him.
    
64. At around the same time, the village of the deceased and Jacqueline and others was burnt to the ground by this same group. This evidence is uncontested. One of those in the group told Jacqueline that they were responsible for it. This is entirely consistent with the element of an intention to cause harm or death. This group were serious, meant business and were prepared to destroy property as well.
    
65. The evidence on his beating with the butt of a rifle, being kicked and punched were virtually uncontested. This was all done in the presence of his wife, children and other witnesses, who begged them to spare his life but were ignored. There was a total absence of any compassion or mercy shown towards a helpless and unarmed man, in the presence of his family and others. This type of action or conduct in the circumstances, is entirely consistent with an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm. Their actions were callous and brutal.
    
66. They also prevented anyone, including Derek Runi, who had sought to intervene at one stage but was threatened. No one could intervene for fear of their own lives, which is consistent with the requisite intention for malice aforethought. Even when the deceased had died and women and children were mourning over his body, they prevented Derek Runi from looking at and checking his body.
    

The element of knowledge.

67. Even if the element of intention may not be to the requisite standard, I am more than satisfied the element of knowledge in this case is fairly evident. The defendant could not have failed to realise and to foresee the consequences that would happen, as a result of their actions, in mercilessly beating, hitting and kicking the deceased and preventing anyone from providing assistance, were bound to cause grievous bodily harm and eventually resulted in his death.
    

Defence of Causation.

68. The defence sought to submit that the cause of death was never established. While a body was exhumed it is argued it had not been established beyond reasonable doubt to be the body of the deceased.
    
69. Evidence adduced in contrast however by prosecution showed that the deceased had been badly beaten over a period of time. That beating has not been challenged or contradicted; it happened in the presence of the defendant and others who consented to and were in agreement with what was being done. They did not stop the beating but also prevented anyone from providing assistance.
    
70. Derek Runi's evidence regarding the condition or state of the deceased at the time of the beating has not been challenged; that he saw white foam-like saliva dripping from his mouth, his body and leg wet with blood and sweat and that the deceased could hardly talk.
    
71. Some two hours later this witness confirmed identifying the body of the deceased being mourned over by relatives and family members. When attempting to check the body, he was prevented from doing so by someone with a gun at the scene. This witness also confirmed that the deceased was buried later that day at the end of the playing field near the beach area.
    
72. I am more than satisfied so that I am sure that the evidence adduced established that the deceased could not have died from any other cause than from the brutal and callous beating received from his captors, which this defendant was a party of. No evidence has been adduced of any other alternative cause of death, or intervening event that could have caused the death of the deceased. Where a submission is made regarding a supervening event, this must be based on some evidence or material, otherwise such suggestion is mere speculation and would not be open to Counsel to raise.
    
73. The deceased's wife, Jacqueline had confirmed in evidence that prior to this incident, there was nothing wrong with her husband, he was well, fit and had been hiding away in the bush in fear of his life. The last time she saw him alive was when he was being beaten in the company of his captors. His last parting words to Derek Runi, was a plea to him to look after his two children.
    
74. I am satisfied ample evidence had been adduced that the body exhumed could not be the body of anyone else than that of the deceased. This is not the case where the location of the burial spot was not known. Derek Runi told the court that the deceased's body was buried that same day by those who were around at that time (see page 27 of the transcript dated 4th October 2011). It follows that with due enquiry the location can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy.
    
75. The evidence of the Police Officer, Emmett Lynch, with the Participating Police Force from the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, who participated in the exhumation process, gave precise evidence of the meticulous process carried out by them in their investigations and enquiry, to identify the location of the burial spot before undertaking the exhumation. There is little doubt in my mind as to the accuracy and reliability of that evidence and the location of the site where the deceased was buried.
    
76. He produced in court two sets of photographs, marked as Exhibits 4 and 5. Exhibit 4 contained a set of photographs taken at the scene where the exhumation process was done.
    
77. Exhibit 5 contained sets of photos which showed articles of clothing attached to the body of the deceased and the skeletal remains. The photographs alone showed cracks on the left scapula (shoulder blade) bone (see photos nos. 15 – 17), fractures of vertebra bones (see photo no. 15), broken bone (see photo 18), and cracked ribs (see photos 19 and 20). This witness was present when Dr. Dodd carried out the post mortem examination and made references to those fractures and cracks. While the doctor had not been called to give evidence and his report objected to by defence, the saying that "a picture is worth a thousand words" is relevant to those set of photographs in that they are consistent with the evidence of a high degree of violence being applied to the deceased by his captors; broken and cracked bones would have been a natural consequence.
    

Decision.

78. I am satisfied so that I am sure that the defendant was a party to the offence of murder by virtue of his involvement and participation with others and I find him guilty of the murder of William Suia and is convicted accordingly.
    

Orders of the Court:

1. Find defendant, Christopher Voho, guilty of the offence of murder; and
   
2. Convicted accordingly.
   

The Court.