Regina v Ramo [2012] SBHC 171; HCSI-CRC 93 of 2012 (23 November 2012)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

CRC NO: CRC NO.: 93 of 2012

REGINA

V

RAMO

(PALLARAS J)

Date of Hearing: 17–19 October, 2012
Date of Sentence: 23 November, 2012

Mr M. Hartmann and Ms S. Ngava for the Prosecution
MR W.K.Ghemu with Ms Spence for the Defence

Sentence – RAMO

[1] On 22 October, 2012 you were acquitted of the charge of attempted murder (contrary to section 215(a) of the Penal Code) and convicted of one count of intentionally causing grievous bodily harm (contrary to section 224 of the Penal Code.)

[2] This is a serious offence for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment is provided.

[3] You are indeed fortunate that your actions have not resulted in more serious injuries or even the death of the victim in this case. By using such a lethal weapon, which you had sharpened for the purpose, in such a dangerous and threatening manner, death or more serious injury might easily have occurred. It is only by good fortune and not by good planning that they did not.

[4] While your motivation for committing this offence was never clearly explained, there was sufficient evidence before me to understand that for whatever reason, you took it upon yourself to be judge, jury and executioner in relation to perceived misbehaviour by the victim. You had decided that his conduct towards certain women was unacceptable and that you would see to it that he would be first punished and then exiled. No evidence was led to substantiate any of your professed opinions concerning the victim and it is clear that he denied any and all suggestions of misconduct when giving evidence in this trial.

[5] What is of particular concern is that you have behaved in a similar fashion in the past. I am told that your previous conviction for unlawful wounding concerned your uncontrollable jealousy over another individual whom you decided had misconducted himself and who was attacked by you and evicted from your village.

[6] You appear to have learnt nothing at all from that experience. You seem to think that you have the right to assault and maim people with whom you have a problem. You take it upon yourself to judge others and to enforce your rules upon them. You then seek to punish them for perceived breaches of those rules by physically attacking them.

[7] You have no right to do that.

[8] Vigilante justice has no place in civilised society as it undermines the rule of law that is so crucial to peaceful public life.

[9] When addressing the various elements in proper sentencing process, it is frequently argued that specific deterrence is unnecessary because the experience of being arrested, charged and convicted has been a salutary lesson in itself. In your case that has clearly not happened and I am of the view that both elements of specific and general deterrence, but particularly specific deterrence should be given appropriate weight in this sentence.

[10] The offence for which you have been convicted was committed without warning and without any genuine provocation. You armed yourself with a lethal weapon and attacked a young man half your size. He posed absolutely no threat to you at all and when you had seriously wounded him you made no attempt to assist him but followed him out of the house.

[11] As I have said in earlier remarks, there are several features of your evidence that have caused me concern as to your rational state. Parts of your evidence possessed such an air of unreality as to cause me to at times question your reason. I have asked your counsel for assistance from a psychologist or a psychiatrist but have been told that the abysmal state of public finance and the almost total absence of relevant professionals in Solomon Islands makes that a futile request. This is a terrible reflection on our chronically under-resourced system of justice.

[12] There is, however, one further unusual feature about this case.

[13] I am told that in March 2012 your counsel wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) seeking to have the charge of attempted murder reduced to the lesser charge of intentionally causing grievous bodily harm, that is, to the charge for which you now stand convicted.

[14] The DPP responded by agreeing to lead no evidence in relation to the charge of attempted murder and that a plea of guilty to the lesser charge would be accepted. Your offer to plead guilty to this charge was confirmed in August 2012.

[15] At a Directions Hearing later in August, the Crown informed the Court that the offer to the Defence had been withdrawn. Despite the Court seeking an explanation for this conduct, the request was ignored. In another Directions Hearing in September 2012, the Court once again asked for an explanation of the DPP's attitude. Once again the Court's request was ignored.

[16] It is a matter of serious concern that the office of the DPP had so little regard for the authority of the Court that it felt justified in ignoring these requests for an explanation.

[17] Belatedly a letter was received by the Court explaining that when the DPP prosecutor had accepted the plea offer, believing it to be a perfectly proper offer, he had not first sought the approval of the Director whom he believed would accept the offer. Nor did he tell the Defence that his acceptance was subject to the Director's personal approval.

[18] It emerged that the Director did not approve the arrangement and instructed the prosecutor to withdraw the offer made to the Defence.

[19] The accused, after having been prepared to plead guilty to the lesser charge and after having been assured that he would not be prosecuted for attempted murder and that his plea offer had been accepted, was then informed that the DPP had reneged on the agreement.

[20] I find this history to be discreditable and bordering on an abuse of process. There is no doubt that most lawyers and indeed most members of the community would expect that an offer made in the name of the Director and accepted and acted upon in good faith by the Defence, ought to have been regarded as a binding offer by the Director. However, I am informed that this is not the case in Solomon Islands.

[21] This extraordinary attitude can result in outcomes which are totally unjust and is an attitude calculated to destroy trust and cooperation within a profession that depends for its efficacy and for its capacity to serve the community upon those very qualities. The sooner that this attitude is changed or judicially challenged, the better.

[22] The relevance of these events to this case is obvious. Because of the attitude of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the accused has been denied the sentencing benefits that normally accompany a plea of guilty. The community has been forced to meet the cost of a trial that might have been avoided. The victim has been compelled to relive the events by testifying in Court.

[23] However, there is yet another side to what has occurred in this trial, for in coming to an appropriate sentence in this case I am mindful that the accused could have offered to plead guilty to the lesser charge before me. He chose not to.

[24] He might also have chosen to testify in a way that demonstrated an appreciation of what he had done and an acceptance of his responsibility for his criminal actions. Again, he chose not to. As already noted, his evidence was given in a manner that suggested that most of the injuries, or at least the most serious of them, were accidental. He also denied that he had any intention to hurt the victim at all. His evidence therefore did not demonstrate any acceptance of personal responsibility nor any remorse for his actions.

[25] If it were not for these features of the case, I would have treated the accused as being entitled to the full benefits that an early plea would have provided him and, as a by-product, made it abundantly clear that I reject the attitude of the DPP in purporting to resile from an agreed resolution. However, the accused's subsequent actions and testimony at trial militate against fully adopting this course.

[26] I take into account the matters personal to the accused including the fact that he is a 35 year old man, married with a total of eight children by two marriages, that he is the principal provider for his family, that reconciliation was reached with the victim shortly after the offence and that he has been cooperative with the police. I am told that his time in custody has been a salutary lesson to him and that he is remorseful for his actions.

[27] I have been referred to several pertinent cases by both counsel in their helpful sentencing submissions and I have taken careful note of those cases and the submissions made by counsel.

[28] Had it not been for the particular circumstances as outlined above, upon conviction after trial in this case I would have imposed a penalty of 8 years imprisonment. I am satisfied, however, that these circumstances justify the reduction of the sentence by 2 years to a sentence of 6 years imprisonment.

Order:

1. The accused is sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.
   
2. Such sentence is to start as from 23 August, 2011.
   

THE COURT