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High Court of Solomon Islands |
HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
Civil Case No. 200 of 2006
JOHN ALAI
Claimant
-v-
PAUL KAKAI
1st Defendant
ATTORNEY GENERAL
2nd Defendant
FAUKONA, J.
Date of Hearing: 7th and 13th November 2008
Date of Ruling: 4th February 2009
D.Tigulu for the Claimant
S. Balea for the 1st Defendants
R.Firigeni for the 2nd Defendants
Ruling
Faukona, J: This is an application pursuant to Rule 23.3 of the Solomon Islands Court (Civil procedure) Rules 2007, for non compliance by the 1st Defendant of the order of this Court made and sealed on 24th January 2007. Beside that the Claimant also sought a number of relief set out in the application filed on 11th August 2008. The Orders were sought on the issue of trespass and wrongful possession of parcel Number 192-010-191 by the 1st Defendant. The relief sought are:
The Counsel for the 1st Defendant, Mr.Balea had failed to appear on 13th November 2008, to make his submissions. On 3rd September he did appear, and after the Claimant’s Counsel had made his submissions, he requested an adjournment so that he could prepare his written submissions. The Court therefore adjourned the case to 13th November 2008, but he failed to show up. The Court then proceeded and heard the submissions from the counsel for the 2nd Defendant and concluded the case.
The Facts:
On 28th June 2000, the Director of Business, of the Ministry of Commerce, Mr. Heroau submitted an application to the commissioner of lands on behalf of Kasons Sheet Steel limited for Parcel number 192-010-191, located at Ranadi Industrial estate, in Honiara. The 1st Defendant is the owner of the company which proposed to operate roll forming machine, manufacturing of corrugated iron and galvanised products.
On 26th July 2000, the Commissioner of Lands approved the application and expressed willingness to offer fifty (50) years fixed term estate in the Lot. The letter also indicated a total sum of fees to be paid amounting to $3,010.00. The amount was to be paid by the 1st defendant within thirty days from the date of the offer. Sometimes after the offer the 1st Defendant moved into the land and occupied it.
The fees were never paid by the 1st Defendant. Sixteen months after the offer was made, on 21st November 2001, the commissioner of lands wrote a letter to the 1st Defendant revoking the offer for non payment of the fees.
On 8th August 2000 the claimant apply for the same lot. On 29th November 2001 the commissioner of lands had approved the Claimants application and on offer was made on 6th May 2002. On 19th September 2002, the Claimant had paid all the necessary fees, and the grant of fixed term estate was done on 20th August 2003.
On 5th March 2004, the 1st Counsel for the Claimant wrote a letter to the 1st Defendant to vacate the land. The 1st Defendant failed to vacate, so a final notice to vacate was issued on 28th June 2004. Since then the 1st Defendant had never moved out from the land.
The land being the subject of this case is a crown land situated at Ranadi Industrial estate. All crown Land requires that the Land be held ultimately by the Commissioner of lands, on behalf of the Government, and is governed by the land and Titles Act (Cap.133). Under the Act the Commissioner of lands is vested with power and authority to deal with, manage, and administer wide spectrum of aspects of the government land policy. In this particular case the commissioner of lands is dealing with a contractual purchase of a fixed term estate, which in normal circumstance will subsequently concluded in signing of a deed of grant and the title transfer to the 1st Defendant.
In performing its function the Commissioner of Lands approved the 1st Defendants application and made and offer by his letter of 26th July 2000, with the condition that the 1st Defendant paid the necessary fees of $3,010.00 within one month. The 1st Defendant failed to pay the fees, hence, the Commissioner of lands revoked that offer by its letter dated 21st November 2001.
Has the Commissioner of Lands power to revoke that offer? Of course under Section 5 of the Land Titles Acts. In fact the offer comprised two performing elements. One was a request for the required fees, and secondly that the fees be paid within prescribed period of time. The 1st Defendant failed in both. Therefore the offer lapsed through passage of time, because acceptance or performance was not made within the prescribed period of 30days stated by the letter of offer. Once an offer is lapse it becomes incapable of acceptance.
In Payne and Care[1] C made the highest bid for P’s goods at an auction sale, but he withdrew his bid before the fall of the hammer. P contended that C was bound by the sale. Held: C’s bid was an offer and could be revoked before acceptance, that is before the fall of the hammer. There was an effective revocation by C.
In the case of Re national savings Bank Association[2]: an application for shares in a company was withdrawn before delivery of the allotment. Held: no contract to take the shares.
In this case the commissioner had revoked the offer before acceptance by performance; it becomes incapable of acceptance. The 1st Defendant cannot continue or insisted to claim legitimate expectation to be given prior notice before revocation. He knows quite well that time was running against him, yet failed to perform, or informed the Commissioner of his difficulties. The Commissioner had exercised its discretion as he saw fit in the circumstances. Any challenges to the Commissioner’s discretionary power for judicial review was open after the letter of revocation. Now it was time barred by Order 15-38 of the Rules. Sixteen months of non payment was sufficient time more than thirty days as required by the letter of offer. No offer can last for ever. It will come a time when it will be terminated by acceptance or by revocation.
The 1st Defendant gave no consideration, or made part payment as a consideration to keep the offer open. Evidence revealed that there was none, and the 1st Defendant himself admitted he failed to pay the prerequisite fees or even part thereof.
In the case of Routledge v Grant[3] an offer was made by the defendant to sell a house for certain price. In his offer the defendant stipulated that acceptance should be within six weeks. On the question whether the defendant could withdraw his offer at anytime within six weeks provides that no acceptance had been made. In this case the plaintiff had given no consideration to the defendant to keep the offer open.
Equitable interest
Has the 1st Defendant equitable interest in the land? In many case equitable interest are created by an instrument in writing, but in other instances they may be created orally or even by conduct. After the offer was made, on an unknown date, the 1st Defendant moved into and occupy the land, which he would be entitled to, if he had paid the requisite fees. Only then he would be recognised as the owner of the land in equity before the contract is completed by payment of the required fees. However equitable interest in land will be destroyed if the land is acquired by a bona fide purchase of a legal interest for value
By taking reasonable step to pay, in the eyes of equity, he may have acquired equitable interest. His failure to perform meant the offer had lapsed and it becomes incapable of being accepted. The Commissioner had made its decision by revoking the offer. After 30 days had lapsed, and before the letter of revocation was issued, was sufficient period for further negotiations. In any event the discretion lies in the Commissioner who has the authority and has the final say in the circumstances he saw fit.
The question is, had the 1st Defendant undertaken those improvements within 30 days; the period equity recognises as having equitable interest. I doubted. If he could not afford to pay $3,010.00 within 30 days, the improvements he now claims in his cross-claim could not possibly be a fact that will induce me to belief.
Legal Title to the Land
Whilst the 1st Defendant did not deny the Claimant’s legal title to the land by his defence dated 25th August 2006, he failed to acknowledge that the title or rights of a registered owner in a fixed term estate are rights which may not possible be defeated.. Unless he can show equitable interest (which undoubtedly he hasn’t) take precedent in the paramount interest of justice. In the case of Wal Wire v Bill Gilmal[4], where Brunton J recognised a sub-lease in the absence of a governmental approval (which otherwise unenforceable for want of consent) as an equitable lease. Or in the alternative the 1st defendant can show by way of prove that the process by which the title was granted was done by fraud or mistake.
The claimant on 20th August 2003 was grated 50 years fixed term estate title to the land. His title was eventually registered by the Registrar of Titles in or about September 2003. This was resulted in a valid contract entered into with the Commissioner of Lands before registering the land in his name. Having done so the Claimant became a legal registered owner lawfully entitled to use and enjoy the land. Section 110 Land and Titles Act gave him rights not liable to be defeated with all the privileges free from all interests and claims subject to exceptions provided therein.
Upon registration the claimant acquired an indefeasible title, a title which is conclusive and vested under the Act. Having acquired title it binds all subsequent purchasers of the land and everyone else (including the 1st defendant] who cannot prove an earlier title.
In Fairafo Limited v Commissioner of Lands and Martin Kealoa[5] where Palmer J stated in page 2, paragraph 6;
"The subsequent sub-division of the said plot with respect was not and cannot affect the validity of that legal binding agreement; neither does it frustrate the agreement entered into by the parties as sought to be submitted by learned counsel for the Plaintiff. All that the sub-division amounts to is to have the said lot (lot 1262) divided into two separate parts or parcels. Ownership by agreement is not affected. The sub-division did not divest the second defendant of his contractual interest over the said plots."
In an attempt to defeat the validity of the legal binding agreement, the 1st defendant in paragraph one of his defence filed on 25th August 2006, pleaded that the registration was done by fraud and or mistake, and he repeats the same in his claim filed on 7th September 2006.
It would appear that the cross claim filed was based on a number of grounds. See defence field on 25th August 2006 and cross claim filed on 7th September 2006.
Fraud and mistake
Section 229(1) of the Land and Titles Act, subject to subsection (2), the Act gives the power to the High Court to make an order rectifying the land register by directing that any registration be cancelled where it is satisfied that the registration has been obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake.
The section requires that the High Court can only exercise its powers if it is satisfied on the material evidence before it. It is a well established law that a party that alleged fraud and mistake is obliged to convince the court by way of proof on the evidence.
The 1st Defendant alleged that the registration of the Claimants name was done by fraud or mistake on the part of the Claimant and the Commissioner of Lands. It was not denied that the Claimant was the registered owner who had acquired his interest for valuable consideration.
Allegation of fraud is a serious matter and subsequent result if proof is serious. The court do not allow this sort of allegation to be treated lightly without supporting evidence. The court must be satisfied before it can exercise its powers and make an order to rectify the Land Register.
The word fraud meant actual fraud that is, dishonesty of some sort. It is designed purposely to transfer to cheat the 1st defendant’s existing rights. It is done by the Claimant to establish by deliberate of dishonest trick to have the land registered in his name. The operative part of it is how the Claimant as the registered proprietor acquired the transfer of title in the circumstances where the 1st defendant has been defrauded out of his registered interest. Fraud must be found to exist in the circumstances in which the Claimant acquired the land. Section 229(2) of the Lands and Titles Act is a protective clause and therefore is protective of the Title of a particular type of the owner. It the case of Billy v Daokalia[6] the court of Appeal stated that the title is protected if:
On page 24 paragraph 5 the Court of Appeal said;
"The claims of fraud or mistake therefore must be necessarily be linked to the time when registration was obtained made or omitted. The knowledge refer to in subsection (2) accordingly, must also be confined to that period when registration was obtained or made. If the registered owner had obtained possession and acquired the interest for valuable consideration without knowledge of the omission, fraud or mistake, then he is entitled to rely on the protection of subsection (2) of the Land and Titles Act".
On 20th August 2003 where the grant of the fixed term estate was done, and Claimant acquired the title for value of the land, it was not registered in the name of the 1st defendant, but was held in the name of the Commissioner of Lands, who later transfer to the claimant for value.
The facts revealed that the Commissioner of Lands approved the 1st defendant’s application and an offer was made on 26th July 2000. Thirteen days after that on 8th August 2000 the claimant submitted his application. On 21st November 2001, the 1st defendant’s offer was revoked. On 29th November 2001, after revocation of 1st Defendants offer, the Commissioner of Lands approved the claimant’s application and offer was made on the 6th of May 2002. On 19th September 2002 the claimant paid all the necessary fees. And the grant of fixed term estate was done on 20th August 2003.
From the facts the 1st defendant was given priority and sufficient time to pay. He failed. So the Commissioner decided to make an offer to the claimant eight days after the 1st defendants’ offer was revoked, and his application was next in line. I do not seem to see .any pressure on the Commissioner to offer the land to the claimant, nor do I see any fraud in the Commissioner’s dealing with the land. There was no evidence to proof fraud.
Beside lack of evidence the 1st defendant failed to plead particulars of alleged fraud and or mistake or undue influences see Manehamose V Kelly[7]). There must be statement specifically stated the allegation of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the case of Simikera v Ragoso[8] one of the arguments advanced by the counsel for the Attorney General is that; "in order to establish the allegation of fraud and mistake the Plaintiff in accordance with his own pleading must prove that the first defendants do not represent the original landowners of Bagha Island."
The Court therefore refer the case back to the Local Court because the custom issue among others were not pleaded.
In the case of Blay v Pollard and Morris [9]; Scrutton L.J said on page 634, paragraph 1.
"But no fraud is alleged in the pleadings, no application has been made, and I cannot think a judge should find fraud or conduct amounting to fraud when it has never been pleaded."
" ...a case must be decided on the issues on the records and if it is desired to raise other issues they must be placed on the record."
In Patty v Tikan[10] Kabui J, as he was stated on page 4 paragraph 6;
"In this case I cannot think otherwise that to say that the claim in the statement of claim is for general damages only for trespass. I cannot read into general damages specific damages, unless are particularized and pleaded."
In Chow v Attorney General[11] Kabui J, stated on page 2 paragraphs 4;
"Loss of revenue and accrued of interest on loan from the bank was consequential losses that in my view ought to have been specifically pleaded."
Those cases bring home a strict rule in regards to pleading and particularization. A party alleging an issue cannot seek relief without pleading or partrulcarizing the issue. The courts will not grant the relief, unless they are pleaded on record. The rules related to pleading are universally applied and no exception will be granted to anyone.
It is apparent that 1st defendant failed to particularize the material fact supporting allegation of fraud and or mistake. I would refuse to consider on the authority of such cases as I quote above. Secondly the 1st defendant failed to seek rectification from this court. His defence and his affidavit filed on 7th November 2008, which he relied did not contain on record his desire to seek rectification of the land register. I consider that as another failure on the part of the 1st defendant. Therefore cannot sustain any cross-claim.
Legitimate expectation:
One of the grounds of which the 1st defendant rely on claiming legitimate expectations to be given notice by the Commissioner, of all the dealings in respect of the land which was improper and or there must be fraud or mistake. By his affidavit dated 7th November, 2008 alluded that this principle is one of the basis that substantiate his cross-claim.
He also claims that the 2nd defendant has always been awarded of the improvements on the land but has failed, neglect or refused to give notice to him. Further claims that he offered on numerous occasions to pay the outstanding fees to the 2nd defendant but the 2nd defendant refused to accept.
The concept of legitimate expectation was first developed by Lord Denning in Schmidt v Secretary of State of Home Affairs[12], where he enunciated the general principle in the following terms;
"The speeches in Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2; [1964] AC 40 show that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to a person who is offered by their decision an opportunity of making representation. It all depends upon whether he has some right or interest or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say."
The concept of legitimate expectation has been adopted in English courts as well as the courts in Commonwealth countries. In Solomon Islands the concept was adopted by the case of Ansah v Attorney General[13]. I shall return to this case later.
In the case of O’Reily v Mackman[14] and Re Finley[15] the House Lords recognised the applications of the concept of legitimate expectation as providing the basis of locus standi in judicial review proceedings.
A duty to consult interested parties before reaching a decision maybe imposed by a statute, or may arise because the parties concerned have some particular interest in the outcome of the decision which is to be made or through legitimate expectation of those parties. In Council for Civil Service v Minister for Civil Service[16], Lord Diplock said;
"the decision must affect some other person.
(a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law or
(b) by depriving him of some benefits or advantages which either
- (i) he had been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy on which he can legimately expect to be permitted to continued to do unless there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment, or
- (ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker will not be withdrawn without given him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdraw."
It must be clear under which category of legitimate expectation the 1st defendant is claming. Was it one of substantive right or an interest in a benefit which the claimant hopes to retain or a fair procedure see R v Devon County Council P Baker.[17]. Normally expectation arises by reason of the conduct of the decisions of another R v Secretary of State of Health, exp. US Tghacco Internationally Inc[18]. A legitimate expectation may cease to exist because its significance has come to a natural end, or because of the action on the part of the decision maker R v Council of Legal Education exp Eddis[19].
A duty to consult interest parties before reaching a decision may be imposed or may arise because the parties have some particular interest in the outcome of the decision which is to be made or through legitimate expectation of those parties, Council for Civil Service v Minister for Civil Service[20].
The Court will not impose a wider duty to consult arising that of legitimate expectation where the statute already provide for R v Hammersmith of Fulhom London Borough Council exp Beddows[21]..
In Ansah v Attorney-General[22], Muria CJ stated "I am of the view that the concept of legitimate expectation can be suitably applied in Solomon Islands in areas where public authority are expected to make decisions affecting peoples rights or interest and the decisions are made following certain procedures".
In this case there is no dispute an offer was made to the 1st defendant. There is no dispute after the offer was made the 1st defendant went into actual occupation of the land and erected buildings. The question is whether by actual occupation give rise to expectation which is legitimate in order to give rise for any interest. It is not clear whether the 1st Defendant had acquired building permit at all. The fact is that he failed to meet the condition of the offer resulting in withdrawal; neither had he made part payment of the prerequisite fees. So there was no valid contract which could be enforceable in law. The fact the original offer was made to a non registered entity, Kasons Metal Sheet Limited, and the letter of offer does not create a right of occupation without grant.
The 1st defendant now failed to inform the Commissioner of Lands within 30 days of his difficulties to pay the fees due to situation at that time.
Despite 16 months had lapsed the 1st defendant had sit on his expectation and expect the Commissioner to be lenient to him, and to be awarded of his various developments. He waited until 9th April 2002 before complaining to the Commissioner after the offer had been withdrawn. I had stated earlier that once an offer had been withdrawn it is not capable of acceptance. Apparently the 1st Defendant claim of legitimate expectation is a mere assertion of right and offered no right to land recognised in law or equity. In the circumstances of this case 1st defendant should not at all be offered opportunity to be heard or represented as failure lies in his part. If he had some legitimate expectation, it ceased when the Commissioner withdrew the offer on 21st November 2001. He cannot expect to rely on non response to his letter by the Commissioner as the basis for legitimate expectation.
I find the 1st defendant had no expectation which is legimated to warrant an explanation before withdrawal of the offer. 30 days to pay the required fees was clear and plain. The Commissioner has a discretionary power which he lawfully exercised under the Lands and Titles Act. The decision to withdraw the offer was done in good faith in the execution of his power and duties and will not be subject to proceedings, section 8 of Lands and Titles Act.
The Cross Claims
The 1st defendant had filed a cross claim on 7th September 2006. He claim he had been expended more than $300,000.00 on improvements on the Land which the Commissioner had been awared of. In the alternative the Commissioner to pay damaged up to $500,000.00 and costs. The cross-claim was pleaded on the ground based on his defence. That he claimed legitimate expectation to be given notice of all dealings on the land, and that the Commissioner should accept an outstanding fee for the unimproved value of the land and grant fix term estate to him.
I have dealt with two significant grounds which the 1st defendant based his cross-claim upon that is legitimate expectation and fraud and or mistake. So far, those two grounds fail to disclose any reasonable chance of success.
Also noted from Mr Tigulu’s sworn statement filed on 6/11/08, paragraph 1-3 that he conducted a search at the company registry and the Registry of Business Names at the Registrar General’s office, and discovered that the name Kasons Sheet Steel Limited did not exist in the Registrar General’s Office.
That evidence reflected that the original offer was made to a non registered entity. This would not have happened if the Ministry of Commerce which applied on behalf of the 1st Defendant’s company (Kasons Metal Steel Limited) investigated to ascertain whether such company exist as a registered entity. The same failure applied to the Commission of Lands. No investigations were made to ascertain existence of such entity before making an offer. In any event the original offer was made to a rogue company claimed to have been owned by the 1st Defendant.
The 1st defendant had never complied with the condition set out in the offer. He failed to pay the prerequisite fees within 30 days. As a result after 16 months had lapsed a revocation notice was issued to him revoking the offer. Since the fees were not paid and the offer was revoked there was no valid contract entered between the Commissioner and the 1st defendant which is enforceable in law. Neither was any valuable consideration offered or paid for the transfer of the land.
The letter of offer to Kasons Metal Sheet Limited did not create a right of occupation of the land without a grant of an estate and town and country planing approval. Section 113 Land and Titles Act stated that a fixed term estated in land consist of the right to occupy, used and enjoy for a period of time fixed and certain at the time of the grant. It is apparently clear and plain, that the holder of a fixed term estate title to a land has right of occupation. His interest, rights and privileges were then conferred by S.109 (3). A line is drawn that unless a person registered as a tile holder he has no right of occupation, or exercise his rights and privileges expressed in S.109 of the Act.
The 1st defendant or his rogue company was never granted a title to the land. The offer was withdrawn prior to any valid contract made and no legal relationship created between the 1st defendant on his rogue company and the Commissioner. In this instance 1st defendant has no right at all to occupy and develop the land. Therefore his cross-claim against the second defendant has no basis in law. He in fact has no registrable interest, even in equity to qualify him sought remedy, his cross claim must be dismissed.
Failure to challenge the decision of the Commissioner
The alternative remedy available to the 1st defendant was to apply for judicial review against the Commissioner’s exercise of discretion to withdraw the offer and to grant the fix term estate to the claimant. Alternatively if he thought the commissioner had error in his decision to transfer the estate to the claimant he should have applied for an order of prohibition. He sat on his rights until this case was brought against him. Now, it is time barred by virtue of Rules 15.3 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007.
Even if he did apply for Judicial review the sworn statement of Agnes Atkin filed on 6th November 2008, and sworn statement of Likaveke para 1- 7 filed on 6th November 2008 that the 1st defendant’s offer of the land was by a proper exercise of the Commissioner discretion, and then revoked for failure to comply with the requirement. There was no error committed by fraud or mistake on the part of the Commissioner.
Caveats on the land
There are two caveats on the land. One was by Brock Kakai, the son of the 1st Defendant, and the other by Pan pacific Limited. I have already decided the status of the 1st defendant and his rogue company that the offer was withdrawn by the Commissioner. There was no valid contract that by virtue of S.113 of Land and titles Act the 1st defendant was not the registered owner of the land, therefore had no right of occupation or developing the land and no valid interest by S.109 of the Act granted to him either in law or equity. In fact the 1st defendant was a trespasser, and it would only be proper that Mr Kakai’s caveat should no longer be wrongfully maintained but be discharged immediately.
In the case of Pan Pacific Limited it has no interest on the land as a buyer. He was misled by the 1st defendant to buy part of the land for $90,000.00. As a result of the 1st defendant’s incapacity to facilitate a valid transfer, Mr Wong registered a caveat. I have already decided that the 1st defendant was a trespasser since the withdrawal of the offer, and the tile being granted to the claimant.
Pan Pacific Limited may have a money claim against the 1st defendant but not an interest in Land. See Quitales Properties Limited v Mason,[23] and Fairafo Limited v Commissioner of Lands and Martin Mealoe[24].
I have decided that there was no valid contract between the Commissioner of Lands and the 1st defendant which is enforceable in law. Therefore render no interest in law or in equity for the 1st defendant to occupy, develop or sold part of the land. The 1st Defendant failed to prove the allegation of fraud or mistake against the second defendant and the Claimant, and his alleged legitimate expectation is no more than a mere assertion, unreasonable and has no basis in this circumstance.
He has been sitting on his rights to challenge the decision of the Commissioner to grant fixed term estate to the Claimant. Now its time barred Rule 15.3.8
As a trespasser who has no valid interest, cannot validly impose a caveat which is wrongfully maintained. The same can be said about Pan Pacific Limited who purchase part of the Land after misled by 1st defendant cannot also imposed a caveat.
Upon all those reasons the 1st defendant’s cross claim against the 2nd defendant has no basis in law. Having said that I therefore grant the relief sought in this application.
Orders:
The Court
[1] [1789] 3 T.R. 148
[2] [1867] LR 4 Eq. 9.
[3] [1828] 4 Bing 653.
[4] (1990) PNGLR 462.
[5] [1998] SBHC; HC-CC No. 108 of 1997.
[6] [1995] SBCA 5
[7] [2007] SBHC 41; HCSI-CC 368
[8] [2000] SBHC 6
[9] [1930] KB 628
[10] [2002] HC-CC 197 of 2002
[11] [2002] HC-CC 127 of 2002
[12] [1969] 2 CH.D 149
[13] [1994] SBHC 14; HC-CC 411 of 1993 (2 June1994)
[14] [1983] 2 AC 237
[15] [1985] AC 318
[16] [1985] AC 374
[17] [1995]1 ALL ER 73
[18] [1992] QB 33
[19] [1995] 7 Admin LR 354
[20] [1987] Ibid
[21] [1987] QB 1050 at 1068
[22] Ibid, page9, paragraph 7.
[23] [2006 HC-CC 362 of 2006
[24] Ibid
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