Regina v Mae [2006] SBHC 10; HCSI-CRC 289 of 2005 (25 May 2006)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

REGINA –v- CHRIS MAE

(Commissioner R D Chetwynd)

Criminal Case No. 289 of 2005.

Dates of Hearing: 21st, 23rd and 24th November 2005
Date of Judgment: 25th May 2006

S Cooper Esq for the Crown.
Ms. M Swift for the Accused.

JUDGMENT

Commissioner R D Chetwynd: The Defendant Chris Mae is charged with robbery. The prosecution say that he robbed Tonny Sipolo of a freezer sometime between 1st and 30th September 2001. The prosecution say that at the time he was in the company of others and that some of the group were armed. Alternatively it is said that Mr Mae and or the 'others' threatened Tonny Sipolo and his wife Loause Sipolo. If the prosecution prove the allegations they make against Mr Mae it is a serious matter because the maximum sentence for the offence is life imprisonment.

Mr Mae denies the charge. He does not dispute the fact that he took the freezer but he says that he honestly believed that the freezer belonged to his Aunt, Julia Funo Vaeilei, and that he was removing it from the Sipolos to return to her. He also disputes all the evidence given by the Sipolo’s as to what went on when he came to take the freezer away.

As Counsel for Mr Mae has said, there is no definition of robbery in the Penal Code. It has been defined as the felonious taking of property from a person by the use of or threat of force. The more modern definitions under English law (Theft Act 1968) have robbery defined by reference to stealing. Under our law there is a separate offence of larceny from a person [1], there are also the offences of robbery set out in section 293[2]. Robbery then appears to be a 'term of art' under our law and you cannot simply say that robbery is larceny from a person with or without force or threats.

The relevance of this point is that the section defining theft[3] says that theft (or larceny) occurs where someone:-

'without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof.'

There is no reference in section 293 as to 'fraudulently' or 'a claim of right made in good faith' etc.

As Kapi JA (now of course Sir Mari Kapi Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea) said in the Solomon Islands Court of Appeal case Toritelia [4]:-

'the Penal Code is intended to be an exhaustive statement of the law. That is to say, it prescribes not only the elements necessary to find a person guilty of the offence, but also establishes any defence in law'

It is clear then that the law, the 'elements necessary' and the 'defences in law' as Kapi JA called them, to be applied in this case is that set out in the appropriate section of the Penal Code namely section 293. In other words section 258 has little relevance to robbery even though the latter must logically involve an element of larceny. Fortunately, there is no need to enter into any convoluted consideration of this point because what is clear is that robbery must also involve some kind of appropriation of property. That being the case the Defendant can turn to section 8 of the Penal Code.

That section says:-

A person is not criminally responsible in respect of an offence relating to property, if the act done or omitted to be done by him with respect to the property was done in the exercise of an honest claim of right and without intention to defraud.

Unlike the Appellant in the Toterilia case the Defendant in this case, Chris Mae, has clearly put a defence under section 8 before the Court.

The provisions (of section 8) have previously been considered by the Court of Appeal (see Toritelia referred to above and to Bennett and Paiso[5]) and so there is some guidance for me. I say some, because those cases involve embezzlement and larceny, not robbery. However, Kapi JA in Toritelia makes it quite clear that there are 'two elements' involved in section 8.

'....the section provides the defence where the two elements set out are satisfied. I have already dealt with the element of honest claim of right. These two elements must go together and one cannot go without the other. A person cannot successfully raise the defence by saying that he had an intention to return the property if he used the property without the consent of the owner or without an honest claim of right. Similarly, a person who has an honest claim of right cannot be successful in raising the defence under s.8 unless he has acted without intention to defraud. Compare R. v. Hobart Magalu [1974] PNGLR 188 at 200. The legislature has clearly set out these matters.'

He goes on to say:-

'The words 'intent to defraud' within, the context of s.8 of the Penal Code, means that not only must a person deal with property based on an honest claim of right, but he must show that he had no intention to deprive the owner of the property. This is a question of fact. The manner in which the property is dealt with is relevant.'

Earlier in the same judgment the President of the Court, Sir John White, very helpfully and comprehensively reviews some of the conflicting decisions to be found (mainly because of the changes in the UK law from the Larceny Act to the Theft Act) and says this:-

The result of the review of the cases, in my opinion, is that the House of Lords and Privy Council (see R. v. Nelson [1902] AC p. 250) and the highest appellate Courts in other jurisdictions have restated the accepted directions as to 'intent to defraud' and 'fraudulently'. Accordingly, those directions should continue to be applied in Solomon Islands. The cases decided in the English Court of Appeal in interpreting the adverb 'dishonestly', in particular Feely [6], have been considered in appellate Courts in Australia and New Zealand, but not in any reported case in the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada or the Privy Council. It can be seen that what may be called the Feely direction as to the adverb 'dishonestly' was often strongly criticised and not followed, or applied only in part, in the majority of other appellate Courts including the United Kingdom. Further, in Ghosh [7] the judgment of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal, presided over by Lord Lane CJ, laid down new directions. In the Court of Appeal of New South Wales and the Court of Appeal of New Zealand it is clear that judgments in England since the Theft Act 1968 regarding the subjective test required as to 'dishonestly' have been reflected in restatements of the principles to be applied when the question of an accused's state of mind - whether honest or dishonest - has been an issue. Further, in New South Wales and New Zealand, where recent cases have been reported, directions to juries have continued to explain 'fraudulently' as they have done for many years and appellate Courts have emphasised the rule that the state of the accused's mind at the time of the alleged offence is an issue for the jury, for example, whether there has been a mistake, or a claim of right or claim of no intent to defraud which, if it could be true, would mean that the accused must be acquitted.

Later in his judgment Sir John White concludes:-

The result of the review of these cases in the United Kingdom, and I am paraphrasing to some extent the view of the learned editors of Archbold, is that while 'dishonestly'; has a meaning as a word of common use, the words with 'intent to defraud' and 'fraudulent' are 'terms of art' which have long been used at common law to denote a state of mind required for particular offences. (This was accepted in Feely as already mentioned). They are words frequently to be found in statutory offences although there is a modern tendency to use the word 'dishonestly' which however does not add anything to the meaning to be given to 'intent to defraud' or 'fraudulently.' The 'state of mind' to be proved in all such cases depends on a subjective test to be applied by the jury, assessors, or trial judges and magistrates sitting alone as a question of fact in each case but having regard to the meaning of 'fraudulently' which is a question of law. Accordingly, the question of fact to be determined on all the relevant evidence is whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did prejudice or take the risk of prejudicing another’s right, knowing that he had no right to do so. Throughout the cases the requirement of proof of that knowledge is commonly described as proving the accused's 'dishonesty.'

I then must decide whether Chris Mae had an honest belief that he had the right to take the freezer and whether at the time that he took it he prejudiced the rights, or risked prejudicing the rights, of Tonny Sipolo knowing that he had no right to do so. In coming to a conclusion on those questions I must bear in mind that any decision must be based on the relevant evidence and equally importantly, it is not for the Defendant to prove anything one way or the other. Put another way, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either Mae did not believe he had a 'claim of right' through his Aunt over the freezer or that he did not honestly believe he had such a right. If the prosecution prove that he did not so believe then I can convict. However, if the prosecution fail in that task, in other words if I accept Chris Mae did so believe, it does not necessarily mean that I should acquit. If the prosecution prove, again it must be beyond reasonable doubt, that when he took the freezer away Chris Mae prejudiced or risked prejudicing Tonny Sipolo’s rights and that at the time he knew he was doing so (in the words of section 8, there was an intention to defraud) then I can convict. That, to my mind, is what Tortelia says.

In considering those questions I can usefully refer to the 'directions' and 'summing ups' quoted with approval by Sir John White in his review of Australian and New Zealand cases mentioned earlier.

Sir John repeats the words of Cullen CJ in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales case of R. v. Cooper[8];

'Now, where fraud is an ingredient of a criminal offence, it must be established by the existence of a dishonest intention at the time when the act charged was committed. The intention is synchronous with the act ... The question they (the jury) had to decide was, did he when he appropriated the goods, act dishonestly, or did he honestly think that he had a right to act as he did?'

Sir John also refers to the decision in the New Zealand Court of Appeal case R. v. Williams [9]. In that decision the Summing up of the Judge at first instance was quoted with approval. The direction given by the Judge was:-

'It is dishonest for a defendant to act in a way which he knows ordinary people consider to be dishonest, even if he asserts or genuinely believes that he is morally justified in acting as he did'.

Sir John White said that the direction:-

'...sums up the subjective test to be applied in New Zealand in a case where the issue arises after the tribunal of fact is satisfied that the defendant 'acted deliberately and with knowledge that he was acting in breach of his obligations'. (I am again quoting from the summing-up in Williams).'

I have been referred to two cases by Counsel. Both are said to relate to robbery and both I find extremely difficult to reconcile with the law as set out in the cases referred to above. The first is R. v. Skivington [10] and the other is R. v. Robinson [11]. Dealing with Robinson first, the report I have seen confusingly says that, 'R’s defence to robbery, reduced by the jury to theft, (my emphasis) was that......' Robinson seems therefore to deal with theft and what’s more, theft under the Theft Act 1968. Skivington, although it is a 1968 case was a case under the old Larceny Act. What Skivington seems to say is that 'an honest belief to a claim of right' in itself is enough to negate an element of the offence of robbery. My view is that the law on the question of 'dishonesty' has been restated in more recent cases (see Sir John White’s comments in Toretilia quoted earlier) and it might well be said that both the decisions would be different today. I also bear in very much mind Kapi JA’s comments in Toretilia quoted earlier. Kapi JA says that such a belief (an honest claim of right) as found in Skivington is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a defence under section 8 of the Penal Code. I would also bear in mind the direction approved of in Cooper and the summing up in Williams both of which are quoted earlier.

Some of the facts in this case are not in real dispute. Julia Funo Vaelia (who was also referred to as Mrs Funo) owned a freezer. For a while she went to live with her cousin Roy Maebiru. She took her freezer, and other belongings, with her. When she moved out of her cousins’ house she left the freezer there. When this happened is a little unclear. What is clear is that at sometime Mr and Mrs Sipolo purchased a freezer from Roy Maebiru. Mrs Sipolo said in evidence that she had bought the freezer about four years prior to the incident in September 2001. Although no evidence was given on 'identification' the freezer was almost certainly the one left by Mrs Vaelia.

Mrs Vaelia went to see the Sipolos to ask for the freezer back. She went 'several times'. There is no dispute that on each visit she was told that the Sipolos, having paid Roy Maebiru $2,000 for the freezer, were only prepared to let her take it if she repaid their money. There is no dispute that Mrs Vaelia then spoke to another of her relatives, the Defendant Chris Mae. In her evidence in chief (she was a witness for the prosecution) she said she had told Chris Mae that Roy Maebiru had sold the freezer to Tonny Sipolo and that he said he would see Tonny Sipolo about it. In cross examination she said she asked Chris Mae to resolve the dispute. In re examination she said she had asked Chris Mae to speak to Tonny Sipolo about disrespect to her and to bring back the freezer.

There is also some agreement about what happened next. Mae went to see the Sipolos. He went in the company of two Police Officers PC Kinita and PC Tongaka. There is a significant difference between the prosecution version of what happened at that meeting and what Chris Mae says happened.

PC Kinita said in evidence that it was about 9 or 10 in the morning. The Defendant called at Central Police station and asked him to go and pick up a fridge or freezer. He went to Vura in a white Bounty car driven by Chris Mae. In the car was another officer, PC Tongaka, and one other person. The other person was a 'wantok' of Chris Mae. They all went to the house of the Sipolos. There was a conversation between Tonny Sipolo and Chris Mae. Sipolo told Mae that he wanted the $2,000 back that he’d paid for the freezer. Chris Mae said he would sort out the problem, give $2000 and that will be an end of it. Mae then drove the two Police Officers back to Central.

In cross examination the officer agreed he went with Chris Mae to talk about the freezer and to reach some peaceable solution. He was asked whether he heard Chris Mae say he would return in two weeks. The officer said that he did not hear that. He heard Mae say, 'We’ll sort it out and that is the end'. He was asked if Mae said something along the lines of, 'I’ll give you a chance to empty the freezer and I’ll be back later'. In reply PC Kinata said he heard that said and he also heard Sipolo say he wanted $2,000. He did not think Mae agreed with that. He did think Mae was going to come back later to collect the freezer. He agreed when they left the Sipolo’s house he did not have any concerns over future problems.

PC Tongaka confirmed that he went to the house along with the Defendant, PC Kinata, and one other person. There were conversations and he heard something about an Aunty and $2,000 when the parties spoke in pidgin. Most of the conversations were in a Malaita language which he did not understand. Later PC Kinata told him what was said.

This evidence, from the only independent witnesses, is somewhat confusing. I accept and appreciate that PC Tongaka did not understand most of the interplay between the parties because it was in language. So far as PC Kinata is concerned, it is by no means clear to me whether he was saying that Sipolo agreed to give up the freezer when it was empty without any conditions or whether he wanted $2000 no matter what. It is far from clear whether or not Mae agreed to pay $2000. PC Kinata did say that he thought the issue had been resolved but he did not say on what basis and why, 'he had no concerns about any future problems'. He said one thing in evidence in chief and another in cross examination.

Tonny Sipolo gave evidence that in 2001 he was living at Vura 1 with his wife and family. A freezer had been bought for $2000 from Roy Maebiru. Julia Funo came to the house on probably 3 occasions, once when he was not there. He told Julia Funo that he had bought the freezer and he believed it was his.

He then gave evidence of two visits by the defendant Chris Mae. The first visit was in the morning when Mae arrived in a white car with two Police Officers. He said that he had told Mae that if he was repaid the $2000 then the freezer could be taken back. Mae then said he would go and talk to his Aunty. Mae and the Police then left.

The second visit by Chris Mae, he said was, 'after that night'. That answer was clarified in cross examination because the witness admitted he could not remember when the visit was, it might have been two weeks later, he wasn’t sure, but there was some time between the first and second visits.

Sipolo said that he heard a noise, his children screaming. At the time he was in his neighbour’s house watching TV. He went to his own house and passed a dark green double cab Hi-lux. There were about eight people around or in the truck. He saw some people in the truck had sticks or guns, he couldn’t see clearly because it was dark. He confirmed this in cross examination. He couldn’t be sure what he saw only that he saw something long and narrow.

He went into the house. Chris Mae was already inside with, he thought, two other men. Mae was standing near the freezer. He was wearing army combat pants, a cut T shirt and a wool hat. His wife and children were standing around in front of the house crying. Chris Mae said to him that it was his last day because if he did not release the ice then Mae would burn the house down and shoot everybody. That frightened him so he told his wife to, 'release the ice'. At the time there were some 200 chickens in the freezer and these were removed, 'by Chris and his boys'. They also, 'lift the ice out and put it in the back of the truck'. When the witness told Chris Mae that he wanted $2000 he was told that it was a problem between him (Sipolo) and Roy Maebiru.

The witness also said that he had been a drinking companion of the Defendant 10 years ago but had not seen him since. During the conversations the Defendant had his right hand inside his right trouser pocket and the witness thought that Mae might be holding a gun. He later confirmed in cross examination that he never saw a gun and Mae had never said he had a gun. Sipolo said that all the men were drunk.

In cross examination he said of the 'first' visit that he agreed Mae came with the Police and that there was an attempt to resolve the situation about the freezer. He confirmed that he told the Defendant that he wanted $2000 and that Mae wanted the freezer back for his Aunty. He confirmed that the chickens were mentioned but he was adamant that he was never told by Chris Mae that he would be given an opportunity to get rid of the chickens. He had never agreed with Mae that he (Mae ) could or should come back when the freezer was empty. His evidence was that Mae never told him he would come back at all.

He was adamant that during the 'second' visit Mae had told him that if the freezer was not given up then the house would be burned down and everyone shot. He was equally adamant that he had not helped carry out the freezer. He said it was true that he heard the children screaming and that Mae and the others were drunk. Sipolo confirmed that Mae had told him, and it was implied from the questioning that this was on the second visit, that the $2000 was an issue between Sipolo and Roy Maebiru. The second visit was not a peaceful visit to take away the freezer and Mae, according to several answers by the witness, was threatening and he (Sipolo) felt frightened.

Mrs Sipolo gave evidence next. She differed from her husband in one material detail. She was sure both visits were on the same day. In cross examination she said she remembered them as being in the middle of the month of September because her daughter’s birthday was about the same time.

She confirmed her husband’s evidence that on the first visit Chris Mae was told that if the $2000 was repaid then he could have the freezer. In cross examination she agreed that the chickens in the freezer had been mentioned. She said that they told Chris Mae it would be hard for him to take the freezer away because they had paid for it and it was full of chickens. She also agreed that Chris Mae had said he would give them time to empty the chickens out of the freezer but she said that she had made it clear that his taking it away would depend on the $2000 being paid back.

Her very firm evidence both in chief and during cross examination was that at the time of the second visit she was in the house alone with the children. They were being readied for bed. Chris Mae came into the house without knocking and was followed by others. They had been drinking. There was shouting and the children were crying for their father. She also shouted for her husband to come and he did so.

Like her husband, Mrs Sipolo never saw any guns. She heard a reference to guns being carried in the truck but did not see any weapons. She said she was told that if the freezer was not released the house would be burned and they would be shot.

Mrs Sipolo also revealed that Roy Maebiru had paid them $2000 in 2004. This happened after she saw Roy Maebiru and told him that Chris Mae had taken the freezer away.

The remaining evidence came from the two RAMSI officers who had conducted the interview under caution. The statement which resulted from that interview was read and tendered. (Exhibit 1). The evidence from these officers confirmed that both knew the nature of the allegation against Mr Mae. One had been involved in taking statements from the two RSIP officers who gave evidence and from Mrs Sipolo. Both officers denied the suggestion that they had said to Mae that if he could explain his Aunt’s ownership he would not be charged. Both said that, in effect, they had told Mr Mae that now was his opportunity to give his side of the story. Chris Mae did not appear to be distressed and he was cooperative.

At the conclusion of the prosecution evidence I heard a submission of no case to answer. I rejected the submission on the basis that none of the evidence dealt with the central element of the Defendant’s state of mind and that therefore there was a case for him to answer.

The Defendant’s evidence was that his Aunt (Julia Funo) had asked him to go and get the freezer back from the Sipolos. He believed that the freezer belonged to his Aunt because Roy Maebiru had sold it to the Sipolos without his Aunt knowing about it.

His account of the first visit to the Sipolos was that he explained who he was and why he had come. He was told that the freezer was full of chickens. He said he would give the Sipolos time to sell them and would be back in two weeks to collect the freezer. He told the Sipolos that the money was a problem between them and Maebiru. He says that the Sipolos agreed to all this.

He then forgot about the freezer. Some weeks later he was buying beetlenut when another of his Aunts (Abby) spoke to him. She reminded him that his Aunt Julia was waiting for news of the freezer. He then saw an acquaintance of his, someone he knew as Sulu, driving a Hi-lux. He asked Sulu to help him collect the freezer and offered to pay the fuel costs. They went to the Sipolos house, the freezer was empty and the three of them put it on the back of the Hi-lux. The Sipolos asked about the money and he told them that Maebiru, the man who sold it to them, would pay them back. There were no threats and no group of men. It was a peaceable recovery of the freezer.

He was asked why his statement under caution was wrong. Chris Mae accepted that what he said in that statement, in effect that the freezer was collected with the assistance of the Police, was wrong. He explained that when he was interviewed about the matter his wife had recently died and that his head was not straight. He said that the Police (RAMSI) had not told him he was going to be charged but that they only asked if he took the freezer from the Sipolos. He thought that if he explained his Aunt was the owner of the freezer then he wouldn’t be charged and nothing further would happen.

He also explained that he had made efforts to find the man named Sulu. He had been unable make contact at first because of his remand in custody. He looked for him in town and asked several acquaintances to speak to or find Sulu. No one was able to do so. He was unable to travel to Malaita because of the conditions of his bail. He had no more details of the man other than his nickname, or language name, of Sulu.

The Defendant Chris Mae was adamant that he had not used threats against the Sipolos. He had reached an agreement with them that when the freezer was empty he would come back and collect it.

I am unable to accept the Defendant’s evidence. I found him to be very unconvincing in the witness box. I do not accept that there was an agreement between him and the Sipolos that he would take away the freezer and that Maebiru would repay them the money they had paid for it. There is no doubt in my mind that Mr Mae knew that the Sipolos would not give up the freezer unless the $2000 was repaid to them. Mae may have had some vague idea that Maebiru should and possibly would pay that sum but as he never contacted Maebiru about it the best that can be said about that idea is that it was very fanciful.

I have very grave doubts about the existence of Sulu. This is a man that the Defendant says, 'came from Kwarae as well' and that, 'I knew him well'. It would appear not well enough to know him by his real name or indeed much of anything else about him. It must have been clear to the Defendant that Sulu was a crucial witness, he first mentions his name in the interview under caution in February 2004. It must have been clear to the Defendant when he was charged in June 2004 that it was vital to find Sulu. From his evidence in chief and from his answers in cross examination it cannot be said that any real effort was made by Mr Mae to find Sulu.

I find the Defendant’s explanation for what he told the police in his caution statement to be very weak. I accept that he may have been adversely affected by the death of his wife. I am equally certain though that he was well aware of the nature of the allegations being made against him. He was being questioned about serious offences and I do not believe his memory was so affected by grief that he would not have realised that. He chose to lie to the Police.

From the evidence I heard I am certain that there were two visits by Chris Mae to the home of the Sipolos. There is no doubt that the first visit was in the company of two police officers and was during the morning. There was discussion about the freezer. I am in no doubt that Mae was told quite clearly that the freezer would be returned to Mrs Julia Funo Vaeilei only on payment of $2000. Mae left after that first visit knowing full well that someone needed to pay Mr and Mrs Sipolo $2000 before the freezer was released. There may have been some thought in the Defendants mind that the money would have to come from Roy Maebiru. However he made no attempt to contact Maebiru. What is not clear is when the second visit took place. I am inclined to accept the evidence of Mrs Sipolo that it was later the same day.

The actual date is not of huge importance. What is important is that having been rebuffed on the first visit Chris Mae came back. He came back in the company of others. I give absolutely no credence to the suggestion by the Chris Mae that Mr Sipolo only saw people at a bus stop and was mistaken in his belief that they were 'with' the Defendant.

On this second visit Mae was not going to take no for an answer. He came with a group of drunken men and he made threats against the Sipolo family. There is no certain evidence that either he or any of those with him had guns. I am in no doubt from the evidence I heard though that threats were made to burn the Sipolo’s house and reference was made (by Mae) to guns and to a possibility that the Sipolos would be shot. I do not find that the Defendant or any of those with him were armed. It is sufficient for the purpose of section 293 (1)(b) that there were threats of personal violence.

I accept that Chris Mae may well have thought that the freezer belonged to his Aunt and that he had some right to collect it on her behalf. His belief in that respect does not depend on any legal 'reality'. In other words it does not matter whether his belief was based on a correct interpretation of the law or not. His belief is nonetheless a belief capable of being an honest belief whether it has any basis in law or not. However as set out earlier in the words of Kapi JA in Tortelia, the fact that he believed that he had an honest claim of right does not help him establish a defence under section 8 if at the same time he that appropriated the property the prosecution show that he intended to defraud, that he acted dishonestly.

The evidence shows, without any doubt, that Chris Mae visited the home of Tonny and Lauese Sipolo. He did so after he had tried to obtain the freezer on an earlier occasion by, what would be considered by ordinary men and women, more peaceful or lawful means. He did so at night and in the company of others. He made threats against the Sipolo’s. He made those threats knowing the Sipolos would be frightened by them and that they would hand over the freezer even though they did not want to do so. He denies making threats but I am, as I have said, satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, that he acted in the way described by Mr and Mrs Sipolo I am satisfied that any ordinary person looking at the proven facts would say that what Mr Chris Mae did that night was dishonest.

I have no doubt that Chris Mae knew, at the time he took the freezer, that he was acting dishonestly. His answers in cross examination confirm that. He said at one time, 'If I had that kind of thoughts (to use threats) I wouldn’t take the Police'. He knew that forcing the Sipolos to hand over the freezer against their wishes and by dint of bullying and threatening them was wrong, that it was dishonest.

He is guilty of robbery as set out in amended information. I therefore convict him.

Dated 25th May 2006

R D Chetwynd
Commissioner of the High Court

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^[1] s 270 Penal Code [Cap 26]
^[2] Penal Code [Cap 26]
^[3] s 258 Penal Code [Cap.26]
^[4] Toritelia –v- The Queen [1987] SILR 4
^[5] Court of Appeal Case No.2 of 2005 (unreported judgment dated 4/8/05)
^[6] R. v. Feely [1973] QB 530: 57 Cr. App. R. 312
^[7] R. v. Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2; [1982] 3 WLR 110

^[8] (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 426
^[9] [1985] 1NZLR 294
^[10] [1968] 1Q.B.166
^[11] [1977] Crim LR 173